Young refugees, citizenship, cosmopolitanism and youth work policy – theoretical discussion on the current trends in Europe
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This analytical paper seeks to address the link between young refugees, citizenship and youth work policy within a European framework. The aim is to build upon the emerging reflection on how to ensure faster and more efficient integration and participation of young refugees in Europe.

Introduction
It is often reported that the number of people living outside their country of birth is now the highest in history (Isin 2009). The UN estimates that in 1910 roughly 33 million people lived in countries other than their own; by 2000 that number had reached 175 million. During the same period, the world’s population grew threefold, from 1.6 billion to 5.3 billion. Migration, by contrast, increased almost sixfold over the course of these 90 years. Strikingly, more than half of the increase of migrants from 1910 to 2000 occurred in the last three decades of the 20th century (UN International Migration Report 2002, as cited in Benhabib 2005).

Over the last 15 years, international migration has continued to grow, from 222 million migrants in 2010 to 245 million in 2015. Nearly one third of all international migrants live in Europe (76 million) (United Nations International Migration Report 2015). In 2014, the total number of refugees in the world was estimated at nearly 20 million (United Nations International Migration Report 2015). Today, more than 40 million persons are displaced within countries, while the number of refugees and asylum seekers has surpassed 24 million (United Nations General Assembly 2016).

We have many categories to describe those living abroad: foreigner, migrant, irregular migrant, illegal alien, immigrant, wanderer, refugee, émigré, exile, nomad, sojourner and many more (Nyers 2003, as cited in Isin 2009). The difference between immigrants and refugees can be fuzzy, as there is often similarity in the settings from which both groups originate (immigrants and refugees may both come from places facing severe difficulties). As in all migratory movements, the decision to leave has two elements: a context and a trigger (Muzurovic, Tipping, Mental and Goldman 2002). The general context is well known (widespread poverty, economic hardship, political instability, insecurity, poor educational prospects ...). Specific triggers for departure occur in the direct environment (family conflict, violent incidents, the death of a relative, or threats made against the family). A key factor specifically attracting young people to Europe is the aspiration to live in a country that offers freedom, respect for human rights, guaranteed work and education; all improving one’s day-to-day life (Mougne 2010; Fournier 2015).

There are, however, two main differences between refugees and migrants: the reason behind their movement and the urgency of departure. Immigrants generally move toward the dream of a better life and the realisation of life goals unattainable in their home country. Their migration is often the result of a well-considered decision-making process, informed by the experience of others who have gone before (Valdés 1991, as cited in Muzurovic et al. 2002). Refugees, on the other hand, are by definition moving away from situations of persecution, and their primary goals are often those of immediate
physical safety and survival. The decision to flee is regularly made with great haste. Left behind are valued personal possessions, as well as the less tangible life goals, aspirations, and projects towards the future (Muzurovic et al. 2002).

Although the refugee label claims to be apolitical, through law and policy making, it establishes highly politicised interpretations (Wood 1985, as cited in Mehta and Napier-Moore 2010), where being granted the status is difficult for most forced migrants (Mehta and Napier-Moore 2010). As argued by Zetter (1988, as cited in Mehta and Napier-Moore 2010), this label both stereotyped and institutionalises a certain status. In doing so, the refugee becomes affected by various simultaneous interpretations. Despite the legal definition (as stipulated by the Geneva Convention of 1951), refugees also become subject to political instrumentalisation (Cole 2015). In doing so, narrowing “the refugee” to a rhetorical figure over “the refugee” as a physic-legal person for whom protection is a right.

On the other hand, there is also a focus on refugees and specifically young refugees based on their status rather than approaching them as young persons in vulnerable situations (Derluyn 2011).

