Challenges for citizenship, citizenship education and democratic practice in Europe

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Preface: European citizenship and young people in Europe

_Hanjo Schild, Yulia Pererva and Nathalie Stockwell_

The topic of European citizenship has gained considerable political importance for both the Council of Europe and the European Commission over the past years. Without giving a comprehensive overview of the policies and programmes of the two institutions, some priority actions should be highlighted, particularly in the field of education, training and youth.

In the period 2006-08, the Council of Europe’s youth sector is putting a special emphasis on:

– promoting and sustaining the role of youth organisations in the development of democratic participation;
– promoting citizenship education and participation of young people;
– promoting access of young people to decision making.

By establishing close co-operation between civil society (youth organisations and networks) and governments through a system of co-management, the youth sector has set up an exemplary model, which is used in practice for promoting young people’s participation in democratic institutions and processes throughout Europe. The Young Active Citizens Award, the activities of the European Youth Foundation, work on youth policy development and particularly the educational and training programme of the Council of Europe’s youth sector are complementary to these principles (for further information, see: www.coe.int/t/dg4/youth).

In the field of formal education, the Council of Europe is currently running a programme on Learning and living democracy for all, 2006-09, which includes a broad range of activities on education for democratic citizenship and human rights (EDC/HRE). Some examples of this work include: development of a set of manuals for various target audiences (known as the “EDC/HRE pack”), development of a framework policy document on EDC/HRE (which could take the form of a framework convention or a charter) and a co-operation research project with the European Union on Active citizenship for democracy, aimed at the development of indicators in this field (further information can be found online at: www.coe.int/edc).

Within the European Union, faced with the French and Dutch negative votes on the European Constitution, in 2005 the European Commission launched its Plan D (democracy, dialogue, debate), laying the foundations for a profound debate on Europe’s future, in particular that of the European Union. The clear objective is to build a new political consensus on the policies required to equip Europe with the wherewithal to meet the challenges of the 21st century and to bring more democracy into the Union.

Also, the Europe for citizens’ programme provides the Union with instruments to promote active European citizenship. It puts citizens in the centre and offers them the opportunity to fully assume their responsibility as European citizens. It responds to the need to improve citizens’ participation in the construction of Europe and encourages co-operation among citizens and their organisations from different countries (for further information, see: http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/index_en.html ).

As an integral part of the European Union’s youth policy, the White Paper on A New Impetus for European Youth encouraged EU member states to promote young people’s active citizenship. “Getting young people more involved in the life of the local, national and European communities, and fostering active citizenship thus represent one of the major challenges, not only for the present but also for the future of our societies,” the White Paper notes. Strong co-operation among member states (Open
Method of Co-ordination) was put into place as a follow-up to this White Paper, concentrating on the implementation of concrete objectives in the field of youth participation, information and voluntary activities. This co-operation also aims at gaining better knowledge of youth. In July 2006, the European Commission adopted a communication on active European citizenship of young people. To actively involve young people in policy-shaping debates and dialogue, the EU emphasises the importance of a structured dialogue with young people. In 2007, the European Commission adopted a communication advocating a cross-sectoral approach to youth policies in order to enable young people’s full participation in education, employment and society as a whole (for further information, see: http://ec.europa.eu/youth/youth-policies/doc26_en.htm).

European citizenship is also one of the priorities of the Youth in Action programme 2007-13. It aims to develop a sense of personal responsibility, initiative, concern for others, citizenship and active involvement at local, national and European levels among young people. One of the proposed objectives of the programme is to promote young people’s active citizenship in general and their European citizenship in particular (for further information, see: http://ec.europa.eu/youth/index_en.htm).

Unsurprisingly, European citizenship and participation have also been one of the cornerstones of the Youth Partnership between the Council of Europe and the European Commission since the year 2000 and still constitute a main focus. Given the growing importance of European citizenship in the youth policies and programmes of both partner institutions, the Partnership has developed and is still developing a number of training and research activities, as well as publications in this field.

The flagship of the Partnership training activities in this field are the training courses on European citizenship. Various training modules, targeting youth workers and youth leaders as multipliers, have been developed since 2001. In 2007, an ambitious programme of training courses on European citizenship, to be implemented by the National Agencies during the Youth in Action programme (2007-13), was launched by the Partnership in co-operation with the SALTO Training and Co-operation Resource Centre. These courses are accompanied by other important initiatives such as a mentoring and support strategy for former participants and a Training-kit on European Citizenship. The main motivation behind the organisation of the training courses on European Citizenship is to encourage participants to explore and “live” the concept of European citizenship by sharing their own experiences and reflecting on their identities. Once they go back home, many former participants start exploring, promoting and building European citizenship through youth work projects. This fully corresponds to the new priority of the Youth in Action programme, mentioned above.

Within the framework of Euro-Mediterranean co-operation, the Partnership organised various training courses focusing on a broad notion of citizenship, beyond its European dimension: “Participation and Intercultural Exchange”, “Human Rights Education and Citizenship” and “Citizenship matters – Participation of Women and Minorities”.

In youth research and youth policy co-operation, the Partnership convened a series of research seminars, specifically for young researchers, which are in one way or another linked to the topic of European citizenship. Their themes were “Political Participation”, “European Youth Voluntary Activities”, “Diversity, Human Rights and Participation” and “Young People and Active European Citizenship”, the results of which are documented in this edited collection (for further information, see: www.youth-partnership.net).

But why is the topic of European citizenship so relevant for the political institutions in Europe? In recent years there have been many debates in our societies with regard to the future of Europe and its institutional and conceptual development. The Treaty of the European Union, the accession of new countries to this Union and the disapproval in some cases (in other cases, the denial) of potential candidates for membership show that there is no clear common vision of the political future of the continent.
Furthermore, people feel that the European institutions do not operate transparently, that they do so behind closed doors, and are distant from the citizens. There is today a growing feeling among (young) people that the representative political institutions are far removed from their realities, and often they are right. Especially young people coming from marginalised or disadvantaged backgrounds often lack appropriate communication channels and access to information; they articulate their concerns and interests in many other ways, which are often neither heard nor understood by policy makers, institutional representatives or even teachers.

On the other hand, many people, especially the young, play an active role in constructing and creating this Europe, they are committed to the European ideal and an open, inclusive and socially cohesive society. For them Europe is about respect for the fundamental values of human rights and the rule of law and a place for increased mobility in which they live, work, study and travel.

Despite all the activities and political priorities mentioned, many (not only young) people still do not exactly know what the concept of European citizenship means and, above all, they do not know how they could integrate this concept into their own life, nor into youth work.

It is against this background that increasing knowledge and a shared understanding of the notion of European citizenship, and of the political, legal, social, cultural and economic framework in which it is embedded, was given considerable importance. To this end, the Seminar on European Citizenship wanted to make these captivating and controversial issues a subject of academic discussion. The political, social and emotional dimensions of European citizenship, the sense of community and belonging, diversity and otherness, dignity and integration need further discussion, emphasis and knowledge.
Introduction: Europe, citizenship and young people

Ditta Dolejšiová

Issues related to European citizenship and European identity represent an important area of discussion among policy makers, researchers, as well as educators and youth work practitioners. Yet, “European citizenship” is undoubtedly an expression that is not part of the vocabulary of many young people living in Europe today. “In the process of construction …” says the title of this publication – referring to the ever rolling debate on living in, belonging to, participating in, being excluded from and still building the community of people in Europe.

Europe is facing a variety of challenges in the process of its political, economic, social and cultural developments. It is almost sixty years since the process of European integration modestly began in the aftermath of the Second World War, with the signature of the Treaty of London in 1949 establishing one of the oldest intergovernmental organisations working towards peace and reconciliation in Europe – the Council of Europe. Led by economic reconstruction, the gradual strengthening of the political aspects of the European Community was occasioned by the end of the Cold War, which opened up new possibilities and perspectives for the integration process. Inspired and supported by the proclaimed “end of the nation state” by academics (Ohmae, 1996; Beck, 2008), the vision of a new supranational Europe, in which the responsibility for policy making would shift from the national states to the European institutions, has become in many different ways a reality. In spite of the fact that European political integration has not been a smooth process, since the mid-1990s there has been a considerable increase in European Union members from 12 to 27. As the enlargement process continues, the supranational “European dream” is on its way to being achieved.

The term “Europe”, which refers to a geographical continent, is often incorrectly used as a synonym for the European Union. Nevertheless, and in spite of different national interests, Europe is united as never before: at the time of writing, at the beginning of 2008, 47 out of the 48 states on the European continent subscribe formally to the principles of the rule of law, democracy, human rights and freedoms, and social justice as members of the Council of Europe.1

“Europeanness” has in some way become an integral part of life for many people living on the European continent through the processes of institutionalisation of European bodies and global interconnectedness, integration towards a single European market, and the increasing possibilities of mobility, information, knowledge and cultural exchange, study, work and trade. With the rise of the European Union, a region with no borders and one currency has gradually become a new reality for more and more Europeans.

At the same time, this reality, characterised by a period of transition towards democracy and restructuring of international economic and geopolitical power relations, has also brought a renewal of civic conflicts and new forms of terror, as well as a crisis of the sense of security and the alleged failure of multiculturalism and integration. Despite the increasing possibilities offered by a globalised economy and integrated markets, there appears to be a call to return to national and local levels. The overall increase in human insecurity, fear of unemployment and the necessity to accommodate “others” gave rise to right-wing extremism, and an apparently benign strengthening of national identities as a source of individual pride. Young people were naturally among those who benefited most from all these developments in a number of positive (for example, mobility and new opportunities) as well as negative (for example, youth unemployment and prolonged transitions to adult life) ways.

1. At the time of writing all states on the European continent, except Belarus, were members of the Council of Europe.
Europe, during its process of “construction”, should be shaped and defined by its citizens. Nonetheless, Europe does not seem to provide sufficient opportunities for its citizens to contribute to this development. This lack of possibilities for ordinary people in Europe to get involved in decision-making processes at local, national and, especially, European levels contributed to the ever growing legitimacy gap between the European institutions and its population. Young people, in particular, have a special interest in and concern about what kind of Europe they want to live in. However, the existing mechanisms that should contribute to the strengthening of their role in building Europe, more often than not, obstruct informed and participatory involvement. It is therefore important to reflect on how European citizenship and debates on European identity can help to empower young people to actively contribute to building Europe.

The recent actions of national governments promoting a reinforcement of immigration policies has encouraged a perception of Europe as a “fortress” or an elite club, closed to all those who are not formally recognised as being part of it. Bearing in mind the changing demographic and sociocultural patterns in Europe, along with an ingrained understanding of who belongs and who does not, how many young people residing in Europe are considered as “outsiders” or “others” and are treated as such on a daily basis?

The legitimacy crisis, reflecting mistrust of European institutions, together with growing intolerance at national levels – through xenophobic and racist discourse – represents an ongoing concern for all those working towards a Europe based on dignity, human rights and social justice. Researchers, practitioners, policy makers, as well as European institutions as a whole, should work together to understand better the existing challenges and explore new ways to address the issues related to Europe and European citizenship in their respective fields of work of knowledge, policy and practice.

Contemporary discourse on citizenship, and European citizenship in particular, mirrors the changing circumstances in an enlarged Europe that is working towards the development of a new, more democratic face, in which all young people will have the right and the opportunity to participate. Yet, in reality, many still witness these new developments only as unheard observers.

Youth participation is often considered as a key mechanism for the construction of citizenship. First, this is due to its educational function, leading to social participation and associative life. Second, it is due to its democracy-building quality, leading to representativeness and democratic culture. Nevertheless, its impact and effectiveness for citizenship formation have been essentially contested in this process as well.

As much as there are increasing efforts to promote and develop new mechanisms for youth participation, real opportunities for doing so at local, national and even European levels are still relatively scarce for the average young person. At the same time, it can be observed that the apparent apathy and lack of political participation among young people, revealed by a growing tendency not to participate in elections or by the fall of membership in political parties, trade unions and NGOs, may be misleading. It may simply reflect a lack of trust in traditional political institutions, as well as a shift towards new emerging forms of expression, which are not so easy to examine, such as the Internet (Forbrig, 2005). The general lack of relevant and adequate education, combined with unequal access to participation, and a great reliance on mainstream national and local media (Eurobarometer, 2007), may be some of the reasons for negative approaches to “Europeanness” among some young people.

Considering these changing patterns, what does European citizenship mean for young people living in Europe? How can European citizenship work in practice, if not all young people share the same rights? How could it be inclusive, if exclusive by definition? How to it works for all those who live in Europe, including immigrants, their children, undocumented workers and asylum seekers? In what ways can civic education contribute to the process of strengthening European citizenship?
Originating in a research seminar promoted by the Partnership between the European Commission and the Council of Europe in the youth field, which brought together researchers, practitioners as well as policy makers in November 2006, this publication reflects a joint interest in the issues of European citizenship and young people. As a result, this collection of articles gathers different perspectives in relation to the conceptual basis for European citizenship, as well as perceptions on how young people reflect, understand and eventually participate in the construction of European citizenship through their actions, or at last in terms of civic education and training.

Ultimately, the purpose of this book is to strengthen the connections between research, on the one hand, and the policies and programming on European citizenship in the youth field, on the other. This should contribute to better-informed and evidence-based policy making and programming among the European institutions, as well as governmental and non-governmental actors in the youth field. At the same time, this debate offered an opportunity for researchers to enlarge their scope of understanding, with a reality check on the fields of policy and practice.

Such joint reflection on the process of construction of European citizenship resulted in a broader understanding of it, which is centred on exploring European identity rather than focusing exclusively on the status and rights involved in membership of the European Union. Yet, not all authors decided to approach the discussion in this way, and at times the notion of European citizenship was used interchangeably with that of citizenship of the European Union.

Reflecting on Europe and European identity

More often than not, Europe is defined by what it is not, rather than what it actually is. According to the research on orientations of young men and women to citizenship and European identity (Jamieson et al., 2005), which examines issues of European identity among 18-24 year olds living in Europe, it became evident that for many young people the geography of Europe was not confined to the European Union. Although clear definitions of Europe were not expressed, “geography and the political alliance of the European Union were found more important than values and tradition or the economic alliance expressed by the Euro”. Yet, only about half of those surveyed felt that they had a European identity.

According to studies on identity making, opportunities as well as material and cultural resources for “being European” are distributed unevenly (Jamieson et al., 2005). While there are divergences in understanding Europe – either as a fluid concept, developing together with the changes in global society, or as the traditional concept linked to the institutional and political formation of the European integration project, which delineates the political-legal status of citizens in the European Union – it becomes clear that in both cases, an understanding of “Europeanness” requires experience of identity formation, which is not offered to all young people in an equal manner. Travel, mastering European languages, and knowledge of “European” music, art and literature, combined with the basic welfare package and appropriate civic education, are simply not available to all young people living in Europe, and not even to all those in the European Union (Jamieson et al., 2005).

Furthermore, until relatively recently, political messages in relation to European integration and “Europeanness” did not particularly address young people and their interests, such as their concerns about unemployment or independent living (Chisholm et al., 1995; Nagel and Wallace, 1997). Except for a minority of young people involved in the formation of Europe through participation in youth work and other cultural, sport and civic activities, the majority of young people were excluded from...
resources for and the debates on the development of European identity, and therefore also from being European in an aware and articulated manner.

However, in what ways is it possible to make “Europanness” available and meaningful without replicating the patterns of social inequality and, on the contrary, going beyond them? In what ways can “Europanness” be effectively promoted beyond the privileged social, cultural, financial or political elites? How to establish links between socially distinct communities of young people that would otherwise not have an opportunity to experience “Europe”?

Some scholars (Putnam, 2000) argue that this may also happen in a natural way through a process of bonding, in which people interact based on a common interest or a common goal. Yet, it is not clear to what extent even the existing pan-European networks involved in anti-racism, environmental, peace or other social movements foster interconnectedness and a common cause among young people (Jamieson et al., 2005).

And yet, youth work at the European level, expressed in diverse forms of educational activities and exchange programmes, and developed and supported by the Directorate of Youth and Sport and the European Youth Foundation, together with the recent Youth for Action programme of the European Commission, demonstrate that “Europanness” is being lived, whether as a political and social status, or as a cultural or social identity.

**Citizenship in the European context**

Against this broader supranational framework and the controversies it involves, it becomes clear that citizenship in the European context cannot be defined in the same way as in a national context. If European citizenship is considered to be a work in progress, its developments require the participation of its population in its creation. European citizenship cannot be simply defined by a scholarly debate on citizenship that certifies the relationship between the individual and the state in terms of a status, experienced by young people in its formal and rather asocial nature when using an identity card, or at the passport control. Citizenship in the European context needs to refer also to the living conditions, and social and political rights of young immigrants and young people without status, who represent an integral part of the European continent.

Besides, it is the social interaction, at home and among peers, that stimulates young people to negotiate their ways of interacting with the society and the community they live in. Given a different access to “Europanness”, it is only in rare cases that a young person needs to negotiate their citizenship or an understanding of it with the authorities. In practice, no individual, whether from a member state of the European Union or not, can go and question their status in Europe in a direct manner.

This calls for a broader understanding of citizenship, which is “conceptualised not just as a status that can be given and taken by the state but as a set of social practices of engagement with civil society over governance issues at personal and local level” (Jamieson et al., 2005).

According to this alternative approach, citizenship goes beyond the political science definitions and strives for a “more total relationship, inflected by identity, social positioning, cultural assumptions, institutional practices and a sense of belonging” (Werbner and Yuval-Davis, 1999). Matters of concern to citizens should be confronted on a daily basis. Although according to the 1997 Eurobarometer study, the main concerns of young people were employment, social inclusion, the fight against social exclusion, peace and security, with not much importance being given to the relationship with the European institutions, a similar study ten years later refers to the necessity to consult young people before any public decision that concerns them is taken.
As much as citizenship has been linked to identity, belonging and common concerns, citizenship in its essence engenders a distinction of “others”, of the non-citizens. While at the national level this may lead to a nationalist discourse arguing against difference, the supranational dimension of “Europeanness” calls for an expanding understanding of citizenship, which is based on a conscious and active dialogue with other citizens that celebrates diversity and protects human rights. The reality confirms that developing this sense of European identity, which is personal and based on individual experiences of young people living in Europe, is not an easy task, as it requires “everyday social interactions that emotionally invest in and habitually practice as well as consciously express this type of active citizenship” (Jamieson et al., 2005).

Considering the human rights based approach to European citizenship, which extends further than the continent’s borders, it could be easily understood as a step towards a global identity and humanity without frontiers (Levy-Strauss, 1966). In this sense, instead of basing European identity and citizenship on states, territory, national and cultural traditions, it should be founded on a legal identity, which celebrates human rights and democracy, and is impartial vis-à-vis cultural communities, while celebrating their diversity (Delanty, 2000). This legal identity refers to the process of identification with democratic and constitutional norms that provide a basis for a citizenship that goes beyond cultural complexities and calls for a legal system that is fair and neutral in its practice. This kind of active citizenship is based on conscious articulations and negotiations through everyday social interactions. Yet, the legal basis for such European citizenship practice is far from reality when compared to the provisions at national level. The legal dimension of European citizenship is only so developed, there are some extra rights, but recourses to any form of legal protection or legal redress are limited. Whether the framework of European law could be adequately developed to provide rights and protection to all citizens at the European level is still to be examined.

The commitment of the two European institutions, the Council of Europe and the European Union, is to invest and inspire other local and national resources for a European citizenship that is meaningful for young people and their everyday life.

Yet, it remains a reality that this broader understanding of European citizenship and its expression is far from being widely incorporated into formal and non-formal education systems or used in the mainstream media. In addition, investment tends not to reach all the young people in the different social strata. It is to be noted that citizenship education in Europe is not universally taught and, if it is, is usually related to national rather then European citizenship. It is of great importance to consider including elements of European citizenship education into existing curricula, as well as strengthening non-formal citizenship education efforts in the mainstream.

Taking this into account, this book, by means of its contributions, provides a reflection on European citizenship according to the following four thematic areas: the conceptual basis and understandings of European citizenship, inequalities between citizens and “non-citizens” living in Europe, changing patterns in and forms of youth participation in society, and approaches to citizenship education. The last two contributions of this book specifically address the implications of the research on policy, educational and youth work practice.

**Overview of contributions**

The different schools of thought on European and national identities, cultural versus rights-based approaches, and the debates about sameness versus otherness, as well as the overall conceptual basis of European citizenship, are discussed in the contributions of Supriya Singh, Jan Dobbernack, Oana Balescu and Tamara Ehs.

Starting from the European dream and the European integration process, Singh explores the theoretical foundations of citizenship by highlighting the pitfalls in contemporary sociological discourse. While
equal rights are being promoted, as an ideal to work towards, the very essence of society inspires group-differentiated rights and multiple memberships. On the basis of the concept of “other” present in European societies, Singh elaborates a “post-colonial critique” of the existing approaches towards European citizenship, arguing that these also shaped the process of European identity formation through their historical colonies.

Cultural affinities, as a basis for shared identities, that can lead to patriotic sentiments are critically discussed by Jan Dobbernack. His essay distinguishes between the two poles of European mystification and patriotic morality, on the one hand, and the aspirations promoting universal values, and rights and responsibilities, on the other. By combining these different approaches, Dobbernack contemplates on their repercussions in relation to citizenship education and young people.

European citizenship, seen from the point of view of eastern European countries, has often been used as a policy tool kit to attract new member states. Yet, different countries used it for different motivations: overcoming socioeconomic backwardness, guaranteeing protection against a hegemonic neighbour, or promoting civic and modern identities. In her contribution, Oana Balescu offers interesting insights into European identity formation and an understanding of nationality and citizenship in the pre-accession countries, by arguing that through the process of multiple transitions, eastern European countries are more prone to nationalist views. With the priorities on economic and legislative integration, national identities, embedded in their historical-geographical contexts, will have to face various challenges in order to facilitate their renegotiation with others.

A call for demythologising the European project, presented by Tamara Ehs, ponders the paradox of developing European identity to overcome nationalism using the techniques of heroism and imagined community to promote it. This picture is contrasted with the rationally based concept of civil concern, which focuses on the real interests of citizens in the affairs that concern and affect them. While thinking about how to strengthen a sense of civil concern and turn young people into active and concerned citizens, Ehs explores the facts of demography and the changing generations for whom unification of Europe is a reality. By exploring examples of young people’s attitudes to European identity, she demonstrates that multiple identities among the majority of European youth are a reality that cannot be contested. Instead, the focus should be on the history of Europe to be told in a demythologising way, which would encourage a dialogue enabling participation and expression of concerns.

The processes of European integration came hand in hand with the processes of exclusion and “othering”. The challenges in the process of identity formation among immigrant communities in the Netherlands and Germany are discussed by Syuzanna Vasilyan and Meral Gezici Yalcin.

In the example of the Netherlands, Vasilyan analyses the immigration crisis of the Dutch pillar system and its approaches to the integration of immigrant communities. By looking at traditional security, demographic, economic, cultural and social measures, and the “new” categories of gender and youth, Vasilyan highlights the trends and policy implications for the lives of migrants. In relation to young migrants, their living situation is twice as poor as their young Dutch counterparts, when compared to indices of school dropouts, youth unemployment and juvenile delinquency. Although the new policies, based on positive discrimination, account for specific strategies for migrant youth, the lack of an integrated approach may lead to ever greater resentment and separation of the “others”.

The effects of citizenship status on political participation of immigrant youth are examined by Meral Gezici Yalcin, concentrating on the cases of Turkish, Greek and Italian communities in Germany. On the basis of a quantitative research, Gezici Yalcin argues that attitudes towards the “country of origin” and the “receiving country” influence young people’s willingness to obtain German citizenship, as well as their decision to participate in collective action. In her contribution, Gezici Yalcin observes that the process of in-group identification with the country of origin varies across the different minorities, and while among Turkish and Italian youth a stronger identification with their country of origin leads to higher levels of participation, young Greek people show the opposite reaction.
Participation of immigrant youth in society depends not only on their feelings of belonging, but also on their education level and their official citizenship status.

New forms of involvement together with the shift of concepts when looking at participation of young people in civic life and their engagement in political action were examined in the contributions of Elvira Cicognani and Bruna Zani, and Bram Vanhoutte.

By looking at the role of social relationships, Cicognani and Zani explore the different dimensions that give young people a sense of community. Based on research among adolescent youth in Italy, the authors confirmed that community attachment plays a role in the development of social participation during adolescence, which provides a basis for developing behaviour that reflects civic responsibility and increases active citizenship. Participatory approaches that involved entire communities, for example, in the school contexts – schoolteachers, school principals, teachers, students, parents, etc. – and not only adolescents, had a much higher impact on young people’s participation in the community they live in.

Based on the example of young people’s engagement in political action in Flanders, Bram Vanhoutte examines the patterns and the new forms of youth participation in social and civic life. Pondering whether the alternative expressions effectively complement the traditional forms of participation, Vanhoutte differentiates between four political behaviour patterns: political conformists, political inactives, supporters of direct action and political activists, through which young people in Flanders express their political preferences. Lastly, Vanhoutte emphasises the factors that contribute to a particular political behaviour, describing therefore the participation patterns that contribute in significant ways to influencing society.

Challenges of access to citizenship by “invisible” social minorities and multidimensional social exclusion, which limit the capacity to enjoy and access citizens’ rights, are discussed in the case of young LGBT people. A contribution by Judit Takács explores the notions of intimate citizenship and the barriers to its realisation within a community membership and in the attainment of a social status. Based on European research into the living conditions of young LGBT people in 37 countries, similar situations of vulnerability and exclusion could be observed in the family, school, workplace as well as in the media.

In an attempt to overcome the democracy deficit and strengthen participation mechanisms among organised youth civil society and the European institutions, the European Commission has implemented the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC). In her research, Kamila Czerwińska analyses the adequacy of this method in relation to the specific characteristics and needs of the youth field by examining its scope for action and its implementation in practice. Through exploring the limits and challenges of OMC, Czerwińska discussed the possible implications of such structured dialogue on youth attitudes to European citizenship.

The possible models for civil engagement are equally central to the contribution of Terry Barber, albeit viewed from a very different angle. In taking the point of departure as the relationship between the individual and the community, his analysis looks at possible reasons why some young people fail to engage with their communities. The essay suggests that a genuine citizenship can be achieved when practitioners work with young people in an open, supportive and democratic manner. Based on empirical research, Barber highlights good practice in developing processes for active youth citizenship, and offers a new model of engagement between young people and their social counterparts.

Promoting active citizenship through school education has been a priority in many European countries. Based on research conducted in Sweden, Tiina Ekman identifies the reasons for negative attitudes towards political participation, as well as attractive forms of political participation among upper secondary school students. Ekman argues that in order to prepare students to participate actively in
society, more attention should be paid to the political competences that are determined by gender, socioeconomic background and the choice of study programme.

Developing opportunities for vulnerable young people to participate in their local communities certainly represents a challenge. Through the examples of three different projects within youth clubs, secondary schools and the local community developed in co-operation with the City Council of Berlin-Neukölln, Franziska Süllke emphasises the lessons learned in strengthening opportunities for citizenship education in a community where young people from migrant background represent a majority. Among others, Süllke’s contribution highlights the importance of the communication strategy and practical applicability when discussing issues of citizenship, participation, partnership, social cohesion, mutual understanding, equity and solidarity.

Recognising the importance of the conceptual clarifications and the different forms of practising European citizenship by young people, the last two chapters gather observations and recommendations that translate the outcomes of the research presented elsewhere in this publication into the two other areas of policy and practice.

While Nathalie Stockwell and Hanjo Schild highlight the lessons learnt and policy implications within the context of the programming of the European Commission and the Council of Europe, Miguel Ángel García López focuses on the lessons learnt in the context of educational and trainers’ practice.

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Understandings of European citizenship: a post-colonial perspective

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Europe conjures up a variety of images in the developing world. It is viewed as an advanced industrial region, inhabited predominantly by a white Christian population and the centre stage of the Great Wars. Europe is also characterised by technological superiority, economic prosperity, enviable transport networks, and educational institutions of excellence. It is a constituent of the “rich North” and “superior West” and a symbol of liberal thought and enlightenment. Europe’s existence is multidimensional as it can be simultaneously a geographical, cultural and racial entity. Geographically, it can be described as a land mass surrounded by the Atlantic to the west, the Arctic to the north, the Mediterranean Sea to the south and the Ural mountains to the east. Civilizationally, it can be argued that Europe was profoundly influenced by the Greek and the Roman empires. Over the years, the increase in transnational movements of people has turned Europe into a constellation of different ideologies, nationalities, cultures, ethnic and religious groups. Today, the plurality of the population is the most forceful signifier of Europe. Jeremy Rifkin (2004, p. 147) considers it “one of the most culturally diverse areas of the world” as the inhabitants “break down into a hundred different nationalities who speak eighty-seven different languages and dialects”.

This article aims to explore the different contours of European citizenship and in so doing, discusses the criticality of a European identity for understanding European citizenship. What does one mean by European citizenship? Is there a distinction between “European citizenship” and “citizenship of the European Union” or are these two terms synonymous? Who is a European citizen – one who believes in the values and ideals of Europe or one who is recognised by the Maastricht Treaty as a European citizen? Who belongs to Europe and who does not? Can European citizenship end the antagonism towards the “other” that has become so well entrenched in the consciousness of the natives? What are the problems with the notion of European citizenship? What can be done to promote the idea of European citizenship? These are some of the questions and concerns addressed in the article.

It is important to remember, however, that in any discussion on European citizenship, the centrality of the European Union has to be recognised even though it is not synonymous with Europe. The abstruseness of any definition of Europe makes it imperative to take the European Union as the starting point. It is also because the idea of a “European citizenship” was first mooted and institutionalised by the Maastricht Treaty and a study of European citizenship cannot ignore this fact. According to McDonald, it has become difficult to talk about Europe without automatically referring to the European Union (Stacul, Moutsou and Kopnina, 2006, p. 7). The disjunction of European citizenship and the European Union would further deepen the obfuscation of European citizenship. It would make it necessary to make a distinction between “global citizenship” and “European citizenship”. Therefore, this article contends that European citizenship, for all practical purposes, refers to the citizenship of the European Union. Its political system is highly decentralised and based on the voluntary commitment of the member states and its citizens, and relies on sub-organisations to administer coercion and other forms of state power (Hix, 1999, p. 5). The European Union is not a state in the traditional Weberian meaning of the word. The power of coercion, through police and security forces, remains the exclusive prerogative of the national governments of the EU member states (Hix, 1999, p. 4).

2. Fritz Groothues (2002) believes that “European” has never been identified with “white” and the modern immigration of many people from other continents and cultures has only reinforced the need to rethink Europe’s relations with the wider world.
“The European dream”\textsuperscript{3}

Rabindranath Tagore, India’s celebrated literary figure, said that the history of man is shaped by the difficulties that he encounters and though history offers problems, it also claims solutions from us – the penalty of non-fulfilment being death or degradation (Tagore, 2002, p. 53).\textsuperscript{4} The European Economic Community, to some extent, was considered as the most effective solution to the problem of divisive nationalism facing early 20th-century Europe.

Europe’s belief in the nation state and its efficacy in ensuring the welfare of its citizens had received a tremendous jolt after two decades of bloodshed, economic depression, totalitarianism and holocaust (Christiansen, 2001, p. 495). The sheer scale of destruction and loss of human lives made lasting peace in the region unfathomable. Writing about the situation in Europe in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Gideon Rachman (2004) says:

“In 1945, Germany was defeated and in ruins; France was half-starved and humiliated; Britain was bankrupt and on the point of losing its empire; Spain was a backward, isolated dictatorship; and the countries of central and eastern Europe had been absorbed into a Soviet empire. Nobody would have guessed that Europe was at the beginning of a new golden age.”

The existing political bedlam prompted many activists and thinkers to look for an alternative political system that would usher Europe into an era of security and stability. According to Christiansen (2001, p. 495), one of the many ideas that were deliberated upon, and received support from a large majority during the war, was a federal union – a unification of the people of Europe under the rubric of a federal government. The European Union in its present form is a result of this vision, which was aimed at rebuilding the shattered region after two devastating wars.

The European Union symbolises a break with the modern conception of sovereignty and political territoriality. Fundamental to the idea of Europe is the act of “crossing boundaries”, which is connotative of mobility and placelessness (Stacul, Moutsou and Kopnina, 2006, p. 5). This is a key idea behind the conceptualisation of European citizenship, which, amongst other things, refers to “cultural and economic mobility” (Barry, 1993, p. 317). This mobility, buttressed by various institutions and laws of the European Union, is expected to foster unity and a sense of attachment amongst Europeans.

In addition, Europe has moved beyond power into a self-contained world of laws, rules and transnational negotiation and co-operation (Kagan, 2004, p. 3). The liberal spirit of the 1960s that sounded the death knell for modernism gave birth to what Rifkin calls the “European dream”. According to him, it symbolises community relationships, cultural diversity, sustainable development, universal human rights and global co-operation (ibid.). He feels that the European dream lies between postmodernity and an all-embracing global age and acts as a bridge between the two eras (ibid., p. 4).

The process of European integration, which has so far brought together 27 states, was historically concerned with economic and commercial benefits. The present and future aim of the integration process is to amplify the degree of involvement of the citizens, in order to strengthen their feeling of belonging to the European Union, while respecting the diversity of national and regional traditions and cultures (Kouveliotis, 2000). McGarry, Keating and Moore (2006, p. 1) contend that European integration has several dimensions, which pertain to normative changes, market integration and transnational structures. The normative changes refer to a new understanding of sovereignty, self-determination and rights of individuals. The free movement of goods, services, capital and labour characterise the market integration of the European Union. European integration has encouraged the

\textsuperscript{3} A phrase borrowed from Jeremy Rifkin (2004).

\textsuperscript{4} Rabindranath Tagore is one of the most prominent literary giants of India. He was awarded the Noble Prize for Literature, for his collection of poems, Gitanjali (song offerings) in 1913. He was a poet, novelist, philosopher, painter, composer and an educationist.
global trend towards neo-liberal economic policy with its emphasis on trade liberalisation, low inflation, deregulation and tight fiscal budgets (Christiansen, 2001, p. 510). The European Union, Council of Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and a number of inter-state agreements such as the Schengen Agreement on Border Controls are examples of the various transnational institutions that are a result of European integration. Hence, European integration has progressed at three levels, namely the socio-political and cultural, economic and transnational levels.

As far as the European Union is concerned, it can be understood as a conflict between three sets of opposing ideas – European superstate versus union of states; interventionist Europe versus Europe of peace and dialogue; and European democracy and governance versus national democracies. These together have given rise to two opposing camps purporting two major theoretical approaches to study European integration – the “intergovernmentalist approach” of Stanley Hoffman and the “supranationalist approach”. Hoffman refuted the claims of many scholars regarding the weakening of the state. He argued that the “nation state and national governments were considerably more ‘obstinate’ than they were ‘obsolete’” (in Cram, Dinan and Nugent, 1999, pp. 10-11). The intergovernmentalists consider the state to be the most important actor in European integration and consequently concentrate on the study of politics among and within the member states. France and Britain are strong believers of this approach and hope to overcome the European Union’s democratic deficit by strengthening the Council of State representatives (Christiansen, 2001, p. 500).

The supranationalists, on the other hand, regard politics above the level of states as highly significant and give more attention to the political actors and institutions at the European level (Christiansen, 2001, p. 500). The proponents of this approach include eastern European states and smaller members who have much to gain from the strengthening of the Union. Supranationalists believe that if civic education in the 1800s could turn peasants into Frenchmen, why could it not now turn them into Europeans or at least into Europeans of French origin (Nicolaïdis, 2005, p. 100)? Further, the supranationalists are trying to recreate a national mystique at the European level and firmly believe that creation of a single demos, that transcends the state in the case of the European Union, is necessary for a genuine political community of identity (ibid., p. 101). While the supranationalist approach works in favour of smaller states, the intergovernmentalist approach benefits the larger powers.

Citizenship and European citizenship

Citizenship is often understood as a universal concept. All citizens in a nation state are equal before the law. Simply put, citizenship is membership of a nation state, which is deemed as the solitary locus of the political community (Carens, 2004). Membership of a political community gives an identity to an individual that supersedes all the other identities such as that of religion, gender and class. According to Roy (2003), “Citizenship constitutes an overwhelming identity masking all other identities to produce masked and unmarked (and therefore) ‘equal’ citizens of the nation”.

This idealised conception of the nation state presupposes a centralised administration and culturally homogenous form of political community (Carens, 2004). This, however, is a very narrow definition of citizenship considering that the context, in which citizenship operates, has changed. Today, the context is one of globalisation, which requires the unbinding of citizenship from territory and nation state to accommodate the multitude of people, their allegiances and aspirations.

Though citizenship provides equal status to all, it does not ensure equality of conditions. According to Sassen (2004, p. 184), the formal equality granted to all citizens does not give much importance to the substantive social and political equality, despite the current conditions having strengthened the notion of rights and aspirations that go beyond the formal legal definition of rights and obligations. As
Rosaldo (2000, p. 253) puts it, one needs to distinguish between the formal level of theoretical universality and the substantive level of exclusionary and marginalising practices.

The classical understanding of citizenship is presented by T.H. Marshall. According to him (Marshall, 1950), citizenship refers to “full membership in a political community” where membership entails participation by individuals to determine the conditions of their own association. This highlights two important objectives of modern citizenship: (a) fostering horizontal camaraderie by the dissolution of the hierarchies that exist in a political community, and (b) integration of the marginalised and the subjugated. Marshall categorises rights into civil, political and social rights that follow a linear progression. Formulated in the 18th century, civil rights refer to liberty of the individual and his or her full and equal justice before the law. Indispensable to civil rights are political rights that came about in the 19th century. Social rights emerged only in the 20th century, when demands for equal rights in employment, education and health gained prominence. In recent times, however, this understanding of citizenship does not encapsulate the developments in Europe and of the welfare state in general. If one takes a look at liberal democracies, the majority of residents and workers with a legal status have been extended civil and social rights. However, political rights, such as voting or contesting elections, have not been granted. In the case of the European Union, the citizens of the member states, and therefore citizens of the European Union, are given political rights, albeit limited, to vote in European elections in their country of residence. Since the acquisition of political rights is not a prerequisite of social rights and vice versa, the sequencing of civil, political and social rights may not entirely be useful in the present day. Oommen emphasises political, cultural, economic and social rights but recognises the existence of categories of population, which may not be treated equally. According to Oommen (1997, p. 10), full citizenship could be achieved by categories whose internality to the society or the system is not contested (ibid., p. 12).

In the context of Europe, Kymlicka’s idea of differentiated citizenship and affirmative action is most pertinent. Originating from the liberal school of thought, Kymlicka believes that difference and diversity is imperative and indispensable, and only by securing and institutionalising group and differentiated rights can personal freedoms be ensured (Clayton, 2000). To be a citizen is to transcend one’s ethnic, religious and other particularities and to think and act as a member of a political community. In reality, however, human beings seldom manage to dismember these attributes from themselves. Kymlicka’s “multicultural citizenship” is essentially a critique of the unitary model of citizenship, where the state does not make any distinction between its citizens on the basis of their ascriptive identities, and prescribes that every citizen enjoy the same legal rights and that every individual possess the legal status. The unitary model gives highest primacy to the state and is not relevant for the study of European citizenship. It is closer to Walzer’s idea of citizenship, which is linked to territory and emphasises the centrality of the nation state. For example, in France, immigrants and other minorities are seriously perceived as a social problem and a danger to the social order. The idea of a seuil de tolerance, which has characterised French society during much of the 20th century, suggests that every society has a threshold of tolerance concerning foreigners and that conflict is inevitable beyond that limit (Doty, 2003, p. 62). In order, to avoid “conflict” the state expects immigrants to assimilate and equality in status and opportunity is conditioned upon the immigrants conforming to the dominant norms. The banning of the hijabs in the state-run schools is a case in point, where “a measure claiming to be justified as a universal and neutral step in actuality requires conformity with the dominant norm” (O’Cinneide, 2004, p. 47).

Yet, this model fails to capture contemporary realities. The existence of liberal democratic principles and equal citizenship is insufficient to ensure group differentiated rights. It is also inadequate to deal with the multiple dimensions of memberships and allegiances. Kymlicka and Norman identify three categories of groups whose “difference” may require recognition and argue that each kind involves a specific kind of group rights (Painter, 2005). First, the disadvantaged group that includes the poor, the

5. The report was prepared by Corentin Calvez in 1969 for the Economic and Social Council and introduced into French policy making the link between limitation and integration. At the heart of the concept of seuil de tolerance are the rather slippery concepts of cultures and civilizations to which foreigners and non-foreigners are presumed to belong or not belong.
elderly and sexual minorities that may demand “special representative rights”. Such rights have the aim of enhancing the voice of oppressed minorities within the political system. The aim is to reach a stage when such special rights may no longer be required. Second, cultural groups who demand the right to self-government and self-determination. They can be distinguished from immigrants and are generally referred to as “national minorities” or “minority nations” (McGarry, Keating and Moore, 2006, p. 2). These national minorities can exist as a minority within a host state (Irish nationalists in the United Kingdom); as minorities in the host state but the majority in another state (such as the Hungarians of Slovakia, Romania and Serbia); or as minorities in more than one state and a majority in none (Basques in Spain and France) (ibid.). Immigrants form the third group who need to be awarded special rights to express their cultural particularity without any danger of socioeconomic marginalisation and discrimination.

According to Carens (2000), the unitary model is empirically inadequate, as it does not correspond to actual practices in many states, which embody recognition of multiple forms of belonging and of overlapping citizenships. It lacks theoretical substance in the sense that it fails to see the ways in which recognition of difference may be essential to fulfil the commitment to equality (ibid.). European citizenship, in comparison, is more accommodative and closer to the multicultural rights of Kymlicka.

European citizenship is distinct from the general understanding of citizenship, which is entwined with that of nation state. It is a post-national, as opposed to national, citizenship. European citizenship is acquired at the level of the nation state. The European Union and Switzerland are the only exceptions with regard to acquisition of formal citizenship through birth, residence or naturalisation, as in both cases citizenship is acquired at the provincial level. In Switzerland, citizenship is acquired in the municipality under cantonal law. In the European Union, citizenship is acquired in a member state and federal citizenship is derived from this decision. The crucial difference between these two cases is that Switzerland has a federal law on nationality that lays down the basic rules within which the cantons can adopt their own policies, whereas the European Union has no competency to interfere with or to harmonise its member states’ nationality laws (Bauböck, 2006, pp. 93-94).

According to Friedrich Kratochwill (1991), two focal points of citizenship are: (a) belonging (determined by how the majority community chooses to define itself), and (b) status (bundle of distinctive rights). He believes (in Karst, 1989, p. ix):

“We all need it if we are to know ourselves and locate ourselves in the world …. Who belongs to America? Successive generations of Americans have answered the question differently, with grave consequences for people excluded.”

The European project is as much cultural and political as it is economic and juridical. The development of a sense of European belonging is seen as an important prerequisite for the success of the European project (Shore, 2000, pp. 66-86). A public information pamphlet from the EU makes this explicit (Painter, 2005):

“In order for people to feel like European citizens, they should first and foremost feel some basic sense or geographic attachment to Europe. In the context of European citizenship, it is also important that people feel psychologically attached to Europe. Although at the end of the 20th century one can still not speak of the existence of a truly European identity, the majority of EU citizens feel to some extent European.”

Though the rights associated with European citizenship predated Maastricht, the 1992 Treaty of the European Union, also known as the Maastricht Treaty, formally introduced the concept of European citizenship. The term “European Economic Community” was changed to “European Community”. According to its citizenship clause (Article 5 (C)): “Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a member state shall be a citizen of the Union”. The 1997 draft Amsterdam treaty modified the Maastricht citizenship clause by adding the phrase, “citizenship


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of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship”. This was to douse the anxiety of the member states over the exclusive control of citizenship issues. According to Déloye, these worries are not groundless as “European citizenship produces a reordering of identities” (2000, p. 211).

In the words of Ulrich Preuss (1995):

“European citizenship does not mean membership in a European nation, nor does it convey any kind of national identity of ‘Europeanness’. Much less, of course, does it signify the legal status of nationality in a European state … European citizenship helps to abolish the hierarchy between the different loyalties … and to allow the individuals a multiplicity of associative relations without binding them to a specific nationality. In this sense, European citizenship is more an amplified bundle of options within a physically broadened and functionally more differentiated space than a definitive legal status.”

**Europe’s colonial project and European citizenship**

The impact of colonialism has been significant on the citizenship debate in Europe. Colonialism divided the world into subjects and masters, on one hand, and “metropolis” and “colony” on the other. Decolonisation witnessed a large number of former subjects immigrating to the land of their former colonial masters in search of better economic opportunities. The large-scale presence of subjects created a category of the “other”, which was different from the category of the “other” comprising of immigrants from eastern Europe. The divide between the “coloured others” and natives was more accentuated than other group distinctions. “It seems that the identification with the European project remains marginal but that at the same time the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are drawn between natives and immigrants from other EU countries on the one hand and immigrants from outside Europe and especially from ‘non-white countries’ on the other hand” (Jacob and Maier, 1998). The presence of former subjects reinforced the division between “belongers and non-belongers” and “internality-externality” of a society.

