4. Reconstructing the international intervention discourse as “politics of difference”: achieving full participation in Kosovo refugee camps

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“Western man gradually learns what it means to be a living species in a living world, to have a body, conditions of existence, probabilities of life, an individual and collective welfare, forces that could be modified.”

(Foucault, 1984)

Introduction

In a post-structuralist interpretation, Western modernity marks the passage towards a new ontology of biopolitics, which focuses on the body as becoming central to the political arena; a space where the private life of the individual (primarily conceived as a subject of law in the Aristotelian tradition) is no longer separate from their public, politically qualified life.

This chapter draws on this critical literature in approaching contemporary political practices as relations of power and knowledge – expressed at the societal level through biopolitics or “governmentality” – as well as with forms of resistance to this particular type of power. Through a case study of Kosovo refugee camps, and the political discursive practices employed to account for international interventions, it argues that refugee management practices allow for the possibility of exclusion through the creation of camps as “zones of indistinction”. Here individuals are reduced to their biological condition; they become homines sacri devoid of all their prerogatives as political and social beings. In this context the rule of law is suspended and thus the enforcement of an extra-legal – but still not illegal – form of power is legitimised by the existing state of exception.

By framing international intervention as rescue activities, it is implied that the rescuers decide the means and practices of salvation, which furthermore suggests the denial of the other’s capacity for its own agency, as well as ruling out any forms of resistance as wrong. The Kosovo refugee camps are an illustrative but conclusive case of biopolitics; where the individuals become “bare life” in a state
of permanent exception instituted by an international authority whose legitimacy as “rescuer” is conveyed by the victim status of the refugees.

This argument presents resistance as an active discourse and attitude against the reality of being reduced to a condition of “bare life”. Such an attitude is made possible through the politics of difference, which call for a rethinking of our categories of the human through an open system that allows other people’s conceptions to be integrated. Thus, the key issue becomes dealing with the post-interventionist approaches and procedures, in the sense that the victims not only require a clear-cut guarantee of their human rights, but they also need to be allowed to develop their own agency and to make their own decisions. However, this cannot be achieved unless the discriminatory “us versus them” approach, as well as the conception of power as universally normalising is left aside as an inappropriate approach in these circumstances. At the same time, there is the need for a higher level of both understanding and acceptance to be employed, which would go beyond mere tolerance, and towards creating a common space of encounter between us and them. At the level of interventions practised by international authorities, this can be done by ceasing to talk on behalf of the victims, a practice that is qualified by Foucault as “indignity” (Bouchard, 1977), and instead intermediate the possibility for a context in which the refugees would be able to speak for themselves; it is furthermore argued that in this way, arbitrary politics can be indeed left behind.

This argument follows Giorgio Agamben’s post-structuralist account of “bare life”, homines sacri and the “camp”, which he sees as the expression of modern political life, principally due to its mechanisms and practices (Agamben, 1998). It is important to acknowledge Agamben as a useful entry point, but at the same time the limitations of his approach – his lack of interest in empirical evidence and the fact that he basically sees no possibility of escaping the reality of the camp – invites one to move beyond him when considering policy descriptions and suggestions. In this move the ideas of Foucault, Derrida and Connolly are important. While Foucault condemns the practice of international intervention missions, namely talking on behalf of the victims (Agamben, 1998), Connolly focuses on emphasising the need to ask and to listen to the other voices, so as to be able to reach the state of what he calls “agonistic care” for the “Other” (Connolly, 1993). Clearly an engagement with the thinking of these figures does not make for the development of concrete policy, however they have much to offer about how to think and act differently about refugees.

Assessing Agamben’s post-structuralist notion of the camp

Following the significant shifts in the international system subsequent to the Cold War and after the events of 11 September 2001, it can be argued that the world order, as well as the security arrangements it entailed, were impacted as never before. In his writings, Giorgio Agamben identifies the genesis of the 20th-century European concentration camp as a direct result of national security concerns, which further allowed for a discourse of threats to be construed in order to provide the necessary legitimisation for such practices (Agamben, 1998).