And so, one of the key effects of global migration is that people move to places where they do not – yet – have a full formal recognition or citizenship, consequently facing exclusion from participation in key aspects of society (Smith and Guarnizo 2009). For displaced people, citizenship is crucial (Leitner and Ehrkamp 2006; Mehta and Napier-Moore 2010), and can be seen as a fundamental part of refugee integration (Bloch 2000, as cited in Stewart and Mulvey 2014). While the significance of formal state citizenship has been somewhat obscured in recent decades by a focus on other forms of transnational citizenship (as we will see in this paper), the perspectives of young people from refugee backgrounds still largely depend on it (Nunn, McMichael, Gifford and Correa-Velez 2015) for their access to personal security, protection under the law and equal access to social and political rights, but nevertheless remaining sceptical about whether formal citizenship will result in equal treatment. This mistrust is based on the discrepancy between the expectations and promises of equity and fairness associated with citizenship, and of the reality in which many naturalised migrants are subject to discrimination, oppression and exploitation (Leitner and Ehrkamp 2006). Inequality, based on ethnicity may cause recent immigrant youth to do less well than the youth of previous waves (Gonzales 2011).

**Citizenship: a marriage between rights and membership**

Let us briefly take a look in our rear-view mirror, and return to the very roots of citizenship and its importance for young migrants and refugees.

Citizenship stresses a multitude of aspects related to the concept: claims, a status and a practice, empowerment, formal and substantive access to society, national and transnational features (Isin 2009). Citizenship is about the enjoyment of rights of various kinds, about political and civic engagements, about experiences of collective identity and solidarity, and about the possession of a formal national membership status (Lim 2013). Citizenship has manifold meanings because it is defined in relation to its Roman and Athenian ancestors (Tully 2008). This is where, according to several scholars, the cradle of our two main conceptions of citizenship can be traced back to (Bloemraad, Kortweg and Yurdakul 2008; Bowden 2003; Dunne 2006; Isin and Turner 2007; Leung 2009; Leung 2013; Schattle 2005).

The core idea in the Athenian polis was to enable citizens to live a good life (Schattle 2005), and in order to do so, Aristotle fostered participation and deliberation among citizens who knew and trusted each other (Bowden 2003). Membership and participation were key aspects in this context (Dunne 2006).

The Roman approach was more formalistic and stressed an extensive mix of rights and duties in order to protect and engage the citizen of a bounded polis. The Roman ideal of citizenship was a legal status, where citizens enjoyed defined rights and immunities (rights to residence, travel, security, welfare, ownership ...) in exchange for some degree of loyalty, of which many are still present in modern societies (Dunne 2006).
The Roman and Athenian heritage reflects upon today’s tensions between citizenship as participation, and citizenship as a legal status. It also reflects a continuing struggle with the exclusionary aspects of citizenship (Invernizzi and Milne 2005), particularly those based on gender, class, ethnicity and religion (Bloemraad, Kortweg and Yurdakul 2008). This is what Lister (2004, as cited in Invernizzi and Milne 2005) describes as the “Janus-faced nature of citizenship, which operates simultaneously as a mechanism of both inclusion and exclusion and also as a language of both discipline and resistance”. Young refugees are also subjects of these exclusionary aspects. Young refugees also face, amongst other inequalities, a double exclusion from citizenship: first as young people and second based on ethnicity (Cockburn 1998).

Kabeer (2005) brings to the fore the ideal of citizenship from the standpoint of those being excluded. Because this ideal is being articulated by groups who have experienced exclusion, these values are closely linked to a vision of what a more inclusive society is to be. Four values of inclusive citizenship emerged. First, justice, articulated in terms of “when is it fair for people to be treated the same and when is it fair that they should be treated differently?” Second, recognition “of the intrinsic worth of all human beings, but also recognition of and respect for their differences”. Third, self-determination or “people’s ability to exercise some degree of control over their lives”. And fourth, solidarity, that is, “the capacity to identify with others and to act in unity with them in their claims for justice and recognition” (Kabeer 2005, as cited in Lister 2007). This value could be said to reflect a horizontal view of citizenship which accords as much significance to the relations between citizens as to the vertical relationship between the state and the individual (Lister 2007).

Kabeer’s focus is a counterpart definition for the formal features of citizenship (rights and duties) around the state. This analogue definition is what Cockburn (2005, as cited in Invernizzi and Milne 2005) calls “membership of a community in which one lives one’s life and involves in the struggle for membership and participation in the community”. This allows Cockburn to say that “if young people are to play an active role in shaping the future direction of society and thus the common good, they must be able to participate in the decision-making that affects their lives”. Rather than passive recipients of the legal status of citizenship, conveyed by nation states, citizens also define citizenship through practices and in relationships with others and communities (Moosa-Mitha 2005, as cited in Larkins 2013). It is one’s ability to realise “genuine participation in the larger political, social, economic, and cultural community” (Gordon and Lenhardt 2007, as cited in Lim 2013).