Etienne Balibar (2003, pp. 38-39) has stressed the importance of including the history of colonial expansionism in any study on European citizenship. Edward Said calls this colonial history, the “colonial project” whose (Europe’s colonial history) inclusion is a reality of everyday life in Europe due to the increasingly larger presence of populations from colonial origins in the old metropolises despite the suffered discriminations (Mezzadra, 2005). Reflecting on colonial history is important if we are trying to understand what constitutes the identity of Europe, because the European recognition of otherness is an indispensable element of its own identity and its power. The article has adopted a post-colonial approach to reflect on the issue of citizenship because in post-colonial studies otherness is widely recognised as an essential element of European identity since the beginning of modernity (Mezzadra, 2005). In addition, post-colonialism denotes a situation in which the end of colonialism came about. It also denotes a situation in which the distinction between citizen and subject, on one hand, and metropolis and the colonies, on the other hand, no longer organises any stable world cartography. It is against this background that the paper briefly discusses the case of the United Kingdom.

**A case study of the United Kingdom**

A sound conception of citizenship divides the world into those who belong and those who do not, and in which legal status overlaps with identity. British immigration policy was not based on any meaningful conception of citizenship. In absence of a meaningful concept of citizenship, British immigration policy operated on a proxy. This proxy has been race (Joppke, 1999, p. 101).
The idea of “race” was employed in the United Kingdom to discuss “the colonies” (Miles and Torres, 2000, p. 21). The end of British colonialism in the 1950s and large-scale migration of former subjects to Great Britain brought the problem of race from the periphery to the core. Few people in the United Kingdom would have envisioned such an overwhelming presence of former British subjects living amidst them. Since then, the concept of race and race relations has been central to the citizenship debate in the United Kingdom.

Malik (1996, p. 20) believes that for the British elite, its sense of self and identity was mediated through the concept of race. “Britishness” was a racial concept and large-scale migration from the colonies threatened to disrupt the racialised sense of national identity. A sense of impending danger due to the presence of large numbers of immigrants was created and later used to justify the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, which placed effective controls on immigration from new Commonwealth countries. All the subsequent legislation pertaining to immigration and nationality was aimed at maintaining the racial homogeneity of the United Kingdom.

The 1968 Immigration Act further underlined the British Government’s deliberate policy of clamping down on immigration from Asia, Africa and Latin America. It was almost a xenophobic reaction to coloured immigration and the most racist legislation in post-war Britain, which denied entry to Kenyan Asians with British passports. It was rushed through parliament in three days and was in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Malik, 1996, p. 23). The Times commented, “The labour Party has a new ideology. It does not any longer profess to believe in the equality of man. It does not even believe in the equality of British citizens. It believes in the equality of white British citizens” (ibid., p. 24).

The Immigration Act of 1971 removed the privileged right of entry to the United Kingdom to Commonwealth citizens. Immigration policy in Britain is still fundamentally defined by the 1971 act. The British Nationality Act of 1981 created an even narrower definition of British citizenship, significantly modifying the doctrine of jus soli (acquisition of nationality by birth), which is the traditional nature of British citizenship (Doty, 2003, p. 50).

Along with legislation on nationality, immigration and asylum, the United Kingdom also enacted its first Race Relations Act in 1965. This act prohibited racial discrimination in public places such as pubs or hotels. It was meant to outlaw the existence of a “colour bar” in Britain. The Second Race Relations Act came into force on 26 November 1968. In an attempt to justify the act, Jim Callaghan,
the then Home Secretary, had said while presenting it to parliament, “The House has rarely faced an issue of greater social significance for our country and our children.”

According to Michael Banton, Britain’s Race Relations Acts suggest “each individual could be assigned to a race and that relations between persons of different races were necessarily different from relations between people of the same race” (Miles, 1993, pp. 5-6). Some scholars claim that racism has been replaced by “cultural fundamentalism” in defining who belongs or does not belong in western democracies (Ong, 2000, p. 21).

Problems and challenges to European citizenship

European citizenship is yet to be concretised; today, it still largely remains within the realm of policy. The unconventionality of “European citizenship” does not make it any easier for the ordinary person to understand its complexities. According to Václav Havel (in Groothues, 2002):

“The most important task facing the European Union today is to come up with a new and genuinely clear reflection on what might be called European identity, a new articulation of European responsibility, an intensified interest in the very meaning of European integration in all its wider implications for the contemporary world, and the recreation of its ethos, or, if you like, its charisma.”

First, it is derivative in the acquisition of citizenship status. The European Union does not have authority to grant the status of citizen; it can be acquired only through nationality of one of the member states. The exclusive competence of the member states to determine who is a national, and therefore an EU citizen, deprives the Community of the right to decide who is subjected to the EU law (Rostek and Davies, 2006). The idea of a “European citizenship” is considered one of the least successful and confounding aspects of the Maastricht Treaty.

Second, national citizenship expresses the stronger identity. In case of conflicts between citizenship rights and duties attached at the federal and the sub-state level, it is the national citizenship that will take priority.

Third, it is an “elitist” idea. Though the creation of the EU has allowed the war-torn continent to tackle integration more pragmatically, the EU’s fundamental problem is that it was not built on a democratic foundation; its citizens were not asked to vet the Union’s creation (Nicolaïdis, 2003, p. 98).

Fourth, many people in Europe do not understand the manner in which European citizenship works. The democratic model that the EU espouses is something that Europeans cannot recognise easily. As an anonymous critic put it, “the concept of Union citizenship as embodied in the Maastricht Treaty amounts to nothing more than a new name for a bunch of existing rights, a nice blue ribbon around scattered elements of a general notion of citizenship. The dynamism is … pie in the sky” (in Guessgen, 2000).

Fifth, there is a lack of accountability in the European Union. It does not have a separate legislative or executive branch. Nicolaïdis (2005) contends that the European Commission, which comprises nationals from every member state, holds more power than any national administration and is unelected. Though the ministers in the EU Council ought to address the views and problems emanating from their national constituencies, they can easily claim to have been outnumbered and

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10. Race Relations Act 1968. The 1968 act kept the existing definition of racial discrimination, but it made the law broader in scope. It became unlawful to discriminate on racial grounds in new areas, such as employment, providing goods, facilities, or services, housing and trade unions. It also covered advertising.

11. This according to Robert Miles is a “circular definition of race”. A “race” is a group of people defined by “their race”: this formulation assumes and legitimises as a reality that each human being “belongs” to a “race”.

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hence outvoted in Brussels. Similarly, the EU Parliament cannot enact legislation and does not have any control over the disbursement of resources.

Sixth, the member states of the European Union have distinct histories. Others claim, “It is a watershed but warn that it will blur the precious differences among the members’ unique histories and identities, turning the EU into a monolithic United States of Europe” (Nicolaïdis, 2005, p. 97).

Seventh, European integration has opened up political space beyond the state that minorities can occupy. Unfortunately, this space remains limited and the EU and other European institutions remain largely intergovernmental in nature. Just as states decide whether cross-border and inter-state cooperation happens, they also control Europe’s political institutions and access to them (McGarry, Keating and Moore, 2006, pp. 16-17). The European Union is predominantly statist in nature and this can be seen in its treatment of regional languages. For example: Catalan is not one of the twenty official languages of the European Union in spite of the fact that millions of people speak Catalan in three European states and it is the tenth most widely spoken language in the European Union (ibid.). The recognition of language is important as it is intricately connected to the self-esteem of minorities (ibid.).

Eight, identity originates in a “community”. Europe is extremely heterogeneous for that kind of a community to evolve (Joppke, 1999, p. 191). The European Union has tried to introduce European identity with an anthem and a flag. During the Italian presidency in 1995, provision was made to boost European identity in “areas of great symbolic value and therefore capable of contributing towards an enhancement of shared community values” (Groothues, 2002). However, such efforts have not been very successful, due to the ever changing and ever evolving nature of identity. In this scenario, merely developing “Euro symbols” will deepen the democratic deficit of the Union.

Ninth, the European Union has an uphill task to unite east and west politically, culturally, economically and ideologically. Cross-border and inter-state co-operation is one of the key objectives of the European Union. Batt opines (2006) that, while British-Irish co-operation can characterised as extremely successful in bringing an intractable conflict to an end, the same might not be true for eastern European countries. Further, most of these states oppose a reduction in their boundaries and a few wish to reclaim lost territory. Many states in the region are new states that gained freedom through secession and therefore jealously guard their territorial integrity; others have new ones carved out of them (ibid., pp. 169-190). For example: Serbia and Hungary have not accepted their downsizing. Serbia and Hungary “have not just lost territory but territory that in nationalist mythology represents the ancestral heartland of Kosovo and Transylvania respectively” (ibid.).

Tenth, excluding foreign residents from Union citizenship has further hampered their position in European societies. Every new privilege enshrined in European Union citizenship puts non-EU migrants in a worse position. The effect of Union citizenship on EU nationals can best be explained by the example of Germany where immigrants constitute 10% of the total population of which 75% come from non-EU countries (Rostek and Davies, 2006). Withol de Wenden feels that EU citizenship has established a hierarchical relation between citizens of member states and third country nationals. He says “at the centre we find the national of the state where he is living, then the Europeans whose rights are reciprocal with those given to foreigners in other European states, then the long-term non-European residents, the non-European non-residents, the refugees, and at the margins, the asylum seekers and the illegals” (ibid., p. 25). “In post-war Europe foreign nationals, regardless of nationality, have been increasingly granted the same social, economic and civic rights which state citizens are entitled to. The legal status of foreign residents and nationals has become more and more equal all over Europe” (Jacobs and Maier, 1998).

Eleventh, the perceived nexus between Islam, on the one hand, and religious extremism and political violence, on the other hand, has painted a negative picture of Muslims world over. Europe has witnessed strengthening of anti-Muslim sentiments. According to popular perceptions in most western European states, “Muslims are making politically exceptional, culturally unreasonable or theologically
alien demands upon European states” (Madood, 2003, p. 100). This has heightened sensitivities towards Muslims, leading to a perception that views Muslims as a homogenous group, inherently fundamentalist and violent, with little or no internal heterogeneity in terms of cultural, geographical or ideological orientations. The stereotyping of Islam and Muslims in general has been the most unfortunate fallout of 9/11, which has widened the gulf between the Muslims and their host societies.

**Conclusion**

Identity cannot be imposed. The European Union in the past has attempted to introduce a European identity with an anthem and a flag. During the Italian presidency of the European Union in 1995 provision was made to boost European identity in “areas of great symbolic value and therefore capable of contributing towards an enhancement of shared community values”. All these attempts were top down and raised questions about the EU’s democratic legitimacy, efficiency and transparency. The concept of nation state gained renewed strength, since people did not want to accept an identity imposed on them by an EU they thought of as bureaucratic, wasteful and remote. European citizenship in the true sense can be developed only by working at the grass-roots level.

There is a need to generate a broad-based consensus on the issue of European citizenship. A holistic understanding of citizenship cannot be developed if its onus lies solely with the bureaucrats in Brussels or Strasbourg. More and more ordinary people have to be involved. Without the “trickling down” of this holistic understanding of European citizenship, a European demos cannot be created.

Any attempt to create a citizenship based on a European identity surpassing national identities will be difficult and may not be the best way for the future of European citizenship. This will exacerbate the alienation and exclusion of minority communities. There should be mutual recognition of members’ identity rather than a common identity. For example: in India, the religious minorities have the freedom to have their respective personal laws despite a common criminal law. Similarly, affirmative action and positive discrimination have been adopted by way of special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes or for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.

The European Union will have to shed its distinctly western orientation, with its main institutions in Belgium, Luxembourg and France. With 27 members on board and many still waiting in the wings, the coming decade will in a way decide the future of the European Union. Groothues (2002) feels that “at the very least, there needs to be a symbolic counterbalance, making us aware of the enriching effect of integrating the accession countries. This is the first key element in constructing a new identity: embracing the dynamism of enlargement.”


> “Alienation from politics is not just a European problem, it is global, national and local. But for the Union it presents a particular challenge. Given the deep level of integration already achieved, people have similar expectations for the Union as they have for domestic politics and political institutions. But the Union cannot develop and deliver policy in the same way as a national government; it must build on partnerships and rely on a wide range of actors. Expectations must be met in different ways.”

The White Paper identifies participation as one of the five principles necessary for good governance, as it is expected to improve both the efficiency and legitimacy of European governance. It expects to connect Europe with its citizens. It is also expected to reduce the emphasis on the top-down approach and make the policy process more inclusive and accountable. All this should “create more confidence” in European institutions and generate “a sense of belonging to Europe.” The White Paper suggested a
shift in the approach of the Union towards citizenship. In the past where a sense of belonging has been attempted to be created through policies, the White Paper actually talks of its creation through democratic practices (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003). For Magistro (2007, 1 (1), pp. 51-73):

“It is indeed a supranational identity, a sense of European togetherness, that seems to be among the public goods the EU needs to advertise in this crucial phase of its development, a product that, if ‘consumed’, can help preserve the delicate balance between nationalism and supranationalism …. Selling or simply publicising a supranational identity to Europeans is a challenging and delicate enterprise as, generally speaking, these problematic ‘buyers’ already have well-defined local identities.”

However, it is without doubt that the European Union is one of the biggest and most exciting experiments of the 20th century. Despite its failings, it has provided millions across Europe with a hope of equal treatment. The project that was undertaken half a century ago will take some time to fructify. The idea of European citizenship is more symbolic than substantive in nature. One of the objectives of its establishment was to overcome the democratic deficit. However, the emphasis should be on establishing a European community where the “other” is seen in relation to the “self” and not in opposition. Efforts should be made to foster fellow-feeling and create a bond between people.
European citizenship: between patriotic sentiments and universal rights

Jan Dobbernack

“… for he who has a right to a share in the judicial and executive part of government in any city, him we call a citizen of that place; and a city, in one word, is a collective body of such persons sufficient in themselves to all the purposes of life” (Aristotle, Politics, 1275b).

“I am a citizen of the world” (Diogenes the Cynic, rumoured).

A statement attributed to Jacques Delors, “no one falls in love with a common market”, allows for opening this article’s area of concern. Beyond the technical and economic aspects of European integration, it raises questions on the purpose of a sentiment such as love towards an entity such as Europe. Is love required to further civic commitment, active participation and an internalisation of European values? Is love not a stance that is reserved for outdated notions of how individuals relate to a given community, such as a patriotic sentiment towards the nation state?

This article suggests that the unresolved debate on potential virtues and dangers of patriotism may inform an approach towards the concept of European citizenship in civic education that confronts, though not necessarily solves, the above puzzles. The alleged benefit of non-exclusive forms of patriotism lies in their potential for rendering civic values tangible and for conveying a sense of their immediacy by drawing on principles, (hi)stories and role models present in the respective national contexts (see MacIntyre, 1995; Galston, 1991). Against this position, philosophers point out the danger of patriotic attachments potentially leading to a perversion of what civic education should be aiming at: grounding active participation in a critical spirit, universal values and human rights.

This contrast proves to be instructive for a discussion of European citizenship. Contemporary approaches towards this concept are situated in between, on the one hand, adherence to universal claims that go beyond the borders of the European polity and, on the other, the reference to shared identities predominantly conceived of through cultural affinities (see Habermas, 1995; Weiler, 1997; Shore, 2004, for similar discussions). In this manner, a debate on the direction citizenship education should pursue in the European context needs to pay tribute to questions such as these: Is it appropriate to convey civic values by reference to shared cultural, historical or religious characteristics? Should civic education draw on the symbolic resources provided by these commonalities and aim for an emotional attachment with Europe conceived of as a cultural/historical/religious community? Or should any morally warrantable agenda in civic education refrain from doing so and promote universal values by way of reference to a canon of universal rights that extend beyond the particularities of culture/history/religion? This article conceptualises these alternatives and explores possible places of European citizenship in between patriotism and cosmopolitan lines of reasoning.

First, the article situates the discussion within broader strategic choices of political philosophy. Second, it investigates the moral implications of citizenship by casting light on debates among adherents of cosmopolitan thought, and, third, theorists striving for a rehabilitation of patriotism. Fourth, it weighs up the choices and considers the position of citizenship education in between civic passion arising from identification with particularities of Europe and universal morality. Finally, the article argues for the pluralist vision of a “bicameral orientation”, which combines deep normative commitments to the particular with a readiness for open conversations. This stance, powerfully

12. See, for example the vivid case made by Martha Nussbaum (1996), or the works of the educationalist Eamon Callan (1994).
formulated by William Connolly (2005), might allow for forms of civic education that inspire enthusiastic engagement whilst retaining openness beyond communal boundaries.

Two languages of political philosophy

Approaching concepts such as citizenship requires some reflexion on the standpoint of the observer and on the reality of the concept in question. First, a normative-evaluative stance may be concerned with giving judgment on the practical implications of prevalent forms of citizenship, be it the inclusion of outsiders or the consequences of liberal or republican notions of citizenship for how individuals relate to a given polity. A second approach is largely concerned with the deconstruction of concepts such as citizenship. With critical theories increasingly incorporated into the scholarly canon, the claims of concepts such as “the nation”, “the state”, “community” and “citizenship” have been questioned and often enough found wanting. Accordingly, these concepts should be regarded as entities not outside the range of individual and collective agency, but as emerging from the interplay of social forces, discourses, structural determinants, or individual and collective action over time. This historicising venture, thus, defamiliarises political concepts that have come to acquire quasi-natural status in the course of their employment.

The separation between normative evaluation and deconstruction, however, appears unsatisfactory when aiming for analysis and normative evaluation at the same time. A question that brings together both language codes for making sense of citizenship may proceed as follows: What kind of citizenship should we be constructing in order to build the kind of community we desire to live in? Somewhat naively, this question rejects reified notions of political community and approaches citizenship as something in-the-making. Whilst the underlying idea of a manipulability of individual-community relations is certainly not universally warranted, this approach involves a normative commitment to the value of individual decisions in the creation of desirable communities. It involves a deconstructive move away from sedimented traditions, objectified social relations and the naturalist pretence of settled language codes towards an emphasis on the construction of the “good” community – and the negotiation of what “the good” may look like.

These brief thoughts on possible approaches towards concepts in political philosophy indicate the somewhat intricate area of this article. Its aim is to investigate content and consequence of ideas, such as cosmopolitan values, civic commitment and patriotic sentiment, which, looked upon from the deconstructive perspective, are anything but real. Notwithstanding, their reality for moral agency needs to be taken into account to lead a discussion on how values should be realised in the construction of desirable political communities.

Cosmopolitanism and the universal aspiration

Cosmopolitanism, according to Thomas Pogge, involves the commitments to individualism, universality and generality (Pogge, 1992, p. 48). Rather than departing from an emphasis on the nation state or distinct groups (for example, families, ethnic, religious or national communities), it singles out the individual human being as its primary object of concern. Universality refers to the equal distribution of this concern focusing on humankind in toto and going beyond its subdivisions into cultural, religious or gendered subgroups. Generality, according to Pogge, refers to the force of its

13. Indeed, the “state”, “nation”, “political community” and notions of citizenship that connect the former with the political life of individual persons have been productively challenged over time. In the literature on the formations of nation states (Anderson, 1983; Tilly, 1990) the reconstruction of historical occurrences serves to point out the particular constellations that brought into existence nations as we know them. Moreover, scholarly work on the emergence of nationalism (for example, Gellner, 1983; Brubaker, 1996) has pointed out the functional logic of nationalisms in the creation of the nation state and highlights its purpose for the actualisation and reaffirmation of states’ claims to sovereignty and its significance in the mobilisation of people spread out over large-scale territories.
claim that is directed not towards marked-off groups but involves the allocation of obligations of everyone for everybody. These features of cosmopolitan thinking are part of an age-old branch of political theorising that is united by the purpose of transcending the contingent boundaries of particular groups. Stoicism in the Roman world (see Hadas, 1943; Hill, 2000), the theological thought of Augustine’s Civitas Dei, and the universalism of Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace exhibit this commonality of providing a moral theory that aims at overcoming the significance of boundaries for normative judgment – or at least at establishing a second domain of moral judgment of overarching importance to the particularity of life in the community – and, thus, for establishing obligations towards the communal “outsider”. A contemporary revival of cosmopolitan lines of thought comes along as part of renewed concerns with global justice in the light of, on the one hand, poverty-struck and war-torn regions in the Third World, and, on the other, affluence and peace in the West. In particular, Charles Beitz has taken up cosmopolitan ideals to substantiate his call for global commitment in sometimes painstaking justifications of universal obligations in the light of the impermeable boundaries of sovereign states, limited resources and the recurrent unwillingness to help and intervene on behalf of others (Beitz, 1979, 1989; Beitz and Alexander, 1985).

In a more recent attempt, Martha Nussbaum introduces a set of cosmopolitan ideals with particular emphasis on questions of education. Building on the image of concentric circles of obligation, she goes on to adopt an inclusive view and rejects physical proximity as the governing principle for allocating obligations. Nussbaum (1996, p. 9) contends that:

“we should … work to make all human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern, base our political deliberations on that interlocking commonality, and give the circle that defines our humanity special attention and respect.”

Shared nationality, as a “morally irrelevant characteristic” (ibid., p. 5), should not serve as an excuse for the abrogation of obligations towards those in more distant circles. The principles of common humanity and world citizenship, indeed, require an equal distribution of concern. Nussbaum acknowledges that certain obligations may be better served within narrow circles, such as the upbringing of children by their natural parents. However, when it comes to national groups, ethnic or religious communities and states, she points out their moral insignificance as the allegiance to humanity precedes any particular and accidental sense of belonging. The common feature of the cosmopolitan argument is this representation of communal boundaries as morally insignificant. Other theorists, however, cast doubt on the cosmopolitan line of reasoning.

Critics of cosmopolitanism: the principle value of culture

While the normative thrust of cosmopolitan thought is generally considered sympathetically, it has been argued that certain spheres of commitment need to be established in order to arrive at a morality that appears to fit to what human beings are like. Thus, apologists for the moral significance of boundaries generally proffer some anthropological undergirding for their reasoning. Emphasis is put on the relevance of cultural contexts for the constitution of individual agency and identity. Human beings, according to one line of argument, require a “standpoint in the somewhere” in contrast to the allegedly detached perspective of cosmopolitanism’s “standpoint in the nowhere”. Human beings are situated in concrete social and cultural contexts; addressing moral agents requires acknowledging the specificity of the context in which agents are being constituted and constitute themselves. In this

14. Indeed, Kant may have defined the cosmopolitan agenda – or at least its promise – most vividly by arguing that “the narrower or wider community of the peoples of the earth has developed so far that a violation of rights in one place is felt throughout the world” (Kant, 1795/1963, p. 105). Much could be said on the lack of credibility of many cosmopolitan claims in the light of the Stoic justification of slavery or outrages committed in the name of the Catholic Church. What this article will be concerned with, however, is merely a type of moral argument and not the consistency of its practical application.
16. Another case could be made on the limits to what human beings can (be expected to) do in the light of global injustice, limited resources and the preoccupation with the relatively narrow concentric circle of one’s daily life.
manner, Charles Taylor provides two types of argument, which may be read as attempts to rehabilitate the moral significance of boundaries.

First, to uphold democratic modes of political organisations, always a complex and arduous task, civic commitment is a requirement. Civic commitment, however, can only be incited and instilled when community members attribute some fundamental importance to their community. Taylor argues that this kind of participation “requires not only a commitment to a common project, but also a special sense of bonding among the people working together” (Taylor, 1996, p. 120). Patriotism may instil this bonding.

Taylor’s second line of argument is part of his argument of how the formation of individual identities coincides with conceptions of “the good”. Cultural contexts, Taylor argues, figure as a background frame against which individual value judgments become possible. In order to arrive at ideas of “the desirable” and “the valuable” human beings draw on practices that are part of the cultural background they grow up in. Even the attempt to dissociate oneself from one’s upbringing, cultural heritage and so on obtains meaning, and only becomes an individual moral choice, against the cultural practices from which it dissociates itself. Moreover, the inextricable “situatedness” of individual human beings in cultural contexts makes “good life” only attainable when the context as such may become the potential object of esteem (Taylor, 1995). This argument certainly does not function as a description of the current state of affairs, but as a prescription for how individuals may lead good lives in good communities – which, then again, might still need to be constructed.

From a different angle, Michael Walzer (1996, p. 125) casts doubt on the notion of world citizenship that often comes along as part of the cosmopolitan extension of circles of obligations beyond the nation state:

“[I am] not even aware that there is a world such that one could be a citizen of it. No one has offered me citizenship, or described the naturalization process, or enlisted me in the world’s institutional structures, or given me an account of its decision procedures (I hope they are democratic), or provided me with a list of the benefits and obligations of citizenship, or shown me the world’s calendar and the common celebrations and commemorations of its citizens.”

Walzer’s argument amounts to a complaint about the lack of proper institutionalisation of anything remotely reminiscent of a world polity. Equally important, however, is his reference to the lack of common celebrations and commemorative events in any kind of world community. Put differently, Walzer is concerned with the lack of cultural material and symbolic resources he considers to be an important part of what being a citizen amounts to. The hollowness of any contemporary notion of world citizenship does not provide the ground material for individuals to identify and Walzer finds it hard to believe that anybody could arrive at a sense of obligation and commitment without such symbolic resources available. Both Taylor’s and Walzer’s positions point to the necessity of symbolic resources for civic commitment that are part of growing up and being socialised in specific and particular contexts. Against the cosmopolitan perspective, their emphasis on thick cultural backgrounds as a prerequisite for civic commitment asks for a different kind of moral reasoning and, certainly, for a different starting point in civic education.

**Patriotism: the principle of proximity**

A disclaimer is due before engaging with concepts of patriotism. What is meant here are moderate forms of patriotism, namely, notions of patriotism that show sensitivity to the perversions of xenophobia and racism. The concept, however, is intricate to approach as there is neither a settled understanding nor, accordingly, an unequivocally acknowledged demarcation between patriotism and nationalism. Some have argued that the key difference between the two lies in the nationalist inclination to postulate the superiority of one’s nation – in contrast to patriotism’s lack of comparative desires of such kind – and then infer a claim to political dominance. While this distinction is hard to
corroborate on the ground, it may make sense to bracket nationalism from the debate and focus on what are said to be the distinguishing marks of “moderate” or “good” patriotisms. Patriotism is characterised, as Igor Primoratz (2002, p. 444, emphasis in original) argues convincingly, by:

“a certain type of concern for one’s country and compatriots. It is special concern for their interests, their welfare: a stronger and deeper concern than the concern one has for all other human beings.”

Worth mentioning, that from this point of view the concept of a critical patriotism looses its persuasiveness. Whether “love of one’s country” allows a critical distance towards one’s nation state certainly is an important question to answer; if patriotism, however, is essentially defined by creating a sphere of particular obligation and by charging territorial boundaries with moral significance, critical distance towards the shortcomings of one’s community does not diminish the hierarchisation of obligations according to the principle of proximity.

Having dealt with the cosmopolitan charge against this principle, the investigation will now turn to a more specific line of argument – Alasdair MacIntyre’s reasoning on the virtue of patriotism. MacIntyre takes the concept as a motive to question some fundamental issues of liberal moral theory. The issue of patriotism challenges the conception of neutral moral points of view from which to pass judgment on particular issues according to universal standards. Patriotic morality discards this standpoint. In important cases – MacIntyre refers to the distribution of vital resources and aggressive foreign policies – patriotism’s claim might not coincide with the demands of universal morality. Against this notion of the universal, individual and general claims of morality, patriotism leads MacIntyre to consider a version of morality that puts fundamental importance on the question of “where and from whom I learn my morality”. It is important to mention that he does not endorse this version (indeed, MacIntyre offers no answer to his initial question, “Is patriotism a virtue?”). It does, however, serve as a contrast foil against which to point out the shortcomings of liberal moral theory:

“Detached from my community, I will be apt to lose my hold upon all genuine standards of judgment. Loyalty to that community, to the hierarchy of particular kinship, particular local community and particular natural community, is … [thus] a prerequisite for morality. So patriotism and those loyalties cognate to it are not just virtues but central virtues” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 11).

Recalling the argument of Charles Taylor, one notable difference, however, can be discerned. While communal culture, in Taylor’s account, constitutes the building blocks, which people can avail themselves of to evaluate their life choices, the “morality of patriotism” in MacIntyre’s wording, figures as a determinant for individual choices. It seems that, while Taylor argues for the value of cultural contexts for individual moral choices, MacIntyre’s representation points towards a rejection of individual moral choices that exceed communal boundaries.

The danger with this kind of moralising, it seems, lies in falling for a reified concept of culture understood as something that inevitably, absolutely and inextricably determines our viable conceptions of “the good”. Thus, a middle ground between culturalist determination and the liberal disregard for culture appears warranted. This is particularly the case if taking seriously Taylor’s and Walzer’s position that passionate civic commitment depends on some kind of cultural undergirding and symbolic material to draw on.

Forms of cosmopolitan and patriotic morality

At this point, there is no need to further evaluate the normative claims of the cosmopolitan and the patriotic argument. The two figure as prototypes of reasoning either questioning or putting emphasis on territorial and cultural boundaries as a significant variable in moral arguments. Both types are

17. Consider the value-laden uses of the labels “patriotic” (mostly as a positive self-description) and “nationalist” (mostly as a negative attribution). Stephen Nathanson (1993, p. 185) argues convincingly that the distinction is all the harder to corroborate as there are illiberal and liberal understandings of both concepts.
seldom encountered in pure forms. Elements of their claims and derivatives, however, are at hand in almost every invocation of citizenship and talk on the nature of individual-community relations.

Elements of cosmopolitan judgment are closely related to many other forms of moral universalism. The universality of human rights contains a claim that exceeds boundaries; enlightenment ideals ascribe rationality and a potential for emancipation to every human being. Value commitments that start from these ideals are usually charged with cosmopolitan undertones. Moreover, regarding the cosmopolitan ideal of a world state, it comes as no surprise that passionate proponents of human rights generally stand up for strong international institutions and advocate scaling down the sovereign power of the nation state.

This, however, is not to deny the significance of the patriotic point of view. In the image of outwardly diminishing circles of obligation, there lies a pragmatic element of patriotic morality, which ascribes special status to insiders, for example, those with closer proximity to the centre. The pragmatism of contemporary policy making, for example the decreasing amounts of foreign aid justified with the need to spend resources on domestic policy issues, points towards the prevalence of pragmatic patriotism in contemporary policy making.

There is, it seems, a mixture of cosmopolitan universality and patriotic particularity in our moral choices and in the choices made on our behalf by political actors. Rather than radically separating the two from a conceptual point of view, the article will now briefly trace their persistence in thinking on what European citizenship is and should be like.

**European citizenship in-between two poles**

The ethical implications of European citizenship are difficult to comprehend. Different understandings of citizenship indicate different political resolutions to individual-community relations and seem to bear witness to specific kinds of morality afforded or seen to be prevalent in a community. While they may testify to a strong sense of obligation towards a nation state, the contemporary situation in Europe asks riddles as to what sense of obligation and commitment may come along with being a citizen of Europe. Unsurprisingly, the most formidable challenge is the peculiar status of the European polity – be it something completely different from nation states or an attempt to mimic the shape of the state. The preceding paragraphs, however, serve to pin down two poles for how to make sense of Europe as a polity with demands on moral responsibilities, obligations towards others within and outside of that polity and the rising call for active citizenship.

On the one hand, one can witness attempts towards a framing of Europe in terms of symbolic resources that were previously regarded to be the exclusive domain of nation states. Besides the incremental institutionalisation of the European polity, a European currency has been introduced, European symbols invented, and the European Union even seems to develop forms of a founding myth, which may one day even take a shape similar to the grand narratives that are being told about the emergence of individual nation states. While it is not the point here to assess whether these trends

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19. In this context, the European Commission has argued that symbols “play a key role in consciousness-raising, but there is also a need to make the European citizen aware of the different elements that go to make up his European identity, of our cultural unity with all its diversity of expression, and of the historic ties which links the nations of Europe” (Commission of the European Communities (1988): A People’s Europe. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament. COM (88) 331/final. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement No. 2, Luxembourg).
20. For a critical evaluation of the significance and function of myths, see the article by Tamara Esh in this volume.
21. This founding story, which is certainly not as settled as national narratives, may take up the motif of peace after the Second World War, the historical accords made between previously antagonist peoples and leaders, or, as recent elements, the struggles in setting up a constitution. While this argument appears somewhat odd at this stage of the European integration process, it is by no means the case that bureaucratic and technical arrangements never before received a symbolic conversion. For a similar line of thought see Benedict Anderson’s account of how contingent bureaucratic decisions are afforded symbolic status and, thus, obtain relevance beyond the bureaucratic act itself (Anderson, 1983). Anthony Smith, however,
are desirable, one can still ascertain the significance of these attempts inasmuch as they are aiming at the introduction of something new, the framing of Europe as an entity one can be loyal to, one can refer to in one’s self-descriptions, one can relate to as something that provides oneself with a cultural identity and, particularly interesting, as something that allocates obligations calling for active participation. Casting this development in terms of the moral options sketched out above, it can be argued that this might be the beginning of a European patriotic project that might, eventually, allow for a particular European standpoint of moral judgment. Indeed, recent attempts to convey meaning to European citizenship follow this kind of reasoning. Thus, for some participants in the debate, the question is not any more whether it should be, but how a genuine European patriotism could be, created. There is, however, some anxiety about Europe’s universal aspirations and its open-ended integration process, which is regarded as being too big a task when truly operational supranational institutions should be the primary goal of further integration. A contribution by the Belgian MEP Gérard Deprez and Domenico Rossetti di Valdalbergo gives evidence of such conflicting motives:

“La relance de l’intégration européenne, déjà à Quinze mais encore plus à Vingt-cinq, passe par le développement d’un patriotisme européen. Inspiré des valeurs universalistes de l’Europe, loin d’être enfermé sur lui-même, ce patriotisme sera ouvert sur le monde.”

What is the meaningful content of patriotism when characterised by unlimited openness? Indeed, the authors seem to be taking from the best of two worlds – the establishment of a sphere of particular attachment while rejecting the normative consequences arising from drawing boundaries and insisting on the ideals of moral universalism. A more consistent account is provided by Dominique de Villepin, who advocates a form of economic patriotism:

“l’Europe doit mieux défendre les intérêts de ses citoyens et de ses entreprises. Et c’est pour cela, même si le terme est parfois mal compris, que j’insiste sur la nécessité d’un véritable patriotisme européen: il ne s’agit pas de se replier derrière un protectionnisme qui est bien sûr dépassé. Il s’agit au contraire de rassembler nos forces, d’unir nos efforts pour aller dans le même sens et affirmer sans faiblesses nos intérêts dans le monde.”

Even though he withdraws from the undesirable isolationist stance he appears to associate with patriotism, with de Villepin it becomes clearer that patriotism is not about embracing the world, but about safeguarding interests, or, put differently, about reassuring oneself as to the addressees of one’s moral obligations. The attempt is to create a particular European standpoint as a prerequisite for living up to European responsibilities.

The peculiarity of this attempt, however, is the strong status universal morality and openness towards others are being afforded. Indeed, the European project can be read as an attempt in the creation of a

makes a strong case to the contrary, namely, that “[w]hen it comes to the ritual and ceremony of collective identification, there is no European equivalent of national or religious community” (1992, p. 73). His argument, however, draws on the current state of affairs, and does not say much about the future of the integration process.

22. See the interventions by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing whose call for European patriotism is also connected to the demand of setting up clear boundaries for any future expansion of the EU (e.g., www.turquieeuropeenne.eu/auteur149.html ).
23. Own translation: Europe needs to perform better in defending its interests and the ones of its citizens and enterprises. That is why, even if the term is sometimes misunderstood, that I insist on the need to create a genuine European patriotism: this is not about to draw back behind an antiquated protectionism. On the contrary, it is about uniting our forces and our efforts and to pursue the same direction and to affirm our interests in the world without weakness” (www.archives.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/villepin/acteurs/interventions_premier-ministre_9/discours_498/discours_universite_humboldt_berlin_55148.html).
24. Own translation: Europe needs to perform better in defending its interests and the ones of its citizens and enterprises. That is why, even if the term is sometimes misunderstood, that I insist on the need to create a genuine European patriotism: this is not about to draw back behind an antiquated protectionism. On the contrary, it is about uniting our forces and our efforts and to pursue the same direction and to affirm our interests in the world without weakness” (www.sig.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/acteurs/interventions-premier-ministre_9/discours_498/discours-dominique-villepin-universite_55148.html).
25. Certainly, nation states frequently embrace universal lines of argument. Consider, one example among many, the French mission civilisatrice: the idea that the moral superiority of French Enlightenment ideals mandates their universal proliferation. The anomaly with universal values in the European case, it seems, lies more in their place, often taken to be the defining features of any European identity (ideals of peace, rights, decent living).
universal standpoint to export stability, human rights and peace beyond its borders. The emergence of a European Convention on Human Rights, the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, and many interventions from the side of the Council of Europe and the Union give evidence of a set of universal responsibilities, which apparently stem from an obligation felt not only to European peoples but towards the whole world. The European project is to a considerable extent about a universal sense of mission.

These two poles, the markedly universal aspirations of the European project and the recurrent attempts to create a patriotic European standpoint, designate the place of European citizenship, as a project of assigning obligations and responsibilities. To close this discussion, the article will now briefly weigh up these choices in the context of European citizenship education.

**Conclusion: the uneasy choices of citizenship education**

David Archard (1999, p. 167) remarks that citizenship education invariably encounters a paradox:

> “The liberal polity, if it is to survive, requires that its citizens patriotically identify with one another and with the project which that polity represents. Yet, if we teach patriotism, civic education betrays the ideals which, arguably, are constitutive of any proper education, chiefly a commitment to the standards of critical reason.”

Archard eventually challenges this paradox and emphasises the position of all critical thought within specific cultural and historical backgrounds. William Connolly offers a similar line of reasoning that might help to include commitments to the particular and strong beliefs with the universal aspirations of cosmopolitanism. Connolly, in his recent book *Pluralism* (2005), argues for what he calls a “bicameral orientation” (2005, p. 5) that involves both deep commitment to the particular point of view and the acknowledgement that there is a plurality of such commitments in the world we live in. The question to be answered in order to create commitment and active citizenship is:

> “how to enliven the dispositions through which perception is colored, concepts are formed, evidence is sifted, interpretation is engaged, arguments are inflected, and faith is consolidated” (ibid., p. 161).

This is most notably not a secular or detached standpoint, but one that allows for strong beliefs such as in the particular value of one’s most inner circles of obligation. Connolly’s call, however, while aiming for this kind of passion and colourful faith – what he calls the vertical dimension of personal commitments – is to retain openness towards the horizontal plurality of strong beliefs, judgments and moral points of view. Thus, patriotic morality might be affordable as long as it negotiates its claims with the knowledge that it cannot be an aggressively unifying project. A “standpoint in the somewhere” (and this “somewhere” being Europe) is required; it should, however, come along as one of the many possibilities people possess to make sense of their lives and commitments. The mistake of the nation state to opt for the coercive imposition of its identity claims should not be repeated.

There might be a wide range of ways to resolve the tension between universal and patriotic morality. It has not been the intention of this article to evaluate how successful proposed solutions are in finding a viable middle ground between patriotic and cosmopolitan morality. The argument, however, is that active citizenship requires deep commitments and strong moral standpoints that serve as pivotal points to ground this commitment. In order for Europe to provide this kind of standpoint, it is not necessary to imitate institutions and symbolic resources provided by the nation state. Having said that, it will not be sufficient to maintain a detached and merely evaluative stance if the aim is to create commitment for the European polity. Borders may be charged with symbolic significance; symbols may be created and narratives established that facilitate assuming a committed European point of view. Values may be

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26. See, for example, Habermas’ constitutional patriotism. For a discussion of some attempts to resolve the tension see Canovan (2000).
grounded in the specificities of European history and culture (to be read as something essentially constructed). Thus, passionate and active citizenship might arise, which, however, needs to be informed by the availability of other legitimate sources of passionate identification.

Let us restate the question laid out at the beginning: What kind of citizenship should we be constructing in order to build the kind of community we desire to live in? This is not a question that teachers of civic education need to answer before engaging with young people. On the contrary, the goal of civic education might be to pose this question together with the young people one is working with. How to accommodate strong commitments to particular communities and how to draw on emotional attachments in order to arrive at active participation is a question that needs to be negotiated within open settings in civic education. Allowing for strong beliefs and commitments within a vision of pluralism indicates one possibility for how this might be achieved. Then, the task for those involved in civic education would be to foster commitments while arguing for a persistent openness towards the other.
Reflections on European identity: the case of eastern European countries

Oana Balescu

“European integration” are two words heard daily in political, social or even business discourse. Whether watching TV, attending university or travelling in the countryside, everybody is talking about the European Union.

The issue of European integration arose in central European countries after the collapse of communism in the early 1990s. In 1993, at The Hague, the European Council decided the main criteria for a country to join the European Union: a functional market economy, the capacity to deal with competition within the Union, adoption of the acquis, which means the capacity to change and adopt laws established by the Union, and political, economic and monetary integration. It was recognised that there are differences among the candidate member states concerning the adoption of the general conditions and criteria because each of them is at a different point of development. Integration took into account these differences and discussions were always based on practical realities. However, there are other things to take into account, things that cannot be touched, such as, identity, citizenship and nations. The European Union does not only mean a gathering of states with commercial and worker exchanges or people moving freely. The European Union is continuously constructing itself, transcending as does the nation state.

The main purpose of this article is to see how the former communist countries will find their own place in this European project. In this respect, the contribution will deal with the concept of European identity in relation to national identity, and the question of how a European identity can be created in the CEE countries? When talking about European identity in the former communist countries, their common history over recent decades will be taken into account – as will, the way they perceive they are or will be treated as members of the European Union – so it will be important to discuss the relationship between European identity and the national identity of a state.

European identity in relation to national identity

The idea of a European identity was created around 1970. Before this, nobody used the concept. The keywords in the Cold War framework were European integration. Identity is a problematic concept. Taking it literally, it means equality, the quality of being identical or being the same. It is a concept used to construct community feelings of cohesion and to convey the impression that all individuals are equal in an imagined community.

At the Copenhagen summit in December 1973, the idea of identity was based on the principle of the unity of the nine, on their responsibility towards the rest of the world, and on the dynamic nature of European construction. The meaning of “responsibility towards the rest of the world” was expressed in a hierarchical way:

– it meant responsibility towards the other nations of Europe with whom friendly relations and co-operation already existed;
– it meant responsibility towards the countries of the Mediterranean, Africa and the Middle East;
– it referred to the relations with the United States, based on the restricted foundations of equality and the spirit of friendship;
– narrow co-operation and constructive dialogue with Japan and Canada;
– relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of eastern Europe;
– a reference was made to the importance of the struggle against underdevelopment in general.

The idea of European identity was an instrument to re-establish order and confidence within Europe and to give the European Union project back the feeling of having a place and a mission in the world order.

The debate about the European Union can be situated within the two ideal types of social organisation distinguished by Ferdinand Tönnies as Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. The distinction between these two concepts is that the first one refers mainly to a certain sense of belonging based on shared loyalties, norms and values, kinship or ethnic ties (community); it is conditioned by feelings. The second, on the other hand, relates to the idea that people remain independent from each other as individuals, but may decide in a “social contract”, or a “convention”, to group together for the conduct of profit-making transactions (society); it remains an artificial construct that will only continue as long as its citizens find the contractual arrangements of common value and it will stop when they decide that it is no longer profitable.

It can be argued that all EU member states have built a European Gesellschaft (society) because the EU exists nowadays as a social contract, but that it lacks the life-and-blood characteristics of an internal living and organic entity; it is not for the moment a truly European Gemeinschaft (community). Also considering that the official, institutionalised name is the European Union, not the European Community, we have evidence of what the project was meant to be in the beginning.

Nation states in many ways continue to cultivate their national heritage, which does no longer have political relevance (as many scholars predicted after the collapse of communism). Yet, it still represents a legitimising instrument of state authority and power. As Gilles Andreani (2002, p. 2) said “Indeed, the problem now for Europe is the very weakness of the nation state rather than its excessive power”. Frequently, we can encounter the argument that changes in technology, economic relations and social institutions have led to a contradictory process of simultaneous globalisation and localisation (“glocalisation”). And, the first victim of globalisation ought to have been the nation state rather then the European Union. It is obvious that technology has managed over recent years to unify time and space, creating images that are global and eroding established categories of identity. In this context, it is important to mention Karen Cerulo (1997, p. 397), “In the present, one cannot consider identity without reference to the new communication technologies.” As a result, people have started to imagine virtual “new communities” beyond the traditional nation state. These new homes are developed based on cognitive regions, which include understanding culture, common identity and a commensurate sense of solidarity. Also, this means, at another level, that we need to find new ways and tools for making people participate in civic and political life.

At the same time, it must not be forgotten that the nation state is a social construct and the European Union is an elite-driven project. Regular Eurobarometer opinion polls, conducted by the European Commission, invariably register steady and broad support among the European population for the European project in all its different aspects. Until the mid-1980s, European integration was perceived first and foremost as an economic project, not one directly affecting the core values of its constituent peoples. Over the decades, Europe’s collective identity has developed hand in hand with an institutionalised “culture of co-operation”.

For the construction of a collective European identity, Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of “palimpsest identity” is crucial. It is the kind of identity in which forgetting, rather than learning or memorising, is the condition of continuous fitness; in which every new thing and new person enter and exit without rhyme or reason. Only such a palimpsest identity may help Europe generously accommodate its many cultures and multifarious senses of “us”. National identity is a social construct, determined by history. Constructing a European identity means, first of all, a new memory policy: to celebrate primarily those past events that brought together the nation states, not those that meant war and division. Alternatively, European identity can be constructed by forgetting the common unpleasant events of the
past. But this does not mean forgetting common history with other nation states in Europe. This European sentiment needs to have the same intensity as the national bond, but should not seek to replace it.