Agamben sees the camp as the very expression of the politics of modernity, which is set in place when the nation–state system is confronted with a deep crisis regarding its structure, conventionally made up of clear territorial limits and controlled by the state mechanism through different sets of rules and
juridical aspects. Moreover, within this traditional paradigm, the individual is made to belong to a specific order by simply being born in a certain space; in other words, the very birth of the individual (its bare life) grants it a politically qualified status, that of a citizen within a state-run arrangement. Hence, it is argued that the camp adds itself to the conventional structure of the nation-state system precisely by signalling its crisis through a practice of dislocating localisation (Agamben, 1998) and thus, the camp becomes at the same time both excluded from and included in the state territory, since it remains inscribed in the very political and legal mechanisms that initially construed it as a place of banishment (Agamben, 1998).

Accordingly, for Agamben the camp emerges out of a state of exception, which manifests itself outside the ordinary legal order. Moreover, it appears as a place of stable exception, of permanent lack of normal juridical order, characterised by a general suspension of individual rights and freedoms, as well as of different aspects of personal privacy (Agamben, 1998). Along these lines, the camp can be regarded as a zone of indistinction between different aspects previously constructed as binary oppositions, namely the inner and the outer, exception and regulation, legal and illegal. Individuals entering this realm are taken away from their political rights as citizens belonging to a certain social order with different privileges and obligations in order to be left as simple biological beings, as homines sacri (Agamben, 1998). Thus they are directly confronted with different manifestations of power, without any other intervention than the different forms of governmentality. In this reality anything becomes possible: atrocities and crimes are no longer assessed and perceived as such, since the conventional law has now been replaced by a state of exception. Here power is arbitrarily exercised and political decision making constantly oscillates somewhere in between categories, hence ceasing to distinguish between law and facts, exception and rule (Agamben, 1998).6

The refugee or stateless subject, who cannot be included in the nation–state because of national security concerns, is therefore demoted to a restricted area – the camp – internally placed within the state boundaries, and yet external. The camp appears as the place of excellence in producing the “sacred life” as permanently exposed to death, by separating the biological, bare life (zoe), from its politically qualified dimension (bios). Thus, the refugee is constructed as homo sacer, the embodiment of sacred life, as well as the exception, the Other, whose reinforcement creates the required background against which the normal can define itself (Heins, 2005).

--- Escaping the biopolitical paradigm ---

It can be argued that Agamben’s perception of the camp as abandoning life through the creation of zones of indistinction characterised by the suppression of law – and moreover, his interpretation of this state of exception as expanding from the periphery so as to include the entire societal dimension of the modern West – represents a rather pessimistic perspective on modern politics, which does not provide any way forward from the camp, seen as the dead-end of modernity. Furthermore, the lack of contextualisation in his narrative makes his concepts appear as abstract notions, where the particularities that construct them remain unaddressed. These limitations become of real significance to both a coherent assessment of post-structuralist theoretical frameworks regarding practices of exclusion and inclusion, and to offering possibilities for escaping the reality of the camp. The conceptual
standpoint employed here needs to be broadened so as to include a dimension of resolution, suggested by the Foucauldian analysis of modernity.

Unlike Agamben, who interprets biopower as producing sacred life by practices of exclusion, Foucault is interested in flat, empirical questions and furthermore, he submerges himself in different sites of power in an attempt to grasp their logic. Moreover, by exposing the precariousness of power relations and the contingency of things (Foucault, 2003), his work emphasises that “…wherever there is power, there is also resistance” (Foucault, 2003, p. 81). What is more, he opposes the so-called technologies of domination7 – as well as the technologies of political power8 – to the technologies of the self, which allow individuals to affect, through their own means or with the help of others, a certain number of operations imposed upon their own bodies. Moreover, by admitting the fact that one can never be in full control of oneself, the technologies of the self can be seen as the individual attempts of people to modify themselves according to certain templates provided by the society, through participation in different processes of refashioning themselves in line with concepts that come from outside (Foucault, 1986) – and thus, to act towards escaping the biopolitical paradigm surrounding them.