This can be seen as a broadening of the scope of citizenship to different kinds of citizenship, and conceptualising it as a practice in addition to a “thing” or a legal status (Aleinkoff and Bosniak, as cited in Lim 2013). This has led to a definition of citizenship in which the emphasis is more on norms, practices, meanings, identities (Isin and Turner 2002) and experienced “belonging” (Lim 2013). Although refugees tend to experience belonging in relation to their access to rights and services, there is also a strong desire to belong in this more emotional and culturally meaningful way – a desire which is blocked by experiences of exclusion by the mainstream population and cultural differences (Fozdar and Hartley 2013).

Rights, duties and membership are the building blocks of citizenship, and this gives it a universal status (Lister, Smith, Middleton and Cox 2003). Everyone is understood to be a citizen by virtue of membership of the community or nation. Membership entails belonging, and belonging is a pacemaker for participation. Dunne (2006) sees the freedom to participate with others in the joint practice of self-government, solidarity among citizens, and equality, as crucial in the conception of citizenship.

Full equality is not only endorsed by membership but also highly based on the rights approach (Marchetti 2008). For Marshall (1950, as cited in Bloemraad et al. 2008), the notion of full equality sees rights not only as valuable in themselves, but also as the means to ensure the solidarity necessary for the functioning of a social and democratic welfare state. In this way, citizenship rights and legal status promote participation and a sense of belonging, which in turn facilitates social cohesion and common
political projects, but nevertheless leaves unresolved how to transform formal into substantive equality (Bloemraad et al. 2008), fairness, economic well-being, dignity (Heisler 2005), or political participation (Bloemraad et al. 2008). The social climate of the host community plays a key role for young refugees in becoming established in the host society, and in the development of a positive relationship with the broader host community (Correa-Velez, Gifford and Barnett 2010). Young people tend to place a high premium on this constructive social participation in the local community, which for many represents the essence of good citizenship (Lister et al. 2003), expressed by the degree of connectedness with the community (Jans 2004; Barber 2009). This connectedness is linked to membership, defined as the feeling of being part of a territorial or relational community. Young people want to influence through participation, making their own contribution in a reciprocal relationship. Young people seek a positive relation between themselves and the community, where they can satisfy needs as a group or as community members; and where they look for a shared emotional connection, defined by the sharing of a common history, significant events, or the quality of social ties (McMillan and Chavis 1986, as cited in Barber 2009).

The concept of citizenship has expanded to embody what Gordon and Lenhardt (2007, as cited in Lim 2013) have described as one’s ability to realise “genuine participation in the larger political, social, economic, and cultural community”. For migrants and refugees, the acquisition of citizenship is a condition for equal participation in the economic, social and political spheres of the receiving society. This desire for equal participation has to be seen in the context of their experiences with discrimination (Leitner and Ehrkamp 2006), and their will to transform themselves from subjects into rightful citizens (Isin 2009).

Europe and youth participation: a tool for citizenship

The positive effects of participation, both on a personal and a societal level, have increased the importance of participation on every single policy level (Roggemans, Smits, Spruyt and Van Droogenbroeck 2013). Participation (social, societal and policy) is seen as a bridge to adoption and integration in society and as valuable for citizenship (Leitner and Ehrkamp 2006). As formulated by the Council of Europe (2003):

The active participation of young people in decisions and actions at local and regional levels is essential if we are to build more democratic, inclusive and prosperous societies. Participation in the democratic life of any community is about more than voting or standing for election ... Participation and active citizenship is about having the right, the means, the space, and the opportunity – and where necessary the support – to participate in and influence decisions and engage in actions and activities so as to contribute to building a better society.

Since the European Commission’s White Paper (A new impetus for European Youth 2001), much attention has been paid to youth participation, making this aim part of Europe’s genetic code. This was achieved through resolutions of the European Parliament fostering participation, social integration, and social inclusion of young people in Europe. In a subsidiary way the Commission decided to affiliate in this domain, due to the low rates of engagement of young people in public life; in doing so, reinforcing what had already been undertaken by member states (Reding, “A contract for the future”). In Viviane Reding’s introduction to the White Paper, noticeable links to “citizenship as participation” are to be found:

The young people consulted see themselves as responsible citizens and as such they wish to be further involved in the life of their community and claim a place in the process of formulating policies.