Although the act of forgetting may seem a somewhat artificial and insincere method of advancing European identity, it should be recalled that nation states have over the centuries practised a complex policy of remembering and forgetting in their efforts to produce nationalism and a sense of belonging. Ernest Renan claims that forgetting has been a crucial element in the creation of nations, and that once a nation has been established; it very much depends for its continued existence upon collective amnesia. National unity, according to Renan, has often been established through brutality and force, and the newly created “Frenchman”, “German” or “Italian” had to actively forget his or her local, regional or other non-national roots and past by adopting a hegemonic national identity. Although the EU is unlikely to enforce such a collective process of forgetting, it does ask for a shift in allegiance and solidarity, which implies a weakened link between citizens and “their” nation state. But, as a group of researchers have shown in their work (Ruiz Jiménez et al., 2004) national and European identity are compatible because:

“they are seen as identities of a different level, bearing different meanings. For advocates of more Europe, and for those politicians interested in forging a European identity to serve as one of legitimizing foundations of the EU, this finding could have both positive and negative implications. The good news is that the EU could swell the ranks of the citizens with dual identity by further strengthening the performance of the European institutions and the benefits they bring (or rather the public perception of both).”

The fact that Europeans continue to feel, primarily, nationals of their home countries is not bad news. In fact, if this point of view were made clear to national governments it might facilitate the emergence of this type of European identity, which is currently resisted by some member states, concerned that it might erode their sovereignty (and the loyalty of their citizens).

In this respect, of great importance is the fact that Professor Bronislaw Geremek (2006), MEP, has drawn attention, on the occasion of an exhibition in the European Parliament entitled “Jerzy Giedroyc – Voice of European Liberty”, to the fact that:

“Despite the changes over the years in Eastern Europe, the fall of the Iron Curtain and enlargement of the EU, the historical division of our continent is still present in our minds and consciousness. Europeans have no memory or consciousness of their collective history. There are no common heroes and references. How then can we talk about unity, about a common future? Figures such as Jerzy Giedroyc deserve to be widely known in Europe – not just in Poland, for the values he defended which have now become common European values. Giedroyc dedicated his life to the idea of reconciliation, which is one of the cornerstones of European integration.”

Ultimately, Europe can go beyond its limits and construct a common identity as a whole if it learns to remember the events of the past that transcended the nation state and have had a positive impact on every individual/state. Nation states should not forget their own history (which is important in constructing the identity of an individual as a member of a certain nation state) but we cannot be one in Europe, even if we are different, unless there is something to bring us together (the good moments of the past).

National identities in central and eastern Europe and views about European integration

The history and the nation-building process in central European countries make it rather unlikely to think that they would support the transformation of the European Union into a political federation. There is a gap between the eastern European states’ wish to assert their sovereignty and their wish to become integrated in the EU. In the view of the Copenhagen school, national identities constitute
foreign policy and vice versa. This means that the identities of eastern European nations can influence the ways in which they act in the EU, but their participation in the EU integration project will also influence their identities.

The dominant view among the countries from central and eastern Europe was that an enlarged EU must not become “a fortress”, keeping nations and people outside its boundaries at a distance.

Contrary to what the term “central and eastern Europe” implies, this region’s position in Europe has never been central. The region has rather been condemned, through the centuries, to constitute a periphery. In Medieval Europe the region was the western Christian world’s periphery, which had to face the threat of the Muslim world. In the 17th century it came to occupy a peripheral position in an economic sense, too, from which it never recovered. In the 18th century, the Europe of Enlightenment and later, central and eastern Europe was regarded at the periphery of European civilisation. Eastern Europeans received confirmation of their peripheral position, and hence marginal importance, at the end of the Second World War, when at the Yalta Conference, in 1945, the Western powers gave their tacit agreement that the region should fall under the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. The elites in the region are fully aware of the area’s peripheral situation and bitter about the fact that for centuries it has been treated as “the suburb of Europe”. In the discourse on Europe in these countries, one can trace an inferiority complex coupled with a need for self-assertion and, on the one hand, an idealisation of Europe and, on the other, bitter criticism of it. The stratification of Europe, and including central European countries in the periphery, might have negative consequences on identity, by creating a negative feeling expressed through the shame of one’s location. Identity is formed in interactions with others. It does not always take the same form; it is changing and it needs positive reactions to it. This is the role of society elites (the political, economic or cultural elites of a society).

The promise of EU enlargement gave these countries the hope of changing their situation as peripheral countries and becoming fully valid and respected members in Europe. Membership to the EU can be seen as a “return to Europe”, a Europe understood in terms of values and hence a “Europe of equals”. This rhetoric expresses an important emotional driving force behind the striving of central and eastern Europeans towards integration – the will to confirm and strengthen their identity (as Europeans) and to increase their self-respect. But the question is: How realistic are these expectations? Probably for us there is no escape from a peripheral situation, although within a “Europe of equals” there is nonetheless a chance that the weaker, peripheral countries will be able to co-operate and thus to balance their interests against those of the larger countries.

Other researchers argued that in the early 1990s, European identity in the eastern European countries was closely related to breaking with the communist past. The slogan “back to Europe” represented a diffuse and affective image of Europe as a desirable counter to dire state socialism, with its communist ideology, soviet hegemony and Marxist-Leninist organisation of state and society. The idea of a return to Europe also implied that the country had been part of Europe throughout most of its history, but that it was artificially decoupled from Europe due to unfortunate historical incidents.

Studies made by a group of researchers from the accession countries (Brusis, 2000, p. 3) highlighted many interesting things, such as:

A. The notion of EU membership has given way, or been replaced by, an increasingly utilitarian notion of EU membership, with an elaborate time dimension: explanations given for joining the EU have shifted from general historical and geopolitical reasons to more concrete economic and security benefits; supporters of EU membership place more emphasis on the significant economic and political benefits integration will entail for one’s own country; EU membership no longer represents an aim as such, but (increasingly) a means to attain economic modernisation, political stability and to regain national sovereignty in the face of globalisation.
So, EU membership is viewed as more detached than simply relating to being European or having a European identity, and drawbacks and costs of EU membership are more clearly seen and articulated.

B. The debate was more about going into the EU than about being there. The political elites of central European countries, lacking a distinct public opinion or consensus on a member’s identity in the EU, appeared to have a considerable degree of freedom in defining whether their country adopts more integrationist or more intergovernmentalist dispositions concerning co-operation within the EU and the future of the EU.

This political flexibility can be explained in several ways. Political elites in central and eastern Europe seem to be far more removed from public opinion and general society than in the democracies of western Europe, which have gone through decades of political-cultural consolidation and have long-standing experience of European integration, materialised in entrenched cleavages and public expectations with regard to a country’s role in the EU. Furthermore, the domestic context in the accession countries was and is shaped by a historical tradition of adopting modernisation from the West and by recent experience of fundamental constitutional change necessitated by the political transition. This legacy has generated a higher receptiveness for internationally spread institutional arrangements and “best practices”.

C. The discourse on Europe appeared to invoke and reinforce “European belongingness” as a legitimating resource the political elites of the region can rely on. This affective affiliation with Europe has been moderated by the rationalisation process described above. Political elites in the accession countries still appear to have a similar surplus of advance trust at their disposal, which has been eroded in EU member states in the course of the last decades.

What seems to be important for the meaning of national identity is the centre-periphery difference in nation state building. The level of the cleavage between modernisation and traditionalism in the context of the national culture relates to how European identity is constructed and claimed in national discourses. In central and east European countries where this cleavage has strongly developed and persisted in the configuration of the party system, European identity is placed more at the centre of political controversy, and “Europeanness” constitutes a device used by westernisers to argue against traditionalists. In countries with a less polarised cleavage, European identity is constructed as self-evident, being part of the overarching national consensus and ephemeral to topical political debates.

This cleavage difference, however, can only partially explain why the functions attributed to EU integration differ between countries. The evidence presented in the Martin Brusis’ book suggests that Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia are countries in which integration is primarily seen as a policy tool kit to overcome socioeconomic backwardness. In Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia, advocates of EU integration view it as a strategy to promote civic and modern identities. This emphasis can be related to the more partisan role of European identity and EU integration in some of these countries. Compared to this weak correlation, the communist past provides an easy explanation of why in the Baltic States and Slovenia integration has been seen as a form of protection against an hegemonic neighbour. While EU integration is usually seen as entailing a transfer of sovereignty rights from the national to the supranational level, the opposite is also plausible: transferring decisions to the EU could reinforce statehood, and integration could be a strategic move to re-establish and enhance national sovereignty. This function of EU integration is mentioned only in relation to Estonia.

In eastern European countries, there are also Euro-sceptics. Social and economic groups and sectors which are, or perceive themselves as, negatively affected by integration articulate their concerns by resorting to three main lines of Euro-sceptic reasoning. The most prominent form of Euro-scepticism seems to be arguments according to which the European Union jeopardises the cultural distinctiveness of “our” nation, regained national sovereignty and dignity. Political actors that agree to such traditional-conservative arguments belong to conservative clerical groups in Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.
A second form of Euro-scepticism considers that Brussels represents an “etatist-bureaucratic form” that harms the liberalism achieved and promoted in the transition countries.

The third form of Euro-scepticism views economic integration with western Europe as a sell-out of national assets and hard-earned values, sacrificing the country to the forces of global capitalism.

All the variants of Euro-scepticism are related to the cleavages structuring party systems and politics in the accession countries. Traditional-conservative Euro-scepticism is a discourse strategy of traditionalists against westernisers, reflecting the cleavage mentioned above. So, it is not incidental that in countries with a more pronounced modern-traditional cleavage in the party system – such as Poland with its opposition between Catholic-conservative groups versus laics-liberals – traditional-conservative Euro-scepticism was more strongly represented in public debates.

Today, evidence shows us that Euro-scepticism was weaker than the wish to belong to the European family because eastern European countries are already members of the European Union. No matter what the envisaged advantages and disadvantages of integration were, the will to belong to the EU, to finally feel European and be treated as such, was stronger. The hidden wish of the CEE countries to feel European has finally been expressed.

**How to create and support European national identities in eastern European countries?**

The European Commission has always tried to contribute to a wider understanding of what the European Union represents, so much so that it launched a communication strategy in May 2000. The objectives of the strategy were to improve the public’s knowledge and understanding of the EU in the accession countries, to explain the implications of accession for each country and to explain the link between the pace of preparations for membership and the progress of negotiations (European Commission, 2000).

The implementation of this communication strategy was based on three principles, which were supposed to be the key to its success:

- decentralisation: the strategy was implemented in a decentralised manner in both the member states and the candidate countries, in order to ensure that it was geared to the specific needs and conditions of each individual country;
- flexibility: in order to adapt to varying communication challenges arising from an essentially dynamic process;
- synergy: essential to ensure that the efforts deployed by the Commission, the European Parliament and the member states, together with other groups in society, complement and reinforce each other.

However, a communication strategy, notwithstanding its importance, is an insufficient response since it can not replace the rethinking of the political role of the EU in central and eastern Europe. What is needed may be described as complex organisational learning, a learning process that goes beyond the change of polity outputs and extends to changing the organisational knowledge base and cognitive frame of policy making. These two elements form part of the organisational identity of the EU and have shaped the perception of problems and policy formulation within the EU. It seems necessary to establish an intra-EU capacity that enables EU decision makers and institutions to take into consideration how intra-EU debates affect central and east European perceptions and become effective in the domestic debates about joining “Europe”.

The process of the negotiations provided interesting examples of how national European identities in the accession countries were shaped by the European Union and its member states, without much consideration of the impact of their policies on the EU’s image in the region. The Italian blockade of
the European agreement made the Slovenian public realise that: “Europe was run by nation states and their interests, which at some points challenged the roots of Slovene sovereignty and its identity.” The more the negotiations broached politically controversial issues, such as freedom of movement and the acquisition of real estate, the stronger was their impact on the public’s perception of the EU in the accession countries. In view of this, the indirect identity-shaping impact was not sufficient to explain the link between the pace of preparations for membership and the progress of negotiations. More important seemed to be ensuring that the accession countries perceived the process as fair and grounded in factual objectivity.

Beyond the accession-identity nexus, the most challenging issue for the EU was, and still is, to clarify the relationship between a state’s European identity and a state’s identity as a member of the EU.

The EU can base its attitude towards European states outside the EU on a synecdochical relationship of EU member and European identity, that is EU membership is a part, representation and symbol of European identity, but EU membership as such has a different meaning, and European identity is clearly more than an a EU member’s identity. The advantage of relying on this relationship is that European states and their citizens can identify themselves as European without having or wanting to be members of the EU. The EU has less definitional (legal) responsibility since its internal norms are not congruent (and do not have to be congruent) with the entire set of norms that have evolved and guide political behaviour among and within states in Europe. The EU can construct itself as a club where the members have to fulfil certain entry conditions. This way of club thinking has been revealed by the French President, Jacques Chirac, who stated: “It is legitimate that old member states, who have contributed so much, have more votes than those who are new and bring problems.”

Alternatively, the EU can adopt a cognitive frame, according to which there is a synonymous relationship between EU member and EU identity, namely that both notions have the same meaning and are equivalent. This configuration of the relationship implies that EU membership is defined as the natural correlate of having a European identity. Since the norms structuring member states’ relations and co-operation in the EU are equivalent with European norms, the EU has the power to define these norms as constitutive of “Europeanness”, as core features and requirements of European identity. This endows the EU with a powerful policy instrument to create political stability across Europe: to the extent that European states and citizens outside the EU identify themselves as European and adopt the synonymy principle, they will accept all the implications and requirements that the EU links to membership – not as a conditionality imposed from outside but as a norm to be internalised. Europeans outside the EU will perceive their non-membership as a deviation from normality and try to achieve cognitive consistency between their diverging self-perception as Europeans and non-members of the EU. This perception prevailed in central and eastern Europe in the early 1990s and can still be found in declarations of politicians, as was the case of the former Bulgarian Prime Minister Ivan Kostov: “Our European identity was buried long after the Second World War and came back to life ten years ago as an aspiration to European Union membership.”

Hitherto, European politicians have been able to manage enlargement by fusing the synonymous and the synecdochical relationship between being a European Union member and EU identity. It also enabled political representatives of the former applicant countries to legitimise unpopular measures by referring to the synonymy notion. Both notions are, however, increasingly difficult to reconcile since Turkey with its application for membership and also the membership ambitions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation will challenge the credibility of the synonymy notion suggested by the European Union. The core of the problem is not to find and draw the geographical borders of Europe but to strike a balance between two concepts of European identity – synecdochical or synonymous – by taking into serious consideration the function and relevance of a European identity for the democratisation process in eastern Europe.
If the EU wants to foster European national identities in the former accession countries (and the so-called new member states), it should focus on involving them as equal partners, by which they will perceive the problems of the European Union as their own, they will thus internalise them. This way of viewing the debate has reinforced the imposed character of EU membership in the perception of east European countries. This can be seen in Martin Brusis’ comments (Brusis, 2000) about the Czech Republic: “Czechs tend to feel that their identity within the EU has been somehow prearranged for them, prepared by somebody else.” Such an attitude is likely to prejudice attitudes in, and political dispositions of, the new member states towards the EU, relieving them of the responsibility to advocate communitarian concerns in their own right, and not in an instrumental way that is common for the entire Union.

The EU should try to complement the accession focus in the public debate through a membership-guided perspective. An appropriate political strategy would open the debate on the final result of the EU and European integration, framing it as an open constitutional process that extends to all European countries. It would encourage the eastern European countries to reflect on their role as a member of the EU and to redefine their national interests taking into consideration their new status.

For example, in Romania, before joining the EU, political discourse was mainly based on the idea that they had to be part of the EU, but after accession was formalised, the debate changed in certain aspects. In one of his discourses, the Romanian President said that accession to the EU is similar to going to a fancy restaurant, where you have to pay attention to what you order, so that you have enough money to pay the bill. It was the first time that the issue of what integration really means was brought into political discussions in such a way. It followed a similar declaration by certain Romanian ministers. Before the European Commission’s country report in September 2006, which gave the green light for Romania to join the EU, no political elite had touched on this issue in the public debate.

The dynamic between identity and integration is similar to the dynamic between the organic and the institutional. The risk of making changes to only the formal level, and thus not taking into account the actual substance, was very real, for example, in Romania. Europeanisation at only the political and legislative levels, combined with the pressure from economic factors, may lead to a situation, where societies will be forced to transform their essence, once the institutional reforms are implemented. It is believed that cultural integration will come about as a consequence of the unification introduced by mass communication. The circulation of economic goods means at the same time the circulation of symbolic goods, which may lead to the standardisation of behaviours. The new world culture is expressed in English and images. This type of integration has negative consequences by producing cultural homologation, by excluding modern and traditional values, and by uniforming and devaluing people.

Conclusions

Reorganising Europe has to start from the fact that it is composed of nations. Central and eastern European countries that dealt with profound transformations in their recent history are more sensitive to the tensions of economic reorganisation. This is why under the pressure of adapting to the western way of life they are more inclined to nationalist views. For example, as demonstrated in the formation of an extremist group in the European Parliament, the former ITS group (identity, tradition and sovereignty). The formation of this political group was possible with the support of the Romanian extremist group Partidul Romania Mare, which had a large share of seats in the Romanian Parliament, being the third political group in the country. The creation of this new group in the European Parliament has provoked a large series of debates on its role as a party in the European Parliament. Usually, extremist groups do not play such an important role in western countries, so until now it was not possible for them to create a strong group in the European Parliament.
Taking into consideration all the facts presented in this article, it is useful, rather than talking about the dismantling of national states and national identities in Europe, to talk about their redefinition in response to the challenges they are confronted with. That is, to see national identities as historical-geographical imaginations renegotiated in interactions with others. Some very interesting research from this point of view was carried out by Anna Triandafyllidou, who analysed how national identities are reconsidered in the three dimensions of the identity space discussed below: the transnational or European level, the national or member state sphere and the local-regional context, including minorities and immigrant communities.

With regard to identity formation, the European integration process has posed two main challenges. First, it has been suggested that “Europeanness” should be integrated into in-group identity, with fellow member states no longer being seen as external “others”, but as a part of the in-group. Second, the European Union itself has grown into an inspiring or threatening, external “other” for many European countries. By contrasting the internal threatening of the external “other”, it was suggested that when a nation strengthens its sense of belonging, it is thus able to inspire external “others”, such as the European Union. Anna Triandafyllidou (Simonsen, 2004, p. 358) found responses to these challenges in her study. In all the countries studied, the press discourse revealed dynamic interaction between, on the one hand, national tradition and established features of national identity and, on the other hand, the necessity to deal with new challenges and the changing social, economic and political environment. Discourses on nationhood tended to reinvent, modify, transform and reinterpret formerly established national features, and to develop new understandings of nationhood and images of the nation. The new opening towards a European identity was accompanied by increasing hostility towards groups of immigrants.

In her analysis, Anna Triandafyllidou traced a new form of nationhood, developing interaction between former national identities and some form of “Europeanness”. National identities develop into more flexible forms of national belonging, which allow for national traditions and feelings of “we-ness” to intersect with a wider transnational cultural and political space, which is partly included in the identity space. Because the new discourses of nationhood become more complex and the boundaries more blurred, she argues that they may in the long run render difficult the definition of “others” as those not belonging to the “in-group”.

In my opinion, the future of Europe, quoting one of my professors (Septimiu Chelcea, 1998), will be:

“European unification will be possible by keeping cultural, ethnic and national identities. The failure of the melting pot theory (the apparition of a new identity by melting all the cultural, ethnic and national characteristics) should raise a big question mark for those politicians that nowadays are trying to sacrifice their national and cultural identity for economic reasons. We would say, paraphrasing a well-known aphorism, that Unified Europe will be democratic and multi-identity, will accept collective memories or it will not be at all.”
European identity and civic concern: an argument against mythologising Europe

Tamara Ehs

“Intellectual criticism will bind Europe together in bonds far closer than those that can be forged by shopmen or sentimentalists. It will give us the peace that springs from understanding.”

Oscar Wilde

Introduction

Appeals for demythologising the past often imply the deconstruction of heroes and the unveiling of fairy stories. Although the will to discover myths is quite strong in general, it decreases rapidly when it comes to unveiling myths that one would consider as the core of its identity. Hence, appeals for demythologising our past often cause instant fears of losing or softening one’s identity. In reaction to any attempt at deconstructing these stories one is constantly blamed for negating history. This accusation mistakes or equates history with stories, with grand narratives and collective memories that are often based on myths.

“[T]he best that can be achieved is to know what was, and to endure this knowledge …” (Arendt, 1968, p. 20). To argue for demythologising the past and to argue against current ideas of myth-making in Europe in order to gain a common identity represents a clear need to highlight our common European history. That means supporting the critical capacity to re-examine our often conflicting national histories as well as the common acceptance of what is called “European values”. Both made Europe what it is today. A knowledge of the past is indispensable in understanding the present, building a better future and having a good life. This is consistent with Adorno’s quest to “work through the past” (Adorno, 1959). According to Joerges (2006, p. 5), “Working through the past is a European burden” and “it may, however, even be Europe’s vocation to reconstrue a purged identity through confrontation with its past”.

But severe criticism has to be expressed when misusing the past by telling stories instead of teaching history, by creating and/or stabilising European myths around “great events” and “great men”. Myths and stories about heroes are already interpretations of the past, whereas the mere presentation of all the facts leaves the interpretation to the individual. Bearing in mind the nexus between memory and political power, especially power over memory (Müller, 2002), it is important to know all the historical facts and (re)gain individual analytical autonomy.

The circulated myth of European integration – that some politicians seek to use for educating European citizens – reads as a storyline in which visionary leaders engaged in the critical adventure of designing a new Europe to overcome barbarism, as revealed by the Second World War. As in every myth this one also has aspects of it that are true, but it presents only a small part of European history. It is covered by a veil of mystification over the mechanics of power and the underlying motivations of European integration efforts, which are generally labelled with the keyword “idealism” but which in
reality were as much the political and economic interests of the ruling elites in each nation state, and therefore were less sublime than the myth portrays.  

Myths are unchangeable stories, not open to scepticism, with an absolute claim that narrows the leeway of the evolving future. Every attempt to build a European identity by mythologising the past and using emotions of adoration for European heroes or “founding fathers” is unhistorical, and is an attempt to negate essential facts of European history. The more recent history of Europe is a history of relativisation, uncertainty and doubt. After centuries of having been the centre of the world, Europe had to discover that power is relative, that the centre is subject to change, that the future is not a way of absolute advancement. Europe suddenly was a weak place full of doubt between two superpowers (Sloterdijk, 2002, p. 7). This experience of relativity and this knowledge of uncertainty marked ways for a new “Europeanness”: a certain attention with regard to conceding absoluteness to anything.

Furthermore, the quest for a European identity, similar to the one for national identity, has to fail. The common concept of the “national” originates primarily in the romanticism of the 19th century, creating cultural identity as the basis of citizenship (Münch, 2001). These “nations by culture” used stories, myths and heroes to address emotional affiliation among strangers and to overcome their strangeness, because the modern, industrial state required homogenous, standardised people. These myths pretend absolute belonging. But the 20th century made affiliations less absolute and put former certainties into perspective. The 21st century makes those feelings of belonging even more relative. It is a consequence of greater mobility (travelling, studying/work ing abroad, or virtually by using modern means of communication) of more and more people, as well as the huge number of people immigrating to Europe and those seeking asylum.

Building European identity by tracing the origins of European integration back to myths amounts to advancing idealistic reasons later on and maintaining Europe as an elitist entity invented by certain visionary men. However, this ignores the reality of Europe encountered by many ordinary people and most migrants living there today. That is why this article argues for the prosaic approach of a legal community – and political network identity – instead of emotive myths, visions and illusions concerning European citizenship. It argues for a more radical democratic approach, for concentrating on the concept of civic concern as elaborated below and for a more sensitive attitude towards the post-national, pluralistic, deterritorialised reality in Europe.

Since Europe’s model cannot be that of the classic nation state, not even the federal nation state, but rather a network and a medium that does not create a new grand narrative but a hypertext that is open to decentralised, non-decreed and reversible sense-making (Schmale, 2007), European citizens (and European citizens to be) cannot be sworn to mythological stories of the past that tell them nothing about how to engage in today’s Europe. They should rather be confronted with all the facts of European history, with the institutions that represent European values, with the functioning of the European Union and should be empowered to become active.

Creating and relying on a European myth, creating a cultural-national identity by spreading stories about founding fathers and other heroes holds nothing for the present and future active citizenship. It would rather pave the way for a kind of Euronationalism, recycling the imperial myth formations of the late 19th and 20th-century nation states (Varenn e, 1993). Pointing to European institutions and the practices of European politics could instead raise awareness of how much everybody is affected by European integration each and every day.

28. For the influence of myth and memory see also my work Helvetisches Europa – Europäische Schweiz (2005) where some motivations for (not) supporting European integration in Switzerland are analysed.
29. Moreover, what sort of a signal is worshipping the “founding fathers” to female youth regarding ideas of emancipation and gender politics?
30. I would rather call them “achievements”, as “values” may be mistaken as being absolute in themselves For efforts in this direction, see Hoerster (1994) and Türcke (2006).
This means advising youth workers to demonstrate the many ways in which people are affected by decisions made by EU institutions. Moreover, means of engagement have to be highlighted, so that civic action can result from concern. And last but not least, engagement has to be made possible by reconsidering the concept of democracy: the identity of the ruler and the ruled. People will be emotionally attached to Europe when they experience a democratic Europe – their Europe. It is not enough to explain this Europe to the people to gain their support; it is necessary to turn subjects into citizens by democratising Europe. This might be a way in which the elitist project of European integration can be taken over by the people. By telling emotive stories about the European myth, of great men and conventionalised founding treaties, European identity relies on cultural memory alone, and misses the chance to build a strong future-oriented, politically active identity. Europe’s daily political practice concerns people more, and – especially, if it perceived as being “by the people for the people” – commits them more to their European citizenship than flowery stories.

That leads to another objection often raised when arguing for demythologising: deconstructing myths does not necessarily come into conflict with feelings of affection for the European idea. My argument against European myth-making does not play emotions off against reason, but is directed against attempts to encourage cultural-memorial aspects instead of historical facts and political practice. It is against trying to use metaphysics to acquire identity by love for or pride in Europe because this would result in quite passive citizenship where people just accept Europe without being educated or becoming active in politics. If young people are interested in European affairs (because they see that they are affected by European concerns) they may discover that Europe is lovable (or not) by themselves. Emotions towards Europe should be the result of experience (“If what ‘Europe’ stands for is good for me, my family and friends, then I will like it”), not of schooling to sing the anthem and recite a myth.

Myths are reductions of historical complexity. Just take a look at the unaptness of the logo marking the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome: “Together since 1957” is a historical fact for six member states but intentionally invented collective memory to be foisted on 21. Myths are sheer propaganda for cultural identity, whereas the education on a political consciousness, by pointing to daily concerns, could be a way to interest and engage people in the European network. It is necessary to teach history in all its complexity and to enable youth to take part in the democratic discourse. This means enabling them to be part or, better still, a promoter of (evolving European) civil society.

Heroes, myths, identity

Hungary 1956-2006: an introductory example

Since the meeting in Budapest in November 2006 just a few days after the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Hungarian uprising, Hungary allowed itself to serve as an introductory example to show the connection between myth and identity.

Hungary’s struggle for freedom, the people’s fight against Soviet superiority, in 1956 still marks a modern foundation myth of Hungarian identity. Everyone knows someone through stories told at home or at school who stood up to the Red Army, who even died for the cause. Since then, Imre Nagy, prime minister at that time, has become a Hungarian national hero and the uprising – this self-assertion against an alien power – is part of the collective memory of Hungary, something that holds Hungary together. As a result, the myth fulfils its task: political integration by pretending homogeneity, reducing social complexity, and offering orientation and companionship. Still today “many have

32. The term was introduced by Halbwachs (1950).
retained a rather passionate romantic vision of the revolution: Hungary dodged and challenged the Soviet giant like the mythical ‘David and Goliath”’ (Kezsmarki, 2006). But many historical facts that may challenge the mythical image have still not been told. The scientific analysis of these events is only in its early stages.\(^{33}\)

Even the young Second Republic of Austria drew from the Hungarian national uprising. Just having obtained freedom and neutrality itself, Austria was the first place of refuge for many Hungarians. This became a source of Austrian identity: to be – finally – regarded as a free country and to be protected by neutrality. Moreover, the Bridge at Andau became a symbol of freedom, it became a *lieu de mémoire*.\(^{34}\) The small, wooden bridge over a creek was the escape route for about 70 000 Hungarians. It became a memorial and a symbol of tolerance and helpfulness, reconstructed in 1996 to mark the 40th anniversary, according to the emotive identity storyline of brave Hungarians that fought for the freedom of their nation and free Austrians that warmly welcomed them. Even literature (*The Bridge at Andau* by James Michener, 1957) and film (*Der Bockerer III*, an Austrian movie) refer to this event, again blinding out many facts that would allow more sophisticated interpretations of the past and would therefore allow another political handling of present (and future) events and decisions.\(^{35}\)

### Theorising the myth

Plato characterised a myth as “dishonest”, but admitted that it may be necessary as a lie for a state’s ends (Dörner, 1995). Schmale (1998, p. 40) explains the use of myth for state and nation building today: myths provide identity. This myth-based identity supports the processes of political integration by reducing complexity and denying strangeness. The dictum is: “We are one because we have a common past when we suffered together for a higher reason. We prevailed because we were guided by something bigger than us.” This something (or someone) bigger, this ideal, is thereby often wrapped in historical mystery – telling only those parts of history that are necessarily needed for a state’s ends, overall being dishonest concerning historical facts (Liebhart, 1998).

Ernest Renan (1995, p. 56) in his famous speech, “What’s a nation?”, saw the very basis of every nation in common suffering for “the good cause”. François and Schulze (1998, p. 22) accurately refer to myths as “emotional fundaments of nations”, stating: “How strongly nations stick to the perpetuation and transfiguration of their sovereignties can be seen by the fact that they conventionalise those big moments in history into their most important myths, when they – being sure of enjoying the benevolence of destiny and fighting for the good cause – fought heroically for freedom and independence.”

To sum up: Myths can support integration by providing a common identity. So, what is the problem concerning Europe?

When talking about using myths for backing European identity and activating citizenship later on, it should be borne in mind that myths connect to religious thinking. Myths have to be believed in, they rely only on clippings of the past, they are already interpretations of the past, and they essentially rely on features such as heritage and ethnic descent. Who has not experienced the heroic act that constituted a myth or who is not akin to a witness of the heroic act as recounted by successive generations, who was not brought up in the specific culture that passed on these stories of heroes and exceptional events, who does not dearly believe in these stories will forever stay somehow “different” and therefore excluded from the “real nation”.

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\(^{33}\) See, for instance, the recently held international Conference on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution: Context, Effect, Myth, Collegium Hungaricum, Berlin, 4-6 October 2006.

\(^{34}\) The term was introduced by Nora (1984).

\(^{35}\) I, for example, allude to ongoing discussions concerning Austrian neutrality.
Myths pretend absoluteness and homogeneity (concerning the perception of history, of culture, of values, etc.), which does not exist, which first and foremost cannot exist in a huge and pluralistic and constantly changing society like Europe that faces changing borders and changing people by enlargement and migration.

**In search of the European hero**

Jacques Delors’ pushing for giving Europe a soul and his well-known remark “You can’t fall in love with the single market” are still today often cited references to the European longing for an identity that would transcend the common market. Since the very beginnings of European integration, it has often been maintained that Europe has no narrative, no substance and therefore no lasting feeling of solidarity. This view was encapsulated by Raymond Aron (1953, p. 410) in the 1950s: “The European idea is without substance. It does not have the transcendental sheen of messianic ideologies, it is not comprehensible, not tangible compared to the traditional embodied fatherland. Europe is a creation by intellectuals that appeals to reason but hardly has an echo in the hearts.”

More than fifty years later, similar considerations and assessments of Europe can still be heard. Indeed, a “tangible” Europe in everyday life can be found, most prominently, in the euro banknotes. But just compare them with the old national banknotes: one does not find any common European heroes or intellectual giants that “embody the fatherland”. The EU could only agree on a common history of architectural style, which is quite meaningless to many ordinary people living in Europe and “has no echo in the hearts”.

There is no European hero. There is no practicable European myth that holds Europe together. Forget the legendary figure “Europe” who was kidnapped by a bull in Ancient Greece. She has no practical power, she is an image for artists or academics, like the names “Monnet” and “Schuman” are for sculptors and intellectuals, and of no importance to most people.

People are left with no hero, no leading myth, just some “Eurocrats” sitting there in Brussels, currently designing labels for vodka bottles, which tell us that spirits are bad. However, although spirits lose out in Brussels, Europe is still in search of its common European spirit, a spirit that constitutes a feeling of unity and therefore allegedly a feeling of citizenship that would activate engagement with politics. Some already seek to use the storyline of visionary, idealistic leaders that had the dream of overcoming barbarism to create a European myth to educate European citizens.

**Post-national = post-emotional? Myths and heroes as the creed of the secular nation state**

Ash (2005) asks why we continue to search for a European soul and for emotive European symbols, like a European foundation myth or anthem. These symbols and myths belong to the concept of the classical secular nation state, replacing religion as the tie of society, being quasi-religious themselves. Herder redefined the Enlightenment’s voluntaristic meaning of “nation” (see Rousseau and Kant) and contributed to a substantial, folkish understanding of nation as a community based on common ethnic origin, common language, telling common stories about heroic deities and great battles, a nation by culture: an invented tradition and a narrow definition of culture leading to a mythologically charged understanding of citizenship, an understanding that presumes a nation to be a homogeneous unit, a very exclusive and therefore excluding unit, overall a concept that does not give any consideration to the plurality of modern lifestyles, morals and identities.

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Gellner (1983) accordingly located the beginnings of nationalism at the time when a socially mobile, anonymous society suddenly starts pretending to be a closed, cosy community, thereby taking up the differentiation between community and society first elaborated by Tönnies in his monograph *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1887). A few years after Tönnies, Meinecke (1907) introduced the conceptual dichotomy of *Staatsnation* (civic/voluntaristic nation) and *Kulturnation* (nation sharing cultural attributes and language, images of common ancestry) into academic discourse, a concept that still dominates the debate. Many European nation states go back to nation building done by *Kulturnation* (confer Germany, Italy and others in the late 19th century and the newly established nation states in CEE countries) and still rely mainly on *jus sanguinis* as the basis of citizenship.

Another distinction is relevant for the discussion: nation building and state building, which is according to Haller (2003) done by creed. National identity demands a statement of faith (uttered by the knowledge and propagation of the nation’s myths, heroes, etc.) to a community defined by ancestry. Contrariwise, state identity operates beyond every creed, because the individual can be part of the society without belonging to the ethnic group that prevails and without providing evidence of belief. She or he can identify with the state because she or he is subject to its norms and therefore concerned by its politics. The latter describes the concept of political identity as explicated by Meyer (2004): the development of self-conception as a citizen by experiencing social and political reality and knowing how to act within.

This theoretical examination allows us to take a closer look at what is currently going on in the EU. It often seems that the society witnesses some kind of European nation building when observing the propagandistic efforts of establishing a story on Europe, a European myth to build a common identity. There are frequent attempts to mythologise Europe in order to establish a feeling of belonging.

When criticising we need to ask: Where does the democratic, liberal state – that the EU would surely want to be – draw its unifying power from, if not from the ethnic-cultural, metaphysical ties that the late 19th-century concept provides? According to Böckenförde (1967), “we hold the wolf by its ears as the liberal, secularised state lives on preconditions it cannot guarantee by means of enforcement without losing its liberality”. Hence, he suggested some time ago that identification with the state has to be fed by an inner impetus similar to religious feelings.

No identity without a creed? No active citizenship without something bigger than prosaic institutions to take part in? Is the European creed needed similar to the American’s Creed? A secular religion based on mythical stories about great events and great men, about “patriots that sacrificed their lives and fortunes” as the ties of society to feel the community? Is mythologising Europe the only way to a strong common identity?

The American’s Creed reflects American nationalism, accompanied by symbols like the flag, the seal, the pledge of allegiance, the star-spangled banner, the eagle and, above all, the constitution as the normative centre. The creed is quasi-religious, addressing a belief in absoluteness. But a look into history reveals: the US Constitution of 1789 was a prosaic catalogue of “rules of the game”, which was not conventionalised into a mythological foundation act until the 20th century when its future orientation was changed into an adoration of the past by mythologising the constitution as the genesis of the US people. Maus (1994) even speaks of a change towards “constitutional theology”.

It sometimes seems like some European policy makers intend exactly the same by equipping the EU with a flowery story on founding fathers and a preamble as guidance to salvation (Budelacci, 2004, p. 10) to gain support for the new constitution. It seems that they intend to press the European Union into the corset of late 19th and 20th-century concepts of “nation” and “state” and their corresponding concepts of allegiance.

37. On this differentiation, see also Lyotard (1986).
38. That is, nationality by descent, in contrast (and sometimes also in addition) to jus soli, nationality by place of birth.
39. The American’s Creed is a product of the late 19th and 20th century, written by William Tyler Page for a nationwide contest in 1917 and accepted by the US House of Representatives in 1918.
In respond to this trend, a change in perspective is necessary to identify the modern 21st-century character of the EU as a network (Schmale, 2007) and a legal community (Busch and Ehs, in print), because “I therefore believe it is my duty to my country to love it” – as the American’s Creed states – neither complies with European history (experiences of nationalism), which bore the process of European integration nor with European presence (migration, fluid identities, heterogeneity). There should be no belief, no duty to love Europe. If Europe is lovable because politics holds something for peoples’ everyday life, Europe will be loved anyway and people will engage to support this process. This plays against any longing for dependence on religious, or quasi-religious (myths, heroes), backing of European integration. Searching for metaphysical concepts such as a European spirit or defining the European soul reveals constant attempts in this direction. Myths are being witnessed in the making, without giving them appropriate attention in relation to memory and political power qua power of interpretation.

The 21st century, the century of globalisation, the century of mass tourism, the century of mass communication, of information and acceleration, has broadened the outlook; and, at the same time, the cocoon of the local and the nation in many places have been rekindled as a place of refuge in a sometimes insecure and confusing world. Many (elderly) people recall the local, the concrete. They recall the things they know to regain orientation. But there is no European people to identify with like the American people, referring to a common creed, a common language, common education etc., and there is no Euro-nation in the narrow sense of the 20th century. During the last few years the European Union has made attempts at using the means of classical nation building and trying to draw off emotions that are bound to the old concept of the nation state, which were successful in many countries throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, and still are even today. Much to the surprise of many politicians this project is failing as it attracts public hostility from the majority of people, especially the older age-groups as they perceive “unknown Europe” as a threat to what they have know for decades and what makes up their identity: the nation state they live in. The referenda in France and the Netherlands showed, inter alia, the limits of creating Europe according to the model of the nation state.

When Weiler (1997) proposed a European identity – echoing what Aron had highlighted years beforehand – he stated that the national appeals to our hearts, and the supranational to the rational within us. Although this dualistic idea frequently reappears in sophisticated debates, and although – from an academic and historical point of view – the idea of a European citizenship without any passion (that would also ensure an absence of blinding emotions) is quite enticing, there are serious doubts that reason alone is attractive enough to promote European citizenship beyond the walls of academia (Shore, 2004). There is also the suspicion of the populist playing eros off against ratio, since the focus on the discussion is rather on cultural and not political identity (Cerutti and Rudolph, 2001). It is not a question of either/or since both include emotional as well as rational elements, although at different intensities. Whereas the concept of a substantialised cultural identity is past-oriented, refers to the “imagination of continuity reaching back in the depth of time” (Assmann, 2000, p. 133) and uses myths and metaphysics to ally citizens, the concept of political identity is future-oriented and argues for a democratic public, that is, stronger participation in the European project by the citizen: identification with Europe as a result of feelings of belonging to a common politity experienced by democratic participation.

40. See for example José Manuel Barroso’s speech “A Soul for Europe” held at the Conference on a Soul for Europe, in Berlin, 17 November 2006; or MEP Bronisław Geremek’s comment on the exhibition “Jerzy Giedroyc – Voice of European Liberty”, opened on 28 November 2006 in the European Parliament, “Europeans have no memory or consciousness of their collective history. There are no common heroes and references. How is it possible to talk about unity, about a common future?”; or former French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin in an interview with the Financial Times on the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, “It required the audacity of the founding fathers and the ambition and enthusiasm of the leaders …” and on the European crisis, “The risk was to leave Europe without soul …” (6 February 2007).
Civic concern

European citizenship: (un)conventional participation

The concept of political identity is the basis for my considerations on the idea of civic concern. A lack of heroes and myths in the European identity of ordinary people is very welcome and there is no reason to search for them as this absence allows a form of active citizenship and political engagement that leaves ways to correspond to present and future events, such as changing borders (EU enlargement) and changing people (migration): namely, a utilitarian approach, a kind of cerebral love that is less spectacular than the cultural-affective approach but therefore less bellicose, more diversity-oriented, and does not come into conflict with the existing love for one’s country as it addresses another level of affiliation (contrary to a common misconception, the development of a European identity does not have to be accompanied by the decline of national identity). As Ash (2007) argues, “Our enterprise does not need or even want that kind of emotional fire. “Europeanness” remains a secondary, cooler identity. Europeans today are not called to die for Europe. Most of us are not even called to live for Europe. All that is required is that Europe should be let live.” To keep Europe alive and vivid needs the participation of its citizens.

Whereas citizenship in most countries is still ethnicity based (and naturalized citizens hardly ever are regarded as “true” citizens by the “natives” – especially when the “foreigners” have darker skin – as they do not share their national myth, their collective memory since they were simply not brought up with it), the approach of civic concern for European citizenship can be open to all (migrants, asylum seekers etc.) those willing to take part in the European network. This citizenry is not based on images of ancestry and collective memory but on that of a politically active society.

Theory distinguishes active from passive citizenship. Whereas passive citizenship refers to the law-abiding, quiet person that does not attract attention and lets the state “do its work”, the focus is on an active comprehension of citizenship: exercising political rights and taking part in politics, be it voting at the polling station or demonstrating in the street. The latter is of special interest for us as informal, unconventional ways of participation, such as demonstrating, sending an e-mail to a politician or distributing flyers to raise awareness for a specific concern, are very popular with young people and are open to third country nationals residing in the EU as well.

According to Mahrer (2005, p. 31) and his studies on Austria one cannot speak of general youth disenchantment with politics. Politicians may poll badly (because of corruption, dishonesty, etc.), but young people are interested in politics as it affects them directly. Since they do not engage in conventional means of political participation, such as parties or trade unions, as much as in earlier years, one often is confronted with the lamentation of “indifferent youth”, thereby disregarding their political action through unconventional means.

Without any exception, political scientists agree on the importance of education for active citizenship. In order to express their civic concern, it is of no use for youth to be educated so as to share the collective myth. European identity should not be created by the loop method of engaging in politics because one loves Europe due to myths that are told to provoke feelings of pride (that are too often the result of feelings of superiority). People should, on the contrary, be educated to share knowledge of how to use conventional as well as unconventional methods of political participation to pursue their own concerns (environmental, social, health, gender politics, etc.).

42. I hereby build on considerations made by Müller (2004).
43. See for instance Ignatieff (1994).
44. For details see, for example, Turner (1990).
45. For instance, Almond and Verba (1996); Plasser and Ulram (2002); Kornelius and Roth (2004); Ehs (2007).
European identity and citizenship should be promoted as being future-oriented and people should not be schooled to worship who and what was, but they should be enabled to come to terms with what is and what will be by shaping their future according to their interests and needs. Rohan (2006, p. 158) recently appealed to European policy makers to make people aware of the EU’s relevance in their daily lives because that would “increase the public’s willingness for further deepening”.

For the success of the concept of civic concern two things have to be done. Firstly, since civic competence can be understood as the potential for democratic objection (Plasser and Ulram, 2002, p. 101) and political participation is the focus of democracy, the European Union should provide possibilities for the conventional engagement of all people living on its territory and therefore being subject to its norms, for example by expanding the right to table a citizens’ initiative as proposed in Article I-47 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe to all people living in Europe, or going even further by releasing the radical potential of EU citizenship (Kostakopoulou, 1998). Second, it is up to teachers, youth workers and others working with the young to instruct them in making use of conventional and unconventional ways of engagement, that is training communication and networking skills.

**European demoi-cracy**

Until the 1980s and indeed even after, people were not asked through politically binding referenda if they wanted European integration at all. Suddenly, the elitist project came up against its limits and recalled the “demos”. Suddenly, a demos is needed to approve what has already been achieved by being told flowery stories.

How Europe is (how it works, how it effects us, how we can participate) has to be given at least equal if not more attention in youth education than why Europe is (integration history). For young people, Europe already is a reality. The existence of European integration as such is not questioned by the young according to the recent Eurobarometer. However, what concerns them more than European myths is what Europe’s presence looks like and the ways of shaping Europe in the future. To handle the future one of course has to know the past, but one has to know the historical truth not the fiction that was and is told because the truth may be inconvenient in some respects. Europe should therefore seize the chance not to stick to lopsided interpretations of the past, to conventionalise the Treaty of Rome into a mythological foundation act and to rely on the radiance of founding fathers, but to think of Europe as ever-aborning, open-ended, as an incomplete act of civilisation, never fully completed. According to Stråth (2002, p. 397), “a concept like Europe is constructed in processes of contention and bargaining”. One may add: a concept like Europe lives on democracy, on relativity and the willingness to doubt and compromise, hence it is in opposition to the concept of a myth and its absoluteness.