Foucault identifies different forms of power as a continuum; power is a mutable, reversible, strategic relationship between people attempting to shape each other's conduct reciprocally, as well as being institutionalised, asymmetrical domination (Foucault, 1986). Furthermore, resistance to these forms of power can be materialised through the politics of difference, construed as a critique towards the paternalistic power relations and advocating for change. Thus, post-modernist thinking, employed here as the theoretical framework, needs to address the social space that would facilitate this acknowledgment of difference and would thus create a space of encounter between the Self and the Other. Moreover, from the perspective of the Other being most of the times constructed as the Same (Levinas, 1991), there is also a clear need for representation and differentiation, in order to be able to further acknowledge the Other as not inferior, but simply different.

Thus, by questioning the origins and ethical confines of our language and discursive performances, Foucault's notion of a counter-discourse (Bouchard, 1977) emerges as a feasible solution for incorporating a meaningful dialogue with the Other. Moreover, bringing the limits of our knowledge and procedures to light can be achieved through the practice of deconstruction, which is made possible by the contingency of power constructions. Hence, it can be argued that the consequences of traumatic experiences represent the most severe forms of materialising the failure and indignity of language – and in this sense, discursive resistance appears as an aesthetic form of language that allows for the possibility of self-esteem in speaking of others.

Along the lines of a Foucauldian interpretation and analysing the distinctions between morality (as traditionally ingrained in Western thinking and practices) and ethics (as a higher form of sensibility and care for the Other), there is the work of William Connolly, who also seeks a feasible solution concerning the possibilities to escape the biopoliticised existence and practices (Connolly, 1993). Departing from Foucault's notion of ethical sensibility (understood as leaving aside the binary constructions of political discourse, developing the capacity to go beyond resentment, the cultivation of a generous sensibility, as well as constantly searching for possibilities of co-existing with the Other), he argues that in order to be able to both think and feel in terms of accepting the Other as different, it becomes necessary to substitute resentment with the politics of forgetfulness.
and move on from the binary construction framework of “good versus evil”, as characterising Western culture (Connolly, 1993). Such an endeavour can be achieved by converting the existing antagonism into agonistic respect for the Other, which is seen as different from liberal tolerance, in the sense that it goes beyond it by establishing a bond with the Other and by starting to identify both with and against it through the development of sensibility, care and political agency towards it (Connolly, 1993).

Still arguing in the line of possible solutions provided by a post-structuralist approach to the refugee issue, one can take Derrida’s approach of bringing in the perspective of full acceptance and inclusion of the Other, by perceiving the Western practices of tolerance as one-sided, exclusive and tied to the reason of the most powerful. In this sense, tolerance is viewed as a conditional form of hospitality, since the Other is accepted only under certain conditions and thus, under the sovereignty, law and authority of the strongest – while his alternative suggests a return to unconditional hospitality as unrestricted openness towards the Other and without any attempts to confine it within artificial limits (Borradori, 2003).

The discourse of refugees and the Kosovo camps paradigm

Refugees, whose number currently exceeds 13 million worldwide (Stanton Russell, 2002), have been discursively constructed in a range of manners that reflect the complexity of the issue. However, according to international law treaties, the main definition of a refugee is found in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 1996), which identify a refugee as an individual who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Chapter 1, Art. 1, Section A/2. in: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 1996). Furthermore, since this early definition only covered the category of statutory refugees and did not make any reference to cases of mass departure from conflict areas, more inclusive agreements were developed by regional bodies, such as the Organization for African Unity (OAU) with the OAU Convention of 1969. These expanded the initial characterisation of refugees so as to include not only individuals facing maltreatment, but also each human being “who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing the public order ... is compelled to leave ... to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality” (Organization for African Unity, 1969).