The consultation of these young people clearly expresses a sense of “citizenship from below”, a completion of citizenship that is conceived through participation (by taking part in the life of schools, neighbourhoods, associations and so on). As we have seen in the previous section, participation is one of the key aspects of citizenship where young people engage in claiming and expanding their rights and access to the citizenry. This participatory reflex reflects the “passive” or “active” nature of citizenship –
that is, whether it is state-driven or not (developed from above or below) (Turner 1990). Participation is catalogued as “citizenship from below”, in the sense of active political participation or contestation (Bauböck 2009). Rather than passive recipients of the legal status of citizenship, conveyed by nation states, citizens define citizenship through practices and in relationships with others and communities (Moosa-Mitha 2005, as cited in Larkins 2013). It is one’s ability to realise “genuine participation in the larger political, social, economic, and cultural community” (Gordon and Lenhardt 2007, as cited in Lim 2013).

The White Paper expresses a notable active interpretation of citizenship, where young people see themselves as claimers and not as eligible receivers of rights. For the European youth policy makers, participation is also seen as a generator of active citizenship. In doing so, the European youth policy in 2001 (by the adoption of the White Paper) is at the more passive side of citizenship. The White Paper firmly stresses participation as a tool for policy making via different kinds of consultation of young people; through one-off or ongoing, spontaneous or organised events. European youth policy makers additionally see information on European affairs as a key aspect in the active participation of young people in Europe, and especially minorities and grass-roots movements.

The fostered participation described in the White Paper seeks a balance between the will of young people to engage in European democracy on the one hand, but also their fear and mistrust of the institutional structures and negative outcomes of globalisation surrounding them. Both aspects (information and participation in policy making) are valuable from the standpoint of citizenship, because they include the stakeholders in decision making, but the broader focus of citizenship (rights), granting young people and certainly excluded groups the needed access to the citizenry, is less visible.

The EU Youth Strategy 2010-2018 is in line with the White Paper and stresses the potential of participation by encouraging young people to actively engage in society. The EU Youth Strategy renewed the framework for European co-operation in the youth field for the period 2010-2018. This resolution seeks to encourage young people to participate in the democratic process and in society. Key words are dialogue with young people in the shaping of national policies, the participation of under-represented groups, and engaging young people from an early age in participation processes.

In this Youth Strategy 2010-2018 there is a strong focus on Youth Work. The first step for this implementation was the Declaration of the 1st European Youth Work Convention in 2010. The convention introduces a holistic vision of youth work as a social practice (and later on – in the 2nd convention – as “supporting youth agency”); in doing so, stressing a broad range of activities (social, cultural, educational and political), maximising participation by, with, and for young people. Youth work now became a practice defined by youth, researchers and policy makers, based on participation and empowerment, but also built on global arguments and values such as human rights, anti-discrimination and tolerance.

Whilst the White Paper, the Resolution and the 1st convention saw participation as a central target, a goal in itself, and as a means for empowerment and inclusion, the 2nd youth work convention made a remarkable addition. The precursors of the 2nd convention drew on notions of citizenship as participation, whilst the 2nd convention recognises inequalities and additionally stresses the Roman conception of citizenship and the enjoyment of rights. In doing so, it made efforts to transform the formal access of young people to the citizenry into substantive access to society.

When magnified, however, the translation of the above goals untangles an opposite focus. Like the previous conventions, this paper continues to address inequalities by reinforcing youth, and particularly youth at risk by making them stronger, more autonomous, active and responsible in order to reflect and resist on their circumstances.

This attention is also highlighted in “Working with young people: the value of youth work in the European Union”, with three central tenets from the perspective of youth, namely a focus on young people, personal development and voluntary participation. These goals are of great value in the
empowerment of youth throughout Europe, but are less consistent in the emancipation of excluded youth and the global challenges and inequalities they face in relation to their access to citizenship. There are however, common rights in the European context that are potential lead outs for young refugees emancipation.