The EU is an evolving network polity, a “community of others” (Nicolaïdis, 2003, p. 5), which cannot seek to rely on the European people, on one demos, but on the people of Europe, multiple demois advancing incrementally without becoming one, based on fluid identities and a hierarchy of norms coexisting beneath the political and legal roof of the EU. Such a definition of European identity as a legal community acting in a political network (Busch and Ehs, in print) would not challenge national identities and does not come into conflict with the love for one’s country. The assumption that there cannot be a European democracy without a single European demos (“no-demos thesis”) can be rejected (Besson, 2007, p. 8) when designing Europe as a deterritorialised demoi-cracy to match the already deterritorialised law-making process. Then, European citizenship is not to be viewed as membership in an overarching demos, but as an additional European membership that is necessarily imbricated into every single national demos and turns each of them into a European demos (Besson, 2006). This would mean boosting the power of the European Parliament as well as that of the national parliaments regarding European issues. Just imagine an EU treaty signed by the national parliaments...
with the people as the masters of the treaty, not the King of the Belgians, the Queen of Denmark and other European crowned heads and heads of state traditionally listed on the first page of a treaty …

In addition to existing democratic deficits, myth-making continues to jeopardise the possibilities for active democratic involvement by seeking to build a common passive European identity on emotions for an invented heroic past instead of establishing a civic European identity by educating and strengthening people to play a part in Europe. According to Lacorne (2002, p. 432), “European citizenship lacks ‘substance’ because so little is expected from European citizens” and he argues that “European citizenship … can only be ‘substantial citizenship’, grounded on common and concrete political experience”. Müller (2004) suggests that achieving a common Europe ‘ought to be more a matter of establishing a ‘thin’ liberal community characterised by a certain amount of civic concern, rather than a full-fledged ‘imagined community’’. Civic concern means a certain level of care for European affairs in addition to the national: I care about the European project and European politics because it concerns me, because I am affected by it in my daily life.

**Side glance at constitutional patriotism**

The concept of civic concern differs from the concept of constitutional patriotism conceived of by Dolf Sternberger (1979, 1990), further elaborated by Jürgen Habermas (1992, 2001) and nowadays often circulated in discussions about European identity. Constitutional patriotism is understood as a post-national, universalistic form of democratic political allegiance. Habermas proposed the transformation of societies from national to trans/post-national communities, from “ethnos to demos”.

This might have been appropriate in the context where it originated, namely West Germany, a “half-nation” with a sense of deeply compromised nationality on account of the Nazi past. But – summing up the objections to this concept – other countries do not have a comparably difficult past, and other countries either have no (written) constitution, or they simply do not venerate the constitution as a focal point of democratic loyalty in the way Germans and, even more so, Americans might do. Therefore, the concept could not be foisted successfully on Europe as a whole (Müller, 2006, p. 279). Moreover, recalling Maus’ warning of a “constitutional theology” as cited above, substantialised constitutional patriotism restrains freedom: not civic participation in democratic decision-making processes constitutes national identity in this case, but the assumption of preliminary decisions by the foundation act of the constitution that only tolerates confirming interpretation – consolidation, not advancement (Maus, 1994).

Seen from a strictly legal and functional perspective, the European Union already has a constitution — it is just not called a “constitution” in public since it has never been “by the people for the people”. Taking into consideration this legal fact and the persistent elitist character of the EU, the process of drafting a European constitution was nothing more than doing identity politics and nation building according to the concept of constitutional patriotism or like Moravcsik (2006) put it, “The draft constitution was, above all else, a public relations strategy designed to attract the attention of common Europeans, to stimulate their involvement in democratic debate over the future of Europe – and thus to convince them to fall in love with the EU” – another way of worshipping, a personification and hypostatisation to use the constitution as an object of reference to love Europe. A decreed constitution, a text of law, is nothing to the people if they are not sovereign, if the congruence between those affected by the law and the authors of the law is eroded, if they are rather subjects than full citizens.

On the one hand, it can be observed that most European publics (especially those that had no referendum) displayed neither great interest in nor knowledge of the constitution itself, and, on the other hand, it can be seen that people are not indifferent but care about politics in general: global warming, global market, social spending, etc., are the hot topics of civil society. That is where the

46. This refers to the much-amended Treaty of Rome, which has been considered as the “basic constitutional charter” by the EU itself, since 1986 at the latest (ECJ 294/83 Les Verts/European Parliament 1986, 1357 [1365]).
pragmatic concept of civic concern picks up: highlighting how Europe affects everyday life. People would not need to swear allegiance to the constitution in order to love Europe, they would be enabled to understand how the ominous network operates and how they can participate if they want to and – most importantly – how to organise in order to make themselves heard and achieve even more political rights to democratise the system. Acting as a European citizen in this regard means participating in a network that has no mythological heroes, only rational institutions to build upon since European integration is not an old collective memory based on fictional stories but a young collective network based on a legal community. The success of European integration will not rely on dumb affirmation but on critical, responsible citizens.

Proposal to policy makers: daring democracy

The issue of the democratic deficit as highlighted in recent years corresponds to the legitimacy gap in the European Union – between those affected/concerned (the legal subjects) and those allowed to participate. To make the concept of civic concern give active European citizenship meaning also beyond the core group of actual citizens and spread to include all those living in the EU, people have to be allowed to voice their concerns in conventional ways of participation, that is most notably elections. Therefore, it is necessary to adapt to the post-national, deterritorialised legal and institutional reality and to overcome the substantive notion of “state” by decoupling it from “nation” and therefore decoupling nationality from citizenship. European citizenship, as it is currently formulated in the EU, merely strengthens the relationship between citizenship and nationality (Shaw, 1997) and has consequently failed to forge a European identity, as Fiorella Dell’ Olio (2005) elaborated by proposing to detach citizenship’s means from nationality or national citizenship. Building on this and following the legal philosopher Hans Kelsen (1925 (1993), p. 150), a prosaic, anti-metaphysical approach towards European citizenship, a citizenship by common subordination to legal norms, could be promoted: “One has to free oneself from the common perception that the people is a regional gathering, a psychic-substantial conglomerate and therefore an entity of a multiplicity of individuals existing independently from every legal system.”

According to Kelsen (1949, p. 241), who refers to Rousseau and Kant, in a radical democracy everyone who is subject to the norms (due to permanent residence) can be granted political rights. This means European citizenship by legal subjectivity, by the criterion of residence rather than nationality. This would mean: due to the simple fact that someone resides in the EU – regardless of being citizen of a member state or not – he or she is subject to its norms, what makes him or her affected by legislation, what in consequence and if enabled by politics and education make him or her participate in the network. This consequently would imply enfranchising third country nationals residing in Europe for European Parliamentary elections, so as to ensure a more effective representation of non-national citizens’ concerns.

The Swiss historian and political scientist Kreis (2006) claimed that the European Union has a very restricted notion of “citizen”, comparing it to the Swiss medieval Hintersassen (long-time residents), who had many more civil liberties than other residents. He stated that the EU’s current notion of citizenship does not give any consideration to a modern society faced with immigration, and called for a new process of drafting a European constitution incorporating all those living in Europe on a broad basis. Thereby, Kreis sees the opportunity of making the process of drafting a constitution (not the constitution itself) a point of reference for a common European identity, by perceiving this identity as a process of constitutional, normative self-creation.

47. On this notion in the context of Germany’s new law on citizenship, see Ooyen (2000).
49. Of course, no national citizenship (and its rights and duties) can derive from EU citizenship, since naturalization is still a matter for each individual member state. But this may be subject to change too.
Epilogue: “growing” European identity

The question from the scientific point of view is twofold: how to support civic concern and how to legally and politically turn concerned people into an active, democratic society; from mere addressee to also addresser.

Instead of worrying about the supposed disenchantment with politics, we should first take a look at the facts and build on what looks like a great starting point: according to a recent international study by Lutz, Kritzinger and Skirbekk (2006) based on Eurobarometer since 1996, younger Europeans are more likely than older groups to consider themselves to have a European identity in addition to their national one. The conclusion of this study is that as older, more nationally oriented cohorts die, there are likely to be significant changes in the pattern of European identity. By the year 2030, the majority will have a commitment to a multiple identity.

![Graph showing EU-15 population with multiple identities over age groups from 1996 to 2030.](image)


Another recent survey (Zuba and Tschirl, 2006) quizzed 500 Austrian adolescents (15-20 years) on their attitudes towards Europe. The conclusions are that grown-up Austrians may be amongst the most sceptical people concerning Europe, but their children are not. They feel more and more European, especially the girls. Moreover, the survey shows that the more educated the young people are, the more European they feel.

These studies demonstrate that we are now experiencing the first generation to grew up not only in a Single Market, but in a European Union (or in a future member/candidate state). The young are already used to Europe, to its advantages and to its struggles, to the way of “Europeanness”. Whereas the older may return to the local and to the nation, the young do not return since they cannot return: they have never been there because they are too young to remember times before being an EU member or being an EU candidate or debating about becoming an EU member one day. Europe is already part of their lives. They have a European identity in addition to their national one. For this reason, Muschg (2005, p. 26 and 35) states, “The people of Europe are maybe less in need of a ‘European identity’ than politicians in well-meaning speeches try to pretend … Europe already is part of peoples’ reality” and, “Europe does not need to be a myth, but it needs its history to be told.”

However, the very fact of feeling European says nothing about whether it is a positive or negative feeling towards Europe. But the direction of emotions does not really matter as long as people are not indifferent towards day-to-day European politics, as long as they are just concerned with Europe, as long as they have the chance to participate and know how to engage to express their concerns.
The integration crisis in the Netherlands: the causes and the new policy measures

Syuzanna Vasilyan

Prologue – Status quaestionis

Praised for its capacity to accommodate different social groups throughout history, ironically, the Netherlands stands out as a country where immigration has become associated with an integration “crisis” needing an urgent response. The latter has been formulated in the “New Style Integration Policy Letter”, which the Minister for Immigration and Integration sent to the Lower House on 16 September 2003. The letter states that the objective of the new Dutch integration policy is “shared citizenship”, which implies that people speak the Dutch language, participate in the social life and make an active contribution to the public domain, establish inter-ethnic contacts and subscribe to the Dutch norms.

In the meantime, the new policy measures the Netherlands has undertaken to solve the integration “crisis” indicate a form of assimilationism, which is defined as “absorption of immigrants culturally and socially so that they become indistinguishable from the existing population” (Castles and Miller, 1998, p. 203). Before passing onto assimilationism, however, the Netherlands had resorted to “multicultural assimilationism” (Vasilyan, 2003, p. 55). This meant recognising the difference of the immigrants and allocating them a certain niche and only afterwards acknowledging their Dutch-ness (ibid., p. 60). Before 11 September, however, the Netherlands could be best described as multiculturalist, that is, “maintaining the languages and cultures of ethnic origin as long as respect for basic institutions/political order was guaranteed” (Castles and Miller, 1998, p. 203). Thus, there has been gradualism in the Dutch policy-making process as far as integration is concerned.

While the bulk of the literature has appeared to reflect on the Dutch integration “crisis” and accompany the political developments surrounding it, there are still things that remain unclear. The latter can be best formulated through the following questions:

– How can one account for the factors that could have caused the integration “crisis” in the Netherlands?
– How has the Dutch Government addressed the integration “crisis”?
– What could be done to improve the situation?

50. Succeeding the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) party member Hilbrand Nawijn as the Minister of Immigration and Integration in the Balkenende I government, the VVD member Rita Verdonk has held the post in the Balkenende II government from 27 May 2003. Ms Verdonk lost it in the Balkenende III government as a result of a vote of no-confidence tabled by the left-wing Groene Links and supported, among others, by the cabinet coalition partner D66. From 14 December 2006 until the formation of the new Balkenende IV government in February 2007, Ms Verdonk served as the Minister for Integration, Juvenile Protection, Prevention and Probation.

51. The Dutch Balkenende I government was composed of the right-wing LFP, named after its founder, the centre-right Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA) and the right-wing Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD). The progressive centre-right Democrats 66 (D66) together with the CDA and VVD were in charge of the Balkenende II government. Now the CDA and the VVD rule in the Balkenende III government. The Balkenende IV government was formed in February 2007 and comprises the CDA, the Labour Party (PvdA) and the Christian Union – a merger of the Calvinist Political Union (GPV) and the Reformed Political Federation (RPF).
History of immigration to the Netherlands

According to the estimates of January 2005, there are 16.3 million people living in the Netherlands, of which 1.6 million are immigrants, namely 10% of the population. Cherished as a safe heaven, the Netherlands hosted Belgians during the Eighty Years’ War with Spain and Spanish and Portuguese Jews who fled from persecution on the Iberian peninsula in the 16 and 17th centuries, and Huguenots from France after the French Revolution. The next largest immigration flows to the Netherlands commenced in the 20th century. In 1945 a number of Moluccas who had been dreaming of self-determination fled from the former Dutch East Indies, which became recognised as an independent Indonesia in 1949. Other immigrants arrived in the 1960s and 1970s from the south of the European continent, namely, Italy, Greece, Spain, Yugoslavia, as well as Morocco and Turkey. Another stream came from Surinam – a Dutch colony, which gained independence in 1975. The newcomers feared an economic downturn and decided to settle down in the Netherlands, given the choice they had. Yet another flow entered the country from the Dutch Antilles and Aruba, which are still parts of the Netherlands. In the 1990s a large number of asylum seekers from conflict-ridden parts of the world made the Dutch immigrant picture even more diverse. In addition, there was continuous labour immigration from Poland, Hungary, as well as China, the Philippines, South Africa and India. In a nutshell, it is just the integration “crisis” that is a new phenomenon to be addressed in the Netherlands, while immigration is not. However, being currently associated with the integration “crisis”, “immigration” has come to bear the burden of which it has to be relieved in order to give birth to “shared citizenship”.

The Dutch case – A case of European importance

Although constrained to the Netherlands, this research can be equally useful for other EU countries facing a similar “crisis” situation. Therefore, at the EU level “social protection and inclusion” – the connotations of which are equivalent to the concept of “integration” – are among the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy. They concern all the EU member states by spilling across the domain of security to that of economy. To demonstrate their commitment to “social protection and inclusion”, the EU member states have agreed to develop a common immigration policy, which still falls within the third pillar of the EU, namely, justice and home affairs and, thus, represents a domain where the national sovereignty of member states is preserved. It is, consequently, evident that here the principle of subsidiarity, whereby member states take the initiative for strategy development, identification of priorities and policy implementation is endorsed. The EU, however, retains the right to monitor the process of “social protection and inclusion” on a regular basis. Most importantly, member state experiences are supposed to be exchanged and co-ordinated through peer review and transnational learning projects on the EU platform (European Commission, 2005).

From and through the EU, the newly devised laws and regulations would be supposedly transmitted to other countries of the European continent – all of which are Council of Europe (CoE) member states. Thus, both within the framework of the CoE and through EU policies, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), covering some of the former Soviet countries on the European continent, namely, Armenia, Azerbaijan, potentially Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, the CoE member states are supposed to standardise their legislation and harmonise their procedures with those of the EU. Such a “partnership” (as worded in the ENP action plans and the four common spaces road maps signed between the EU and the Russian Federation) is likely to generate administrative, legal and political uniformity.

In short, an analysis of Dutch immigration/integration policies is hardly a self-sufficing task and indeed deserves the utmost scrutiny. The analysis of the Dutch case through critical lenses can be of interest and importance to all the states on the European continent.
In line with the research questions set out above, the article will, firstly, examine the existing theoretical accounts, which could help in understanding the factors of the Dutch integration “crisis”. It will, secondly, analyse and evaluate the newly devised/revised Dutch policy measures vis-à-vis immigrants. This will be done by concomitantly, exploring the implications and trends of these measures for each sphere. Thirdly, against the background of the new policy measures, the article will advise as to what should be conceivably done in order to solve the integration “crisis”.

Theoretical accounts

The integration “crisis” in the Netherlands will be revealed through three theoretical lenses, namely, those of political psychology, institutional political science and the micro-theory of securitisation. Such an attempt intends to provide a holistic understanding of the causes of the “crisis” since without knowing them one cannot assess the proportionality of the newly devised/revised policy measures with the problem at hand, and, most importantly, give valuable advice.

Political psychology

Political psychologists refer to the concepts of “ethnic”, “national” or “cultural” “identity” and the conception of “difference” of the “other”. Cheung (1993) defines “ethnic identity” as a construct, which is based on and influenced by racial, natal and cultural factors. Saharso (1989) claims that the definition of “ethnic identity” implies a distinction between the “self” and the “other”, as well as acceptance and acknowledgement of one’s identity both by the “in-group” and “out-group” members. De Vos (1982, p. 19) proposes a functional definition saying that “ethnic identity” stems from psychological attachment to a particular group because of their sharing the same cultural origin or heritage and a specific religion or language.

According to Ward (in Oppedal, Roysamb and Heyerdahl, 2005, pp. 646-647) the greater the cultural distance between the sending and receiving countries, the more challenging is the acculturation. Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior (2004, p. 36) state that the impact of concerns about the Dutch “national identity” “is conditional on the prominence of differences between groups”. The authors predict and demonstrate a high level of perceived conflicting “cultural” identities between the native Dutch and the immigrants. Vedder (2005, p. 398) states that several surveys have shown that “public opinion in the Netherlands is tending towards growing impatience with immigrants and the progress of their adaptation to Dutch culture”. “Adaptation”, in the meantime, refers to not only “speaking Dutch” but also “acting Dutch” (ibid.).

Institutional political science

Institutional political science offers another theoretical framework to draw explanations from as far as the Dutch integration “crisis” is concerned. Coincidentally, Lijphart (1968) focuses on the Dutch case to show that, despite the widely held belief about the impossibility for a state to enshrine peaceful cohabitation in the presence of an ideologically diverse society, the segregated groups in the Netherlands have lived in harmony. This has been achieved through the creation of a system of governance whereby the Catholics, Protestants and Socialists have shared the public space. The creation of ideologically fed institutional pillars qua subcultures allowed every group to retain their

52. The differentiation between “ethnic”, “national” and “cultural” “identity” is of no great importance for the purpose of the article, since it does not disrupt the key concept of “identity”.

53. Racial factors refer to physical characteristics, natal factors – to common ancestry or place of origin, and symbolic factors – to religious beliefs, cultural practices, language, etc.

54. Acculturation is defined as a developmental process aiming at competence within two or more cultural domains, typically that of the host society and that of one’s group.
preferred way of life and preserve their separate niche in the society. In this manner, each group could, according to its own ways and means, take part in public life, both through self-funding and by receiving governmental subsidies. This system came to be known as consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1976). In today’s terms, it alludes to the plausibility of social cohesion, protection and inclusion.

Although Daalder (1996) argues that the pillars have crumbled, he admits that the tradition of accommodation as the “principle of leave well alone whatever one’s gripes and complaints” is still prevalent in the Netherlands. Andeweg and Irwin (2002) suggest that “the importance of pillarization has been overemphasized” (ibid., p. 42) but they also support the argument that pillarisation has not disappeared (ibid., p.39).

Micro-theory of securitisation

The micro-theory of securitisation pinpoints yet more factors that could account for the Dutch integration “crisis” associated with immigrants. It proposes that any issue can be depicted as a “real” threat if there are certain interests in doing so (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998). With discourse lying at its core, securitisation is upheld through speech acts. Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002, p. 23) state that immigration is apprehended by sidestepping economic, social and cultural analyses. In other words, it is a subject matter constrained within the hard political domain. In the meantime, this is dangerous since current discourse lumps together all foreigners – illegal immigrants (referring both to their mode of entry and to their subsequent status), short-term visitors, long-term residents, as well as citizens born to parents of non-“native” Dutch (Bigo, 2002, p. 78) – ignoring their heterogeneity.

Testing the factors in practice

When tested in practice, the factors offered by political psychology hold true and generate the following picture. Although the objective definition of an “immigrant” is a disputable one, in the Dutch context the term is delimited to two “groups”, guest workers and asylum seekers, most of whom originate from Muslim countries and have a low socioeconomic status. Meanwhile, paradoxically, such a perception of “immigrants” is in no way representative. On the contrary, it is a stereotypical and generalised one, and imposes an inferior image on all the “others” taken together by the “native” Dutch.

To investigate whether pillarisation could have led to the integration “crisis” in the Netherlands, one has to cast a look at the situation of the immigrants in the political, social, cultural and economic domains of public life. In the political sphere, immigrants are not adequately represented and they tend to vote for a candidate with the same ethnic origin as their own, validating the existence of voluntary, internally generated pillarisation (Nieuwenhuizen, 2002, pp. 11-17). A similar kind of pillar is characteristic of the social domain: in most of the cases, immigrants lead a self-absorbed social life, that is, their social ties are mostly established within their own ethnic group. In the cultural domain, pillarisation is directly and, thus, externally, endorsed by the government. The latter has subsidised lessons on language and culture of origin, and allowed private schools to be founded, religious institutions to be built and one’s religious beliefs and cultural traditions to be freely practised, as well as guaranteeing services in native languages at such state institutions as hospitals and courts. As a result, 500 000 settled immigrants in the Netherlands have little knowledge of the Dutch language – a figure comprising 30% of the total number of first-generation immigrants (National Contact Point, 2005, p. 8). In the economic field, the generous social welfare system can be said to have indirectly acted as a catalyst of pillarisation since it has allowed immigrants to rely on social welfare benefits instead of encouraging them to engage in the labour force. As regards statistics, the number of immigrants living on unemployment benefits is 2.5 times higher than that of the “native Dutch” and the labour participation rate of the immigrants is 15% lower than the total, which is about three
quarters of the national average (ibid., pp.5-8). While such are the symptoms of the “crisis” in each sphere, pillarisation must have inhibited the smoothness of integration of the immigrants in the Netherlands.

Last, but not least, securitisation seems to have been an overarching factor of the Dutch integration “crisis”. Worse, if Pim Fortuyn, the leader of the right-wing Leefbaar Rotterdam Party, had not initiated discourse on “immigration”, the topic would not have gained so much importance in political deliberations and become so inflated. On the contrary, today’s “crisis” situation might be considered “normal”, ironically, against the background of the “point of departure” of the immigrants, their cultural “differences” and the peculiar institutional tradition of pillarisation.

**Newly devised/revised policy measures**

The Netherlands has embarked on a number of policy measures in order to facilitate integration of immigrants in Dutch society and, thus, overcome the integration “crisis”. An analysis of these new measures in all the domains of public life will be accompanied by an assessment of their implications and trends. This undertaking will help to gain insight into the essence of these measures and see if they can efficiently tackle the engendered “crisis”.

**Security**

A number of measures have been undertaken by the Dutch Government with the aim of assuring public security. The legislation, which has been effective since January 2005, requires mandatory possession of ID at all times and allows identity checks to be carried out on demand by the police. This has been accompanied by increasing the prerogatives of the police and allowing the latter to search on suspicion. Above all, the photos on the ID must match the requirements imposed by law. The instructions on how a photo should be taken (ranging from the colour of the background to the facial expression) are displayed on plasma screens in the town halls.

More surveillance cameras have been put up in public places. Constant checks are conducted by the police. More security, police and public transport inspectors have been recruited and retrained. Measures have been undertaken to eradicate dangerous areas and eliminate the immigrant-concentrated neighbourhoods. Foreign police are supposed to inspect whether the immigrants whose residence permits have expired have left the country.

The government has gone as far as investigating the profiles of immigrants. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Lower House VVD member of Somali origin, was one of the first to undergo such an inquiry, having been accused of changing her name in order to obtain refugee status.

The police have been instructed to check all officially registered enterprises and fine employers who hire illegal immigrants or legal immigrants on an illegal basis. The illegal immigrants are first placed in detention camps and then deported.

**Assessment: implications and trends**

The steps taken, under the pretext of establishing secure public spaces, could be justifiable if the goal of the Dutch Government were to prevent terrorist attacks or fight criminality. Instead, the latter represent exaggerated and disproportional security (in the hard sense) responses. As manifested during the last parliamentary elections in November 2006, Dutch politicians have cunningly marginalised the issue of wages and pensions by moving it from the top of the political agenda in favour of reviving the discussion on banning the burka – the Islamic clothing for women, which covers everything except
for the eyes. The latter is stated to be worn by only 30 immigrant women (International Herald Tribune, 17 November 2006). In the meantime, such political acts and corresponding policy measures, which are probably beneficial for some political actors (in this case, primarily, the far-right parties), seem to be to the detriment of freedom, which, despite having been so cherished in the Dutch culture, is fraught with the danger of becoming an obsolete category.

Technical

Technical measures have been taken to compile information about immigrants. In 2004, the Ministry of Justice’s Research and Documentation Centre, in co-operation with Statistics Netherlands, embarked on developing an integration monitor. The objective of the monitor is to measure the integration of first and second-generation immigrants in society over a period of time and to obtain knowledge about the means through which it has been taking place. The monitor allows a longitudinal analysis of the immigrants’ personal data to be carried out. Personal surveys top up this database, making it render accurate results. It is worthwhile noting that the social statistics database of Statistics Netherlands combines a large number of registers (including those from the tax authorities, social welfare agencies and the Information Management Group), which are linked at an individual level to the municipal personal records database. Above all, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service has agreed to allow its Central Aliens Register to be linked to the social statistics database.

From 2005 onwards, the Dutch Government has resorted to adopting a stricter policy on integration. The Minister for Immigration and Integration has expressed the need to combine the various information flows on integration of immigrants. The Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands, the Ministry of Justice’s Research and Documentation Centre and Statistics Netherlands have been asked to work together to produce an annual report on integration. The latter would replace the minorities report produced by the Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands, the ethnic minorities in the Netherlands report produced by Statistics Netherlands and the integration monitor produced by the Institute for Sociological and Economic Research, which has been published regularly since the mid-1990s. The annual report is supposed to provide a description and analysis of immigrants’ integration and draws from data obtained through surveys.

Assessment: implications and trends

Collating databases and developing a single integration monitor, as well as the publication of a single annual report on integration, could be seen as positive: (a) if the purpose these measures served was co-ordination and (b) if they were targeted at the whole Dutch population. Employing them only against the immigrants, however, is discriminatory and represents a moral assault by impinging on their privacy. Most importantly, keeping the immigrants under constant scrutiny could engender a feeling of uneasiness on their part.

Immigrant composition

Having discovered that there is a shortfall in the number of Dutch graduates from certain academic disciplines when compared to job market demands, the government has resorted to policy measures that aim at encouraging labour immigration to the Netherlands. In the meantime, the Netherlands is the only continental European country to embark on such an initiative, although fellow EU member state the UK and immigration countries, such as the US, Canada and Australia, have already implemented such polices. Although having initially set up a high salary level and a complicated and long bureaucratic procedure, from October 2004 the requirements for “knowledge migrants” to enter the Dutch labour market have been simplified and accelerated.
Assessment: implications and trends

Recruitment of highly skilled immigrants is a step forward from the previously non-strategic immigration policy. However, it can only partially deal with labour market demands. The fact that immigrants, especially the illegal ones, continued to stay in the Netherlands without receiving social benefits after their files were closed pinpoints the fact that there has been a demand not only for highly skilled but also low-skilled labour. Thus, although the development of an immigration strategy is positive per se, it might be replete with negative consequences. In other words, a gap might appear between the demand and supply sides of the Dutch economy, whereby private entrepreneurs might need cheap and low-skilled labour to compete in the world economy.

Cultural sphere

A number of measures have also been taken in the cultural sphere. In January 2005 the Dutch Government launched the Broad Initiative on Social Cohesion. By entering into dialogue with all the social stakeholders – municipalities, NGOs, religious organisations and well-known individuals – the government intends to prevent “people from different cultural backgrounds from ignoring or even becoming alienated from each other” (“National Strategy Report on Social Protection and Inclusion in the Netherlands 2006-2008”, p. 16). The government also supports male and female role models from ethnic minorities who can show a positive image at the local level and, thus, stimulate integration of their compatriots.

In March 2005, the Dutch Government approved a bill submitted by the Minister for Immigration and Integration, which revised the Newcomers Integration Act. The bill obliges both newcomers and settled immigrants aged 16-65 to follow an integration programme in the Netherlands. However, now, in contrast with the past when the integration programme was fully state subsidised, the immigrants have to purchase the course materials themselves, while the government reimburses the costs only if the examinee passes the test within three years. The bill grants the municipalities the right to fine individuals who fail to pass the integration exam and obtain CEFR (Common European Framework of Reference for Modern Languages) A2 level within a specified time. The latter varies from three and a half years for immigrants who have taken the pre-arrival integration tests in their country of origin to five years for all the others.

In March 2006, the Civic Integration Abroad Act came into effect. Under this act, immigrants who voluntarily choose to settle in the Netherlands for a long period of time must prepare for their arrival abroad by taking tests on the Dutch language (oral and written) and culture. They are supposed to pass these tests at the Dutch Embassy in their home country. It is believed that in this way the immigrants will more easily integrate into Dutch society after they arrive. The test costs 350 euros and is a requirement for a residence permit. This also applies to scholars and imams. The compulsory integration exam for immigrants who are already resident in the Netherlands has been in place since January 2007 (“National Strategy Report on Social Protection and Inclusion in the Netherlands 2006-2008”, p. 17).

Assessment: implications and trends

The measures in the cultural field seem to carry the logic of mandatory “Dutchification”, namely allegiance to the Dutch lifestyle and an unequivocal pressure exercised against the immigrants to integrate. Although the idea of fostering integration is in theory positive, the measures imply a certain supremacy of the host, “native” Dutch, society and are, therefore, degrading.
Social

Projects aimed at introducing diversity in housing supply and distribution of households have been embarked on. Investment in disadvantaged neighbourhoods is supposed to be made. Relocation is seen as an important condition for fighting against the immigrants’ concentration in certain residential areas, primarily, the large cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and The Hague, while the “native” Dutch live in the suburbs. This presumably prolongs the integration process.

Assessment: implications and trends

Although social segregation can be fought by introducing different types of housing (from relatively affordable to luxury) in most of neighbourhoods, the immigrants cannot be forced to purchase another dwelling. The choice of housing location would still remain voluntary and relocation might happen only in the longer term. The schooling issue, marked by a division into “black” and “white” schools, lies along the same trajectory since it is the result of the choice of one’s location.

Economic

Measures have been taken to involve the immigrants in the labour force. In 2005 the employers and trade unions reached an agreement on supporting the National Labour Market Discrimination Monitor, which will be set up by the government. The Dutch Government has already taken measures designed to raise the level of labour participation of immigrants. Projects, such as a “jobs offensive” for refugees and a campaign to counter negative attitudes and discrimination in the labour market, have been launched to engage the immigrants in the labour force (“National Strategy Report on Social Protection and Inclusion in the Netherlands 2006-2008”, p. 16).

Assessment: implications and trends

The measures aimed at combating discriminatory attitudes towards immigrants cannot be implemented straight away, as they require an integral approach to monitoring, which takes time to develop. In addition, their success cannot be measured immediately. Even though such measures may make the employers more vigilant as far as the recruitment procedure and the selection criteria are concerned, the presence of cultural stereotypes may inhibit their success.

New categories

Gender

While in previous policies no specific focus had been put on gender, the new measures are more gender-specific since research on the situation of immigrants in the Netherlands has disclosed the following state of affairs:

- the participation of immigrant women in the labour market is lower than among the “native” Dutch (National Contact Point, 2005, p. 5).
- more than 180 000 immigrant women (approximately 30% of the total) live in a socially deprived situation (ibid., p. 8).
Therefore, the Dutch Government has earmarked funds for the years 2006 and 2007 in order to enable the municipalities to foster the participation of immigrant women in society. Extra funds are allocated to the municipalities through the Decree on Payments for Broad Social, Integration and Safety Objectives and the Integration Programme with the aim of encouraging immigrant women to successfully pass the above-mentioned integration exam.

The gender issue has also been given due regard in the economic domain. In January 2006 the Ethnic Women and Work Steering Group was formed. The representatives of this group, namely, municipalities, social welfare agencies and employers work together to help immigrant women find a job.

In addition, through the Multi-Year Emancipation Policy Plan 2006-10, the Dutch Government has aimed at strengthening the social position of immigrant women. At least 75 projects have been initiated in order to back up the plan. Dutch cities have arranged to initiate a campaign for emancipation so that 20 000 women reach out to 200 000 women. A social contract is planned to be concluded with voluntary organisations in order to stimulate the participation of 50 000 socially deprived women (“National Strategy Report on Social Protection and Inclusion in the Netherlands 2006-2008”, pp. 16-17).

Assessment: implications and trends

Targeting women in order to foster their emancipation and integration is an important undertaking, but if overemphasised, such a policy measure could result in resistance. After all, it entails a drastic shift of one’s social role. Given that most of the targeted women are adherents of Islam and have been socialised differently, they could be experiencing moral stress if (a) the measure is not carefully communicated and (b) the women are not cautiously guided through this process.

Youth

The immigrant youth has also come to deserve more attention in the newly devised/revised policy package. The reason for the inclusion of youth as a separate target group is the following:

– young people from immigrant groups are over-represented among suspects of crime (National Contact Point, 2005, p. 8);
– Turkish and Moroccan pupils lag behind in their command of the Dutch language at the end of primary school by about two school years (ibid.);
– dropout rates are higher than among their native Dutch peers (ibid.);
– two thirds of Turks and Moroccans have not attained a qualification, which is 20% higher than the corresponding number for the native Dutch (ibid.);
– juvenile delinquency and dropout rates are high (Vedder, 2005, p. 396);
– in 2005, unemployment among immigrant youth aged between 15 and 24 was 26%, compared to a figure of 11% for the corresponding “native” Dutch youth (Hamidi, 2005, p. 12).

To improve the situation, measures have been taken in the sphere of education and the economy. In the former, appointment of coaches for young people with only lower secondary vocational education has been foreseen. To facilitate youth participation in the labour force, employers and trade unions have made a commitment to remove the obstacles that young people might encounter when searching for professional training and/or employment (“National Strategy Report on Social Protection and Inclusion in the Netherlands 2006-2008”, p. 16).
Assessment: implications and trends

Although the measures could conceivably improve the situation of immigrant youth, the efforts are quite limited. There is no guarantee that this group will welcome the measures taken to foster their integration if the barriers concocted in the security, technical and cultural domains are preserved. In fact, the youth might become overwhelmed by the measures the Dutch Government has resorted to and return to their roots by nurturing their “difference” even more. Such a scenario is hardly the one the Dutch policy makers are striving for by introducing the new policy measures.

General assessment

This depiction of the newly devised/revised policy measures shows that the new policy is affirmative in nature and implies positive discrimination, but that it simultaneously imposes sanctions, deploys stricter instruments and foresees closer monitoring. As a result, it has moved from “multicultural assimilationism” (Vasilyan, 2003, p. 55), as practised since 11 September, to assimilationism. Not only does it “attack” the immigrants in the public space but it also restricts their freedom in the private one, for example, in forming families and being aware of the extent of one’s involvement with his or her own community, especially speaking one’s native language. For example, according to the Dutch coalition agreement of 16 May 2006, immigrants who want to bring a partner from their country of origin to the Netherlands must be at least 21 and have an income equivalent to at least 120% of the statutory minimum wage (Netherlands Government). In addition, the New Code of Conduct of January 2006, which is to be introduced by the Dutch municipalities, states that the Dutch language should be the official language used “in school, at work, in the street and in community centres”. Such instruments could generate more resistance on the part of the immigrants by reinforcing their perception of “difference” from the “native” Dutch. They could open the way to “othering” and have hardly any positive effects on the integration of immigrants. On the contrary, the policy could intensify rather than eliminate the existing perceived “difference” of the immigrants from the “native” Dutch and, in the long term, turn out to be very costly for the Netherlands.

With the government imposing obligations on the immigrants, making them subscribe to the norms of the host culture, more resentment could be the outcome. The immigrants who wished to integrate into Dutch society must have already done so when more discretionary instruments were in place. The ones who showed some resistance towards integration might show even more now. Moreover, while for the settled immigrants the preliminary stages of arrival and residence in the country and adaptation to the norms must have served as a stimulus to show their respect for the host Dutch society, as well as conformity with its values and rules, potential newcomers might now reconsider choosing the Netherlands as their place of residence. Furthermore, the immigrants who have or will obtain permanent residency might contemplate leaving the Netherlands because of the increased moral pressure and civilian control. Even the “native” Dutch might turn away from a state where the current tense climate, ironically, might undermine the promulgated motto of “shared citizenship”. It is noteworthy that since 2005 the Netherlands has once again (after having been an immigration country since 1961) become an emigration country and this might become a new trend. The latter would carry negative repercussions, which, in the long run, would be undesirable for the Dutch policy makers.

Therefore, this article will embark on providing policy advice. After all, the Netherlands is just one of the EU countries that has become tough on immigrants and its experiences might be similar to other countries in the EU where the far-right has gained such momentum.

Solving the integration “crisis” – policy advice

By and large, the new policy measures should become more general as far as their goal and application are concerned, even if eventually (deliberately or coincidentally) most of the subjects will be
immigrants. Otherwise, as the new policy measures obtain an inertia of their own, “shared citizenship” – the proclaimed objective of integration of the immigrants in the Netherlands – might remain an empty concept or even become a political fiasco. The following advice, stemming from the policy analysis, might be helpful.

Security and technical considerations

Instead of openly subjecting immigrants to scrutiny – often without valid reasons – the Netherlands should possibly become more tacit. This can be done through an open and sincere dialogue, which would be more likely to facilitate integration. After all, the Netherlands does have an excellent experience of cherishing differences and still remaining an admirable “safe heaven” and a “bastion of freedom”.

If there is an inherent worry that the country has been abused by the “immigrants”, who have been labelled as “welfare scroungers”, the government might reorient its instruments towards making the admission policy more efficient. In this connection, it is noteworthy that in a letter sent to the Minister for Immigration and Integration, the national ombudsman expressed “his concern about the functioning” of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (National Ombudsman of the Netherlands, 2005, p. 7). The latter could be improved by retraining the Dutch civil servants, providing them with information about the countries of origin and, thus, demanding more competency.

Cultural and social considerations

In the cultural domain, reciprocity should be endorsed. If the immigrants are required to become “Dutchified”, the “native” Dutch should also be in turn required to learn more about the “other” in order to preserve rather than lose the ideals of Dutch tolerance. In this case, some focus on the immigrants’ cultures at school could help to attain this goal. This could be done by modifying the school curricula and having both the immigrant students and the “native” students appreciate and “celebrate” their “differences” instead of hiding the latter away at this level, whilst highlighting them at a higher political level, albeit placed in a negatively charged “shell”. In this way, alienation would be substituted for acceptance and mutual adaptation and, thus, lead to integration.

When this happens at school, social segregation will no longer be the case and neither will there be a need for imposing housing supply regulations. Instead, coexistence will be valued as a natural outcome bred through cultural learning.

The economy

Instead of contemplating abandoning the welfare system altogether and moving towards a more liberal economic system, the focus should be put on devising such laws that will be both universally friendly and ensure participation of immigrants in the Dutch economy. The following measure might be considered: deprivation of benefits not only if one is not actively looking for a job, which should be demonstrated by all the people receiving social welfare benefits, but also if one changes jobs too often (an indicator can be set after examination of the labour market trends). The usefulness of such a tactic is that it will make use of stricter measures without affirmatively segregating the “immigrants” from the “native” Dutch.
New categories: gender and youth

As far as the newly introduced categories of gender and youth are concerned, the following is advisable. Gender targeting should be done selectively. The engagement of socially and economically deprived immigrant women should carry a voluntary nature and incorporate only those who are willing and ready to experience a change of their role. Moreover, the immigrant youth deserve more attention than the new policy provisions. Even if the Netherlands has failed in integrating previous immigrants, it can still invest in the younger generation. This will ensure that the Dutch society of tomorrow becomes a socially cohesive one naturally prone to “shared citizenship” and worthy of serving as a model to other European countries.

Immigrant composition

Given the foreseen demographic changes, the Netherlands might be in need of both highly skilled and low-skilled labour, so as to maintain its current wage and pension system. Moreover, to remain a globally competitive economy, it would have to open up its labour market, while at this time the tendency to attract immigrants is grinding to a halt. If the Netherlands is willing to do so, and is sceptical of the recently identified dependence of immigrants on the welfare state, it might consider institutionalising the non-institutionalised sectors of the economy (for example, household services) in addition to practising stricter economic measures, as proposed above. Moreover, the future immigration policy should stem from the identified need for human capital. Consequently, the immigration policies could rely on bilateral country agreements with both the countries of origin and destination taking responsibility, respectively, for the push and pull consequences of immigration flows. In the meantime, the procedures for hiring immigrants temporarily or even permanently (the chance of obtaining permanent residency status should not be excluded, since this might serve as the best stimulus for the immigrants to choose the Netherlands as a country of destination) should be further simplified. It is believed that such a policy would be non-discriminatory and satisfy all the reasons because of which the previous immigrants had been accepted. At the same time, it would facilitate better integration of immigrants in the host Dutch society.

Addressing the causal psychological, institutional and securitised factors

Overall, the newly devised/revised measures are not seen as adequate for solving the integration “crisis”, since they are not in proportion to the factors that must have engendered it. On the contrary, they might exacerbate the situation because they do not address the root causes. To prevent the worst effects of the new immigration/integration policy, it is advisable that the new Dutch Government, which comprises both left-wing and right-wing parties since February 2007, de-securitises immigration as a threat. The propaganda conveyed by the politicians and the media, which unequivocally suggests “difference” and segregation, should be eradicated through a qualitatively different discourse. The latter should reveal the advantages of immigration with the help of the media. More emphasis should be put on exhibiting the similarities between the group identities rather than differences. It is essential to show both the cultural virtues and the vices of the “native” Dutch and the “immigrants”, as well as the junctures of compatibility/incompatibility between the two. It is important to provide non-biased coverage, not only of cultural paradigms, by displaying a more nuanced picture of “immigrants”, but also highlighting individual stories. This should be done not by presenting certain identities (Dutch, on the one hand, and “others”, on the other) as complementary or conflicting (as has been done), but by suggesting that different elements have been/can be combined on an individual level at will. This kind of tactic would ensure that integration will be achieved as a result of enmeshing the “identities” and “pillars” without prioritising and/or choosing between them. Such should be the setting within which the Dutch – as European citizens of the 21st century – will find “social protection and inclusion”.

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Epilogue

While the image of the Netherlands as an exemplary European country capable of harnessing both well-being and freedom has been shattered through an integration “crisis”, this research has tried to make a diagnosis, look at the prescribed “medication” and evaluate its effectiveness, as well as suggesting better treatment. In doing so, it has (a) unveiled the factors that might have caused the “crisis” and (b) analysed the newly devised/revised measures taken by the Dutch Government to “cure” the new Dutch “disease”. The former has been done by retrieving all the possible factors from the existing theories and testing their validity against the situation in the Netherlands. All of them have proven to be present. The latter has revealed that the measures have been concocted merely to treat the symptoms and not the root causes of the “crisis”. On the contrary, not only are they inadequate but they might also exacerbate the situation. Ultimately, a daring step has been made to provide policy advice on what should be done to optimise the promulgated objective of “shared citizenship” – a value of European importance.
The effects of citizenship status on political participation in the case of young immigrants living in Germany

Meral Gezici Yalcin

The streams of international migration after the Second World War led to the establishment of numerous new immigrant groups in western European countries. Thus, inter-group boundaries between “newcomers” and “natives” developed. Institutionalisation (citizenship, religion, language, etc.) is a key issue in terms of inter-group boundaries between immigrants and the host country community, since it, particularly citizenship, governs access to fundamental and political rights in the immigrant-receiving society (for example, Alba, 2005). The citizenship regime of the host country affects the sense of membership and the willingness to make claims by the immigrant community residing in the host country, as well (for example, Alba, 2005; Koopmans and Statham, 2001).

Citizenship regime of Germany

In Germany, until recently (1990), the Reichs- und Staatangehörigkeitsgesetz (Nationality Act of the German Empire and State) of 1913 was the only legal basis for naturalisation. The legislation was found to work very slowly compared to other European countries (for example, Soysal, 1994; Kastoryano, 2000). After the change in the Nationality Act in 1990, a new item was adopted in German citizenship law in 2000, which symbolically stopped the naturalisation on the basis of blood kinship (jus sanguinis). The precondition for German citizenship is an eight-year residency of one of the parents or the holding of an unlimited residence permit for at least three years. Under the new law, children who fulfil the precondition acquire citizenship at birth (jus soli), but at the age 23, the youngster is expected to decide on one of their two nationalities. Thus, the new citizenship law permits the descendants of immigrants to acquire dual citizenship for at least a certain period of time, which Kaya and Kentel (2005) call a limited “hyphenated” citizenship.

Citizenship policies as well as other social and political rights that have been gradually given to immigrants show that holding the status of a “foreigner” or “immigrant” does not enhance or facilitate economic, social or political life (for immigration and its aftermath see for, for example, Portes, 1994) or well-being (for example, Branscombe, Schmitt and Harvey, 1999). When the economic programmes first began, immigrants were conceived of as being temporary, and their stay was defined by the constraints of economic cycles (Schönwälder, 2006); and guest workers were denied many of the basic civil rights such as family unification and freedom of assembly. The German Foreigner Law of 1965, for example, declared that foreigners enjoy all basic rights, except the basic rights of freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of movement and free choice of occupation, place of work and place of education, and protection from extradition abroad (Soysal, 1994; for the historical development of the legislation for foreigners in Germany, see Weizsäcker, 2005). But the same law guaranteed the same labour market rights for EU nationals (Martin, 1998).