The refugee camps in Kosovo were built as a response to a post-conflict crisis situation and for an indefinite period of time. The people settled within these locations were perceived exclusively as “bare lives” needing to be safeguarded, without taking into account the political dimension of their existence (Edkins, 2000). Moreover, the focus of the camp administrators, mainly represented by NATO troops, remained constantly on the physical condition and well-being of the refugees, in other words on aspects related solely to their construction as *hominis sacri*. Crucially, the encamped victims were expected to display an attitude of passive acceptance of the external aid and intervention provided, up to and including being spoken for in the name of their safety (Edkins, 2000).
Due both to massive inflows of refugees, and the determination of the international intervention missions to avoid casualties in their ranks, the state of affairs in Kosovo was securitised from the very beginning. In this sense, the refugees were treated as mere biological bodies, with the only objective being to provide them with basic organic needs. Thus, people who had previously been socialised within political, economic and civic frameworks, suddenly saw all these rights taken away from them in the name of the need to secure their “bare lives”; they were left to proceed with their lives within the reality of refugee camps as *homines sacri*, devoid of their status or active political agency as citizens (Edkins, 2000). Additionally, due to the indefinite duration of camps as places of active exclusion, such processes of learning in some cases also imply the socialisation of children along the standard paradigm of normality, since they are basically told how to behave and act with respect to different external stimuli. What is more, if one were to consider the above-mentioned situation, the refugee camps could be perceived as places of forming both minds and bodies according to a desired set of standards and rules, which were drafted as a result of pre-established notions about the local people – in other words, as producing “bare life” at the same time as sovereignty. And at a closer analysis, such realities do match the condition and practices of the NATO troops deployed throughout Kosovo, since the status of these troops was, from the very beginning of the operations, a special one, encapsulating this dual dimension of producing sovereignty at the same time with “bare life”. The status of NATO troops has oscillated between that of an oppressive force, bombing and turning the Kosovans into refugees who needed to be safeguarded into camps and turned into *homines sacri* – while later on, with the developments of the conflict and the refugee crisis, and when the bombings came to have a more solid justification, it became the benevolent pastor, the sovereign power within the camps (Edkins, 2000), with the mission to protect and organise the lives of the people inside, now devoid of all their civilian prerogatives. Most of these camps, near the Kosovo-Macedonian border (the most important ones being those at Stenkovec and Brazda), were set up, guarded and governed by the NATO soldiers: “But here in the camps, for the first two weeks of this crisis, NATO has been everything – the provider of food, water and shelter, the guarantor of peace and security” (Parry, 1999).

By projecting the image of these people through constantly reinforcing binary constructions of rescuers versus the disempowered, of those who own the knowledge versus those who need to be taught the right way – and thus, basically rejecting their humanity – these populaces become “bare life”, they are left open to discriminatory and biased practices (Norris, 2004), such as control over food, sleeping areas, medical services and, *in extremis*, control over the lives of the encamped refugee people.

Still in this line of argumentation, post-conflict interventions can be interpreted as attempts at refashioning the subjectivities of people, and not simply allowing them the free choice towards continuing their lives (Jiwani, 2004). In this sense, the power of language, as well as the context and discourse shaping the meaning of the language, become crucial for the reality of the camp, since refugees are being socialised in a particular language community, by using certain frames in order to name different things. Thus, by using a language of rescuing and democracy promotion, international intervention in Kosovo can be seen as hailing the refugees in a particular subjected position, constructed as unable to manage the crisis situation they are in and incapable of speaking for themselves (Jiwani, 2004). This furthermore entails the need for salvation and protection that the
international rescue missions claim as their rationale for intervening in post-war societies. Moreover, in what concerns the majority of UN peace-building and peacekeeping operations, their discourse is mainly grounded in pre-established images and ideas concerning the behaviour and mentality of aboriginal populations, which is precisely the case with the Kosovan refugees.

In this sense, it is worth mentioning a common practice of international intervention missions in Kosovo, that of primarily focusing on the emotional state of the refugees and thus constructing them as traumatised populaces, according to a pre-established Western pattern of tackling social issues (Pupavac, 2002). Hence, by giving priority to such actions as counselling programmes and psychological intervention, a therapeutic paradigm is put up, where the Western practices, rooted in a post-traumatic culture, become universally applicable recipes, presumably good enough for any post-war transitional society, like that of Kosovo. However, what is at stake here is even more than a misplaced emphasis on the specific needs of the Kosovan people, it refers to deeper implications of such pre-established international intervention practices: on one hand, there is the reality that different cultures and beliefs have distinct ways of coping with extreme situations and therefore, such universally applicable models will not do; and on the other hand, by constructing the Kosovan society as traumatised, it further implies its disqualification from self-government, which leads to a self-legitimisation of international interventions and administration (Pupavac, 2002).