There is for instance, the famous reference in the Treaty of the European Union in Articles 165 and 166 TFEU as the basis for EU action in the youth field. The inclusion of “youth” as a concept in EU policy dates back to the Treaty of Maastricht, which entered into force in 1993. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which has the same legal value as the treaties (Article 6 TEU), includes an article on children’s rights (Article 24).

Article 165 TFEU provides for Union action in order to encourage the development of youth exchanges and exchanges between socio-educational instructors, that is youth workers, and – with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty – to encourage the participation of young people in democratic life in Europe. Article 166 enables the EU to implement a vocational training policy to support and supplement the action of the Member States. It tasks the Union with facilitating access to vocational training and encouraging mobility of instructors and trainees, particularly young people. In addition to these articles, children and young people benefit from EU policies in other fields, such as education, training and health, or in relation to the rights and protection of children and young people.

This paper so far has argued that citizenship, both as a practice and as a formal recognition, are important in the lives of young refugees. When analysing the successive European Youth (work) Conventions, we see a strong emphasis on the empowerment of youth and their participation in decision making. However, the different conventions overlook the counterpart of citizenship, namely the formal and substantive access to the citizenry young people and especially refugees have or lack. There seems to be little notice of refugees’ emancipation in the subsequent conventions.

In the following section, we want to bring cosmopolitan citizenship to the fore as a powerful moral argument for an open and more inclusive society and, in doing so, providing youth work with ethical munition regarding refugees’ emancipation and empowerment.

Refugees and the cosmopolitan argument

Refugees are a problem for traditional definitions of citizenship. They break the state-nation-territory triad that conventionally and formally defines citizenship in refugees’ home and host states (Nyers 2007, as cited in Mehta and Napier-Moore 2010). History, moreover, demonstrates that refugees have continually challenged the illusionary stability of the nation-state polity throughout the 20th century (Long 2011).

Migration, whether it is transnational or international, voluntary or forced, legal or not, highlights the increasing interconnectedness of polities, economies and societies (Heisler 2015). This increasing flow of people, culture, economic and political interests led to a range of “translocational” social processes. These not only affect those who are directly “on the move”, but also the locales in which they settle, converting them to translocational spaces, and so affecting in different ways everyone who lives within these spaces (Anthias 2008), hence dramatically changing the local, national and international context where citizenship is defined, granted and enacted (Saunders 2010). In doing so, the growth of transnationalisation has called into question fixed conceptions of citizenship and its spatial dimensions and grounds (Kallio and Mitchell 2016; Jacobson 1996, as cited in Schuster and Solomos 2002; Mehta and Napier-Moore 2010). The state and the national polity, therefore, no longer appear as the self-evident loci of citizenship (Kallio and Mitchell 2016). Migration, globalisation, refugee flows and human rights have enlarged citizenship to a transnational matter (Isin and Turner 2002), and the notion has acquired meanings that go well beyond the formal rights-based status only (Kallio and Mitchell 2016).
Like citizenship, its global counterpart, cosmopolitan citizenship, is rooted in the ancient world, where the Stoics elaborated the concept (Leung 2009). According to Held (2005, as cited in Leung 2009), the Stoics were the first to refer to themselves as cosmopolitans in their affirmation of man’s membership of the universal city rather than a local polis. Asked where he came from, Diogenes of Sinope answered: “I am a citizen of the world” (Leung 2009). For other Stoics, such as Cicero and Seneca, the world was seen as a single community (Leung 2013), and the basis of cosmopolitan belonging is the “equal worth of reason and humanity in every person” (Leung 2009), which Hierocles symbolised by the slogan: “unity amid difference” (Leung 2013).

Enlightenment thinker Immanuel Kant, in his turn, was interested in advancing the cause of human progress by working out the best form of global structure, conceived as a pacific federation of states bound by cosmopolitan right, thus turning each individual into a “citizen of a universal state of mankind” (Leung 2009; Leung 2013). At the same time, Kant was also aware of the sovereign will of the Nation State and its perfect right not to be coerced into entering such a world republic. The compromise was to limit cosmopolitan right to the condition of universal hospitality, meaning “the right of the stranger not to be treated with hostility when arriving on someone else’s territory” (Leung 2009).