The extension of rights and the removal of the statutory obstacles for foreign workers to obtain equal status have developed gradually. The first rights granted, early on, were trade union and collective bargaining rights, and some social benefits (Abadan-Unat, 2002; Schönwälder, 2006; Soysal, 1994). Other economic and social rights followed, soon after guest workers had established themselves in the host countries. Foreigners still experience exclusion as non-Germans. For example, apart from the
foreigners’ councils,\footnote{Based on the new Law of Immigration and Integration former Ausländerbeirats have been transformed into integration councils since January 2005.} which have an advisory role at local level, foreigners in Germany today have no institutionalised channels of access to the political process (Koopmans and Statham, 2001).

**Political participation**

Political participation\footnote{Political participation and participation in political actions are used synonymously in the present paper.} is one of the most studied concepts in social and political sciences. Mainly, two approaches have dominated the literature. The first approach is sociological and has concentrated traditionally on structural-objective variables in its attempts to explain the determinants of political participation (for example, Milbrath and Goel, 1982; Verba and Nie, 1972). The second approach is the psychological one, which has recently focused on the topic of personal attitudinal variables (for example, political efficacy, locus of control). Ulbig and Funk (1999) argue that in past research, social psychological factors have been largely ignored and mainly individual differences in political interest and beliefs of political efficacy have been studied. However, recently, social psychological theories focusing on inter-group attitudes, emotions and behaviours in relation to different forms of political participation have been proposed (for example, Klandermans, 1997; Kelly and Breinlinger, 1996).

In sociological literature, political participation has been conceptualised primarily as intent or the effect of influencing governmental actions since Verba and his colleagues’ first proposal (for example, Verba and Nie, 1972). According to Brady’s (1999) review, political actions have been differentiated as indirect (for example, discussing politics and recruitment), electoral (namely, voting, campaign activity, party membership or member of a political club), and non-electoral activities. The latter involved both conventional (for example, informal community, contacting, organisational memberships, attending meetings or serving on boards) and unconventional actions (for example, petitioning, lawful demonstration, boycotts, joining in wildcat strikes, refusing to pay rent or taxes, occupying buildings, blocking traffic, destroying property).

However, who takes these political actions? Social psychological analysis of social change implies that it is more likely for disadvantaged and low-status group members to take part in political actions in order to eradicate disadvantages in favour of their own groups than advantaged or high-status group members (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). According to social identity theory (SIT) by Tajfel and Turner, identification with disadvantaged or low-status groups is the crucial factor in responding to status differences and disadvantages. Tajfel (1978) states that people who define themselves and are also often defined by others as a group solve a problem (that they feel they have in common) collectively (see also Simon et al., 1998).

SIT (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) postulates that individuals define themselves to a large extent in terms of their social group memberships and tend to seek a positive social identity. This social identity consists of those aspects of an individual’s self-image that derive from the social categories to which the individual perceives him- or herself as belonging to and to the value and emotional significance ascribed to that membership. Thus, social identity is a self-definition in terms of group membership. Because people strive to maintain or enhance their positive self-concept, they are motivated to view their in-group more favourably than out-groups. When the positive distinctiveness of one’s own group is not salient or is not reflected in the existing basis of comparison, members who maintain identification with their group may seek alternative dimensions for comparison that favour the in-group or may attempt to regain feelings of positive distinctiveness by more active means.

Since different social groups possess social values disproportionately in Germany, it is plausible to expect immigrant group members to take part in political actions in order to improve their situation. Put another way, deprivation of equality may lead to the mobilisation of immigrants’ own groups as well as the general public (for example, Simon and Klandermans, 2001) to provide better conditions to
immigrant groups. However, because of the systemic obstacles, such as the political context, economic situation (for example, the unemployment rate), demographic issues (for example, the desired population level), immigration policy, and attitudes towards immigration (for example, prejudice), immigrants may encounter many problems in acting to protect their own group interests. Diehl and Blohm (2001) indicate that institutional settings as well as limited socio-political resources in Germany act to demobilise political participation among immigrants rather than promote it.

Political opportunity structure (POS) researchers (for example, Koopmans and Statham, 2001) argue that the opportunities and constraints set by national citizenship regimes and integration models influence the type of immigrants’ claim-making regarding their situation in the country of settlement. One fundamental factor in terms of claim-making is whether immigrants have the right to vote (which largely depends on citizenship status). Other factors, such as the existence of equal opportunity and anti-discrimination legislation, state subvention and consultation of immigrant organisations, or the availability of cultural group rights in domains such as education and the media, play crucial roles as well.

One of the mobilisation opportunities for immigrants is the ethnic organisations and networks by immigrants, which play an important role in the emergence and survival of new ethnic minorities in immigrant-receiving countries (Diehl and Blohm, 2001; Kemp et al., 2000; Sanders, 2002). Through facilitating the maintenance of social boundaries and ethnic identities they can provoke interest either in homeland or in host country politics. According to Kemp et al. (2000), the literature underscores three main functions of ethnic associations: the adjustment of immigrants into the host society; the reaffirmation or the transformation of immigrants’ ethnicity in the new environment; and the mediation between immigrants and the home community in the sending countries.

Besides, the heterogeneity of immigrants not only in terms of population but rather in terms of living conditions and socio-political rights can undermine their united political participation. As non-EU citizens, Turks have experienced several limitations regarding migration, stay and working conditions, whereas Italians and Greeks (since Greece’s membership of the EU in 1981) have not faced such difficulties as EU citizens (Hinrichs, 2003). Differential inequalities between immigrants who migrated from Turkey and those who migrated from EU countries are reflected in other dimensions, as well. If one compares different nationalities in terms of the unemployment rate, for example, it is highest among Turkish labourers – about 21% in 2001 whereas it is about 15% for Italians and Greeks (ibid.). Moreover, the cultural distance or misfit of Turkish immigrants compared to others who come from the EU territory has been attenuated (for example, White, 1997). And, segregation and disintegration of Turks has been one of the major debates as well as the main focus of scientific research (for example, Abadan-Unat, 2002; Auernheimer, 1988; Schönwälder, 2006).

Evidence on political participation of immigrants in Germany and research questions

In Germany, a significant body of research has been conducted on immigration and immigrants in all social science fields since 1960s. Yet, the major focus of these multidisciplinary attempts has been either the socio-psychological or political integration of immigrants. Socio-psychological integration has been mainly studied in respect to identities (for example, Auernheimer, 1988; Akgün, 1993; Glatzer, 2004) and/or acculturation attitudes (for example, Bierbrauer and Pedersen, 1994; Nauck, 2001; Phalet and Schönpfugl, 2001; Piontkowski et al., 2000). Political participation of young immigrants (Diehl and Blohm, 2001; Glatzer, 2004; Weidacher, 2000) has been conceptualised as

57. By far the largest first-generation immigrant group is Turks, followed by Yugoslavians and immigrants from the other European countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain). For the second generation this ranking changes somewhat, but Turks are still the largest. Today, after Turks, Italians constitute the second largest immigrant group living in Germany (Hinrichs, 2003).
political integration. However, relatively few studies have been conducted on the political participation of immigrants in general.

For example, Glatzer (2004) compared Turkish, Italian, and German youths (N=1,200) in terms of political participation. The researcher illustrated that signing a petition is the most frequent action (44%) that all respondents (Germans included) participate in, and political demonstrations take second place (32%). Some 40% of the respondents, however, indicated that they did not participate in any action listed. In addition, 55% of the immigrants identify with both countries and almost equally, which researchers called ambivalent identification. Another study, basing itself on the same data collection, investigated the political participation of Italian, Greek, and Turkish young adults (Weidacher, 2000) focusing on the analysis from a social psychological perspective.

Consequently, political participation of immigrants has been investigated in sociology and political science, but yet, to our knowledge, any social psychological research on this topic has been conducted in relation to in-group identification and citizenship status. Thus, the aim of this paper is to examine the socio-psychological underlying factors of political participation by immigrants. Specifically, the following questions guided this research: How does the citizenship status of immigrants in Germany affect their political participation? Do immigrants identify with their country of origin or with Germany? What is the effect of this in-group identification on their participation in political actions?

Study 1

In the first study, three immigrant groups were included in order to investigate the group differences in terms of political participation. In order to do that the survey (Ausländerurvey 97) by the German Youth Institute (Weidacher, 2000) was re-analysed. In the survey, on the one hand, respondents were asked to indicate their residence status, including German citizenship (either already have or applied to have) in the same item. On the other hand, the interest of the respondents in German naturalisation was asked in another item. Therefore, the hypotheses regarding the data were reformulated. The specific hypotheses to be tested in the first study were formulated as the following:

Hypothesis 1: there is a variation among immigrant groups in terms of political participation: Turkish immigrants participate significantly more than Greeks and Italians;
Hypothesis 2: the participation level is affected by the citizenship status of the immigrants: immigrants with German citizenship participate more in political actions than those holding limited residence permits;
Hypothesis 3: among immigrants who want to have German citizenship (an interest in German naturalisation), the participation rate is higher compared to others who do not want to have it;
Hypothesis 4: identification with country of origin and interest in German naturalisation interact in the political participation of Turkish immigrants, but this effect is not significant for Greek and Italian immigrants. Put another way, Turkish immigrants who strongly identify with their country of origin participate in political actions more when they have an interest in German naturalisation; however, such interaction is not significant for Greeks and Italians

58. Some other scholars refer to it as dual rather than ambivalent identification by arguing that a person can simultaneously identify with both social groups and this can be a positive attribute (for example, Simon, 2004).
59. The social psychology of migration has a focus on the intersection of objective (immigration policy of the governments, the laws, unemployment rate in the receiving country, etc.) and subjective (prejudice, racial or discriminatory attitudes of the individuals in the receiving country) processes (see Pettigrew, 1996). That is, perceptions, attitudes and behaviours of immigrants are assumed to be products of the interaction between macro- and micro-level factors, which are constructed particularly through everyday interactions and experiences.
Method

Participants

Altogether 2,504 interviews with young adults (aged from 18 to 25) were evaluated by the German Youth Institute: 848 Italians (men = 425; women = 423), 826 Greeks (men = 429; women = 397), and 830 Turks (men = 422; women = 408). In terms of educational level, the three samples differed slightly. As regards primary school education, the Turkish sample had the highest percentage (48.7%) compared to Italians (40.7%) and Greeks (37%), but on the contrary, they showed the lowest percentage (18.7%) in terms of secondary school education compared to Italians (25.6%) and Greeks (26.2%). Almost the same percentage (60%) of Italians and Greeks were employed, whereas the figure was 49% for Turks.

Less than half of each immigrant sample (41.9% of Italians, 40% of Greeks, and 38.1% of Turks) had never lived in their country of origin. Only a small proportion of each national group (7%) had lived in their country of origin until the age of 26 before migrating. Less than the half of the respondents had unlimited residence permission (41.4% of Italians, 40.1% of Greeks, and 45.7% of Turks), whereas some held the temporary status of residence (33.8% of Italians, 37% of Greeks, and 26.7% of Turks). And, almost 10% of the respondents had applied for German citizenship (8.5% of Italians, 9.1% of Greeks, and 10.2% of Turks). Limited residence holders across the groups differed slightly as well (8.7% of Italians, 9.8% of Greeks, and 14.7% of Turks).

Measures

There were identical questionnaires for the three immigrant groups. The questionnaires for each group were sex-specific and were available in both German and the respective national language. Since any validity and reliability tests for the scales were reported in Ausländersurvey97 (Mittag and Weidacher, 2000), these were tested.

Political participation was assessed according to 15 items via dichotomous scales (yes/no type). Items were listed as writing a letter to a politician, participation in a public discussion, working in a political office or in a committee, writing a letter to the media, membership of a party, participation in a citizens’ initiative, working in a political group, donating money to a group, signing a petition, membership of a party, participation in a citizens’ initiative, working in a political group, donating money to a group, signing a petition, participating in a legal or illegal demonstration, participation in a trade union strike or other strike, and boycotting. Explanatory factor analysis (EFA) showed a multifactorial structure (Eigenvalues: 3.24, 1.52, 1.27, 1.11, 1.01, .88, etc.), however, the first factor explains 21.60% of the total variance, but other factors do not contribute much to the explained total variance (10.17%, 8.50%, 7.43%, 6.72%, etc.). Therefore, a one-factorial model was adopted. Cronbach’s Alpha was .73 for 15 items.

Two items of the Ausländersurvey 97 were re-operationnalised as identification with country of origin on the basis of findings that show that “feeling at home” is a component of identity construal (Hopkins, Reicher and Harrison, 2006; Reicher, Hopkins and Harrison, 2006), and that immigrants are rather perceived as “Germans” or even as “Germaners”61 or as “German-like” by individuals from the home country (for example, Kaya and Kentel, 2005; White, 1997). “Feeling at home” was assessed via the item: “When people live in Germany for a long time and then visit [country of origin], some can experience a difference. What is it like for you? Do you feel at home immediately, quiet quickly, after some days, or after a long time? Or do you always feel foreign?” The scale ranged from 1 (“I feel immediately at home”) to 6 (“I do not travel to …”). The second item was used to assess whether the respondents think that they are perceived as Germans by those in the home country people: “When you stay in [country of origin] for some time, for example on vacation, the people there would very

60. The questionnaires, the code book and the file structure are available online at: http://213.133.108.158/surveys/index.php?m=msw,0&sID=7.
61. Note by the editor: Germaners is a slang expression that refers to the Turkish minority living in Germany.
often, often, sometimes, rarely, or never consider you as German?” The scale ranged from 1 (“never”) to 6 (“I do not travel to …”).

Results

The differences between immigrant groups were tested in terms of political participation (first hypothesis). The results showed significant differences among groups: Turkish immigrants’ political participation illustrated the lowest mean value (\( M = 2.09, sd = 1.72, n = 825 \)). The mean value for political participation of Italian immigrants was higher (\( M = 2.15, sd = 1.67, n = 845 \)) than for Turks, although the difference between these groups was not significant. The highest mean value was obtained for Greek immigrants (\( M = 2.48, sd = 1.93, n = 822 \)); and the differences between Greeks and Turks, as well as between Greeks and Italians were significant. Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations.

Table 1: Mean comparisons in terms of political participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>2.1538</td>
<td>1.6722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>2.4805</td>
<td>1.9360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>2.0921</td>
<td>1.7247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residence type</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limited residence holders</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>2.2283</td>
<td>1.8864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German citizens/applicants</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>3.0216</td>
<td>2.4485</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest in German naturalisation</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never want to have it</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>2.2468</td>
<td>2.0061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably not</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>2.1056</td>
<td>1.6118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>2.0751</td>
<td>1.5794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always want to have it</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>2.3522</td>
<td>1.7861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German citizens/applicants</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>3.0086</td>
<td>2.4477</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: the table shows the results of a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA).

\(^a\) The difference is significant according to the \( F \) value (\( F(2, 2491) = 11.34, p = .000 \)).

\(^b\) The \( F \) value is significant (\( F(1, 507) = 16.98, p = .000 \)).

\(^c\) The difference is significant (\( F(4, 2491) = 14.36, p = .000 \)).

The second hypothesis assumed a difference between limited residence holders and immigrants who already have or have applied for German citizenship. Because of unequal distribution in terms of residence type, which could distort the results, only the means of two of these groups were compared. The comparisons revealed that limited residence holders in Germany (\( M = 2.23, sd = 1.88, n = 276 \)) participate significantly less than German citizens/applicants (\( M = 3.02, sd = 2.45, n = 232 \)). The effect of an interest in German naturalisation on political participation was tested as well. Immigrants who always want to have German citizenship participate more (\( M = 2.35, sd = 1.79, n = 494 \)) than others, but the highest rate of political participation was among German citizens/applicants (\( M = 3.01, sd = 2.45, n = 233 \)). For means and standard deviations see Table 1.

Finally, the interaction between nationality, identification with country of origin and interest in naturalisation was tested. The identification scale was differentiated as low versus high identification categories by using the mean split. The interest in naturalisation variable was re-computed as a yes/no type, in which immigrants who want to naturalise are coded as 1 and those who do not as 2, and German citizens were excluded. Thus, three-way interaction could be analysed. According to the
results, no three-way interaction between the variables was significant (see the note under Table 2); therefore, our fourth hypothesis was not verified.

However, two-way interaction between nationality and identification was found to be significant \((F(2, 2162) = 4.38, p = .013)\). These interactions were qualified with the direct effects of nationality \((F(2, 2162) = 10.25, p = .000)\) and identification \((F(2, 2162) = 5.65, p = .018)\). According to the mean comparisons, Italian \((M = 2.07, sd = 1.67, n = 417)\) and Turkish \((M = 1.80, sd = 1.45, n = 383)\) immigrants who identify weakly with their country of origin participate less in political actions in Germany than those who identify strongly (for Italians, \(M = 2.24, sd = 1.65, n = 332;\) for Turks, \(M = 2.23, sd = 1.73, n = 325\)). However, for Greeks low identification with country of origin \((M = 2.42, sd = 1.78, n = 393)\) lessens political participation when compared to high identification \((M = 2.35, sd = 1.75, n = 312)\). The results are presented below, in Table 2.

**Table 2: Means of political participation according to identification and nationality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification with country of origin</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>2.0695</td>
<td>1.6720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>2.4249</td>
<td>1.7829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>1.7990</td>
<td>1.4467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>2.2380</td>
<td>1.6473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>2.3558</td>
<td>1.7547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>2.2277</td>
<td>1.7277</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table Note: a 3 (nationality: Greeks, Italians, Turks) x 2 (identification: low versus high) x 2 (interest: never versus always) ANOVA was calculated. The three-way interaction \(F\) value was not significant \((F(2, 2162) = .30, p = .739)\).

**Discussion**

The results of the first study verified our first hypothesis about the variation among immigrant groups in terms of political participation, but did not verify our assumption that Turks participate more than other groups; indeed, they recorded the lowest participation rate. Simply put, it was found that Turks participate significantly less than Greeks. This is contrary to the general assumption that deprivation of equality may lead to mobilisation of immigrant groups as well as the general public (for example, Simon and Klandermans, 2001). Similarly, it does not confirm the assumption of SIT (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), which argues that disadvantaged and low-status group members are more likely to take part in political actions in order to eradicate the disadvantages in favour of their own group. This lack of confirmation, however, maybe due to the design of the research, that is, the aim of political actions is not controlled. Therefore, it cannot be argued that even though these political actions target the eradication of disadvantages in favour of the immigrant groups, the participation level of Turks (the most disadvantaged group since they come from a non-EU country of origin) is low.

Nevertheless, one possible explanation for the lower level of participation among Turks could be the difference in social and political rights and opportunities (for example, Koopmans and Statham, 2001). That is, the fact that they are immigrants from a non-EU country might undermine their political participation compared to Greeks and Italians who are immigrants from EU countries. In addition, it was found that limited residence holders participate less in political actions than German citizens/applicants in line with the findings of POS researchers. And among immigrants who want to obtain German citizenship, the participation rate is higher.

In terms of identification with country of origin, it was found that the stronger Italian and Turkish immigrants identify with their country of origin the more they participate in political actions. Namely, identification with country of origin increases the political participation level of Italian and Turkish
immigrants. On the contrary, when Greeks identify with their country of origin, they participate in political actions to a lesser extent. Put another way, identification with country of origin decreases political participation among Greeks. Thus, the meaning of identification, which is not controlled in this study, comes to the fore. In other words, the meaning of identification with country of origin may vary across immigrant groups as well as within a certain immigrant group: it may have either negative or positive connotations and/or contents.

Moreover, the effect of an interest in naturalisation did not provide a significant moderation effect in the first study. For that reason, instead of measuring the respondents’ interest in naturalisation, the actual citizenship status of the respondents at the moment of data collection was assessed.

**Study 2**

In the second study, only Turkish immigrants living in Germany were included to extend the first explorative findings. In this study, only respondents who have citizenship status either from Germany or from Turkey were included. Respondents’ identification with country of origin was recorded along with other items not used in the first study. In addition, identification with Germans was measured. Subsequently, the specific hypotheses of the present study were formulated as follows:

- **Hypothesis 1**: whereas respondents’ identification with country of origin significantly predicts political participation, identification with Germans does not;
- **Hypothesis 2**: the effect of identification with country of origin on political participation is moderated by the effect of citizenship status. That is, immigrants who identify strongly with their country of origin participate more in political actions when they have German rather than Turkish citizenship status.

**Method**

**Participants**

This study used a sample of 193 male (n = 101) and female (n = 92) respondents from Turkey living in Germany with an age range of 18 to 28. The educational level of respondents varied from secondary school (34.2%) to university (8.3%). Altogether, 48.3% of the participants held a high school degree which meant a relatively high education level compared to the Turkish immigrant population living in Germany. Regarding income, our sample showed the heterogeneity of the Turkish immigrant population in Germany. Respondents held either German citizenship (51.3%) or Turkish citizenship (46.1%), however, five respondents did not indicate their citizenship status. Furthermore, only 52.8% of the respondents reported an ethnic origin of either Turkish or Kurdish, and about half did not report any ethnicity. Concerning religion, Sunni (47.7%) and Alevi (36.3%) people as well as atheists and people who have other religious backgrounds were included.

**Measures**

Political participation was assessed by asking the respondents whether they had taken part in the actions listed during the previous two years, on scales ranging from 1 (“never”) to 6 (“very often”). Items involved, for example, spending time working for a political campaign, attending meetings or workshops, signing a petition, participation in an illegal or a legal demonstration, and contacting media or members of parliament. EFA showed a one-factor model (Eigenvalues: 4.62, 1.01, .74, etc.), with 62.49% of total variance explained. The measure was reliable (α = 88).

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62. These are two large confessions of Islam in Turkey.
Identification was assessed by asking respondents whether they identify with their country of origin and with Germans via three identical items. For example, whereas the item “Belonging to my country of origin is very important to me” was used for identification with country of origin, “Belonging to Germans is very important to me” was used to assess identification with Germans. Respondents replied on a six-point scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Loadings of the items on the relevant factor were quite satisfactory according to the EFA results: .87, .81, and .76 for identification with country of origin; and .87, .70, and .45 for identification with Germans. Both measures were reliable ($\alpha = .85$ for identification with country of origin, and $\alpha = .70$ for identification with Germans). The inter-correlation between the two factors was not significant.

Results

Two identification measures were included in the regression analysis to test the first hypothesis. As a result, political participation was significantly predicted by identification with country of origin ($\beta = -.18$, $t(190) = -2.48$, $p = .014$), but not by identification with Germans ($\beta = -.08$, $t(190) = -1.18$, $p = .240$; $F(2, 192) = 3.62$, $p = .029$). Contrary to the findings of Study 1, the less Turkish immigrants identify with their country of origin the more they participate in political actions.

However, when citizenship status was included in a two-way ANOVA, it was found that Turkish immigrants who identify weakly with their country of origin participate in political actions more when they hold Turkish citizenship ($M = 2.41, sd = 1.28, n = 38$) than German citizenship ($M = 1.92, sd = .79, n = 42$) as can be seen from Table 3. Conversely, Turkish immigrants who strongly identify with their country of origin participate in political actions less when they hold Turkish citizenship ($M = 1.78, sd = .86, n = 51$) than German citizenship ($M = 2.00, sd = 1.11, n = 57$).

In summary, the citizenship status of the respondents moderates the effect of identification with country of origin: whereas strong identifiers with country of origin participate more in political actions when they have German citizenship, they participate less when they hold Turkish citizenship. The opposite is true for weak identifiers: Turkish citizens participate more in political actions than German citizens.

Table 3: Interaction between identification with country of origin and citizenship status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification with country of origin</th>
<th>Citizenship status</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1.9206</td>
<td>.7945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2.4143</td>
<td>1.2837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2.0042</td>
<td>1.1156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1.7841</td>
<td>.8621</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: the table illustrates the results of a 2 (identification: low versus high) x 2 (citizenship status: German versus Turkish) ANOVA. The $F$ value is significant for the interaction ($F(1, 188) = 5.54$, $p = .020$).

Discussion

In the second study, identification with country of origin and Germans was assessed for Turkish immigrants living in Germany. As assumed, only identification with country of origin significantly predicted political participation, although the relation was negative. This finding is in line with the assumption of SIT (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), which argues that rather than identification with high-status group (Germans), identification with low-status groups predicts attempts at social change. But, contrary to SIT, identification with country of origin did not trigger political participation in our sample.
However, the result of the second hypothesis indicates more complex relations between identification with country of origin and citizenship status. That is, when citizenship status is controlled for, it is seen that weak identification with country of origin results in a lower level of participation among German citizens whereas it leads to a higher level of participation for Turkish citizens. Indeed, political participation is the highest among the latter group (weakly identified Turkish citizens, $M = 2.41$, $sd = 1.28$) compared to the other three groups. The second highest participation level is found among highly identified German citizens ($M = 2.00$, $sd = 1.11$). This finding is interesting since among immigrants who are, to some extent, excluded from the mainstream political process of the settlement country (as are Turkish citizens), weak identification rather than strong identification with country of origin leads to a higher level of political participation. One possible reason might be the meaning of this membership (country of origin).

According to SIT, the value and emotional significance ascribed to membership is important for the positive self-concept of the individuals. This implies that the meanings attributed to membership of country of origin may vary among Turkish citizens. This seems reasonable when the different ethnicities (Turks, Kurds, etc.) and religious backgrounds (Sunni or Alevi) among immigrants who participated in the study are considered. It is probable that the attitudes towards the country of origin will be diverse, and may even be negative among some of the immigrants from Turkey living in Germany. Regarding this point, the reasons that caused our respondents to migrate from Turkey may also play an important role in the identification with country of origin: voluntary or involuntary migration (particularly for Kurds or Alevis or left-wing activists due to political pressure). That is, this might be relevant factor, which is not controlled for in the analysis.

Nevertheless, concurring with POS, it can be argued that citizenship of the settlement country increases immigrants’ political participation when they strongly identify with their country of origin. These results also concur, to some extent, with the studies that show that it is often the more advantaged members of disadvantaged groups (German citizens in the present work) who engage in collective political actions, and not the most disadvantaged (Gurin and Epps, 1975; Klandermans and Simon, 2001; Vanneman and Pettigrew, 1972), since the advantaged members of disadvantaged groups are the most likely to make subjective social comparisons with members of more advantaged groups (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994).

Conclusions

In this paper, the effects of citizenship status and identification with country of origin on political participation of immigrants were examined. The main motivation was to examine whether those variables trigger or undermine the political participation of immigrants. In general, our results confirm the importance of citizenship status as well as of identification (not only with country of origin). In particular, our first study showed that immigrants’ participation in political actions varies among diverse immigrant groups (in the present research Turks participated less than Greeks, and Italians); and it is more likely for immigrants to participate in political actions when they are German citizens or when they are interested in German naturalisation. These findings imply that the legal opportunities, such as citizenship, provided to immigrants within the settlement country trigger their level of participation. Based on POS postulates, it can be concluded that the lower participation level among Turkish immigrants might be due to a disparity between the socio-political rights granted to immigrants from non-EU countries and immigrants from EU countries (Greek and Italian immigrants).

Regarding identification with country of origin, the findings of Study 1 showed that for young Italian and Turkish immigrants strong identification leads to a higher level of participation. In the same way, the findings of the second study suggest that immigrants’ (Turks) German naturalisation may not increase the level of participation in itself, but only when they also identify with their country of origin (interaction effect). This is contrary to the political discourse that argues against ethnic background identification as an undermining factor in political participation or integration of immigrants. But this
also implies that the opportunities that are provided to immigrants are not sufficient to enhance participation in political actions; it is also essential that immigrants identify with a social group/category. In the second study, it was showed that this group/category can be the country of origin. The reason might be that identification with country of origin makes the group membership (for example, Turks) salient to the immigrants in the society of settlement. Still, if enhanced participation among non-German citizens (Turkish citizenship) who are weakly identified with their country of origin is considered, it seems crucial to asses also the meanings of this membership, which is missing in the present work. As a result, however, it can be concluded that both the assumptions of POS and SIT are verified in our research in a complementary way.

Nevertheless, it should be noted here that the results of the present research are neither comprehensive for all immigrant groups nor for all generations. The differences between immigrant groups and generations need to be explored in further research. Besides, it is not likely for us to make causal inferences because of our research design (cross-sectional). More appropriate research designs (longitudinal) are required for such causality explanations.

Finally, it is to be noted that an individual immigrant’s decision to migrate can only operate within the constraints of the opportunities, such as employment and housing prospects, transport costs, international law, immigration policies and the need for documents like passports, visas and work certificates (Castles, 1985; Cohen, 1987; Sassen, 2000). As it was noted earlier, the status of “foreigner” or “immigrant” does not enhance and facilitate immigrants’ economic, social and political lives as well as their well-being. For example, immigrants still have no institutionalised channels of access to the political process (Koopmans and Statham, 2001).

Nonetheless, even without formal citizenship status, immigrants incorporate themselves in various organisations, although organisational life is fragmented not only by nationality (Greeks, Italians, Turks, Kurds, Yugoslavians, etc.) but also by political stances (for example, left-wingers, nationalists, religious fundamentalists), which undermines united political participation. Besides, the high level of organisational activity among immigrants does not have a centralised and representative character: most of the organisations are very locally based, as opposed to nationally or internationally. But over the last decade, immigrant groups have started to focus on their living conditions in Europe and the organisations established since then reflect this orientation (for example, Abadan-Unat, 2002). This recent development might lead immigrant groups to act together to improve socio-political conditions for all immigrants living in host European countries.

63. For the salience of group memberships or identities see Turner et al. (1987).
64. Horizontal hostility and nationalist sentiments among immigrant groups have been noted.
Sense of community and social participation among adolescents and young adults living in Italy

Elvira Cicognani and Bruna Zani

Introduction

“No one is born a good citizen: no nation is born a democracy. Rather, both are processes that continue to evolve over a lifetime. Young people must be included from birth. A society that cuts itself off from its youth severs its lifeline; it is condemned to bleed to death” (Kofi Annan)

“Effective youth participation is key to community development and key to youth development”

This study focuses on the relationship between participation in civic life and the psychological sense of community among adolescents and young adults. The aim is to discuss the role of the sense of community (SoC) in young people's participation in civic life and the effects of their involvement in the community on social well-being.

The study introduces the main concepts and relevant theories, drawing from community psychology perspectives, where these constructs occupy a central place and have undergone wide investigation.

The second part explores the recent trends in social participation in European countries and discusses them in light of the results from research studies with adolescents and young adults that try to illuminate the possible psychosocial processes underlying different forms of social participation.

In conclusion, the implications of research findings on developing interventions in formal and informal education settings for an increased social participation will be discussed.

Theoretical reflections on living in community and social participation

The following section looks at the sense of community as it is understood within community psychology theory.

Sense of community

The concept of sense of community (SoC) has become very popular in the last decade within a vast range of disciplines (psychology, sociology, social work, political sciences) and practices. It appears in the popular press, government policies, and many other discourses. Furthermore, the term has quite different meanings in common-sense discourse, as it is used to describe feelings of belonging to different kinds of communities. These include formal and informal social organisations bounded by a physical or geographical location, such as the local community, the town or city, the nation, extra-national entities, such as the EU, the neighbourhood and the school. The term has been also used when referring to social entities based on common interests, goals or needs, for instance sport groups, political groups and volunteering groups.
The debate over the significance of the community as a form of civil coexistence among people has grown in recent years, as a consequence of social, demographic, political and cultural changes associated with globalisation phenomena (Bauman, 1998). The negative consequences of such social changes, and most notably the increasing fragmentation of social relationships, individualism, conflicts, feelings of loneliness, alienation and helplessness, social problems, cultural homologation and the like have been well documented and discussed. In order to contrast such phenomena, attempts are being made to rediscover the community as a place or ideal context (sometimes idealised), within which it is possible to experience significant and authentic relationships, aimed at reaching the “common good”, capable of generating positive feelings and processes of social and cultural identification.

Such an idealised view of community is reminiscent of traditional conceptualisations by Tönnies. The author distinguished between *Gemeinschaft*, often thought of as the village or small town with strong kin and friendship linkages, and *Gesellschaft*, to describe the impersonal city. Much of the current literature on community and sense of community makes reference to this perspective.

In the context of community psychology, sense of community is considered a core construct, as well as a central value and ideal (Fisher, Sonn and Bishop, 2002), capable of orienting interventions aimed at increasing well-being within communities.

The concept of sense of community, introduced by Sarason in 1974, is defined as “the perception of similarity with others, a recognized interdependence, a willingness to maintain such interdependence offering or making for others what is expected from us, the feeling to belong to a totally stable and reliable structure” (p. 174). In current research and theoretical debates, this term is used to describe the belief that healthy communities exhibit an extra-individual quality of emotional interconnectedness of individuals played out in their collective lives (Bess et al., 2002).

In an attempt to understand and empirically analyse how sense of community can influence relationships among individuals in communities and their collective behaviours, McMillan and Chavis (1986) proposed a four-dimensional model including the following components:

1. Membership: the feeling of being part of a territorial or relational community. It includes perception of shared boundaries, a common history and symbols; and feelings of emotional safety and personal investment in the community.

2. Influence: the opportunity of individuals to participate in community life, giving their own contribution in a reciprocal relationship. This dimension corresponds to the perceived influence that a person has over the decisions and actions of the community.

3. Integration and fulfilment of needs: the benefits that people derive from their membership of a community. It refers to a positive relation between individuals and community, where they can satisfy some needs as a group or as community members.

4. Shared emotional connection, defined as sharing of a common history, significant events and the quality of social ties.

More recently, from a social identity theory perspective, Obst, Zinkiewicz and Smith (2002) added a fifth orthogonal dimension of sense of community: strength of community identification. According to these authors, sense of community is stronger when individuals feel that community belonging is a central component of one’s self-identity and when they highly identify with it.

Each person is member of several communities at any one time; these include national communities, gender groups, political parties and religious groups. Sense of community can be experienced toward
all of them; however, these distinct belongings may have different salience, with each person having a primary community on which they draw at times of significant challenge.

Sense of community has been the topic of considerable research and intervention programmes within community psychology. High levels of SoC have been associated with several indicators of individual well-being (for example, life satisfaction, loneliness). Moreover, SoC can be considered as a catalyst for social involvement and participation in the community (Chavis and Wandersman, 1990; Davidson and Cotter, 1989; Perkins et al., 1990).

Some authors (for example, Pretty et al., 1996; Royal and Rossi, 1996; Chipuer et al., 1999; Osterman, 2000; Zani, Cicognani and Albanesi, 2001, 2004) investigated sense of community and its relevance for “adolescents”, a term which refers to the second decade of life, and approximately from 10 to 22 years of age (cf., Jackson and Goossens, 2006). The most typical communities examined are the neighbourhoods, the town and the school community. Findings show that sense of community is related to many aspects of adolescents’ well-being, which includes better mental and physical health (in particular, reduction in health risk behaviours and in deviant behaviours, higher social integration and adaptation), as well as developmental outcomes (for example, better educational achievement).

Sense of community is very much debated among scholars, in particular when adolescents (and particularly early adolescents, the 10 to 15 age-group) are concerned. It is argued that there is a difference in the degree of understanding of the notion of “community” among subjects of this age range. The question is whether it may be assumed that the meaning of such a concept for adolescents is similar to adults’ representations. This issue is critical when responses from different age-groups are compared; using instruments devised for adult populations with reference to theoretical models, like, for example, the Sense of Community Index (measuring SoC according to McMillan and Chavis’ conceptualisation). Adolescents’ lower degree of knowledge and personal experience with various community contexts explain the finding that, when thinking about and discussing community, they mostly refer to those contexts they are more familiar with (for example, the family, the peer group, the school, the neighbourhood) and find it more difficult to conceive of community as a whole. As a consequence, adolescents may have limited abilities to contemplate the importance and consequences of civic responsibility. Late adolescents (18-22 years) and adults, on the contrary, show more complex understandings of this concept and therefore have a more mature understanding of civic responsibilities.

A further and related issue concerns the applicability of McMillan and Chavis’ theoretical model to adolescents’ experience of sense of community. Chipuer et al. (1999) noticed that adolescents have limited opportunities of exerting influence over their community, so the “influence” dimension of the SoC model is not relevant for them, at least until they reach legal age and are entitled to vote and to exercise other rights.

For these reasons, it is suggested that conceptualisations of SoC with reference to the local community in early adolescence should be based on the neighbourhood, as a significant context of daily life, and should take into account the nature of the experiences typical of this age period.

Following this reasoning a research programme was devised to study adolescents’ sense of belonging to territorial community (town or city), considering it not only as a geographical context, but also as the locus of meaningful social relations (Puddifoot, 1996). Research methods included both qualitative and quantitative instruments (Albanesi, Cicognani and Zani, 2005; Cicognani, Albanesi and Zani, 2006). Findings suggest the usefulness of a model of adolescent sense of community, which is consistent with McMillan and Chavis’ perspective, even though it articulates the concept and its dimensions according to needs and experiences of this developmental phase. Specifically, research confirmed that adolescents’ sense of community includes: sense of belonging, support and emotional connection in the community, support and emotional connection with peers, satisfaction of needs and opportunities for involvement and opportunities for influence. Focus group research confirmed the usefulness of distinguishing between emotional connection referred to the community and that to the
peer group, the latter being a more significant context for the construction of meaningful emotional relationships during this developmental period. Moreover, it was found that, even though adolescents perceive having limited influence over their community, they would be interested in having more opportunities for exerting influence. Actually, the subscale “Opportunities for influence” obtains the highest indices, which confirms the importance of providing adolescents with more opportunities for an active involvement in their community contexts. This picture is consistent with data collected by Da Silva et al. (2004), who found that 50% of the adolescents of their sample would participate in volunteer and political activities if more opportunities existed. Therefore, youngsters’ sense of community should be on the agenda of policy makers.

Some authors consider the sense of community as an indicator of the quality of social relationships in the community and of social well-being. The following section discusses the concept of social well-being, and the theoretical model of this construct.

Social well-being

In recent years, following the Positive Psychology movement (Seligman and Csiksentmihalyi, 2000), there has been a growing interest in the study of the positive dimension of well-being. Seligman (2002) pointed out at least three aspects that should be the focus of researchers’ attention: positive subjective experiences, positive individual qualities and traits, and the characteristics of positive institutions, organisations and communities.

Ryan and Deci (2001) distinguished two main perspectives in the study of well-being: hedonic, which includes the study of positive subjective experiences or subjective well-being (Diener, 1985) and eudaemonic. Within the second research tradition, Keyes (1998, 2005) proposed the concept of social well-being. It refers to the appraisal, by individuals, of their own circumstances and functioning in society. This can be conceived as the outcome of the optimal relationship between person and social context, as it is built within social and community structures, where individuals must face many social tasks and challenges (Larson, 1993).

Keyes (1998) distinguished five dimensions of social well-being:

1. Social integration. It is the degree to which people feel they have something in common with others and they belong to their own community. Social integration requires the construction of a sense of belonging to a collective and the perception of a common fate. Individuals who score higher on this dimension should perceive the neighbourhood as safer and people more reliable, and should be more involved in the care of their life context. Social integration, according to this definition, should promote social involvement and participation, and be affected by it.

2. Social contribution. It is the feeling of being a vital member of society, with something important to offer to the world. Individuals who score higher on this dimension perceive themselves as active members of their society, capable of providing significant contributions to others; moreover, they feel more responsible toward their society. Social contribution enhances individuals’ involvement and participation in the community (Keyes, 1998).

3. Social acceptance. It refers to trust toward others, and having favourable opinions on human nature. Individuals who score higher on this dimension hold favourable opinions and expectations toward other people.

4. Social actualisation. This dimension concerns the evaluation of the potential of society; the idea that society has potential that comes true through institutions and citizens. Individuals scoring higher on these dimensions hold the belief that society is evolving in a positive way, and have positive opinions toward its institutions.
5. Social coherence refers to the perception of the quality and the organisation of the social world. Higher scores on this dimension are related to the attempt to better understand the world and its functioning, and also people from different cultures and traditions.

The concept of social well-being appears more useful to study positive functioning within social units, such as the different community contexts. Unfortunately, the existing research on social well-being is limited, centred mainly on adult populations (Keyes, 1998).

Social well-being, according to Keyes’ conceptualisation, is related to individuals’ active engagement with their community and society. In the following paragraph, the discussion will thus consider the concept of social participation, with reference to community psychology perspectives.

**Social participation**

The concept of “social participation” occupies a central place within community psychology (Heller et al., 1984; Wandersman and Florin, 2000), and represents the focus of conceptualisations and theoretical perspectives.

In this discipline, social participation refers to “a process in which individuals take part in decision making in the institutions, programs, and environments that affect them” (Heller et al., 1984; Wandersman and Florin, 2000). At the individual level, it is considered as a component of civic competence and civic responsibility (Youniss et al., 2002; Da Silva et al., 2004).

The community psychology perspective emphasises that social participation takes place within a community context. Forms of participation are determined by issues arising within a (local) community, a place, and include its culture, norms, values and institutions. Thus, the community and the social groups in it are the context within which it is possible to experience the different forms of social participation.

According to Campbell and Jovchelovitch (2000), social participation can be considered the actualisation of the community, “the process by which the community is actualized, negotiated and eventually, modified” (p. 264).

In this literature there is an agreement on the existence of a positive association between social participation in local communities and sense of community (McMillan and Chavis, 1986). The direction of the relationship between the two concepts is not completely clear and most probably, it is bi-directional. For example, according to Chavis and Wandersman (1990), sense of community should be considered a catalyst for social participation (cf., also Simon et al., 1998). However, Hughey, Speer and Peterson (1999) suggest that participation itself might enhance sense of community.

**How adolescents participate in their communities**

In the developmental and educational psychology literature, researchers have attempted to explain the nature and significance of the different forms of social participation during childhood and adolescence, and investigated their antecedents and effects on developmental processes and social adjustment. Moving from the premise that social participation produces important benefits for individuals’ and collective well-being and should be pursued from an early age, a further aim was to devise approaches and methods to enhance it (for example, by education – formal, informal and non-formal; by other intervention approaches, such as community development, etc.).
In this research, different definitions and indicators of social participation are employed, depending partly on the particular discipline (for example, political science, sociology, education, psychology) and the theoretical perspective. Several types of behaviours are investigated as forms of participation. Some of the behaviours are not really “social”, but, nonetheless, can be considered as precursors for more mature forms of social participation. For example, social participation includes political participation (which is not formally possible before the legal age), voluntary activities, engagement in social, cultural, sports, recreational events and activities, and other extra-curricular activities. Some studies focus on specific activities and behaviours (for example, political, volunteering).

Inconsistencies among the definitions and indicators used make it difficult to compare research data and draw firm conclusions about the processes affecting social participation.

**Social participation: what definition and what indicators?**

Defining the meaning of social participation and finding a common agreement on its indicators has been a challenging task.

In this context some proposals advanced within international surveys will be considered, since the need to provide comparative data requires indicators that can be applicable across national contexts and irrespective of regional/national specificities. The variety of forms of social participation is potentially enormous, in particular, when non-conventional forms are considered, which can be specific to national and regional contexts.

The classification of forms of participation for adolescents adopted within the IEA (International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement) Civic Education Study includes the following:

- within-school activities: for example, participation in student councils, school newspaper groups, student exchange programmes;
- extra-curricular enrichment activities: for example, participation in sports and arts, drama, music organisations and computer clubs. These activities are generally related to the expansion of adolescents’ education and the use of leisure time, rather than with actual opportunities for civic participation. However, to the extent that they occur within the context of formal groups, they may be a context for learning social competences;
- voluntary activities: for example, participation in a charity collecting money for a social cause or in a group conducting activities to help the community;
- involvement in civic-related organisations: for example, youth organisations affiliated with political parties, environmental, human rights, cultural/ethnic and religious organisations, girls’ and boys’ scouts (Menezes, 2003).

Indicators that are currently being developed within the Active citizenship for democracy project distinguish measures of active citizenship and measures of education and training for active citizenship (Hoskins, 2006).

Indicators of active citizenship, in terms of personal and community outcomes, cover the following domains:

- political: they include participation within a representative system, activities within participatory democracy and value orientated activities;
- social: community participation, associational life, neighbourhood, school life and youth initiatives;
- cultural: participation in cultural activities, organisation of cultural activities, participation in religious organisations, participation in cultural organisations and multicultural experiences;
— economic: these refer to participation in the labour market, participation in a workers’ union, paying taxes, integrity, ethical consumption and employers’ organisations.

Indicators of education and training are distinguished according to formal, non-formal and informal education. Formal education includes domains (and indicators) related to curriculum content, materials, school climate and teaching strategies; level of active participation in educational institution and opportunities for engagement with external communities; practitioner training, etc. Non-formal education refers to courses/training, learning from non-formal conversations and learning from educational extra-curricular activities. Informal education refers to watching TV, listening to the radio, Internet use and reading the newspaper.

This research provides a wider framework within which to locate different types of participatory activities. However, for many such indicators comparative data are still lacking.

Considering general trends in social participation among adolescents and young adults, several studies conducted in specific national contexts have provided a fairly consistent picture of apathy toward traditional politics, but also showed evidence of interest in a range of non-mainstream forms of civil involvement, including voluntary activity. In the Italian context, the IARD survey, conducted on a regular basis on representative samples of over 3 000 Italian young people aged between 18 and 26 years, shows a steady decline (from the early 1990s to 2000) in involvement in formal participation. In year 2000, only 3% of the sample declared themselves to be actively involved in politics (Buzzi, Cavalli and De Lillo, 2002) and about one third is interested in knowing more about political events. Involvement within associations shows a slight decline from 1982 to 2000 (from 51.1% to 46.8%); the preferred associations are those of consumption (30%), followed by political and social (21%) and religious (11%). Only one fourth of the sample participates regularly. Public events are attended by only 33% of the sample. Adolescents are mostly involved in recreational extra-curricular activities. The level of awareness about participation is generally low. Opportunities of participation at school are well known, but most adolescents are not willing to take on such responsibilities.