Nevertheless, by denying the refugees’ capacity for agency or self-government and furthermore deeming any of their attempts at resisting the forms of international aid as outside the norm – these practices of universal good governance in line with Western criteria appear as the very embodiment of biopower. Illustrating this point are international interventions in the post-conflict society of Kosovo which, following Western views, interpreted the situation as primarily rooted in distressing memories of trauma and feelings of revenge that furthermore fuelled the ethnic hatred phenomenon – but in this way, leaving aside a more obvious and applicable motive, namely the present politics as keeping the nationalistic sentiments, and thus the conflict itself, alive (Pupavac, 2002).

In what concerns the current refugee discourse, one notices a predisposition towards categorising the refugees as constantly needing to be rescued from different practices of maltreatment (Bouwen, 2004). Moreover, since refugees are generally defined as people fleeing persecution, this discursive construction only reinforces the perception of these individuals as a special category, primarily requiring aid and protection (Stanton Russell, 2002). Furthermore, by taking into consideration the genealogy of aid as an international practice, it can be argued that traditionally, the notion implied a short-term action of limited help and separated from the political field – while after the Cold War, one can see a clear marginalisation of this approach, towards long-term concerns including politics and ideology, so that nowadays aid is being increasingly coupled with security issues (Duffield, 2002). Hence, it can be contended that this modern version of governmentally supported aid represents a process of constituting regularity, since other forms of organising life than Western ones are perceived as abnormal and thus in need of a normalising intervention. Nonetheless, in order to allow for an escape window out of this biopolitiscised approach, one has to question what are the sources which supposedly confer an overall legitimacy to Western standards and thus suspend such normative judgments as good versus bad and accept the legitimacy of other versions of rationalities as different (Duffield, 2002).
Subsequently, it becomes necessary to re-evaluate the idea according to which there is a responsibility of the international community to protect and thus normalise the individuals perceived as victims of conflicts and the state failure to care for them. However, the remaining pressing issue refers to the post-salvation status of these people, when they need to regain their own agency in order to be able to enjoy their political and socioeconomic rights, which became suspended during the crisis period. In other words, it can be argued that, besides the economic stalemate, one of the principal problems regarding the aftermath of conflict and linked to the international intervention missions, is now the complete reactivation of the politically qualified life of these individuals – and in this sense, the refugees need to be perceived as persons who can be invested in (Stanton Russell, 2002) by highlighting their social, political and especially their economic potential, so as to integrate them into the local circuits in a first phase and thus, make available the possibility for change regarding their status as refugees later on.\textsuperscript{10}

In order to be able to move beyond different practices of biopolitics, there is the need to depoliticise international interventions as they currently are and to question the very foundations of these pastoral, paternalistic practices. Thus, by rejecting this paradigm and acknowledging that different cultures and beliefs may display different attitudes and responses towards difficult situations, and also, by creating a space of encounter between the rescuers and the refugees within camps, where these people are actually in a position to reclaim their capacity for agency and self-evaluation – it is argued that there is a possibility for regenerating the post-conflict society of Kosovo.

\textbf{Concluding remarks and final assessment}

Summing up, this chapter constitutes a post-structuralist account of the manifested structures of power within present-day modern society, with a particular focus on the forms of exclusion allowed by the employed discursive practices. Moreover, the arguments concerning the Kosovo refugee camps represent a concrete outline of a particular type of discourse: constructing the Other as different and, consequently, allowing for discrimination and the creation of the refugee camp as a zone of indistinction. Not only is this fresh perspective employed here of an increased relevance for the realities within current society, but also the proposed political agenda improvement to escape the current discourse of binary constructions and exclusion can be applied as a feasible practice of real inclusion via the politics of difference, a solution hinted at through the empirical analysis of the Kosovo refugee camps.