Contemporary cosmopolitanism keeps on building upon the Stoic/Kantian tradition, but regards it as more relevant in today’s world, where global problems cannot be resolved by bounded communities, and where the sovereignty of states is challenged by cross-border flows of information, finance, goods and people (Benhabib 2007; Brown 1997; Delanty 2000; Dower 2003; Held 1995; Hutchings and Danreuther 1999; Linklater 2007, as cited in Hoerschelmann and Refaie 2014). Cosmopolitan citizenship is about a vision of global justice that focuses on the welfare of the individual regardless of his or her geographical or cultural location (Leung 2013). Kant’s arguments were of great influence on the shape of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but an essential part of what Kant saw as necessary for a global legal order is usually neglected. What is overlooked is Kant’s emphasis on the status of individuals under what he called “cosmopolitan law” (Kleingeld 1998). Pogge (1992, as cited in Bowden 2003) identified three central Kantian tenets common to cosmopolitanism: (1) individualism – the primary unit of concern is the individual rather than any other sub-groupings, nations or states; (2) universality – the primacy of the individual as the central unit of concern is afforded to all human individuals without exception; and (3) generality – the primary concern for the individual is extended to all humanity. One’s concern for others does not stop at the border, nor is it the privilege of only those who share one’s own ethnicity, religion, or other features held in common.

In this context, cosmopolitan law is not concerned with the interaction between states, but with the status of individuals in their dealings with states of which they are not citizens. Moreover, it is concerned with the status of individuals as human beings, rather than as citizens of states (Kleingeld 1998).

Kant’s theory invites the citizens of separate states to have a deeper moral concern for human beings elsewhere, providing a bridge to transnational citizenship (Linklater 1998). The claims of refugees on the protection of other states is founded on loyalties superseding territorial allegiances and resting on humanitarian solidarity. Refugees have always embodied the cosmopolitan ideal; their appeal to humanitarian principles resonates within broader calls for global citizenship (McKinley 2009). World citizens remain members of bounded communities, but the act of imagining themselves as participants in a universal society in which all human beings are respected as ends in themselves places powerful moral constraints on the wrongful exercise of state power (Linklater 1998). It is morally desirable and politically possible to uncouple citizenship from the state, just as citizenship was detached from the city (Linklater 1998; Chandler 2003), and extend it from the nation to humankind as a whole (Chandler 2003).
Breaking down distinctions between citizens and aliens, and building institutional arrangements which provide outsiders with opportunities for representation and voice (Linklater 1998), within new forms of political arrangements dedicated to a world political system (Anthias 2008), are necessary responses to the contemporary problems of national democracy (Linklater 1998). The pluralisation of the demos would be more consistent than a mere translation of the national demos into a global or European demos, which could only ever reproduce national logic on a larger scale (Lacroix 2015). The point is thus not to reconstitute sovereign authority over a wider territorial domain but to promote multiple sites of political responsibility which represent transnational allegiances as well as loyalties to nation states. The sovereign state, therefore, cannot claim to be the only relevant moral community (Linklater 1998). Since the issues at stake (migration, transnationalism) are global in kind, an adequate response cannot be other than equally global (Marchetti 2009).

Various images of Europe defend widening the boundaries of political community to bring citizens and aliens together as equal associates with transnational networks of joint rule. They envisage the practice of universalising legal and political rights in the absence of morally relevant differences between persons (Linklater 1998) and the banality to think of the world in terms of naturally divided nations (Billing 1995, as cited in Andreouli and Howarth 2013). They are alert to the need to combine the logic of universalisation with measures which combat economic and cultural exclusion. These visions of Europe imagine a condition in which supranational institutions underwrite the legal, political, social and cultural rights of all European citizens (Linklater 1998).

Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997, EU member countries have been aware of the need to harmonise conditions of entry and naturalisation in member countries, embedding immigration and asylum policies within an EU framework. The resolutions of the European Council, reached in Tampere, Finland in 1999, echoes this commitment to European integration, based on respect for human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law. The subsequent Treaty of Maastricht made provisions for a “Union citizenship”, where members of Union states can settle anywhere in the Union.