The more recent IARD Euyoupart WP8 survey (Cornolti, Cotti and Bonomi, 2005), conducted on a national representative sample of 1 000 adolescents and young people aged between 15 and 25, shows that, among those who are eligible to vote, 85% went to the poll at the last election. Among the different ways of being politically active, the most popular are participation in public meetings dealing with political and social issues (39% participated at least once), legal demonstrations (48%) and a strike (56.8%). Some 26% signed at least one petition, 23.6% bought products for ethical, political or environmental reasons, 23.2% wore an object with a political meaning, and 27.9% occupied houses, schools, universities, factories or government offices. Only 6% contributed to a political discussion on the Internet, only 12.1% wrote and forwarded a letter or an email with political content and only 10.3% wrote a political or non-political article. As for participation in the school context, the sample is quite active: 88% took part in student meetings (40% played an active role). About 68% took part in a protest movement at school. In the work context, political participation is lower; only 19% of those who had work experiences took part in union or workers’ meetings and only 7.8% took part in the organisation of a work group to influence directors’ decisions. The survey has also shown the trend in proactive participation in associations. Some 49.9% of the sample took part in youth, religious, pacifist, charity and cultural organisations, while 63% took part in a sports club. In the last twelve months, about 20% of the sample took part in youth organisations and religious organisations. Also charity and social-welfare organisations (about 15% of the sample) and pacifist, human rights or humanitarian aid organisations (about 10%) are well represented. At the same time participants are involved in cultural, theatre, music and dance groups (24%) and sports clubs (41%). Participation in environmental organisations is lower (3.9% are active) as is that in anti-globalisation ones.

Psychological approaches to the study of social participation among adolescents have attempted to explain the role of the individual, psychosocial and developmental processes underlying this phenomenon.
Research on the development of civic competence

In this and the following section, two lines of theorisation and research on participation in adolescence within developmental social psychology will be presented; the former aims at explaining the variables that promote adolescents’ involvement and participation in society, whilst the latter is more concerned with the effects of participation on developmental outcomes and well-being.

Youiss et al. (2002) define “civic competence” as “an understanding of how government functions, and the acquisition of behaviours that allow citizens to participate in government and permit individuals to meet, discuss, and collaborate to promote their interests within a framework of democratic principles” (p. 124).

In the study of civic competence among adolescents, there is recognition of the need to adopt a broad definition of the concept, expanded beyond the confines of formal knowledge of government and normative acts, such as voting, which includes actions pertaining to civil society and aspects of daily life in which individuals freely associate in groups to fulfil their interests and protect their beliefs (Flanagan and Faison, 2001). A broad definition is also supported by data showing the long-term continuities between participation in youth organisations during adolescence and political participation in adulthood (for example, Verba, Scholzman and Brady, 1995).

Research interest focused on antecedents and precursors of social participation within the family, the school, as well as mass media influences. Moreover, current theoretical perspectives acknowledge the active, constructive role of adolescents in such processes, and the importance of social participation for the construction of personal and social identity (Yates and Youniss, 1999; Bocaccin and Marta, 2003). Empirical research showed that adolescent participation in social activities within their community increases leadership competences, sense of cohesion, social responsibility, and perceptions of personal efficacy and agency. Opportunities for exerting influence over their living context are critical for personal and social realisation. According to Prilleltensky, Nelson and Peirson (2001), opportunities for participation and self-determination and the possibility of making a contribution to community life are fundamental for increasing psychological and social well-being and their sense of belonging.

Research on the effects of adolescents’ involvement in different forms of activities

Another line of research has investigated adolescents’ involvement in different kinds of activities during their leisure time and its effects on physical and psychological well-being and on developmental outcomes (for example, academic achievement, psychosocial development, deviance, risk behaviours) (for example, Larson and Verma, 1999; Eccles and Barber, 1999; Mahoney and Stattin, 2000).

Some research has been conducted within a sociological framework (adolescent “lifestyles”), examining how adolescents spend their time and the consequences of different kinds of activities. The basic distinction is between structured and unstructured activities. Among the most consistent results are the benefits of involvement in structured activities and the association of unstructured leisure activities with risk behaviours and deviance (Mahoney and Stattin, 2000).

Another theoretical perspective (“flow” theory; Csiksentmihalyi and Larson, 1984) moves from the assumption that some activities, and most notably those associated with the subjective experience of “flow” (for example, challenging activities), may offer learning opportunities, useful for optimal development and growth. Challenging activities are associated with high levels of motivation and involvement, providing an optimal context for personal and social development.
Several benefits of involvement in structured activities have been documented; these include school achievement, psychological well-being, a reduction in risk and deviant behaviours, better social relationships and higher self-esteem. Explanatory processes involved include the role of participation in the construction of significant social relationships with peers and adult figures, the increased of sense of belonging to groups and the community and the possibility of playing significant social roles.

**Sense of community as a catalyst of social participation and social well-being among adolescents**

The research presented in this section focused on the role of sense of community on social participation among adolescents and young adults, and on the impact of such constructs on social well-being. Research considered initially high school and university students; more recently, the attention has been extended to other minority groups, such as immigrant adolescents.

The relation between sense of community and the different forms that participation can take during adolescence is a relatively understudied topic. Da Silva et al. (2004) found that community attachment plays a role, even if smaller compared to the role of peer pressure and attachment, in the adoption of behaviours that reflect civic responsibility.

The exact direction of the relationship between sense of community and social participation is not clear, however. Many authors suggested that opportunities to exert power (Prilleltensky, Nelson and Peirson, 2001) and to be involved in school activities (Bateman, 2002) or having places to congregate outside school (Pretty, 2002) increase adolescents’ sense of community development.

As regards the effect of social participation on well-being, in the literature there is a general recognition that during adolescence, contributing to community life through social participation increases adolescents’ self-efficacy and personal control and enhances positive developmental outcomes and well-being (Smetana, Campione-Barr and Metzger, 2006). Most indicators used consider individual well-being; less attention has been given to social well-being.

The first study (Zani, Cicognani and Albanesi, 2004; Albanesi, Cicognani and Zani, 2007) was conducted on a sample of 567 adolescents (high schools students) living in two cities in northern Italy, half male and half female, aged 14 to 19. The study aimed to test the relationship between formal group membership, civic engagement and sense of community, and their impact on social well-being. Since being involved in formal groups offers adolescents opportunities to establish meaningful relationships with significant adults out of family and school, positive correlations with sense of community and with civic engagement were expected. Civic engagement and sense of community were also expected to significantly increase social well-being.

To assess social participation, two indices were considered: involvement in structured group activities (group membership). Groups included sport teams, religious groups, cultural or music groups, volunteer organisations, and environmental and advocacy groups; civic engagement. The frequency with which adolescents were involved in ten forms of participation was assessed on a four-point scale, ranging from never to often. The list of activities included: political manifestation, protest parades, occupation of schools, self-management of school activities, charity purchasing, donations, cultural events, local folk festivals, petitions and strikes.

Two underlying dimensions of social participation emerged: protest-oriented civic engagement (occupation of schools, self-management of school activities, petitions and strikes) and prosocial-oriented civic engagement (charity purchasing, cultural events and local folk festivals).
Sense of community was measured using the sense of community questionnaire for adolescents (Cicognani, Albanesi and Zani, 2006), whereas social well-being was measured using Keyes’ (2005) well-being instrument.

Considering group belonging, 52.8% of the sample declared themselves to be member of a sport group, 25.2% belong to a religious group (parochial or scout), while 9.4% are part of a group involved in voluntary service and 12.7% belong to a cultural group. Less than 2% of adolescents are members of political organisations. Some 29% of the adolescents declared that they do not belong to any formal group or organisation, while 25% belong to two or more formal groups. These percentages are not too dissimilar from those emerging from nationally representative samples.

Involvement in formal groups increases sense of community. However, this effect seems to be specific for groups in which adolescents have the opportunity to play specific roles (like in sports teams) or for groups in which members are actively involved, as happens in religious groups. The kind of group to which one belongs seems to affect also specific dimensions of sense of community. Sports group members score higher on all dimensions of sense of community except for “Opportunity for influence”, while members of religious groups perceive that they have more “Opportunities for influence”. The last result suggests that the values shared within the group are critical in defining to what extent one can consider the community trustworthy and open to adolescents’ initiatives and influence.

As regards the relation between group membership and civic engagement, it appears that even if levels of personal engagement in prosocial-oriented activities are moderately low, belonging to formal groups seems to act as a catalyst for it: the more the group has an explicit prosocial orientation, the more often participants show altruistic behaviours.

Considering the relation between sense of community, prosocial-oriented civic engagement and well-being, on the one hand, sense of community appears to be a mediator of the relation between group membership and social well-being, and to be the main predictor of social well-being, confirming the results obtained by Pretty et al. (1996). On the other hand, results showed that its effect increases social well-being through the partial mediation of prosocial civic engagement. This suggests that behaviours that reflect the affective and cognitive component of sense of community (doing things for other members of the community, participation in events that reflect the culture and the traditions of the community) increase adolescents’ perception of their social well-being.

Protest-oriented civic engagement does not play a significant role in levels of social well-being, in contrast to some of the results of research on social activism. This could be related to the limited interest of adolescents in exerting influence on institutions, as Chipuer et al. (1999) suggested. An alternative explanation, however, could be based on the analysis of the different costs and benefits of protest and prosocial activities: costs implied in protest engagement against formal institutions are high compared to the chances to affect power relationships and to produce real local changes. Prosocial behaviours, on the other hand, produce desirable outcomes with less effort because they are primarily devoted to alleviate someone else’s suffering providing personal resources (time, money) and not devoted to change community power relationships (Albanesi, Cicognani and Zani, 2007).

The second study (Cicognani, 2004, 2006) focused on social participation, sense of community and social well-being among university students (aged 19 to 26). The sample included 200 Italian students (Cesena), and comparable samples of 125 US students (Atlanta) and 214 Iranian students (Tehran). One of the aims was to test commonalities and differences across countries.

To assess social participation, a list of 14 different activities was presented. Factor analyses showed four correlated factors:

- sports and recreational participation (for example, involvement in sports activities, helping in the organisation of sports events and helping in the organisation of recreational events);
political and cultural participation (for example, involvement in political activities, involvement in cultural activities and attendance at meetings to press for a policy change);
to meetings and signing petitions;
volunteering and religious participation.

Levels of social participation are low overall. The highest scores concerned voluntary and religious participation. Significant differences emerge between countries of origin; in particular, the scores for social participation are the highest among US students, and in the majority of the items. Italian students have the lowest scores both in political participation and volunteering activities.

As regards the relationship between social participation and sense of community, results confirm that those participants who score higher in levels of social participation also enjoy a greater sense of community (cf., Da Silva et al., 2004).

Social well-being is positively affected by social participation and sense of community. More specifically, political-cultural participation has the greatest influence on social well-being, and particularly on dimensions of social integration and social contribution: subjects that are more involved in political and cultural activities feel that they belong to their community and that their own contribution is valued by other people.

Volunteering and religious participation play an important role in enhancing social acceptance: students that are involved in such activities trust other people and hold more favourable opinions of themselves.

A further interesting result is that the pattern of relationships between social participation, sense of community and social well-being differs according to country of origin. Specifically, among Italian students (and to a small extent among Iranian students) sense of community positively correlates with social participation, confirming that a higher social involvement is related to stronger feelings of membership of one’s community. The correlation is not present in American data. This result was unexpected and requires further investigation to better understand the processes underlying social participation. A possible explanation lies in the type of “community”, which has the greatest salience for specific groups. An inspection of the data shows, for example, that, only for American students, family support plays an important role and positively correlates with social participation. This suggests the need to take into account, in future research, the relative salience of different “community belongings” and their associated values, traditions and practices (for example, not only the broader territorial community, but also the peer group, the family, etc.).

Summarising, data confirm the presence of both commonalities and differences across countries. Sense of community is positively associated with social participation and is a significant predictor of social well-being across countries. Social participation, and especially political-cultural participation, predicts social well-being only in the Italian sample. A possible explanation may be the existence of specific meanings of participation in the Italian context (for example, associated with historical vicissitudes and social, cultural and political background). More research is needed, however, to understand such findings.

These results point to the important role of sense of community experienced within formal groups in increasing social involvement and social well-being. Also, the role of social participation in enhancing adolescents’ social well-being is confirmed, even though different forms of participation seem to be crucial at different ages (prosocial involvement for adolescents, political-cultural participation among young adults).

Recently, the research interest focused on social participation and sense of community among other groups of adolescents, such as ethnic minorities. Preliminary data collected among immigrant adolescents regularly attending high school show lower scores of social participation compared with Italian peers, particularly for social and political participation. No differences emerged in sense of community (referred to the town): overall levels of SoC are medium to low for both groups. Research
is now focusing on immigrant adolescents who do not attend school (regularly or at all), who show a profile of high risk for what concerns health behaviours.

Conclusion: promoting sense of community as an instrument to increase social participation and adolescents’ well-being?

“It takes an entire village to raise a child” (African proverb)

Research data support the existence of a positive relationship between sense of community and social participation during adolescence. On these grounds, promoting the development of sense of community can be considered an objective of interventions aimed at increasing civic involvement and active citizenship.

Within community psychology, sense of community and social participation are seen as instruments for creating “competent communities”, capable of reflecting and becoming aware of their needs and of mobilising their resources for satisfying them. Sense of community generates communal efficacy (we can do together what we cannot accomplish on our own), responsibility and concern for social justice amongst its inhabitants.

Some experiences of intervention with the aim to increase adolescents’ sense of community and social participation are being conducted both in territorial and school community contexts. Following the community psychology perspective, most promising interventions are those that involve the whole context and not only adolescents (for example, in the school context, school principals, teachers, students, parents, and extend also to the neighbourhood and community context where the school is located, consistently with “ecological” frameworks: for example, Bronfenbrenner, 1986), and follow “community development” approaches. These “bottom-up” approaches attempt to involve members of local communities in a collective process of need assessment and search for possible solutions. Their aim is to empower individuals by offering them opportunities to influence the conditions that affect their lives. A considerable body of evidence demonstrates that young people who are afforded opportunities for meaningful participation within their communities are more likely to achieve a healthy development and to realise particular goals in their lives. A developed community is therefore one that allows all its members, including the youngest ones, to participate.
Exploring youth political participation in Flanders

Bram Vanhoutte

Participation is highly valued in Flanders. Local youth policies are made in consultation with young people and thus are participatory by method (Schillemans and Bouverne-De Bie, 2005). Next to formal political participation in local or regional policy making, several other possibilities exist to be engaged in society. This study explores the different forms of political participation among Flemish youth. Next to outlining differences between participants and non-participants in both formal and alternative forms of political action, this article examines the relations between political, alternative and societal participation. What characterises young people who are in one or several ways politically active? Can differences in terms of participation in associations, or in norms accompanying citizenship be found?

From a research point of view, people who do not participate in conventional politics represent an interesting group. Usually a lower interest in formal politics, such as voting, is considered as the basis for lack of involvement. Verba and Nie (1978) give two possible explanations for the relations between political interest and political involvements. The abstention hypothesis states that certain groups are generally less interested in politics and henceforth politically apathetic. A second explanation is that these groups are not less involved, but that they participate less because of certain barriers that exist for them. This is the inhibition hypothesis. This study looks at the outcomes of applying these hypotheses to other forms of politics. Does conventional political participation, namely voting intention, make a difference when it comes to being an active citizen?

This article begins with a short overview of a more conventional political behaviour, such as voting in contexts where voting is a compulsory obligation. In relation to this, the popularity of alternative political action is explored. Secondly, different profiles in political action and their relation to socio-demographic background characteristics are examined based on a sample of Flemish young people. Finally, the social participation of Flemish youth is assessed and the conclusions for citizenship are distilled. The data used were gathered by the Flemish Youth Platform in the framework of the first measurement of the youth monitor. This survey is a representative cross-sectional study on Flemish youth aged between 14 and 25.

Political behaviour and citizenship: theoretical reflections

Political behaviour: what exactly is political?

Some authors see a decline in political participation all around, others see this decline in formal political interest countered by a one-off issue approach, or by rising new forms of political action. These different opinions show that the definition of what is political plays an important role.

In this contribution political participation is understood in a broad sense, as the spectrum of behaviours of civilians, aimed at directly or indirectly influencing the government or its policy. Conventional forms of participation, such as having a clear voting intention or political interest, and unconventional forms of political participation, like for example ethical consuming, are both taken into account. Conventional participation consists of primarily those acts of political involvement directly or indirectly related to the electoral process (Barnes and Kaase, 1979, p. 84). Unconventional
participation is defined as “behaviour that does not correspond to the norms of law and custom that regulate political participation under a particular regime” (ibid., p. 41).

Political involvement among young people runs less along traditional channels, such as voting and expressed political interest, than through modern ways such as the Internet, says Ragí (2005). Through explorative research among students Stolle, Hooghe and Michelelli (2005) found that ethical consuming appeals most to young people who have lost their trust in political institutions. In the Flemish youth survey the popularity of unconventional forms of political action was examined among the other subjects. A second point of interest was to examine to what degree these alternative forms of political action are related to other forms of political action, as well as to involvement in society in general.

Citizenship

In theories around citizenship the definition of Marshall (1950) is used quite often. In this view, citizenship is a complex of rights and duties in the nation state that count equally for all citizens. Consisting of three different components, citizenship has a civil, a political and a social dimension. Marshall’s institutes for citizenship rest on an implicit normative framework, which makes democracy work. This normative citizenship consists of support for values such as tolerance, solidarity, equality and a minimum of political participation.

Due to changes in societies these three forms of citizenship are in decline, but a new form has arisen, Turner (2001) argues. Citizenship in our late modern society has to be seen in new specific ways. Where before people were citizens because they were serving their country, adding to the growth of the national gross product, or contributing by augmenting the population, now people are citizens through associative participation and locally engaged actions. Participating in voluntary organisations stimulates active citizenship, focusing on global and normative rather than local and materialistic issues. The skills, knowledge and values that are needed to co-operate with others are formed through participation, and voluntary associations can be seen as a practice ground for democracy.

In this study the link between political behaviour, participation in voluntary associations and civic values in Flanders is examined. If active citizenship consists of participating in society and supporting civic values, what kind of political behaviour does an active citizen in Flanders express? Who is the active citizen in Flanders in terms of social background?

Exploring political participation

Voting intention: less intention – less participation?

Belgium is, together with Greece, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Liechtenstein, one of the few countries with compulsory voting from 18 years onward. In other countries, where voting is not compulsory, the election turnout and voter registration are used as indicators for conventional political involvement, next to party membership and attending political meetings. In Belgium the turnout cannot be interpreted as an expression of political interest. The intention to cast a valid vote is used instead as an indicator for conventional political participation, since people can also have the intention not to vote, to vote blank or to vote invalid. This intention to cast a valid vote was derived from a question asking which party they would vote for if there were elections today. People with no valid voting intention thus could not choose between the different parties, or had no intention voting valid.
Table 1: Voting intention of the Flemish population aged between 14 and 25 (N=2,503)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>14-17</th>
<th></th>
<th>18-25</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid voting</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>1,349</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>1,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank, invalid or not voting</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

About 25% of the young people would consciously not vote, vote blank or invalid. This might reflect that they are not interested in politics, or that they think that voting is not a useful way to be politically engaged. In comparison with some decades ago, young people in many European countries are less inclined to vote (Hooghe and Kavadias, 2005). It is important to notice that the age from which young people are entitled to vote, which is 18 years old in Flanders, plays a key role in their voting intention. One possibility is that achieving the voting age stimulates making a choice between the different parties. Where before 18 having a party affiliation only had fictional political impact, achieving the right to vote creates an urgency to decide which party fits most to the ideas one has about society.

Table 2: Voting intention of the Flemish population aged between 14 and 25, by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>14-17</th>
<th></th>
<th>18-25</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid voting</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank, invalid or not voting</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further analysis revealed a gender gap; almost half of the females younger than 18 would not vote validly. This gender gap in voting intention is especially visible before the voting age. These differences can be interpreted in more than one way. One traditional explication in terms of gender roles is that boys are expected and stimulated to be more involved in the public domain, where girls are more involved in the private domain. This difference in political interest can also been seen as a gender-specific difference in taste, in preference. It is important here to understand that this difference is not a choice, coinciding with gender by coincidence, but the result of a different political socialisation. Another explanation of the gap could lie in a difference in cognitive self-image between boys and girls: where boys believe more easily that they are able to take a decision in terms of choosing a certain party, girls could be more hesitant in expressing their voting intentions. It is striking to notice that once the voting age is achieved, the gender differences disappear. It points towards the positive impact of the obligation to vote, since it stimulates young people to have an opinion on party politics, and express a voting intention.

Unconventional political action: predominance of positive support?

Now that the conventional political engagement of young people has been explored, their unconventional political participation is examined. The question posed here was whether the respondent had undertaken the actions listed in Table 2 during the previous year.

Table 3: Participation of Flemish youth aged between 14 and 25 in political actions during the previous year (\%), by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>14-17</th>
<th></th>
<th>18-25</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid voting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>1,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank, invalid or not voting</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to this study, the majority of 14 to 25 year olds (68%) talk about politics. More than half of them signed a petition, and the same proportion donated money to a good cause. Ethical consumption is being actively pursued by a large minority of Flemish youth. It is quite striking that a positive form of action, such as buying a product because it has been made under some form of ethical regime, is performed by twice as many people as a negative action, such as boycotting. This illustrates that doing something extra is easier than changing actual patterns of behaviour. Young people in Flanders are less inclined to strike and demonstrate, although the legitimacy of these forms of action has been increasing over recent decades. It seems barriers still exist to participate in these actions, or that young people do not believe in the impact of demonstrations as a tool for political action. It is important to know that during the period covered by the survey, no major “emotional manifestation” took place. The term “emotional manifestation” refers to a manifestation triggered by an event that plays on the emotions and the sense of righteousness of people, rather than on “rational” policy questions such as employment, union legislation, etc. (Walgrave and Verhulst, 2006). Examples of these kinds of manifestations are the “white march” in Brussels, where demonstrators reacted against the way the government and police had handled the investigation and prosecution of the infamous kidnapper and paedophile Dutroux, and to a lesser extent the demonstration against the war in Iraq. These emotionally charged manifestations attract a larger public than the traditional manifestations around socioeconomic or political problems (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001).

Certain actions have a different impact along gender lines. Signing a petition, supporting charity and ethical consuming are more popular among young women, while talking about politics and consulting a political website is more popular among men. It is probable that the cultural traditions are responsible for these differences. Gender roles in society do not spread themselves only through interests and tastes, which explains the male dominance in computer-related action, but also in the psychology of young people: women are “supposed” to be more compassionate, which explains their greater disposition to sign petitions and support charity.

### Analysing political and social participation

#### Political participation

Since both conventional and alternative forms of political action are examined in this study, it would be interesting to use different approaches towards the subject. To find an order of difficulty in these
actions, the average number of actions carried out by participants for each action was examined. In this way an order of different actions was tabulated, going from “easy to do” to “hard to do”. It is presented in Figure 1.

**Figure 1: Percentage of respondents participating in an action, ranked from a low to a high degree of political involvement (N=2 503)**

It can be seen that for most of the items, the actions that are easier to undertake, such as having a valid voting intention, talking about politics, supporting a charity or signing a petition, had been done in the previous year by more respondents than the harder actions, such as demonstrating, boycotting a product or visiting a political website. This means that there is a high probability that people that have done one of the more difficult actions, such as, for example, boycotting a product, will probably have done most of the easier actions, in the example this would be voting, talking about politics, signing a petition and consuming ethically. One exception is striking. Very few young people strike, but the action is not very high on the ladder of difficulty. This means that although people who have struck in the past year have participated in most of the “easier” political actions, there were not a lot of strikers. This can be explained by the fact that only one out of three young people in our sample was working, which makes the chance to participate in a strike lower. Next to that, strikes in school or in higher education are very exceptional in Flanders.

To know for sure that apples are not being compared to oranges, some further analysis was necessary. Two different dimensions were found, one that measures involvement in several political actions, and another that had striking and manifesting as the strongest items. This means attending strikes and manifestations do not influence participation in other forms of political action among Flemish youth. As a result, striking and manifesting are excluded from the following analysis.

Of greater importance is to what extent young people differ in the political actions they undertake. In other words, groups of young people who distinguish themselves through their political behaviour

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were further analysed. Young people in the same group make use of the same kinds of political action, while young people belonging to different groups strongly differ in their political action.

Table 4: Cluster profiles: political action. A chance to answer positively every item

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Politically conformist</th>
<th>Politically inactive</th>
<th>Supporters of direct action</th>
<th>Political activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Signing a petition (also via the Internet)</td>
<td>.572 (.34.2%)</td>
<td>.143 (.28.2%)</td>
<td>.519 (.18.6%)</td>
<td>.908 (.19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Talking about politics with friends, family, colleagues …</td>
<td>.999 (.345)</td>
<td>.345 (.365)</td>
<td>.962 (.886)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Supporting charity financially</td>
<td>.606 (.002)</td>
<td>.716 (.076)</td>
<td>.886 (.523)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Boycotting a product (consciously not buying a product because of …)</td>
<td>.021 (.000)</td>
<td>.076 (.021)</td>
<td>.523 (.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Buying a product just because it has been produced in an environmentally or animal friendly way, or because it has a guarantee that it has been made under good labour conditions</td>
<td>.280 (.000)</td>
<td>.453 (.453)</td>
<td>.964 (.314)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Consulting a political website</td>
<td>.284 (.050)</td>
<td>.002 (.002)</td>
<td>.314 (.350)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Voting intention</td>
<td>.980 (.630)</td>
<td>.350 (.935)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to its characteristic political behaviour, the clusters were named “politically conformist”, “politically inactive”, “supporters of direct action” and “political activists”.

The politically conformist cluster contains about one third of the respondents. Their profile shows us that they talk about politics and have the intention to vote. They also tend to sign a petition or support charity. Buying a product because of ethical concerns is something this group is less inclined to do. In comparison to the other groups they have a greater tendency to visit a political website. Because this group expresses a desire for more traditional ways of political engagement, such as voting and talking about politics, and is as a rule only averagely or less inclined to use unconventional ways of political engagement, such as ethical consuming or signing a petition, this group is called the “political conformists”. Their pattern of political action comes close to the more traditional approaches of political participation. They are the spectators of the political arena.

66. Using hierarchical cluster analysis.
The second group is not so politically active. They have a greater tendency to vote validly, but they do not talk much about politics. They are not likely to sign a petition. This cluster contains 28% of the respondents. They are not very keen on participating through traditional political channels, and even less so through alternative forms of political action. They have the lowest rate of carrying out each action in comparison to the other groups, except for voting validly, where the third group has the lowest rate. Because of their low level of involvement they are named the “politically inactive”. They are more or less apathetic when it comes to politics.
The third cluster can hardly be described as politically active. This group contains 18.6% of the respondents. They have the lowest voting intention. This lack of political interest also shows itself in the frequency of talking about politics and in not consulting the Web in relation to political subjects. What distinguishes them from the other less politicised group is that they are open to forms of direct political action, which do not ask for long-lasting engagements, such as supporting charity, signing petitions, or buying a product out of ethical concerns. In this respect they are as politically active as the political conformists. For this reason they are named the “supporters of direct action”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster profile: political inactives</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid voting intention</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visiting a political website</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buying a product on ethical grounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boycotting a product</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting charity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking about politics</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signing a petition</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third cluster can hardly be described as politically active. This group contains 18.6% of the respondents. They have the lowest voting intention. This lack of political interest also shows itself in the frequency of talking about politics and in not consulting the Web in relation to political subjects. What distinguishes them from the other less politicised group is that they are open to forms of direct political action, which do not ask for long-lasting engagements, such as supporting charity, signing petitions, or buying a product out of ethical concerns. In this respect they are as politically active as the political conformists. For this reason they are named the “supporters of direct action”.

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<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visiting a political website</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buying a product on ethical grounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boycotting a product</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting charity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking about politics</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signing a petition</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The last group is just as politically active as the first group, but they differentiate themselves from the first group because they sign petitions, support good causes and consume ethically. They represent about 19% of the young people. The increased tendency for both boycotting and consciously buying a product is quite unique; none of the other groups boycott products to the same extent. This group is named the “political activists”. This group does not reject conventional forms of politics, but combines both forms of action.
To discover what plays a role in political behaviour, a look at the composition of the different groups is needed. Membership of a particular group is analysed with reference to young people’s socio-demographic background. This allows the social position of young people in terms of their profile of political participation to be deduced.

**Table 5: Clusters of political action in Flanders among those aged between 14 and 25: beta coefficients from logistic regression**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political conformists</th>
<th>Political inactives</th>
<th>Supporters of direct action</th>
<th>Political activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=806)</td>
<td>(N=663)</td>
<td>(N=437)</td>
<td>(N=448)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.05***</td>
<td>7.39***</td>
<td>2.41**</td>
<td>.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (ref.: male)</td>
<td>.66***</td>
<td>.86(ns)</td>
<td>1.66***</td>
<td>1.32*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (in years)</td>
<td>1.11***</td>
<td>.90***</td>
<td>.88***</td>
<td>1.09***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High education level (ref.: low education level)</td>
<td>1.99***</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>.62***</td>
<td>2.65***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least one parent has a diploma of higher education</td>
<td>1.14(ns)</td>
<td>.62***</td>
<td>1.19(ns)</td>
<td>1.25(ns)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

67. We examine the socio-demographic background by using logistic regression. The beta coefficients in the table reflect a comparison with the reference category of the ratio that a certain event will happen against the probability that this event will not happen. If the coefficient is 1 there is no difference in outcome between the tested and the reference category. If the coefficient is lower than 1, it is less probable that someone with this characteristic will be classified in this cluster instead of another. If the coefficient is greater than 1 it is more probable. The significance of the coefficients is indicated by the stars. A significant coefficient indicates that the associations found in the sample can be generalised to the entire population. The explained variance R² is a measure of how well the model explains the differences in every group.
An example of how to interpret the coefficients in the table is useful here. In the political conformist group, we see that having a high education level has a coefficient of almost 2. This means that compared to people with a low education level, it is two times more probable for people with a high level of education to display political conformist behaviour. Being female, on the other hand, makes it less probable to be present in this group, when compared to being male. Being older increases the possibility of being political in this way. To sum up, we can say that the conformists mainly consist of men. Those who are more rather than less educated also take part in this form of politics. This group consists of people at the older end of the range.

Young people with a high education level are three times less likely to be politically apathetic than those who are less educated. An additional influence in the same direction comes from the educational level of the parents. People that are not engaged in politics are somewhat younger as well. People who are not involved in religion or any other philosophy of life are about two times more likely to be politically less engaged. This group is the most socio-demographically homogenous group, as indicated by the explained variance.

The third group, which shows a more unconventional political behaviour, is composed of more girls than boys. They are younger. They also have a lower level of education, but to a lesser extent than the inactive group.

The political activists group contains more higher educated people and those involved with a life philosophy. This group is also somewhat older. More women seem to prefer this profile of political action.

It is striking that young men are over-represented in the politically conventional group, and young women are significantly more present in the groups with a profile for alternative forms of participation. The least politically active groups are considerably lower educated and younger. For about 40% of young people, unconventional forms of politics play a role in their political behaviour. For 18% this is the only way of participating in politics. This could mean that formal politics as a closed system is less accessible for women, the lower educated or younger people. The more direct ways of having an impact on society, through consumption, signing a petition or donating to charity, seem more fitted to expressing a voice in society. Since these ways of being engaged directly relate to their environment and interests, instead of focusing on parties and power balances, alternative forms of politics teach young people that the political is everywhere, and does not only take place within parliament. This is clearly not the only way in which young people engage in politics; about half of young Flemish people talk about politics or have a clear voting intention. In this way, the alternative forms of political action can be seen as a stepping-stone towards understanding the conventional political arena.
Social participation

Within the scope of citizenship not only political participation plays an important role, being embedded in social networks is also seen as a structural indicator for more democratic civic behaviour. As a cross validation of the influence of social and political participation on citizenship, ethnocentrism will be used. Ethnocentrism is based on a pervasive and rigid in-group/out-group distinction; it involves stereotyped negative imagery and hostile attitudes regarding out-groups and submissive attitudes regarding in-groups, and a hierarchical, authoritarian view of group interaction in which in-groups are rightly dominant, and out-groups subordinate (Adorno et al., 1969, p. 150). It is an attitude that fully opposes democratic citizenship values, such as solidarity and attachment to democratic political procedures. A higher score on the ethnocentrism scale means a more ethnocentric attitude, and hence a lower level of citizenship. In the theoretical outline the relation between social participation and civic values was explained. Here, the validity of this argument can be tested. Furthermore, there is an examination of the extent to which a particular political behaviour corresponds to societal participation. Does conventional participation go along with more social participation than unconventional participation or vice versa?

Table 6: Score for each cluster on indicators of social participation and citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Social participation indicators</th>
<th>Citizenship indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average number of associations of which one has been member (out of 7)</td>
<td>“Recent” associational participation (% yes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political conformists</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political inactives</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporters of direct action</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political activists</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The politically conventional group and the group that supports direct action display about the same level of social participation. The politically apathetic group is clearly less socially active. The most socially engaged group is the activist group. It seems that a higher level of political engagement goes hand in hand with a higher social engagement: the activist group has participated in the greatest number of associations, and they also have the largest proportion of recent participation.

A vulnerable group in the context of active citizenship is the apathetic group. They do not participate in conventional or unconventional political or social ways. This group consists mainly of lower educated or people coming from a lower social background. They seem to be disconnected in every way examined in the community, not being involved politically, socially or religiously. The discourse that sees participation and involvement as a way to include people does not apply to these young people.

Looking at the different forms of political participation, it is clear that citizenship is most present in the activist group. Young people with a conventional form of citizenship do not seem more engaged in

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68. Youth associations, youth clubs, community youth work, sports associations, hobby associations, cultural associations, social associations and organising a party/festival/neighbourhood party

69. Approaching measure, not absolute percentage.

70. For technical details see JOP (2007).
society or less ethnocentric than individuals that participate in short-term engagements, such as petitions.

Conclusions

Unconventional forms of politics are quite popular among young people in Flanders. About half of young people have signed a petition in the last year, or have supported a good cause. Over a third buys products because of ethical concerns. The groups of youngsters that combine these forms of politics with political apathy, which consist of more lower educated people and women, are in contact with political themes. A lower level of education remains a very decisive indicator in the group with low political engagement. The unconventional forms of politics play a role among young people, but they do not replace the traditional political channels. A large group of young people is only engaged in politics in conventional ways.

In the framework of active citizenship, it is remarkable that young people who, in general, do not participate politically are less involved in associational life as well. Young people, who combine both traditional and unconventional forms of political participation, are significantly more active in associations, and give more support to values associated with citizenship, such as tolerance.

When introducing the subject, the question of whether inhibition or abstention was more applicable to the less politically active parts of Flemish youth was posed, and whether this picture changed when looking at alternative forms of political participation. Based on these data, both hypotheses can be confirmed. The lower educated seem to be more politically apathetic. Also, more informal forms of politics do not attract them. So, they mainly abstain from politics. It seems politics is not a language in which the lower educated can express themselves. Two ways are open to change this: on the one hand, the language of politics can be made more transparent, for example by translating political issues into several possible choices, and, on the other hand, the possibilities for learning this language should be multiplied, by including (young) citizens more than the obligatory vote every few years. For women, it seems that if possibilities to be politically active at a practical level arise, such as signing a petition or consuming ethically, they engage more than men in these forms. Where young men are mostly either politically active in a conventional way or not, women are more attracted towards concrete and direct forms of politics. Young women seem to understand politics better than men if it comes down to the practical translation of words into deeds. This suggests that if politics is seen not only as discussing “politics” or voting, but also encompassing more direct ways of influencing society, women are equally or even slightly more engaged than men.
Limited access to active citizenship: social exclusion patterns affecting young LGBT people in Europe

Judit Takács

From social exclusion towards recognition and participation

Introducing citizenship concepts into the discussion of multidimensional social exclusion mechanisms has several advantages. This approach emphasises that the inability to participate in (and be respected by) mainstream society is a violation of a basic right that should be open to all citizens; and thereby places a burden on society to ensure that it enables participation and integration of all its members. As a result, there is less temptation to blame the excluded for their fate. Instead, citizenship concepts can highlight the role of political, economic and social arrangements in generating exclusion, and the role of solidarity among members in overcoming it. Another advantage is that instead of demanding uniformity of outcomes, it calls for equal freedoms for all to enjoy all aspects of citizenship. The citizenship discourse of social exclusion thus focuses on claims for equal capabilities – to be interpreted as the ability to exercise civil and social citizenship rights – which may necessitate extra efforts by society. In this context it is important to realise that an equal starting point – that is, providing “equal opportunities” – may not be enough to ensure equal capabilities (Klasen, 2002).

Interpreting social exclusion as the denial or non-realisation of civil, political and social rights of citizenship (Room, 1995) – where citizenship is defined as a status enjoyed by persons who are full members of a community (Marshall, 1963) – is also a useful approach to highlight the specific nature of social exclusion mechanisms targeting LGBT people in general and LGBT youth in particular.

LGBT is an umbrella term covering a very heterogeneous group of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people who often appear with joint political efforts in the local and international political arena for efficiency: in order to get a better social representation and more political support. While there can be significant differences between the individuals signing up for being politically represented under the LGBT heading, their main uniting force derives from their social minority group membership. LGBT people are members of relatively powerless social groups, but they differ from “traditional” minorities in two main aspects: they are usually not marked by their bodies – for example, by their skin colour – thus they are not recognisable at first sight; and their existence is still perceived in a lot of places as “challenging the natural order of things” (Gross, 1991).

Political scientists emphasise that political exclusion or marginalisation of subordinate groups and persons, including LGBT people, is a wrong and harmful social practice, not only because it undermines promises of equal opportunity and political equality implied in democratic commitments, but also because more inclusion of and influence for currently under-represented social groups can help a society confront and find some remedies for structural social inequality (Young, 2000). This recognition is reflected in the European Parliament resolution on homophobia in Europe, which called on the member states of the European Union to ensure that LGBT people are protected from homophobic hate speech and violence and ensure that same-sex partners enjoy the same respect, dignity and protection as the rest of society.\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{71} In this resolution of January 2006, homophobia is defined as “an irrational fear of and aversion to homosexuality and to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people based on prejudice and similar to racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and sexism, which can be manifested in the private and public spheres in different forms, such as hate speech and incitement to discrimination, ridicule and verbal, psychological and physical violence, persecution and murder, discrimination in violation of the principle of equality and unjustified and unreasonable limitations of rights, which are often hidden behind
LGBT people as social minority group members can suffer from various forms of socioeconomic and cultural injustice, but according to Nancy Fraser their political claims can rather be identified as claims for recognition aimed at remedying cultural injustice than some sort of political-economic restructuring referred to as redistribution aiming at redressing economic injustice. In this context recognition is defined as a cultural or symbolic change involving the upward revaluation of disrespected identities, or even a complete transformation of societal patterns of representation, interpretation and communication in ways that would change everybody’s sense of self.

Sexuality in this conception is a mode of social differentiation whose roots do not lie in the political economy because homosexuals are distributed throughout the entire class structure of capitalist society, occupy no distinctive position in the division of labour, and do not constitute an exploited class. Rather, their mode of collectivity is that of a despised sexuality, rooted in the cultural-valuational structure of society. From this perspective the injustice they suffer is quintessentially a matter of recognition. Gays and lesbians suffer from heterosexism: the authoritative construction of norms that privilege heterosexuality. Along with these goes homophobia: the cultural devaluation of homosexuality. Their sexuality thus disparaged, homosexuals are subject to shaming, harassment, discrimination and violence, while being denied legal rights and equal protections – all fundamentally denials of recognition. To be sure, gays and lesbian also suffer serious economic injustices; they can be summarily dismissed from paid work and are denied family-based social welfare benefits. But far from being rooted directly in the economic structure, these derive instead from an unjust cultural-valuational structure (Fraser, 1997, p. 18).

Lack of social recognition is closely connected to the ambiguous citizenship status of LGBT people, especially if it is taken into consideration that full citizenship “requires that one be recognized not in spite of one’s unusual or minority characteristics, but with those characteristics understood as part of a valid possibility for the conduct of life” (Phelan, 2001, pp. 15-16).

During the 1990s various models of citizenship – such as feminist citizenship (Walby, 1994), sexual citizenship (Evans, 1993), intimate citizenship (Giddens, 1992; Plummer, 1995, 2003) – were introduced, in response to the social changes and the emerging new representational claims that emphasised the necessity to broaden the scope of modern citizenship to consider full participation opportunities for social groups, including LGBT people, being formerly deprived of full community membership. The broader concept of intimate citizenship is centred on a fourth component besides social, political and economic rights that examines “rights, obligations, recognition and respect around those most intimate spheres of life – who to live with, how to raise children, how to handle one’s body, how to relate as a gendered being, how to be an erotic person” (Plummer, 2001, p. 238).

Similarly, the concept of sexual citizenship is concerned with the genders, sexualities and bodies of citizens that matter in politics, and draws attention to all kinds of social exclusions that the various sexual communities can experience in relation to, for example, free expression, bodily autonomy and institutional inclusion (Hekma, 2004). Proponents of sexual citizenship point to the necessity of challenging the heterosexist assumptions that govern most societies as well as the potentially dangerous interaction between inclusion and normalisation tendencies. According to this approach it is false to interpret the extension of certain rights associated with citizenship to embrace LGBT people as a success, if equality and normality is still defined in terms of sameness with heteronormative mainstream values and practices (Richardson, 2004). Without revising these dominant meanings and norms the position of “sexual dissidents” compare with that of the illegal alien: “Both are produced as outside the bounds of normalcy, and of law, and they are strangers; but also the most dangerous strangers of all, in that they are essentially different, but also able to ‘pass’ undetected in the absence of close surveillance” (Stychin, 2003, p. 99).

LGBT people can be provided with full – or closer to full – community membership by broadening the political agenda at least in three dimensions: in gaining respect and representation in national institutions, including the government, the workplaces, schools, families, welfare and health care institutions; in having social dialogues encouraged by institutions, and in the manner of equal partnership where concerns of all the parties can be voiced and heard; and by revisiting the norm of the good citizen who tends to be heterosexual, “gender conventional, link sex to love and a marriage-like relationship, defend family values, personify economic individualism, and display national pride” (Seidman, 2002, p. 133). The main problem with a narrow rights agenda is that it “leaves the dominant sexual norms, other than gender preference, in place and removed from the political debate”, while it “ignores the ways ideas of sexual citizenship establish social boundaries between insiders (good citizens) and outsiders (bad citizens). And, while same- or opposite-gender preference is surely one boundary issue, there are many other dimensions of sexuality that are used to separate the good and the bad sexual citizen; for example gender norms, the age of the sex partners, whether sex is private or public, commercial or not, causal or intimate, monogamous or not, gentle or rough” (ibid., p. 189).

Following Carl F. Stychin’s (2001) analysis, sexual citizenship in the European Union, involving the achievement of rights through social struggle, can be interpreted as an active, public and potentially democratic endeavour in national, as well as in broader, European transnational contexts – as opposed to, for example, the passivity of European citizenship characterised by enjoyment of rights, which are centred in a private, depoliticised sphere and handed down from above. In this context sexual orientation can be seen as becoming an identity with anti-discrimination rights attachments, which according to Stychin “raises the possibility of a movement towards a European-wide consensus around the meaning of sexuality, not only as warranting anti-discrimination protection, but also more fundamentally as a politicized identity” (ibid., p. 295). However, this “politicised identity” must be understood as an element of a coalition-based model that allows for the effective political co-operation of heterogeneous LGBT crowds. In this context sexual citizenship is seen as increasingly being grounded in a politics of affinity operating with politicised flexible affinities and coalitions, rather than with fixed, monolithic identities (Phelan, 1995). Stychin (2001, p. 295) also points to the active, democratic political strategies through which coalitions will continually emerge, change and evolve as individuals may identify with certain elements of rights struggles, while not with others, and emphasises that sexual identification “undoubtedly is a bond which may bring people together, but the differences between them seem far too great to establish anything like a fixed and stable identity”.

Applying a coalition-based strategy can be useful in activating transgender citizenship: “An example could be common endeavours and mutual support around rights struggles between transgendered people and lesbians, gays, and bisexuals …. While dialogue across identifications here may prove valuable, any attempt to construct a single, logic public sphere grounded in a fixed identity would not reflect the differently located subjects at issue” (ibid.). A wide variety of people transgressing the traditional gender binaries can identify themselves as transgender persons including “transsexuals, transgenderists, transvestites, cross-dressers, third sex, intersex, non-labelled, drag queens, drag kings, gender challenged, gender-gifted, shapeshifters etc.” (Nataf, 1996, p. 16), thus it would not be easy to use the transgender category in the course of a unifying sexual identity based politics either. Nowadays, the effective functioning of transgender rights coalitions – such as Press for Change in the UK – can be witnessed in gaining gradually fuller community membership for some transgender people in some cases, while being aware of the fact that “fighting for rights for all transgender people would entail substantial social change, such as the creating of ‘third and other’ sex/gender categories and legislative support for marriage between people of all genders” (Monro and Warren, 2004, p. 357).