Nevertheless, since this paper draws on a post-structuralist approach, one cannot expect clear-cut solutions to be provided to the outlined problems – but rather an indication of what is out there. Moreover, the decision to escape the biopolitical life of normalising practices, as well as the path to follow in order to achieve this target, are both left at the individual level. Post-structuralism is about questioning the existing, about deconstructing and thus probing the meta-narratives (which made judgments of right versus wrong possible), challenging the limits of our knowledge and reassessing different concepts and notions – and in this way, individual choice and the self-reflection regarding the decisions one makes can gain ground. Therefore, it is along this line that the solutions are presented in this chapter, namely as a call for rethinking the previously employed paternalistic politics vis-à-vis refugees, as well as acknowledging the need to create a space of encounter between the Self and the Other, so as to achieve full participation of all societal elements.
References


Endnotes

1. One of the main post-structuralist claims is that there is nothing outside discourse and language, which frame our concepts and views of the world.

2. Critical or post-structuralist authors, such as Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, Maurizio Lazzarato, Jenny Edkins, Judith Butler (among others).

3. The terms biopolitics and governmentality, although not completely identical, display a convergence in meanings; they refer to the modern alternative to sovereignty (as the power to kill, owned by the ruler), a new form of power (to make live or to let die) concerned with administrative aspects of providing the good life for its citizens; it is also a normalising power that operates outside the rule of sovereign law, which seeks to organise, discipline and classify the behaviour of individuals according to certain standards that fit the frames envisaged by authorities.

4. The term *hominès sacri* is used by Giorgio Agamben in order to express the idea of individuals as “bare life” – a life that, due to the state of exception characterising the refugee camp, can be taken at any time, this constituting neither a crime nor a sacrifice (Lazzarato, 2002).

5. The term “rescuers” is employed by Yasmin Jiwani, in its traditional meaning, to define the authoritative educators as embodied by the nineteenth-century colonisers, as well as in its current signification as administrators of peace-building sites, in post-war afflicted societies (Jiwani, 2004).

6. Having reached this level, Agamben however fails to deepen his theoretical stance by adding an empirical dimension to it – which is why it is at this point that his post-structuralist notions can be happily merged with those of Foucault, since the latter not only shows more interest in empirical facts, but he also regards such notions as power, biopolitics and sovereignty in a different manner, which provides other ways forward for Western modernity, not simply the pessimistic Agamben suggestion of throwing away all the practices used so far and starting everything anew. Agamben seeks to elucidate the nature and structure of power as a metaphysical principle, while Foucault is interested in how the power works, he sees it as historically contingent and having multiple forms, and it is precisely this type of interpretation that allows for an emphasis on practical, day-to-day examples to illustrate his theoretical arguments. Thus, by applying the Foucauldian analysis to the refugee camp paradigm, one can identify several examples of control and power practices being exercised within its confined space. For example, the surveillance or panoptic power refers to the fact that people inside refugee camps tend to act in accordance with the reality that they always need to control their movements and language, since they are aware of being constantly watched by guards and security personnel; also, the discipline power can be seen as the sets of conduct rules inside the refugee camps, which are justified as intra-camp management, but eventually lead to the construction of the so-called “docile bodies” (Foucault, 1984, p. 57).

7. The technologies of domination, exercised by the government, represent coercive measures employed to shape political subjects, such as the power manifested through the regulation of consumption for different goods and services: medical, labour, education (Foucault, 1986).
8. The technologies of political power represent practical means of achieving solutions for problems; they encompass the technologies of agencies, namely fostering certain skills, values and attitudes, so as to build a certain type of social conduct, and the technologies of performance, namely the control over spaces in which people's behaviour can be improved for the purpose of optimising the subjects and internal efficiency (Foucault, 1986).

9. In what concerns the recent refugee situation in Kosovo, the statistics were still showing in 2005 over 2,000 people being monitored by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees – more exactly, 2,158 camped refugees (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees/UNHCR, 2006, p. 85).

10. When speaking of the best approach towards solving the issue of post-conflict societies and its most pressing aspect, the refugee problem, Mulenga Nkula points towards Resettlement and Local Integration versus (Voluntary) Repatriation and Reintegration, as the most common sets of choices that the international community can make use of. Furthermore, based on case studies of the societies of Mozambique and Kosovo, the author finds that the latter solution package is most favoured by the international community, since it implies a short-term, lower-cost resolution – while the former approach requires a long-term perspective, as well as more effort in settling the refugee issue (Nkula, 2005).