The obverse side of membership of the Union is a sharper delineation of the conditions of those who are non-members. The rising movement of asylum seekers from different parts of Africa and the Middle East to the European Union has made the national borders of European states extremely visible. Even in the context of Schengen neighbours, some of these national borders are now being physically fenced (Benhabib 2002). Based on various risk assessments and statistics concerning their countries of origin, but also on the receiving countries’ estimated capacities to take asylum seekers, European states are dividing the incoming migrants into potential insiders and definite outsiders (Kallio and Mitchell 2016).

Key components of citizenship have located its definition within either status or practice, as membership of a nation state or as being a bearer of rights. Cosmopolitanism, in its turn, sees people as belonging to a range of social relations and political and cultural communities across nation states (Anthias 2008). Within this social process the emphasis is less on legal rules and more on norms, practices, meanings and identities (Istin and Turner 2002). Nevertheless, the movement towards a human rights basis for citizenship also has a great potential for inclusion, particularly among the many excluded groups (Lister 1998, as cited in Invernizzi and Milne 2005). Human rights and citizenship have long been closely intertwined (Nash 2009), and if citizenship is to be understood as a “bundle of rights”, then human rights are their translation on a global level (Nash 2009; Schuster and Solomos 2002). The contemporary discourse of citizenship fluctuates between nationality and humanity, reflecting heightened attention to diversity and globalisation and the rhetorical strength of human rights (McKinley 2009).

Cosmopolitanism, as the universalisation of human rights, is represented in an array of UN conventions (Ong 2006). Since the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, an international human rights regime has emerged. Benhabib (2005) understands this to mean the development of interrelated
and overlapping global and regional regimes that encompass human rights treaties as well as customary and international soft law.

On the downside of the spectrum, the Universal Declaration is silent on states’ obligations to grant entry to immigrants, to uphold the right of asylum, and to permit citizenship to alien residents. These rights have no specific addressees and they do not appear to anchor specific obligations of compliance on the part of second and third parties (Benhabib 2005). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises a limited right to freedom of movement across boundaries: it recognises the right to emigrate (the right to leave a country), but not a right to immigrate (the right to enter a country) (Benhabib 2005; Marchetti 2009; Mehta and Napier-Moore 2010). The paradox is that human rights are not connected to duties and they are not based on past contributions. The United Nations Declaration implies obligations, but they are not clearly defined, and there is no sovereign power uniformly to enforce human rights at a global level (Isin and Turner 2007).

The Geneva Convention of 1951 Relating to the Status of Refugees, and its Protocol, added in 1967, are the second most important international set of legal documents governing cross-border movements (Benhabib 2005). Under international law, states are obliged to protect non-citizens and those residing within their national borders. Refugees thus have a strong basis for protection against persecution and abuse of their civil and political rights. But their social, economic and cultural rights falling under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) remain very neglected, and host states are often reluctant to award them to refugees. These so-called “second generation” rights include the right to development and self-determination, the right to food, health, education, participation and the right to livelihood more generally (Mehta and Napier-Moore 2010).

European states are signatories to the Geneva Convention but have demonstrated an increasing unwillingness to accept the growing number of spontaneous asylum seekers or to give them a permanent status (Kofman 2005). Their reach is limited and uneven, and their intervention intended to be temporary and exceptional. These regimes and organisations are, furthermore, dependent on states for legitimacy, enforcement, access and funding (Isin and Turner 2007; Ehrkamp and Leitner 2006; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004, as cited in Nunn et al. 2015).

Conceiving of cosmopolitan citizenship – summarised – means to seek a possible connection between the national and the transnational, between struggles for equal rights and collective self-determination initiatives. Conceptualising cosmopolitan citizenship means recalling that citizenship is also a status, and not only a form of political action (Lacroix 2015). Transnational migration brings to the fore the constitutive dilemma at the heart of liberal democracies: between sovereign self-determination claims on the one hand and adherence to universal human rights principles on the other (Benhabib 2005). It must not be forgotten that such principles exist to augment, not replace, the role of nation states (Haddad 2008, as cited in Nunn et al. 2015).

Finally, for youth work, this article is an appeal on the political voice of youth work. The participation of young refugees continues to be a natural reflex of the youth sector. But the youth sector as a whole can also keep on challenging systems and hold decision makers and organisations more accountable about the impact their decisions have on the formal and substantive access of young refugees to society at large.

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