Concepts of intimate and sexual citizenship underline the need not only to broaden the scope of modern citizenship, but also to revise its normative content. This need can be reflected by the formation of broader temporary “plastic coalitions” to fight against social exclusion practices denying

72. www.pfc.org.uk.
certain citizenship rights from overlapping segments of otherwise potentially very different populations.

Identifying as LGBT and being young, LGBT youth often become victims of multidimensional mechanisms of social exclusion and multiple forms of discrimination on the basis of age and sexual orientation. These overlapping aspects of vulnerability imply that they can be socially excluded as a result of their low incomes, unemployment, poor education, health, and housing conditions, gender, religion, ethnic origin, as well as the inability to realise their autonomy and citizenship rights.

In the following the article will focus on barriers preventing the successful social integration of LGBT youth, reflected by accounts of real life experiences of young LGBT people from 37 European countries.

Obstacles to active citizenship practices

This part of the article is based on original survey research (N=754)\textsuperscript{73} conducted by the ILGA-Europe and the IGLYO social exclusion research team in 2006. The main goal of the research was to illustrate how mechanisms of social exclusion work in everyday life to prevent the successful social integration of LGBT youth. From individual accounts reflecting real-life experiences of young LGBT people (collected from 37 European countries) similar patterns of social exclusion emerged: families, schools, religious communities, workplaces, and symbolic media environments were shown to be potentially threatening places to grow up and live in for young lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people.

According to our findings, young LGBT people have a lot of trouble with the main agents of socialisation: family, school, peer group and media. School and family seemed to be especially problematic social contexts for LGBT youth to fit into.

Almost two thirds of respondents (61.2\%) referred to negative personal experiences at school related to their LGBT status. More than half of them (53.0\%) reported bullying, which included a wide spectrum of negative experiences from name calling through ostracism to physical attacks. Longer term or repeated bullying was shown to have serious consequences on the victims. Some of them became withdrawn and socially isolated, or dropped out of school. Respondents claimed that mostly their peers were responsible for their negative experiences and especially for suffering from bullying. Bullying was often interpreted as being related to or being the consequence of gender non-conforming behaviour, character and look – or what was perceived to be such by others. Perceived non-conforming gender behaviour leading to assumptions and suspicions of being non-heterosexual leading to anti-gay/lesbian victimisation in school could equally affect non-heterosexual as well heterosexual youth. Many respondents gained negative experiences of anxiety related to fear of discrimination or bullying. In this context revealing one’s true – LGBT – self could be seen as a luxury with dangerous consequences.

A number of respondents mentioned teachers as being the source, or being a part of their problems. These teachers were described as passive outsiders failing to provide help for the isolated, hurt and/or bullied students. Homophobic and heterosexist manifestations of teachers were also shown, including for example, intrusions into the personal lives of students. Teachers’ offensive and/or threatening language use could also indicate their homophobic attitudes. In this context, the need for teachers’ training to prevent or handle LGBT issues was highlighted. Lack of openly LGBT teachers – serving as potential positive role models for LGBT students – was also perceived to indicate the general problems of acceptance. Among those who did not have any negative experiences in school, 4\% mentioned good attitudes, respectful treatment and acceptance from teachers.

\textsuperscript{73} This research was conducted as part of producing a report on the Social Exclusion of Young Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People, published by ILGA-Europe and IGLYO in April 2006.
While 43% of respondents found that their school curriculum expressed prejudice or included discriminative elements targeting LGBT people, more people referred to the lack of representation of LGBT issues in the school curriculum as a deceptive representation of real life. The fact that LGBT issues are not included, mentioned and covered in school curriculum was interpreted by many respondents as an institutional tool for maintaining LGBT invisibility in school and as such being discrimination in itself.

More than half of our respondents (51.2%) reported experiences of prejudice and/or discrimination in their family. Typical family reactions to revealing one’s LGBT identity to close family was shown to be disbelief, denial and demands for “changing back to normal”. Stereotypical misconceptions of what it means to be gay, lesbian, bisexual or transsexual greatly contributed to the non-accepting attitudes towards LGBT family members. Transgender respondents mentioned that they had to go through a double coming out with a double burden: since before identifying as a trans-person most of them believed themselves gay or lesbian. Being rejected as an LGBT person by close family members was shown to force young people into self-denial and/or constructing a double life strategy. In some cases coming out to parents could pose the threat of or actually lead to being forced to leave the family home. Rejection by family members often reflected fear of social stigmatisation affecting the parents and the family as a whole in a heterosexist environment. Many respondents were/are unable or unwilling to reveal their LGBT identity within their family because the discouraging homophilic environment of the family itself. In contrast with the many negative experiences of most of the respondents, there were a few reports of a positive, accepting family atmosphere. In some of these families there were already openly gay or lesbian family members providing positive role models for young LGBT people.

Less than one third of our respondents (29.8%) reported experiences of prejudice and/or discrimination targeting them as LGBT people in their close circle of friends. In comparison to the relative hostility of the family environment, they seemed to find more acceptance and recognition in their friends’ circles. After revealing their LGBT identity, some respondents indicated a certain restructuring in their friends’ circle: some old friends they lost, while finding new ones – especially from the LGBT community. In the lives of young LGBT people, friends can play a very significant role by providing them with the sense of belonging and being accepted that is often refused to them by their family of origin. Friends – especially LGBT friends and LGBT community members – can become members of a family of choice that can provide young LGBT people with an accepting family-like environment where they can feel at home.

In the context of being discriminated in different community settings, respondents referred to negative experiences in relation to the workplace by mentioning a wide spectrum of phenomena, including not getting promoted, being dismissed – or not even getting the job in the first place – having their freedom of expression curtailed, being ostracised, isolated or subjected to unwanted moralising. Revealing one’s LGBT identity at the workplace seemed to be a risky endeavour, therefore some respondents preferred to hide this aspect of their lives. Sometimes they were forced into subterfuge and deception, while the energy spent in concealing identity and inventing stories could be better devoted to the work at hand.

Many respondents referred to instances of institutionalised discrimination – affecting them as citizens whose full community membership is denied by heteronormative institutional policy designs – including discriminative legislation failing to provide heterosexual and non-heterosexual citizens with equal rights, restrictions on giving blood, discriminative insurance policies and everyday practices. A lot of respondents felt restricted in their use of public spaces – for example, walking on the streets – without being harassed. Safety is a basic concern for everyone but it seems that it cannot be taken for granted so readily by LGBT people who are often reminded to be aware of potential attacks, abuse and other acts of hostility.

74. Some 38% of our respondents gave an affirmative answer to the question of whether they experienced prejudice or discrimination targeting them as an LGBT person in any community they belong to.
More than a quarter of respondents (28%) identified themselves as being religious, and one third of them (33%) reported having encountered prejudice or discrimination in their religious community. Church institutions were often described as inherently homophobic – leading to the development of internalised homophobia. Many formally religious respondents reported leaving their church as they found the religious teachings to be incompatible with their own life experience. In spite of the seemingly inherent incompatibility of religion and homosexuality, a number of responses illustrated that it is possible to reconcile faith and sexual difference.

Three quarters of the respondents (75%) found that the media products of their country expressed prejudice or included discriminative elements. LGBT people and issues were seen to be excluded from media in the sense that if they are shown at all, it is in a negative or stereotypical setting.

When respondents were asked what they consider the most important cause of social exclusion of LGBT youth in their country, the following general themes were recurrent in most of the countries: lack of knowledge; ignorance as well as misinformation; fear of the unknown; homophobia, biphobia, and transphobia; lack of full community membership, equal rights, respect and recognition; distorted representation or invisibility in media and all spheres of life; lack of LGBT activism; lack of a public awareness and debate; stigmatisation and marginalisation; and patriarchy, heteronormativity, homonegativity, and heterosexism.

While these – often interrelated – causes can explain social exclusion of LGBT people in general, LGBT youth was shown to be especially vulnerable to social exclusion because of additional, youth-specific reasons, including their economic as well as emotional dependence on parents and adults in general; lack of resources and support; lack of positive role models; heterosexist socialisation – through which they learn that “heterosexuality guarantees social inclusion, whereas non-heterosexuality leads to marginalization, to being thought of as somewhat less of a person”; lack of courage (to come out) and groups to belong to; being silenced and isolated; feeling a freak, different, and lonely; rejection by friends and family; parents’ disappointment and feelings of failure; school culture in general: lack of education and communication on LGBT issues in school, lack of teachers’ and parents’ training; lack of representation in school curricula; and failing to acknowledge bullying in school as a problem.

Heteronormative practices of families, schools, different community settings, workplaces and symbolic media environments were shown to have disempowering effects on LGBT youth: the pervasive silence concerning LGBT experiences and lifestyles contributed to their feelings of isolation and invisibility, resulting in the perception that coming out would endanger their physical and emotional well-being and in their choice to disguise their identities (Quinlivan, 1999). Many of them become withdrawn and socially isolated in the period while most other young people learn to express themselves socially (Martin, 1982), as they spend an enormous amount of energy and time with monitoring their own behaviour and using hiding strategies to minimalise the risk of being found out, often at a cost to their mental health (Rivers and Carragher, 2003).

Let’s get involved!

While our research findings demonstrated how social exclusion practices function as barriers limiting access to active citizenship and prevent LGBT youth contributing to society, opportunities to promote their successful social integration can also be found.

Even in places where the situation of LGBT people was characterised by a lack of state recognition in the form of rights for a long time, there have been citizenship practices constructed by them in the form of community building, creation of cultural and social spaces and participation in civic

75. 27-year-old Dutch male respondent.
associations and other everyday life practices (Grundy and Smith, 2005). LGBT youth can also activate these forms of citizenship practices. In the following, a few examples of these existing opportunities will be introduced:

1. Get Involved – A Guide to Active Citizenship for LGBT People\(^76\) is a publication of Stonewall UK, a non-profit civic organisation for equality and justice for lesbians gay men and bisexuals. This guide describes some of the main areas of public life that provide the chance for LGBT people to play an active role in various fields of social, political and cultural life, including the community and voluntary sector, the criminal justice system, democratic participation, education, health, housing, industry and economic development, and social services. It provides information, from a LGBT perspective, on how to get involved in a range of activities and areas – from volunteering with a community group to being on the board of a housing association or sitting as a magistrate.

For example, within the community and voluntary sector they focus on volunteering within the LGBT community and wider society, and the roles of LGBT forum members, charity trustees, and volunteer fund-raisers, while it is pointed out that the:

“community and voluntary sector provides LGBT people with a unique opportunity to get involved and have a voice in the local community. LGBT people have a long history of participation in the voluntary sector, working on issues relating to sexual orientation and other subjects. … It cannot be assumed that all mainstream voluntary and community groups will be ‘gay friendly’ or that all LGBT groups are free from prejudice, for example against trans or disabled people. Eliminating these prejudices – both in LGBT and other groups – is one of the main challenges and responsibilities of getting involved.”\(^77\)

In the context of getting involved in the criminal justice system, it is emphasised that traditionally:

“many parts of the sector have been the territory of straight men and ‘old boy’ networks. Indeed, because consensual gay sex was illegal for so long, many gay men, rather than being able to be part of the system, were wrongly criminalised by it. But times are changing fast. Now, LGBT people can expect to receive protection rather than harassment from the police and equal treatment rather than a criminal record from magistrates.”\(^78\)

In the context of democratic participation, the idea of “change from within” is underlined:

“With a history of activism and self-help in the face of criminalisation and social exclusion, participation in the official democratic process may not seem to be the most natural home for LGBT people. And it is important that we do not lose our role of challenging the system from the outside. However, it is also increasingly important and possible to use the experience and skills gained from our history to campaign for change from within. The formal system, for example of local councillors, is where important decisions are made that affect our lives. So, as LGBT people it is essential that we are actively engaged and involved with the democratic process at a local and national level, pushing for positive change in relation to sexual orientation and other crucial issues affecting our society.”\(^79\)

While for those who want to activate themselves in the field of education the main message is that:

“as an LGBT individual or group involved in this area, you may find that the first thing you need to do is carry out some education of your own by raising awareness among colleagues about why LGBT issues matter and why schools are an appropriate place to address them.”\(^80\)

In the field of health care, it is emphasised that:

\(^76\) www.stonewall.org.uk/information_bank/community/64.asp .  
\(^77\) www.stonewall.org.uk/documents/Section_1.pdf.  
\(^78\) www.stonewall.org.uk/documents/Section_2.pdf.  
\(^80\) www.stonewall.org.uk/documents/Section_4.pdf.
“LGBT people’s experiences with health care professionals show that many have misconceptions, such as that all gay men are automatically at risk of HIV infection and all lesbians have no sexual health needs because they do not require family planning. Some argue that this shows that homophobia is rife within the NHS, affecting patients and staff alike, and making involvement in the sector an uphill struggle for LGBT people. However, others argue that, as part of a rapidly modernising system, now is the perfect time to change things for the better. This can be achieved by influencing the way that health services are planned and provided, including those that affect marginalised groups, such as LGBT people.”

2. Različnost bogati: ne siromašti (Diversity Makes Us Richer, Not Poorer: the Everyday Life of Gays and Lesbians) is a CD-Rom produced in Slovenia: a teaching aid for teachers to use during the educational process. It is intended to assist in classroom discussions on homosexuality; to provide information for employers on how to ensure safe working environment for gays and lesbians; and to support gays and lesbians, their parents and friends. The CD-Rom includes short movies about the everyday life of gays and lesbians and interviews with gays and lesbians, which are designed to enhance a better understanding and knowledge of the everyday life of lesbians and gays. This project is part of a wider project Intimate citizenship: the right to have rights, which is supported by the European Commission’s Promotion of active European citizenship programme.

3. Enabling safety for LesBiGay teacher 2002-2005 is a Dutch project focused on the employment situation of lesbian, bisexual and gay teachers. The project included: comparative research on heterosexual/bisexual/homosexual education personnel (published as “Healthy Teacher, Healthy School”); an analysis of school guidelines on safety, bullying and sexual intimidation; pilot projects in 15 schools (primary schools, secondary schools, regional training centres for young adults and adults) on how to improve their LGB policy; a manual to support LGB-specific school policies; and organisation of a European Sexual Orientation Mainstreaming Conference.

4. School book review on LGB content: the Dutch Ministry of Education commissioned a review of all school books and methods to establish the content about LGBT issues. The National Information Centre on Teaching Resources did the review on 63 school books, which included all primary school resources and the resources for biology, social issues and care in secondary schools. The information centre does not give a qualitative judgment of the resources, but offers copies of the relevant pages in an elaborate appendix. The National Pedagogical Institute, which co-ordinates Dutch efforts to make schools safer, and used the results of the review to advise the government to start a dialogue with the commercial school book publishers, who are responsible for the content of school books.

5. Torna a l’Escola! – ¡Vuelve al Cole! (Back to school) is an ongoing awareness-raising campaign for including gay and lesbian issues in the school curricula (an adaptation of the “Go Back to School” programme of GLSEN, US) from Catalonia, Spain. Gays and lesbians are asked to write letters or postcards to the director of their former schools and point out the importance of including gay and lesbian issues in the school curricula and apply more gay and lesbian friendly teaching methods. There is reference given to available lesbian/gay-friendly teaching material collected by the INCLOU organisation, from where further assistance can be asked. In these letters former students can also include references to their personal experiences from school that can help teachers to understand what kind of difficulties a homophobic school environment can cause for students.

6. “Different in More Ways Than One: Providing Guidance for Teenagers on their Way to Identity, Sexuality and Respect” is a manual for educators and counsellors on how to deal with lesbian, bisexual and gay issues in multicultural contexts, which was developed (as the main outcome of the European project/team called ‘TRIANGLE’, namely transfer of information to combat discrimination against gays and lesbians in Europe) to be used as a tool to combat discrimination especially among

82. www.mirovni-institut.si/razlicnost.
83. www.lesbigayteachers.nl.
84. www.tolerantescholen.net.
young people. The manual pays special attention to situations involving double discrimination where individuals face discrimination on the grounds of their race or ethnic origin as well as of their sexual preference.
Open Method of Co-ordination: a new avenue for enhancing young people’s active citizenship?

Kamila Czerwińska

“Government by the people” – participative democracy, legitimacy and active European citizenship

Increased involvement in the decision-making process by a diverse set of stakeholders is a central normative demand of any conception of participative democracy – and thus constitutes one of the key issues and challenges for the European Union (EU). Democracy and legitimacy are complex concepts and the divagations about them will not be the subject of this paper. However, it is important to recall that until the 1990s, the European Community derived its legitimacy largely through its output (performance and results). As regards the support of the people for European integration, one took the existence of what is known as the “permissive consensus” for granted. Since the Treaty of Maastricht, however, this consensus seems to be breaking up (Horeth, 1999). Criticism of the EU is voiced for its lack of “government by the people” (so-called input legitimacy), often discussed under the label of the EU’s “democratic deficit”. The different actions of the European Commission, following the failed European Constitution referenda in France and Netherlands, and the recent opening of a new Intergovernmental Conference on the Reform Treaty are clear signs that European institutions have entered a period of reflection on the enhanced involvement of European citizens in the EU decision-making process. The need to “bring Europe closer to its citizens” is widely recognised, and a new era of active European citizenship has appeared, characterised by the active engagement of European citizens in the construction of a “common” Europe as well as their sense of belonging and “ownership” of Europe.

According to the theories of input legitimacy, “the more citizens are involved in the decision-making process and its control, the more likely it is they will accept the resulting political outcomes” (Horeth, 1999, p. 258). It means in practice that the enhanced involvement of European citizens in the decision-making process could make it more democratic and legitimate, as “the principle of input legitimacy claims that a democratic system of rule achieves its legitimacy by the way decisions are made (and not by the results these decisions produce)” (Schimmelfennig, 1996, paragraph 3.2.1). Thereby, the will of “the people” – or the principle of popular sovereignty – is mainly achieved through participation and consensus building. In this context, it is important that the European system guarantees that the citizens’, and thereby also young people’s, preferences are taken into account during the policy-making process. This study will, therefore, try to answer the following questions: Can the (Open Method of Co-ordination) OMC actually help to strengthen the involvement of organisations representing young people and enable them to express their interests in the decision-making process and thereby, indirectly, stimulate active European citizenship? In which ways, if at all, have organised youth interests found a place within it? If the OMC enhances the participation of these interests in the decision-making process, does it make this process more democratic and legitimate (and vice versa)?

In this article, it is argued that the OMC can provide new possibilities to involve organised youth interests in the decision-making process, thus making it more democratic and legitimate and also, indirectly, potentially stimulating young people’s active citizenship. However, until now it has been mostly of limited success due to the different constraints and the relevant stakeholders’ still looking for their place within this process. In order to develop this argument, firstly, the Open Method of Co-ordination as a new mode of governance and its application in the youth field is introduced. This serves as a background for a detailed examination and evaluation of the OMC and of the participation
of organised interests in the decision-making process in the youth field. Thirdly, criteria are established to assess if and to what extent the enhanced participation of organised youth interests in the OMC can actually make the EU decision-making process in the youth field more democratic and legitimate. Hereby, it is shown that although the OMC opens a new avenue for organised youth interests, the new possibilities provided by this method are often not fully exploited by political institutions, civil society actors and young people themselves. Therefore, the potential stimulation of young people’s active (European) citizenship is also restrained. This article will conclude by showing new prospects and making some recommendations on possible improvements in the involvement of organisations representing youth interests and young people themselves in the decision-making process.

The OMC as a new mode of governance in the youth field

In 2000 the Lisbon Strategy was launched, establishing strategic goals for the European Union and introducing a new tool to achieve them – the OMC. The OMC is the EU’s mechanism of policy exchange and development, having a similar structure in the different policy areas. The origins of this new method can be found already in the Maastricht Treaty and later in the European Employment Strategy (Bursens and Helsen, 2005, p. 3). The OMC was supposed to be complementary to the so-called Community method and other existing instruments. It is often called the “new mode of governance” or “soft governance” (Goetschy, 2002, p. 1; New Modes of Governance, Integrated Project 24, “Citizens and Governance in the Knowledge-Based Society”, 2005) as it uses mainly non-binding regulations. It is also called the “third way” between the obligatory Community method (supranational governance) and loose intergovernmental co-operation (Bursens and Helsen, 2005, p. 5).

One of the purposes of introducing the OMC was to strengthen the commitment of the member states in the policy and decision-making process. Objective 4 of the Lisbon Summit Conclusions concerning the OMC states that this method should “mobilise all relevant actors” at all levels (Lisbon European Council, 2000, in Greenwood, 2005). Janine Goetschy (2004, p. 5) calls it “‘iterative process’ involving top-bottom and bottom-up relations between various levels (local, national, EU)”. Such new relations could therefore not only increase the involvement of institutionalised political but also civil society actors and their interests and thereby make a contribution to the widely perceived and discussed “EU legitimacy” or “democratic deficit” problem (Armstrong, 2005, p. 4). Paragraph 38 of the Lisbon European Council Conclusions states that “a fully decentralised approach will be applied in line with the principle of subsidiarity in which the Union, the Member States, the regional and local levels, as well as the social partners and civil society, will be actively involved, using variable forms of partnership” (Lisbon European Council, 2000, paragraph 38).

The new possibilities in respect of its complementary and non-regulatory character were the main reasons to introduce the OMC in the youth field. Until the Maastricht Treaty, which attributed limited competences to the European Union, youth policies laid mainly in the competences of the member states; the European Commission had a very limited margin of manoeuvre in this field. At the same time, there was a need for a common approach towards youth issues as there were substantial differences between national youth policies, and the system of multilateral co-operation between the countries was rather weakly developed. Therefore, the introduction of the OMC would allow the European institutions to co-ordinate the actions of member states without entering into their realms of competence. Taking into consideration the flexibility of this method, the absence of formal constraints and the area of action, as well as the delicate subject of the division of competences, the OMC was perceived as the most appropriate method for use in the youth field.

87. Civil society will be understood here as: “Interest organisations which are not part of government, sometimes referred to as NGO’s … in colloquial usage it is often meant to refer to citizen organisations” (Greenwood, 2006, Introduction).
Additionally, in 2001, the White Paper on European Governance was adopted and it advised introducing the OMC into different policy areas, as a step towards better EU governance (European Commission, 2001b, p. 21). De Búrca and Zeitlin (2006, p. 2) wrote: “this mechanism is particularly well suited to identifying and advancing the common concerns and interests of the Member States while simultaneously respecting their autonomy and diversity”.

### The OMC in the youth field – limited scope for action

Development of youth policy at the European level gained new ground at the beginning of 2000, when the Youth community programme was established (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Decision No 1031/2000/EC, 2000). It was not a new instrument but a combination of existing instruments, which nevertheless went beyond previous actions by adding new objectives (one of them was the development of co-operation in the youth field). At the same time as the adoption of the Youth programme, the European Commission launched consultations at national and European level, the results of which provided the basis for the White Paper on a New Impetus for European Youth in 2001. This document set new goals for youth policies and introduced the OMC into this field (European Commission, 2001a).

The following structure for the OMC was established:

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<tr>
<th>Steps of decision-making process</th>
<th>Level of decision-making process</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. The Commission consults the member states – each one completes a standardised questionnaire. Member states should consult young people (according to national practices) before sending their reports to the Commission.</td>
<td>National, regional and local</td>
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<td>2. On the basis of consultations with member states, the Commission prepares a synthesis report proposing common objectives (usually in the form of a communication).</td>
<td>European and national</td>
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<td>3. The Council of Ministers (the representatives of the member states), acting on the Commission’s proposal, decides on priority areas of common interest (in the form of a Council resolution).</td>
<td>European</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Member states are responsible for implementation of the common objectives. Each state appoints a co-ordinator for youth-related issues to act as the Commission’s interlocutor. After a period of two years, they report on implementation.</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The various co-ordinators submit to the European Commission details of policy initiatives, examples of best practice and other materials for consideration on the chosen topics in the youth field.</td>
<td>National</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. The European Commission submits a summary and an analysis of this information to the Council of Ministers.</td>
<td>European</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. The Council of Ministers sets out common guidelines and objectives for each of the topics and lays down monitoring procedures and, where appropriate, benchmarks based on indicators. (Until now, implementation has been without reference to indicators or benchmarks, however, the question of</td>
<td>European</td>
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whether and if so what to monitor may be an element of the Commission’s report.)

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<td><strong>8.</strong></td>
<td>The European Commission is responsible for periodic monitoring and evaluation, and reports on progress to the Council of Ministers for Youth.</td>
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<td><strong>9.</strong></td>
<td>The European Parliament must have an appropriate role in this process and in the monitoring arrangements. The Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions also have to have an opportunity to give an opinion.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>10.</strong></td>
<td>Young people are consulted on the priority themes and on their follow-up.</td>
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In the youth field, the Commission set up a less stringent methodology than the one described in the Lisbon European Council Conclusions, or in the OMC’s precursor – the European Employment Strategy. On the basis of the consultations, the Commission also limited the “scope for action” of the OMC to participation, information, voluntary activities and a greater understanding and knowledge of youth (European Commission, 2001a, pp. 22-25) – the priorities that were established as the objectives in the Youth programme 2000. It is important to indicate here that the OMC constitutes one of three pillars of youth policy, the other two are the European Youth Pact (adopted in 2005) and mainstreaming of youth (including a youth dimension in other policies).

To address in practical terms the process of the OMC, the European Council adopted a resolution regarding the framework of European co-operation in the youth field (Council of the European Union, 2002). The resolution invited the Commission to consult the member states and in turn for them to consult young citizens and youth organisations and to respond on this basis to the questionnaires. The outcomes should serve as a basis for drafting the common objectives of the OMC.

Accordingly, between 2002 and 2004 the Commission organised two rounds of consultations, the first questionnaire concerned information and participation and the second concentrated on voluntary activities and greater understanding of youth. After each round, on the basis of the consultations made by member states, the final objectives were approved by the European Council in two resolutions adopted in November 2003 and in November 2004 (Council of the European Union, 2003, 2004). In addition, during this first cycle of the OMC (2002-04), the European Council, on the basis of proposals by the Commission, adopted 14 common “sub-objectives” for these four common priority topics. After approving all the common priorities and objectives for the OMC, the member states started the process of implementation, which is the “crucial phase” (Sellberg and Orr, 2004, p. 14) of the OMC process. The special role (in addition to that of the member states) of collecting information about the OMC’s progress was conducted by working groups established by the European Council’s Youth Working Party (ibid., p.14). The European Commission has also a responsibility with regard to co-ordination of the OMC and analysis of the outcomes of the consultation process.

**Youth OMC in practice – member states questioning its appropriateness**

Even if the choice of this method for the youth field was justified, the evaluation of the OMC reveals that currently this method does not meet expectations at most levels of its application, especially at the implementation level. The following deficiencies can be pointed out. Firstly, the consultations are set and organised by the member states as they “deem appropriate” (Council of the European Union, 2002, paragraph 11b), but no common standards or rules were developed. Actual consultation practices differed significantly among member states: some consulted interested parties (youth councils, youth organisations, individuals), although mainly at the national level, thereby neglecting
the regional and local levels (Masson, 2006). Some filled in the questionnaires without consultations and others did not reply at all (European Commission, Official 1, 2006). The consulted parties revealed in the evaluating documents, prepared independently by both the European Youth Forum and the European Commission, that they were not properly informed about the purpose of the consultations and that the time and resources for their realisation were limited (Sellberg and Orr, 2004, pp. 16-17; European Commission, 2006a, paragraph 2.2, point 3).

It is also hard to say which countries did not participate and what the overall results of the consultations were, as the Commission did not reveal this information. This was justified as an effort not to “blame and shame” any of the member states, as this could negatively impact on future cooperation (European Commission, Official 2, 2006). It is understandable as the national governments are very “sensitive” with regard to criticism of their policies and the Commission, in this area, has mainly co-ordinative competences. Notwithstanding, it diminishes the transparency and accountability of national authorities toward their citizens, as well as responsiveness of the legislative proposals because it is hard to state to what degree the needs and postulates of citizens are taken into account.

Moreover, the whole process of implementation of the common objectives by member states has a voluntary character – the indicators are “defined as appropriate” (Council of the European Union, 2002, paragraph 11d) and the implementation of the common objectives is based on the measures that the member states “deem appropriate” (ibid., paragraph 11c). The voluntary character is one of the main objectives of this method; however, this cannot explain the unwillingness or renunciation of action by the member states. The European Commission points out in its evaluation of the OMC that too few measures were taken to implement the common objectives (European Commission, 2006a, for example, paragraph 2.1.1 or 2.1.3). In practice it means that they rarely became the subject of national action plans or national youth policies in general. Furthermore, in its staff working document on the first phase of implementation of the OMC in member states (2003-05) – “Analysis of National Reports Submitted by the Member States Concerning Participation By and Information For Young People” – the Commission points out that “very few of the national reports reached the Commission on time” and, although “common structure for these national reports was endorsed by all parties”, “the content of each of the seven chapters differs from one country to another, in both quantitative and qualitative terms” (European Commission, 2006b, p. 2). This was due to the fact that the benchmarks, indicators and index were not used, and therefore the results were hard to measure. Thus, countries could benefit fully from the process of mutual learning. Finally, not all European countries or even those eligible under Youth programme 2000 could participate in the OMC process; these were only EU-25 countries (Sellberg and Orr, 2004, p. 16).

Youth OMC and its influence on participative democracy, legitimacy and active citizenship

Another issue must be examined when talking about active citizenship of young people. Having such a loose structure and weak implementation, can the OMC actually boost the active participation of youth organisations and young people in the decision-making process and, therefore, make it more legitimate and democratic (according to input legitimacy theories’ requirements)? Certain criteria can be found in the literature, which may be helpful in examining this. To discuss it, for the purposes of this article, the set used by Caroline De la Porte and Patrizia Nanz (2004) for their analysis of the legitimacy of the OMC will be employed:

– transparency: the criterion of transparency is indispensable in ensuring the trust of the people in the political institutions (European Commission, 2001b, p. 10) and for the political accountability of these institutions. The fulfilment of these criteria is found wanting in the OMC in its current form: neither the results of the consultations nor the annual report were published by certain member states. Furthermore, one can observe a certain “obscurity” with regard to the
country results, as there are no indicators or benchmarks. Indeed, transparency could be strengthened if there are such common rules and standards;

- public debate: “Transparency is a necessary condition for a broader public debate and … is crucial for democratic governance” (ibid., p. 10). Public debate requires that the information obtained in the report on OMC progress become public and that the different policy options are analysed with relevant stakeholders. Currently, as already mentioned above, this is not the case as countries do not want to be “blamed and shamed” and the Commission therefore tries to avoid such an approach. Thus, the public debate must concentrate on good practices rather than on pointing out shortcomings. At the European level, public discussion on youth issues seems to be strengthened through the European Youth Week, presidency youth events, consultations of the European Youth Forum and other youth organisations, the hearings in the European Parliament and, finally, meetings of the European Council’s working group. At the national level, public debates are often politicised and monopolised by certain actors and certain topics, there is too little room for concrete discussion on issues relevant to young people as well as for civil society involvement. Currently, the range of actors involved in the decision-making process in the youth field is limited. The open and concrete public debate is also an incentive for the youth organisations and young people themselves to participate in it;

- participation: this criterion requires that all stakeholders affected by decision-making are involved in the process. “The quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies depend on ensuring wide participation throughout the policy chain” (ibid.). The OMC was introduced with the declared aim of strengthening the participation of all relevant players at all levels, however, analysis of OMC in the youth field revealed that there was weak input from regional and local actors as well as the European Parliament and other European consultation bodies;

- learning: this is the ability to draw conclusions from the outcome of actions and use them for further policy and decision making (De la Porte and Nanz, 2004, p. 273). European co-operation in the youth field touches upon the issues that were until now reserved mainly for states and that were not the subject of multilateral co-operation. The OMC launched the process of exchanging good practice and experience; however, learning is impeded because there is little transparency and public debate, and because of lack of common standards, benchmarks and indicators;

- responsiveness: finally, if youth organisations and young people from the regional and local levels have limited impact on the decision-making process, responsiveness, seen as the ability to involve stakeholders in decisions, is also limited. Moreover, the objectives do not become the subject of action plans, and the results of the consultation and annual reports are not published and disseminated by member states. Although one can assume the utilitarian role of the European Commission and national governments, this means that it is hard to say if the objectives established are responsive to citizens’ needs.

Even if in its current shape the OMC does not meet all these criteria, there are possibilities and potential that should be used. To ensure that OMC objectives are achieved, the EU must better co-ordinate the policy process and reinforce its actions in this area. How could this be achieved? In the following section, I will present some answers to this question.

**Prospects and recommendations – a potential to use**

If, as it has been argued so far, this method does not involve, in an adequate way, stakeholders in the youth field (and thereby enhancement of the active participation of young people is also restrained), one has to wonder about the reasons. The answer can only be complex. The choice of the OMC, as a mode of governance for the youth field, was entirely justified, because it left a lot of space and liberty for the member states, not forgetting the regional and local level. Introduced and recommended by the
Lisbon Strategy and tested in the employment field, this flexible tool could offer new possibilities for common action in areas where the EU does not have explicit competences, such as youth policy.

Member states are traditionally reluctant to give the Commission more competences. Also, youth policy is perceived as a part of education policy and it was reserved, until recently, as a competence of member states. This is an area of great sensitivity as it touches upon the delicate issues of sovereignty and national competences. It is very important for the process of political, economic and “civic” construction of the European Union.

The European Youth Forum, the largest umbrella of youth organisations at the European level, produced shadow reports on the implementation of the OMC, in which it reveals the deficiencies of this method. This organisation criticises the OMC in this field for its lack of methodology and instruments (Masson, 2006). It claims that the OMC could provide many new channels for increased youth participation, but until now it has not had this effect because of very limited institutionalised consultation with organised youth interests and the young people themselves. It leads to their weak contribution to the policy-making process, mainly at the regional and local level (ETUC, 2006). The players that are involved are: the European institutions (mainly the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, although it must be noted that in the European Council sit the representatives of the member states, in this case ministers responsible for youth), the European Youth Forum and certain other youth organisations at the European level, member states (public administrations), national youth agencies, and sometimes youth councils and national experts (European Commission, Official 1, 2006). As the evaluation has shown, the consultation and implementation processes mainly fail at the national and, especially, regional and local levels.

Despite national governments’ fears, the option to reinforce the OMC does not necessarily require the transfer of more competences at the supranational level, but rather, it assumes better alternatives and use of the OMC within the existing competences. The European Commission regularly monitors and evaluates application of the OMC. The first review and suggestions for further improvement of the first two objectives were presented in the communication adopted in July 2006 – Follow-up to the White Paper on a New Impetus for European Youth: Implementing the Common Objectives for Participation By and Information For Young People (European Commission, 2006a). On this basis, the Council of Ministers adopted in November 2006 a resolution on implementation of the common objectives for participation and information (Council of the European Union, 2006). It is based on the conclusions from the assessment of the OMC and actions taken so far in the youth field. The resolution was adopted with a view to “creating the conditions of genuine dialogue ad partnerships” with young people and “to enable them and their representatives to be full actors in the policies affecting them” (ibid., p. 2). It aims to reinforce the OMC.

Firstly, with regard to the consultations, the European Commission introduced a new concept – “a structured dialogue” – to strengthen the governance of the OMC. The change is justified because the consultations, as a term and practice, do not necessarily ensure the equal positions of partners, whereas the dialogue does. Undoubtedly, this “dialogue” should be more structured – institutionalised and formalised with a well-defined system based on guidelines, rules and indications of who should be consulted and how. It should include the wider public, national administrations, youth councils and organisations and, most importantly, young people at all relevant levels. Special attention should be paid to the regional and local levels. To realise this, maybe the Commission could work on a coherent guide to consultations, give longer, but a specific time, for consultations, as well as assign resources because the process takes time and money, therefore it might exclude organisations without the appropriate budgets or young people with fewer opportunities. Also, the role of the European Parliament, as well as the other European consultation bodies, should be strengthened in the process of

88. For more detailed analysis of the implementation of the OMC in the given EU countries, please refer to the shadow reports on the implementation of the priorities of the OMC in the youth field: www.youthforum.org.
89. The follow-up communication with a special focus on the (implementation of) voluntary activities took place in autumn 2007. On this basis the Ministers of Education, Youth and Culture adopted a Council Resolution on 16. November 2007 in which they pledged to co-operate more closely on the common objectives in the field of youth volunteering.
consultations. There are some positive signs in this regard, as these institutions were involved in European Youth Week 2007.

Secondly, the results of the consultations and the structured dialogue (as well as the annual reports about the implementation of the common objectives) should be published (the Commission staff working document, “Analysis of National Reports Submitted by the Member States Concerning Participation By and Information For Young People” is available online at the Commission’s website). This would stimulate a public debate, as well as a process of mutual learning. The public debates are the incentive to ensure a wider participation and mainstream the issue of youth policy, simply by interesting press and media in these affairs, as well as politicians and decision makers. Consequently, the greater interest in existing problems and challenges of the youth sector could contribute to a more effective response to the objectives set by the Youth and now Youth in action programme and the OMC itself. Promoting development of co-operation in the youth field, the idea of a knowledge-based society, active citizenship, European awareness as well as information and participation of youth in voluntary activities could therefore become better known to the wider public.

Thirdly, benchmarks and indicators must be fixed because there are differences in the development of national youth policies. This would facilitate comparative research and strengthen the accountability of member states’ and European institutions’ actions. A positive sign is that in the resolution adopted in December 2006, the European Council introduces notions of minimum standards and quality measures for certain practices and activities in the youth field (Council of the European Union, 2006, p. 1). Also, the Commission invited member states to a meeting in March 2007, to measure progress made through the OMC in the youth field. The countries, however, are still against the strong agenda-setting power of the European Commission. Yet, the process of standards setting used by the Council of Europe could be taken as a model. This international organisation, known as an “architect of European youth policy” (Sellberg and Orr, 2004, p. 4), has been active in the youth field since the 1950s. The standards and indicators are fixed by a “group composed of individuals from various backgrounds, but all with a research profile”, and they make recommendations to the Steering Committee and the Advisory Council (ibid., p. 20). Similarly, at the European level, the indicators could be set by a group of experts and be presented to the Youth Council Working Party. This process could be backed up by a stronger partnership with the Council of Europe, avoiding “duplicating” the work of the Council of Europe bodies and the European institutions (important work has been already done in this area in the framework of the partnership between the European Commission and the Council of Europe, and a research platform was created – the Knowledge Centre).

Moreover, policy objectives should be more concrete and measurable. Until now they have been defined by using special “pedagogy” (European Commission, Official 2, 2006) established according the countries’ capacities. EU countries should decide on more far-reaching goals and such issues as mobility and non-formal and informal learning should, therefore, become the priority of not only the EU’s but all European states’ actions. In that way, the political and social value of non-formal activities could be better recognised by these countries and their societies.90

This option could also involve another good practice taken from the policy making of the Council of Europe – the system of co-management. This mechanism links the Council of Europe with the governments and youth organisations in the decision-making and implementing process (Sellberg and Orr, 2004, p. 18). Although, it would not be advisable to introduce such a system at the European

90. There are some clear signs that European institutions give more attention not only to the development of formal but also informal education, and they recognise its value and contribution. Except the Youth programme, which is almost entirely devoted to the promotion of non-formal learning, there are number of other documents issued by the European Commission and other institutions, such as, for example, the White Paper on a New Impetus for European Youth (2001), European Commission Communication: “Making a European Area of Lifelong Learning a Reality” (2001), Working Paper of the Council of Europe and European Commission: “Pathways Toward Validation and Recognition of Education, Training and Learning in the Youth Field” (2004), the European Council’s “Common Principles for the Validation of Non-Formal and Informal Education” (2004), Commission Communication: “Working Together for Growth and Jobs” (2005), and the European Council’s resolution on the recognition of added value of the informal education (2006).
level, as it would make the decision-making process even more time and resource intensive (and, indeed, too difficult), it could be established at the regional and local level with regard to consultation, objective setting and implementation of the OMC process. In such a system, young people, local youth workers, researchers, local representatives of municipalities and all other persons working with young people could meet together in the committees and therefore contribute to the OMC mechanism. This could stimulate the active participation of all relevant actors at these levels of the decision-making process.

Local and regional authorities should facilitate this system, especially by implementing common OMC objectives, giving special attention to increased participation by young people in civic and democratic life and by taking into account the principles laid down by the European Charter on the Participation of Young People in Local and Regional Life (adopted in 1992 and revised in 2003 by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe). This charter promotes youth participation in the municipalities and regions where they live, and “reaffirms that young people are citizens, … and must therefore have access to all forms of participation in society”. Moreover, it states that “the active participation of young people in decisions and actions at local and regional level is essential if we are to build more democratic, inclusive and prosperous societies. … Participation and active citizenship is about having the right, the means, the space and the opportunity and where necessary the support to participate in and influence decisions and engage in actions and activities so as to contribute to building a better society” (Council of Europe, 2002, pp. 1-2). The new resolution of the Council of the European Union of October 2006 introduces a system of partnerships and dialogue, which is a good sign for further OMC development at the regional and local level.

Conclusions – The OMC as a new avenue for young’s people active citizenship

This paper attempted to demonstrate the challenges of involving organised youth’s civil society interests in the decision-making process of the European Union through the OMC. By highlighting its potential and limits, it also tried to verify its possible impact on young people’s active citizenship. The OMC was created to enable, in general, wide participation of organised civil society interests in the decision-making process but, as the evaluation has shown, in the field of youth it has had only limited success. It demonstrates that there are some good possibilities for participation but “these participative aspirations remain to be met” (Greenwood, 2005). The reason for the weakness of the OMC in achieving “results” in the youth field might simply be the relatively short time over which this method has been applied. Some authors claim that the OMC process needs time to produce any concrete results (De la Porte and Nanz, 2004, p. 287) and the progress is made little by little. The great advantage of this method is that it creates a “collegiate culture” (European Commission, DG Information Society, 2005, p. 5) among the member states, the European Commission and civil society organisations. It creates the habit of thinking in “common sense” and in “common terms” by linking the different stakeholders in the process of consultations, implementation, joint actions, objectives and review procedures. The results of this process do not, however, happen “overnight”. The reform of the OMC in the youth field should go in the direction of a tight OMC model and concentrate on better co-ordination within and implementation of the process (at the national, regional and local levels).

The OMC opens up a new avenue for active European citizenship by giving a chance to young people in youth organisations to “jump” into the process of policy making. However, this does not automatically imply that their participation will be strengthened. Despite some reluctance from member states as regards giving up their competences in this field, the introduction of the OMC has undoubtedly accelerated development of a “European youth policy”. The role and place of youth organisations and young people were recognised by the EU. However, the new possibilities provided by this method are often not fully exploited by political institutions, and indeed youth actors and young people themselves. The OMC provides new opportunities through its decentralised approach, relative flexibility and focus on a wide range of actors. However, organised youth still seem to be
looking for their place within this process. In the words of the Economic and Social Committee, the “failure is rather to adequately involve civil society players” (European Economic and Social Committee, 2004, paragraphs 6.1 and 6.3; Greenwood, 2005).

The significant potential within this process for organised youth’s civil society interests must be underlined. The European Union, in their attempt to make the European decision-making process more participative, legitimate and democratic, is indeed looking for input from diverse civil society actors and especially young people themselves. The multitude of such voices that exist in contemporary Europe makes it very difficult to “hear” all of them in the course of policy formulation. Youth organisations, youth leaders and young people themselves should be more proactive, and should create the networks and mobilise all relevant actors in order to make “their” respective and specific voice heard. In order to be effective, they must continue to exercise pressure on governments and seek advocacy at all levels – local, regional, national and European. Only as organised interests will they be able to influence the process of decision making and, as such, will be seen as important actors. Not least, they will thereby become agents of participatory democracy, making a contribution so that Europe is not merely governed “top-down”.
Choice, voice and engagement: models and methods promoting active youth citizenship in the new Europe

Terry Barber

Introduction

Any meaningful discussion on youth citizenship must acknowledge the fact that as a concept it is hugely contested and potentially open to contamination and vested interest distortion. In terms of definition it must be influenced by relatively complex notions of state intervention, the market, the common good, and rights and obligations mostly prescribed by the “moral majority”. In many ways the march of globalisation, consumerism and the ascendency of capitalism across the new Europe adds to this complexity. Despite these contradictions, this study will present a mainly positive analysis of youth citizenship and its potential to liberate new thinking and action in the field of youth work. The urgency of this debate relates to the very heart of the European Union in the shape of the Treaty of Rome with its three foundation principles of liberty, equality and social justice. Europe is in a state of flux driven by the aspirations of emergent democracies, a movement towards centrist politics and societies in transition. Accepting the EU as it is (acquis communautaire) may need to be revised in the light of unequal access opportunities for young people aspiring to new forms of citizenship.

In this study, the author would firstly like to explore perspectives on citizenship, which is believed to influence the common understanding of effective youth work and the positive developments aspired to. Secondly, there is an examination of the utility of participation models and their applicability in a modern democratic Europe. Finally, there is an examination of field-based insights, which it is believed will contribute to the youth citizenship debate and the development of skilled practice in this critical area.

Defining what is meant by citizenship

The origins of citizenship can be traced back through the philosophical and political traditions most prolific in the civic structures of ancient Greece and the Roman republics. The rights, responsibilities and civic sense of duty were seen as core to a social order aspiring to notions of democracy, polis (city states) and the emerging patterns of civitas (citizenship). Developing ideas and rules of engagement relating to citizenship meant being able to participate in the shaping of decision making and state laws, which was seen to benefit all. This early form of common good was very much focused upon the political nature of participation, dialectics and contradiction.

In more recent times, democratic ideals have developed through shifts in the social structure away from a minority property-owning educated citizenry to a wider populace. The demands for an extended franchise and an opening up of government have all been the result of citizen struggle within emerging democracies. The contemporary view of citizenship is one that describes adult rights as a citizen and responsibilities within a framework of community or state membership. This is held together under a system of representative democracy. Young people in the main have not been encouraged to get involved in adult decision making because of their perceived lack of maturity and some would argue that this is the central issue within any genuine debate on youth citizenship (see Cardiff Declaration, 2005) To be “seen and not heard” has perhaps more meaning than is commonly
acknowledged. Young people as the new “moral underclass” (Levitas, 1998) may be more prevalent than is realised. The development of citizenship for young people is somewhat contradictory.

France (1996, p. 28) observes that:

“The re-structuring of citizenship for the young is the growth and development of new forms of social controls, which limit young people’s choices and restrict their opportunities to become autonomous adults.”

From the outset this perspective alerts us to the fact that the concept may be open to contamination. France cites a number of examples to support his argument including the detrimental changes in benefit entitlements for young people and the increasing dependency on the family for both advantaged and disadvantaged youth. To enable a more reasoned examination of the concept of citizenship and how it relates to participation it would be useful to establish some working definitions.

The classic contemporary analysis by Marshall (1950) in his work is a useful starting point for any meaningful analysis of citizenship. Marshall argues from a reformist perspective, which suggests that social policy reform can challenge the worst aspects of economic and social inequality. The three core elements of citizenship he describes are:

– civil rights;
– political rights;
– social rights.

The civil elements are made up of the right to encourage individual freedom, freedom of speech, thought and faith, and the right to justice, to own property and conclude contracts. The political element asserts that people have the right to vote, join a political body of their choice and influence the institutions of the state. The social element relates to the right to expect economic welfare and security as well as the right to “share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society” (ibid., p. 249). For Marshall, the institutions most likely to uphold these values were the education system and social services responding to the needs of the community in general. The perspective cites the expansion of citizen’s rights from the 18th century, culminating in the redistribution achievements of the post-war welfare state. The implication was that citizenship could counterbalance the negative effects of capitalism and the so-collect free market:

“The dynamic of class inequalities stemming from the capitalist market organisation of society can be moderated to some degree. The worst excesses of class inequality can be successfully ‘abated’ through the expansion of democratic social rights” (ibid., p. 244).

The concept of citizenship is contested by many. Willow (1995) has developed an explanatory framework, which draws upon Marshall’s three core elements but with a clear focus on participation by young people as the means to real citizenship.

The political case

The so-called democratic deficit is often highlighted as a major outcome arising out of youth alienation and disenchantment. At the last United Kingdom election in 2005 only 37% of eligible 18-24 year olds voted. Perhaps more disturbingly the number of young people who said they actually care who wins the next election fell from 68% in 1994 to 39% in 2003 (MORI, 2005)
The legal case

This focuses primarily upon the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child as ratified in 1991 by the UK Government. The ratification is a declared intention that law, policy and practice will be compatible with the principles and standards of the convention; of which 40 of the 54 articles ascribe direct rights to those under 18 years. Willow categorises legal rights under three headings:

– participation rights;
– protection rights;
– provision rights.

The social case

The case for participation as advocated by Willow involves debunking the idealised picture of childhood where young people are presented as having little to say or do except play. Instead she draws on empirical data which highlights the fact that young people have real concerns, which to a great extent mirror the adult community but also display a greater sense of urgency for example, bullying, parental arguments, violence, etc. Whilst acknowledging the fact that young people may not always have the skills, knowledge or experience to make decisions at all levels, Willow argues in favour of Article 5 of the convention that those working with youth should nurture a child’s “evolving capacities” (p. 13). This offers a much more dynamic alternative for those services involved in youth participation.

In many adult dominated “learning” situations young people have been passive consumers receiving the wisdom of their elders. Is it any wonder that they quite often mistrust this new “liberatory” approach? Moir (1999, p. 16) contrasts both stances well:

“The liberatory approach is concerned with the development of critical and reflective thinking and understandings about the nature and complexity of the world they live in, creating the opportunity to take action for change. Education in this approach is not assumed to be neutral.

Conversely ... on domestication ... he writes ... at the root of this model (domestication) is the assumption that young people are in some way deficient, and can be made good by youth work. The political, social, economic and cultural issues which directly impact on and shape their lives are largely ignored.”

A radical shift in the cultural ethos of learning institutions such as schools, colleges and universities will demand a new way of working which is far more interactive and democratic; genuinely working with, as opposed to for, young people. A more creative stance which “embraces uncertainty” and nurtures critical dialogue will be the new guiding dynamic (Taylor and White, 2001; Pease, 2002). This transformation will have substantial implications for institutions across Europe engaging with young people. The major government initiative exploring citizenship led by Crick (1998, p. 10) outlines the goals for addressing this deficit:

“We aim at no less than a change in the political culture of this country both nationally and locally; for people to think of themselves as active citizens, willing, able and equipped to have an influence in public life and with the critical capacities to weigh evidence before speaking and acting, to build on and to extend radically to young people the best in existing traditions of community involvement and public service, and to make them individually confident in finding new forms of involvement and action among themselves.”

Empirical research suggests that there is a significant preoccupation with social disengagement and youth apathy without full recognition of the social inequity faced by a significant number of young people. Recent research carried out by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) in the United
Kingdom points to a “socialisation gap” where young people from higher income families are more able to take up personal and social development opportunities. Conversely, poorer families are less likely to take up these same opportunities. The research also concludes that young people from poorer backgrounds are far more susceptible to the negative effects of consumerism and materialistic self-identity. This focus on the need for a more socially constructed form of youth citizenship is developed by Williamson (2005, p. 13) in his proposition that practitioners engaging with young people need to better understand the “mutuality” principle as a necessary precondition for active engagement:

“Citizenship does not materialise at a particular chronological point through a simple rite of passage. Citizenship is the product of a process – one based on a mutual relationship between the individual and community. It is contingent on a fundamental sense of belonging to a community … the reasons some young people fail to engage with their communities is that they feel these communities have rejected them. Feelings are as important as knowledge and skills.”

There is a growing populist consensus (most evident in the United Kingdom) that efforts to enable more effective participation and youth citizenship in youth work has overemphasised rights at the expense of responsibilities. The focus is therefore firmly embedded in our understanding of what constitutes a “good citizen”. Young people are perceived as “deficient citizens” (Eden and Roker, 2002). Extensive longitudinal research carried out over a three-year period examining transitions into citizenship reveal a much more positive picture with young people taking very seriously their responsibilities to community and society (Lister et al., 2005, p. 33). Perhaps practitioners need to fully understand the difference between that which is “citizenlike” and “citizenship” itself. Being citizenlike implies an altruistic, helping, but more passive approach to social change. Citizenship is potentially a more political form, which could involve challenging the status quo actively. Sparks (1997, p. 75) refers to the notion of “dissident citizenship”:

“‘dissident citizenship’ describes oppositional democratic practices through which dissident citizens constitute alternative public spaces to pursue non-violent protest outside the formal democratic channels.”

The conceptualisation of youth citizenship across Europe must capture the social, cultural and economic landscape that supports the rights and responsibilities of young Europeans or in some cases fails them. This must be the focus of the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) currently being implemented across Europe. Kerr (2003, p. 2) following the work of Jenson et al. (1996) represents a challenge that could contribute to a more holistic understanding of how to achieve citizenship in modern-day Europe:

– diversity – of living in increasingly socially and culturally diverse communities and societies;
– location – of the nation state no longer being the “traditional location” of citizenship and the possibility of other locations within and across countries, including notions of “European”, “international”, “transnational” or “cosmopolitan” citizenship;
– social rights – of changes in the social dimension of citizenship brought about by the impact of an increasingly global economy;
– participation – of engagement and participation in democratic society at local, national and international levels.

The ideology of “third way” politics in Europe draws upon a social democratic philosophy of governance which in many ways is entirely compatible with progressive forms of youth citizenship. Central to the Lisbon Strategy (2000) is the notion of a “knowledge economy”, based on innovation and new forms of democratic governance. Youth citizenship is not a luxury but a necessary prerequisite to the achievement of this ideal. A more devolved government which champions deregulation, decentralisation and the renewal of civil society is something that most practitioners seek, but if this style of government perpetuates a “deficit” model of citizenship based upon a fear of young people then it must be challenged. In the United Kingdom the Anti-Social Behaviour Orders were not primarily designed for dealing with young people exclusively but the reality may be different for most people. Curfews, tagging and advanced surveillance techniques have added to this ubiquitous
fear of young people which, although never wholly intentional, has become the product of New Labour’s third way.

There are very real dangers that some aspects of youth work become more surveillance based rather than working with young people in a process-driven, relationship-based manner. Davies (2005, p. 7) summarises this potential “disproportionality” in current youth policy making:

“In the youth policy field what is crucially different from the 1960s is that today a strategy is being developed based on deliberately exploiting popular tensions and frustrations – on playing directly on fear and prejudice. The result is to encourage blanket demonising and dehumanising of a whole generational segment of the population by resort to, and then the widespread and continual recycling of, labels such as ‘yob’ and ‘feral youth’. In order to turn the full weight of the state against these demons, disproportionate public and policy responses are then endorsed, which involve serious distortion of the operation of judicial and law enforcement procedures.”

It is critical that those involved in youth development challenge the “deficit model” in working with young people and youth work practitioners. The “structured dialogue approach” (see European Youth Forum, 2006), involving diverse interests in the youth field, may have real utility. There is evidence to suggest that young people are embracing new modes of communication using Web-based frameworks that have the potential to re-invent or remix citizenship in a way that could never have been imagined a decade ago (see Coleman, 2005). The so-called “apathetic generation” may be constructing something very, very special.

**Youth citizenship and participation**

If youth citizenship is the end youth work practitioners seek in their work with young people, active participation is the primary means for achieving this end. This study acknowledges the work of Hart (1992), Treseder (1997) and others concerned with authentic participation, but for my purposes I would like to focus upon Arnstein (1969) and Shier (2001). In 1969 Sherry Arnstein produced a typology of participation. This adopted a controversial stance by suggesting that public participation in planning and power sharing was flawed at best. The focus of Arnstein’s attention was the poor practice she observed in her own work and the work of others seeking the meaningful engagement of existing and potentially new participants. Her ladder of participation models a framework from the bottom rung of manipulation through to aspirations of citizen control (see Figure 1). Manipulation and therapy were perceived as window dressing or a form of cosmetic public relations exercise, whilst informing, consulting and placating were seen to be tokenistic forms of preserving the uneven distribution of power.

Arnstein highlighted key limitations in her ladder typology, acknowledging that in the real world there could be hundreds of rungs on a particular ladder with a progression up or a regression down, depending on the context and the resilience of power holders. There is also some contemporary resonance in her observations of how to de-skill opposition by encouraging a form of pseudo-participation which appears to promote consensus and in some cases compliance.
Figure 1: Arnstein’s “ladder of citizen participation”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rung</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eighth</td>
<td>Citizen control</td>
<td>Included in this level are programmes that give power and control to citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>Delegated power</td>
<td>Citizens have significant control. If disputes arise, citizens enter into a bargaining process with officials rather than officials deciding outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Planning and decision making are shared at this level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>Placation</td>
<td>Tokenistic exercises, such as allowing a small number of selected people to become members of official committees, with no real intent to redistribute power or resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>This can be a step toward full participation but consultation alone is not enough to secure citizen participation in ensuring that ideas and opinions are carried into action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Information can be a precursor to full participation but a one-way flow of information is ineffective in finding out people’s views</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>Therapy</td>
<td>Here citizens are encouraged to join groups to share their experiences – this level serves to pathologise individuals while leading to little social change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom</td>
<td>Manipulation</td>
<td>Here citizens are placed on “rubber-stamp” committees to give the appearance of consultation and participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ladder of participation in some ways is stereotypical, presenting stages with little reference to context and this has led many critics to perceive it as an over-simplistic generalisation. In its time, it presented practitioners with a useful model through which they could reflect on their own practice and the intent of their employing agencies more radically. Were they actually enabling young people to participate effectively or were they indeed “agents of social control”?

The strengths of Arnstein’s model lie in its accessibility. Having a sense of the graduations involved in citizen participation is a useful starting point for developing genuine partnerships. The weaknesses relate to the assumptions it makes about progression from one stage to another. The participation of young people is more dynamic, unpredictable and situation-specific than the model suggests. Also, given that a great deal of valuable work across the youth field in Europe is actually focused on consultation, is it fair to accept that this approach is somehow inferior? Bell (2004) enables the youth field to be clearer about the distinctiveness of each approach by defining with some precision, involvement, consultation and participation.

“Involvement” is a generic or umbrella term covering a range of activities. These can include information giving and receiving and consulting on specific issues. It does not define the extent of power young people may have to influence the process or outcomes.

“Consultation” can mean many things from adult-led activities aimed at exploring opinions that may be acted upon later, to approaches that encourage and support child-initiated and child-driven approaches and self-determination. Consultation can be undertaken on a large formal scale or on a personal, informal level. It is often equated with participation – but, crucially, it is usually adults who hold the power to decide what to do with the information.

“Participation” refers to young people taking an active part in a project or process, not just as consumers but as key contributors to the direction and implementation of work carried out. Young people are proactive in this process and have the power to help shape the process – their views have

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the same weight as the adults they are working alongside. Participation refers to children’s and young people’s involvement in decision making, whatever form this may take. Consultation means deliberately asking children and young people about their views. These views may or may not be incorporated into political decision making. Contemporary approaches in the European youth field have built on the work of Arnstein and others and have focused on the structural readiness of organisations to involve young people authentically with varying degrees of success. The recognition that young people have been largely excluded by dominant structures and discourses is well documented (Prout, 2001, 2002; Smyth, 1999).

Shier (2001) is a good example of this change in emphasis, from the young person to the organisational culture and its capacity to involve young people (children) democratically. Shier’s model outlines five levels of participation. At each level the individual has different degrees of commitment. The “choice”, “voice” and “engagement” methods are critical in this regard.

This is clarified by identifying three stages of commitment at each level: openings, opportunities and obligations. Shier describes these discrete but interconnected stages as follows. The openings describe the stance of the worker who makes a genuine commitment to working democratically with the young person. This could take the form of a statement of intent and does not necessarily mean anything other than solid relationship building. The opportunity stage focuses upon the infrastructure to support practice. This could include resources, training and more participative systems within the organisation. The obligation stage models the existence of built-in systems within the organisation where democratic participation becomes a policy norm that is reflected in a new way of working with young people. The model (See Figure 2) is based on five levels of participation which are:

- children are listened to;
- children are supported in expressing their views;
- children’s views are taken into account;
- children are involved in the decision-making process;
- children share power and responsibility for decision making.
Figure 2: Shier’s (2001) pathways to participation

Levels of Participation

START HERE

1. Children are listened to.

Are you ready to listen to children?

Are you ready to support children in expressing their views?

Are you ready to let children join in your decision-making processes?

Are you ready to share some of your adult power with children?

Are you ready to take children’s views into account?

Openings>Opportunities>Obligations

Do you work in a way that enables you to listen to children?

Do you have a range of ideas and activities to help children express their views?

Does your decision making process enable you to take children’s views into account?

Is there a procedure that enables children to join in decision-making processes?

Are there a procedure that enables children and adults to share power and responsibility for decisions?

Is there a policy requirement that children must be supported in expressing their views?

Is there a policy requirement that children and adults share power and responsibility for decisions?

This point is the minimum you must achieve if you endorse the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child

Is it a policy requirement that children’s views must be given due weight in decision-making?

4. Children are involved in decision-making processes?

5. Children share power and responsibilities for decision making.

3. Children’s views are taken into account.

2. Children are supported in expressing their views.

1. Children are listened to.
The model proposed by Shier is in contrast to other hierarchical participation models in that it focuses not only on what young people need to do to progress, but importantly what the organisation needs to do to create participative access. Encouraging young people to be vocal can be problematic and this weakness can often be manipulated by adults who engage in filtering what they have to say; a form of pseudo youth citizenship perhaps. Fine (1994, p. 19) refers to this phenomenon as “ventriloquism”. In the Shier framework there is an opportunity to challenge this by posing key questions as a potential audit function for organisations using the model. The linkage with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and other European-wide policies also adds to the potential application of the model.

There is currently an interesting shift taking place in practitioner understanding of what appears to influence disengagement by young people from societal institutions in general. The core characteristics identified by theorists in this area (Brent, 2004; Davies and Docking, 2004) suggest the need to “actively embrace the young people’s collective identities and seek to help them assert these identities more confidently” (Davies, 2005, p. 18) Historically, there has been a focus upon the participation gap, fed by a lack of confidence or motivation in young people. The intention was always that a fully participating young person, supported by a nurturing adult or two, would somehow influence the structure in such a way that real change would result over time. The reality has been that structure in general has resisted this change and many young people and practitioners have become disillusioned in the process.

Many commentators working in policy and practice now challenge the mythology of youth disengagement and to some extent the acceptance of youth sub-culture as a defining metaphor (Bennett, 2004; Muggleton, 2000). Coleman (2005, p. 2) describes the phenomenon as “mass generational migration from old-fashioned forms of participation to newer more creative forms”. The link with youth citizenship is obvious.

In the authors own practice and involvement within research in the youth field, findings have suggested that it is important to determine exactly who youth work is for? Is it for those who seek to control young people or those who enable them to achieve their fullest potential? The following dialogue model of youth engagement is offered as a basic trigger for discussion by those seeking to explore short, medium and long-term change in the youth citizenship context (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: The TB (top-down/bottom-up) model of youth engagement (Barber, 2007)
Top-down pressures

This area of the model focuses on the structural and societal pressures facing young people and those who work with them. Recent empirical research carried out by Barber and Naulty (2005) in the United Kingdom context suggests that top-down, structural understanding of young people is still largely driven by fear and the need to control.

“Adultising” refers to behaviour by adults who do not fully accept young people as they are. Instead there are great efforts (sometimes overt, sometimes manipulative, paternalistic and hidden) that seek to accept young people only if they mimic “responsible” adult values and behaviour. A great deal of the window dressing and politically populist programmes subscribe to this approach.

“Control” refers to the much held view that young people must be kept in check at all costs if social order is to remain intact. A spectrum of control ranges from soft socialisation in institutions such as the school and the family unit through to more coercive tactics by the more negative elements of state control.

“Fear” refers to the socially constructed perception of youth as synonymous with rebellion and deviancy. Fear of young people is a global phenomenon, quite often finding expression in moral panics in society and community.

Bottom-up pressures

This area describes the aspirational pressures exhibited by young people in the process of engagement.

“Identity” – finding self, being self – refers to the need for young people to develop their own identity internally and through social interaction with others in a diverse range of contexts.

“Risk taking” is the possibility of challenging the status quo and the “wisdom” of adults and is a fundamental part of being young. How this finds expression is a matter of debate. Those working with young people need to understand this principle if they are to relate effectively.

“Developing capacities” proposes that young people are in a state of transition; their needs, wants and capabilities in a high state of flux. Recognition that young people need emotional and physical space to work this through with adults and peers who respond congruently is essential.

The engagement zone

This is the term for the dynamic context where adults engage and interact with young people and structure meets personal agency. The zone is the place for dialogue, compromise, insight and a focus on possibility. In this area there will be expression of anger, cynicism, tokenism, humour, creativity and positive change. Some adults and young people will leave the zone when they feel that their needs are not met; some will remain and continue to struggle optimistically in the hope that change can be achieved.

The TB engagement model is a representation of complex processes but it is hoped that those committed to genuine youth citizenship work with young people can use it as a prompt for discussion and dialogue. Not all top-down pressures are negative. In fact, some structural forces can, in the right context, be productive and developmental. The demands from bottom-up similarly cannot be assumed to be positive and altruistic. The pressures from young people in some ways may be unrealistic,
Conclusions

The promotion of youth citizenship in the new Europe is closely allied to a new “zeitgeist” arising out of changing aspirations, ways of communicating and ways of being. The dominating and sometimes paternalistic attitudes of the moral majority are unlikely to be attractive to young Europeans. Restructuring across nation states, patterns of migration, mobility and a fracturing of cultural homogeneity will feed demands for youth citizenship as a distinctive movement. The European Youth Pact (2005) has the potential to ground the ideals of the Lisbon Strategy and influence youth policy development and ultimately practice in the youth field. There is a need to understand the problematic nature of moving from a state of dependence to adult independence in forms of youth citizenship. “Status ambiguity” refers to the phenomenon of not knowing the extent of your own rights and responsibilities and this has significant effects on the sense of purpose felt by both adults and young people (Moore and Rosenthal, 1995, p. 234). Coleman (2004, p. 228) develops this theme:

“The question of ‘status ambiguity’ is a key one because of what it tells us about the balance of power in the relationship between adults and young people. If the individual’s status is ambiguous, and if his or her rights are not clearly defined, then inevitably he or she will lack the power to influence events and to take control of his or her life … it is essential that we recognise the effects of the inequality between the generations. Effective communication involves the creation of a relatively equal interaction, with give and take between both participants.”

Those with influence in the youth field need to move beyond economistic and consumerist notions of youth which more often than not rely upon vocational skill development. There is a need to actually embrace “soft skill” development more fully if those working effectively with young people are to nurture genuine choice, voice and more radical forms of engagement. The capacity to function effectively as a young citizen relies upon the development of positive relationships, tolerance and creative resilience in action. The movement of positive democratic change needs to be grounded in the policies and practice of all of those who work with young citizens towards the building of a more “possibility-seeing” Europe.
Democratic ideals and practices in educational practice: the effects of schooling on political attitudes among secondary school students in Sweden

Tiina Ekman

Introduction

Promoting active citizenship is a common challenge in western societies, and it has been on the Swedish political agenda for quite some time. Swedish upper secondary school has, according to the curriculum, two main tasks, which are to prepare students for active working life and for active citizenship. The democratic vocation of Swedish schools consists of teaching democracy and fundamental values and having a democratic organisational form that empowers students. What is more, a deliberative classroom environment is given priority among pedagogical methods. Almost all young people participate in three-year upper secondary education, either in academic or in vocational study programmes; other educational alternatives do not exist and the labour market is practically closed for people under 18 years of age.

This study focuses on the educational reforms that have been accomplished in order to diminish the effects of socioeconomic background among youth. Equal opportunity is considered to be an important aspect of school quality, and in an international comparison, the Swedish school system achieves a high level of equity. In particular, the variation in performance between schools is low in Sweden compared to many other countries (see, for example, OECD, 2004). The question is whether these, seemingly very favourable institutional conditions, contribute to reaching the goal of more democratically minded citizens. The main subject of this article is whether or not school-leavers’ democratic competence and their attitudes towards political participation are affected by these ambitions that aim towards equal and active participation in society.

Three major questions are posed in this study. Firstly, why are students on vocational study programmes so negative in their attitudes towards future political participation? Secondly, which citizenship activities attract young people with differing learning experiences, social backgrounds and gender? Thirdly, does the Swedish upper secondary school manage to prepare all students for active citizenship?

The analysis is based on Swedish data on 18 year olds obtained during the IEA Civic Education Study 2000 (N=2 645). Data was collected in a representative sample of 88 upper secondary schools. The student participation rate was 76%. The forms of citizenship activities covered are: future voting in national elections, party membership, participation in legal demonstrations, participation in illegal actions, such as blocking traffic, and voluntary social work (see Table 5 in the appendix). The effects of the democratic learning environment and student participation on students’ civic knowledge and political efficacy are examined across academic and vocational programmes. In the second part, the effects of students’ democratic competence are tested on attitudes towards different forms of citizenship activities. Students’ gender, ethnicity, general cognitive capacity, political interest and parents’ socioeconomic status (SES) are the main control factors.
Educational practices – the democratic task of Swedish upper secondary school

From an educational perspective, the 1990s may be characterised by both an increase in the time spent in education and a broader supply of individual choice in the Swedish school system. The upper secondary school has 17 national programmes, all of which last three years. Each programme provides broad general education and eligibility to study at university or post-secondary level.

Besides the purely educational goals, Swedish schools were given an explicit role as regards democratic values in the 1994 curriculum. The National Agency for Education (Skolverket) describes it as follows:

“The democratic assignment of schools is threefold. The first part of their task is to teach the student democracy and fundamental values, which is to a large degree done in conventional teaching of the school. The second part is that schools shall themselves operate democratically. … The third part of the democratic assignment is the responsibility of schools to foster democratic members of society able to live and function in a democratic society. This involves working with the fundamental value system, i.e. democratic values such as solidarity, equality between people and equal opportunity. In general, it can be said that these parts that make up the democratic whole contribute to the development of democratically aware children, youths and adults. The fundamental value system shall permeate all activities in schools.”

The democratic goal of school education is well expressed, even in the curriculum: young men and women who leave upper secondary school should have a level of civic knowledge to enable their future participation in the society. Obviously, there will always be differences between individuals when it comes to democratic competence and activity, but as the educational policy clearly stresses equal opportunities, the initial differences caused by social class, gender and ethnicity should be actively counteracted during both primary and secondary education.

The concept of “equality” can be interpreted both as “equality in chances” and “equality in results”. In the Swedish case, the emphasis is on the former: every young person is guaranteed a three-year secondary education, all upper secondary students take the same compulsory course in social sciences (different books and teaching methods may be used though) and the structures for student participation are alike throughout all programmes. The question is whether this great investment in equal opportunities in education pays off. Does it lead to more equal relations and educate citizens, who are then all well prepared for active citizenship? Or does school, despite all these efforts, still reproduce the existing, unequal patterns of citizen activity?

Means: two dimensions of democratic competence

The primary task of schools is to educate competent citizens. I use the concept of “democratic competence” for discussing knowledge of political and democratic issues, a concept similar to the concept of “civic competence” as expounded by Youniss et al., 2002 (presented in the article of Elvira Cicognani and Bruna Zani of this volume). In this study, two dimensions of democratic competence are identified: civic knowledge and political efficacy. The idea behind this distinction is that civic knowledge refers to an objective judgment that may be based on cognitive tests or the like, while political efficacy refers to a subjective judgment about one’s capacity to understand political issues. Although both dimensions are key concepts in political participation studies, not many researchers have focused on how these two dimensions work together at the individual level. The way these two dimensions relate to each other reveals that there are interesting phenomena left to explore in the domain of democratic competence. This article, however, will not dwell on this question, although it should be emphasised that a high level of civic knowledge does not necessarily lead to solid political self-confidence – and, vice versa, persons who see themselves as competent political actors do not always have a cognitive base of that knowledge.
Table 1: The relation between civic knowledge and political efficacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Civic knowledge</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political efficacy</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>100</td>
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Note: N=2 645.

The assumption that one’s subjective judgment of political competence is a prerequisite for political participation originated in the 1950s, being first introduced in a comprehensive study on voter behaviour (Campbell, Gurin and Miller, 1954) and then used by a number of researchers. Rosenberg found in the early 1960s that young people with low self-esteem are less interested in politics, pay less attention to political matters in the media, and are less likely to discuss politics and to have much political knowledge (Rosenberg, 1962, 1981/1992). This finding was extended by Carmines, who examined this relationship between self-esteem and political attitudes, and controlled it on political interest. He found that among politically interested people, those with high self-esteem were more likely to have a good knowledge of political issues and how democracy works, be less cynical and feel more politically efficacious, even when controlled for intelligence, socioeconomic status, sex and grade (Carmines, 1978).

The self-efficacy theory, primarily associated with the work of Bandura (1986, 1997), provides a general explanation for the underlying mechanism. According to the theory, people who strongly believe in their personal capabilities tend to perform better and achieve more, whereas people who doubt their capabilities avoid difficult tasks and tend to achieve less. The term “political efficacy” is used in this article in accordance with Bandura’s theory, leading to the assumption that people with a high level of political self-confidence are more positive as regards different forms of political participation, when compared to others.

Both democratic knowledge and general self-confidence are identified as tools in the democratic vocation of schools. More precisely, according to the curriculum schools should:

– use pedagogical working methods in order to increase democracy in the classroom; for example, plan education together with pupils;
– operate as democratic organisations, allowing and promoting student participation;
– advance civic knowledge and democratic values; and
– reinforce pupils’ self-confidence as well as their willingness and ability to learn.

These tasks correspond well with state-of-the-art thinking in educational research, which has shown the positive effects of deliberative pedagogical methods and participatory experiences on students’ democratic knowledge and engagement. For example, student participation in school councils has been found to improve civic knowledge (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Amadeo et al., 2002; Torney-Purta et al., 2001; Torney, Oppenheim and Farnen, 1975; Sora, 2005). Deliberative teaching methods, which create a classroom climate where students feel that their opinions are met with respect, improve students’ civic knowledge (Amadeo et al., 2002; Almgren, 2006; Hahn, 1998). Education in general has a positive effect on democratic knowledge and contributes to deeper understanding of the conditions under which democracy operates (Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry, 1996).

In spite of these results, it is not evident that school itself is the main determining factor in students’ civic knowledge. Studies have shown that upper secondary education functions as a sorting mechanism, and that omitted factors such as a person’s intelligence, parents’ social class, parental engagement in children’s schooling and parents’ political interest have a major effect on students’ political knowledge (Luskin, 1990; Niemi and Junn; 1998; Westholm, Lindquist and Niemi, 1990; Teorell and Westholm, 1999).
Method

This paper outlines two causal links, the first being school factors → democratic competence and, the second, democratic competence → attitudes towards active citizenship.

Figure 1: The conceptual model

The first dimension of democratic competence, civic knowledge, is measured by the IEA Civic Education Study among Swedish 18 year olds. The test consists of 43 multiple-choice items, aimed at testing student knowledge about democratic institutions, principles, processes and economic literacy. A sum-variable scoring from 0 to 43 for each student’s test result is used in the following analyses.91

The second dimension of democratic competence, political efficacy, is measured using a three-item scale. A latent variable for political efficacy is constructed out of the three items, by using the factor-score method.

The political efficacy items are:

– I know more about politics than most people my age;
– I am able to understand most political issues easily;
– When political issues are being discussed, I usually have something to say.

In the analysis, the effects of different school factors on democratic competence are tested stepwise. The plausible school mechanisms are first tested one by one in simple regression models, in order to check whether the effects are significant in the first place.92 Then, a structural equation model including all school factors is tested in different programme environments, in order to prove whether equal opportunities for learning democracy is provided for all students or not. In the next move, the model is completed with a number of control variables for key characteristics. As earlier research clearly shows, social background, general cognitive capacity, gender, ethnicity and political interest are strongly related to civic knowledge, so there are good arguments for picking up these issues in order to validate the influence of the school factors.

91. The test items were developed by the International Steering Committee of the IEA Civic Education Study. The first step was to conduct national case studies in order to investigate what national experts believed students should know about topics related to democratic institutions. The national case studies resulted in 140 items being developed and tested before the task of developing the final instruments on civic knowledge was completed. More information of the study is available at: www.iea.nl/cived.html.

92. All the tested school assumptions had significant regression coefficients when tested. The results are not accounted for in this paper, but are available in an earlier conference paper on this theme (Ekman, 2006).
The second causal path, democratic competence → attitudes towards active citizenship, examines how the two dimensions of democratic competence affect attitudes towards different kinds of political activities. These analyses give the necessary framing for the last move, where a structural equation model is set to predict attitudes towards voting by including the whole battery of previously tested predictors, in programme-wise analyses.

**School contributions to democratic competence**

The ideal citizen, according to the curriculum, is a morally conscious person who participates actively in and contributes to vocational and civic life, comparable to the notion of active citizenship that Jan Dobbernack presents in his contribution to this volume. The task of the school is to pass on values to pupils, impart knowledge and prepare them for work and participation in society (Lpf 94). This chapter takes up the question of whether this is done in a comparable way in all study programmes in upper secondary school.

**Figure 2: Effects of the democratic vocation of schools on students’ democratic competence**

The first test examines the relationship between learning environment and democratic competence. The indicators for learning environment are deliberative classroom climate, traditional teaching methods and political discussions with teachers. Deliberative classroom climate refers to openness for diverse viewpoints and respectful relations – between and among students and teachers – that encourage all students to take part in discussions. Traditional teaching methods apply to the classical teaching context where teachers lecture, and students take notes and memorise facts from the textbooks. A 12-item scale measured classroom climate. Students had a 4-point scale to choose their answers from, with an additional “do not know” option. The items for deliberative classroom climate were:

- students feel free to disagree openly with their teachers about political and social issues during class;

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93. The scale-point labels were “never”, “rarely”, “sometimes” and “often”.

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– students are encouraged to make up their own minds about issues;
– teachers respect our opinions and encourage us to express them during class;
– students feel free to express opinions in class even when their opinions are different from most other students;
– teachers encourage us to discuss political or social issues about which people have different opinions;
– teachers present several sides of an issue when explaining it in class;
– students bring up current political events for discussion in class.

Presence of traditional teaching methods was measured by the following five items:

– teachers place great importance on learning facts or dates when presenting history or political events;
– teachers require students to memorise dates or definitions;
– memorising dates and facts is the best way to get a good grade from teachers in these classes;
– teachers lecture and the students take notes;
– students work on material from the textbook.

The third assumption examines whether talking politics with teachers affects democratic competence or not. Swedish schools actively build platforms for political discussions, both before national elections and during the periods between elections. This is mainly done in co-operation with political parties, but even teachers should bring in topical societal issues, and in consultation with pupils, choose which issues to study further.

Talking politics with teachers is also a latent variable, summing up two measured variables:

– How often do you have discussions of what is happening in national (Swedish) politics with your teachers?
– How often do you have discussions of what is happening in international politics with your teachers?

The next approach relates to democratic school organisation. Participatory governance is one of the prominent features of the Swedish school reforms of the 1990s. The new features in participatory governance are related to democratic learning environments; meaning students’ right to have an influence on working methods and content in study courses, and choice of school and programmes. The traditional part of the participatory governance is measured here with two items. Participation in a student council has a single indicator:

– Have you participated in a student council/student government?
– Taking initiatives was also measured by a single item:
– During the last year, have you done something to improve things in your school?

Earlier research emphasised the importance of civic knowledge when it comes to political participation, especially voting (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Milner, 2002; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). In order to evaluate how Swedish secondary schools manage to prepare all students for future activities, the effects of school factors on students’ civic knowledge and political efficacy will be analysed.

Table 2: Predictors for the democratic vocation of school by programme – Percentage/mean/average

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Predictors Academic programmes</th>
<th>Predictors Mixed vocational programmes</th>
<th>Predictors Male-dominated programmes</th>
<th>Predictors Female-dominated programmes</th>
<th>Predictors All programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

94. Significance tests are in the appendix.
Table 2 above informs us about the distribution of the indicators in the analysis, presented in Table 5 in the appendix. What can be seen is that students on different study programmes have quite different experiences of the democratic vocation of schools. A deliberative classroom climate is not a common teaching method in male-dominated vocational programmes, and what is more surprising; the same goes for traditional teaching. Students in female-dominated vocational programmes seldom talk about politics with their teachers.

Students in academic programmes have both the best civic knowledge and strongest political self-confidence, and the analysis in Table 5 shows that there is a relatively strong, positive relation between these two dimensions of democratic competence among students in academic programmes. This means that people with high civic knowledge have better self-confidence in that field, compared to their peers with lower scores in civic knowledge. The relation is weaker, but still positive, in female-dominated and mixed-study programmes. An unexpected negative connection in male-dominated vocational programmes between civic knowledge and political efficacy complicates the picture. Among these students, people with the lowest scores in the civic knowledge test have the strongest self-confidence in the field of politics. Exaggerating one’s abilities may be a strategy for not showing the uncertainty one actually experiences (Rosenberg, 1979), and it is probably what may be witnessed here. In practice, it is probably these individuals, who hide their insecurity by overacting their self-confidence, that dominate the classroom environment and set the standards for the discussions. That certainly affects the political culture in general and the deliberative classroom climate in particular in a negative way.

Another observation is that factors related to the democratic assignment of school explain more of the variance in civic knowledge compared to political efficacy. The level of explained variance in civic knowledge is around 50%, compared to only 12% in political efficacy. One explanation for this is that while civic knowledge varies a great deal between the programmes, political efficacy shows quite similar levels. Female-dominated vocational programmes deviate though from this trend, the level of political efficacy being very low among these students.

The main indicator for civic knowledge is the deliberative classroom climate. Participation in school democracy does not affect factual knowledge, but it has a noticeable effect on political efficacy.

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95. Table 5 (in the appendix) includes results from two separate equation models. One model includes all programmes in a total-group analysis; the other is a multiple-group analysis where separate coefficients are calculated for each programme group. By comparing these results we discover several interesting phenomena. To start with, the goodness-of-fit index RMSEA is .054 for the total-group model, which indicates that the model has a reasonably good fit. The RMSEA value .023 in the multiple-group analysis is, however, considerably better. That value indicates an excellent fit (Byrne, 2001), and confirms the assumption that students in different study programmes have different experiences of their learning environment and of democratic participation at school.
Participation in a school council, or taking initiatives in order to improve the school, leads to stronger self-confidence in political issues. Finally, two more comments on male-dominated vocational programmes: students in these programmes participate in school democracy to a lesser extent compared to others. What more, among these students, participation in school democracy does not positively affect their democratic competence. This observation relates to the next one, on teaching methods and the level of civic knowledge. Students in male-dominated vocational programmes have a low level of civic knowledge, as Table 2 shows. They also experience a learning environment that is neither deliberative nor traditional. More research is needed before their learning environment can be described in the correct terms, but until then it may be characterised as being clearly less successful compared to other programmes.

Deliberation aims for a deeper understanding of a complex reality, but it works only when the participants have insights into and knowledge of the issues they discuss, and when they pay respect to each other. Where these basic assumptions are not met, deliberation does not lead to any improvement in knowledge, and that is what this study detects among the male vocational students. Traditional teaching methods seem to be a better choice to improve civic knowledge among these students, at least when no other pedagogical methods are being compared.

Swedish upper secondary schools as a whole may be characterised as successful, both in terms of democratic organisation that promotes student participation, and as institutions that prepare young people for active societal and working lives (for an international comparison, see for example, Amadeo et al., 2002), but there are major differences between students in different study programmes. The positive effects are visible in the academic programmes, but hard to find in many of the vocational. This nuanced information should be kept in mind for the study’s next step, namely, controlling for school effects with an increased model.

### Table 3: Predictors for alternative theories by programme – Percentage/mean/average

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Academic programmes</th>
<th>Mixed vocational</th>
<th>Male-dominated vocational</th>
<th>Female-dominated vocational</th>
<th>All programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male, per cent)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Sweden (yes, per cent)</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General verbal skills (maximum 38)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association memberships (mean)</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent with academic degree (per cent)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father employed (per cent)</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest (scale 4-16)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media habits (scale 4-16)</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External efficacy (scale 3-12)</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic knowledge (maximum 43)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political efficacy (scale 3-12)</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

96. What we have traced here may in fact be a reversed or a reciprocal connection between participation and political efficacy, although at this point I will be content to have established the relation. The question that I aim to answer is whether school promotes political efficacy among all students, and whether political efficacy leads to political activity.

97. Significance tests are in the appendix.
Students in academic programmes have the highest level of general verbal skills, strongest socioeconomic backgrounds, and highest level of political interest, media habits and external efficacy (confidence in politicians and politics). Students in female-dominated vocational programmes have the lowest political interest, socioeconomic backgrounds and general verbal skills. Students in male-dominated vocational programmes have the lowest level of associative activity, media habits and external efficacy.

**Figure 3: Testing school factors by alternative theories**

The model above, which includes alternative explanations besides factors related to school, provides improved information about the roots of democratic competence. There are two main explanations for political efficacy, according to Table 6 in the appendix, and these are gender (male) and political interest. Incorporating political interest in an analysis of political participation often encounters criticism, because the two phenomena are closely related. According to the results in Table 6, political efficacy is, among other indicators, predicted by political interest, and the very strong path coefficient, +.66, indicates a close relation. The question of whether these two concepts are identical or not is certainly well founded. After having examined the relationship between political interest and political efficacy, I found that many politically interested people have low confidence in their own political competence (7%) or, vice versa, people with low political interest have high political self-confidence (18%), in a total count of a four-field table.

Civic knowledge has four main indicators, according to Table 6: general cognitive capacity – here measured by verbal skills – political interest, socioeconomic background and deliberative classroom climate. As can be seen, the level of civic knowledge is strongly connected to one’s general cognitive capacity, here measured by a vocabulary test. Students with good results in the civic knowledge test

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98. The analysis of the model in Figure 3 is presented in Table 6, and it has a slightly better fit index, RMSEA = .038, compared to the former model (.044). The amount explained variance has increased, but by only one percentage point. The school-related coefficients are weaker in the model above, especially in estimating political efficacy. For example, the path coefficient between talking about politics with teachers and political efficacy was +.23 in the school model (Table 2), compared to +.01 in the model where school effects are controlled by alternative explanations.
are more verbally oriented compared to others; alternatively, good verbal skills are a prerequisite for understanding the mechanisms that characterise a democratic society. Besides, the importance of the learning environment as an indicator for civic knowledge has passed a critical test when controlled for heavy-weight explanations such as political interest, socioeconomic background and general cognitive capacity. Deliberative classroom climate has only lost a minor part of its explanatory power, and is one of the main indicators for civic knowledge in the final model. So, irrespective of a person’s interest in politics or parents’ academic exams, students who experience a deliberative classroom climate clearly have a higher level of civic knowledge compared to others.  

This leads to the conclusion that the democratic vocation of school does make a difference. The democratic learning environment gives noticeably better results in civic knowledge, and the effect has passed a very hard control. Even efforts to promote student participation give at least some positive results. Participation in a school council supports political self-esteem. The effect is not high, but it is significant and does not depend on a person’s political interest, social background or general cognitive capacity. What is more, the number of students that participate in a school council in Sweden is high when compared internationally (Amadeo et al., 2002), and the variation in participation among students in different study programmes is moderate. This indicates that school councils support equal opportunities in school, based on the fact that the positive effects are quite evenly distributed with regard to gender, socioeconomic background and general cognitive skills.

The negative message is that there are programmes where only a few students experience a good learning environment during social science classes. These students, mostly from the male-dominated vocational programmes, will leave upper secondary school less well-prepared for active citizenship, compared to their peers. Their level of civic knowledge is insufficient, and they lack the experience of a deeper understanding of democratic values that comes with deliberation. It is mostly students in academic programmes, with a solid middle-class background, that have good experiences of the democratic efforts made in school. This means that the initial differences in democratic competence most probably increase over the years in upper secondary school. This study has not managed to reveal strong candidates in pedagogical work that would counteract the effects of social background, gender and ethnicity on democratic competence. Even if school is successful, to at least some degree, the effects are low compared to the effects of initial differences among students. There is certainly more potential, but the results of this study call for more attention to the mechanisms leading towards exclusion, which are active in the male-dominated vocational programmes.

**Active citizenship**

The curriculum points out several goals for the school to attain – for example, “to satisfy the preconditions for taking part in democratic decision-making processes in civic and working life” (Lpf 94), which is about future societal and political participation. When mapping causes for political passivity it is fundamental to understand why education matters for political participation. Studies in political behaviour have shown that the length of one’s formal education is strongly related to political knowledge. Formal education is therefore even related to political participation, as knowledge facilitates the process by which citizens translate their opinions into meaningful forms of political participation (Campbell et al., 1960; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry, 1996; Niemi and Junn, 1998; Holmberg and Oscarsson, 2004).

This study, focusing on how experiences of student participation and the democratic learning environment forward young people’s democratic competence, develops this research field by giving a

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99. Translated into unstandardised coefficients, the maximum effect of a deliberative classroom climate is 3 correct answers out of a maximum 43, when controlled for alternative explanations. As the mean value was 33, and the quartiles 29, 36 and 40, an increase of 3 can be considered as important.

100. Participation in a school council is not correlated with gender or ethnicity, and the correlation with socioeconomic background is +.1 and with general cognitive skills +.09.
more nuanced understanding of how civic knowledge and political efficacy, seen as two dimensions of a person’s democratic competence, relate to different political activities.

Table 4: Attitudes to political activities, by programme – Percentage answering “Certainly” and “Probably” to the question, “When you are an adult do you expect to …?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Academic</th>
<th>Mixed vocational</th>
<th>Male-dominated vocational</th>
<th>Female dominated vocational</th>
<th>All programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote in national elections</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Join a political party</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in a non-violent protest</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer time to help people in the community</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block traffic as a form of protest</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Students in academic programmes are most positively disposed towards future voting, joining a political party and participating in a non-violent demonstration. Students in female-dominated vocational programmes are most positively disposed towards volunteering time to help people in the community, and students in male-dominated vocational programmes towards blocking traffic as a form of protest.

Table 7 in the appendix shows that democratic competence relates strongly to political participation among 18 year olds, the only exception being voluntary social activities. There are, however, large differences in how much of the variance the two predictors represent. Civic knowledge is the main predictor of future voting, and is also significant in participation in legal demonstrations. The effect is negative when it comes to illegal actions such as blocking traffic as a protest, which means that people with a low level of civic knowledge are more likely to participate in illegal actions compared to others.

Young people with solid political self-confidence are more likely to participate in all forms of citizen activities, besides voluntary social work. The strongest relation is to party membership. Together with political interest, political efficacy explains most of the variation in young Swedes’ attitudes toward party membership.101

Over 90% of the students in academic programmes responded that they probably or certainly are going to vote in future national elections, compared to just under half of the students at male-dominated vocational programmes.102 Table 7 shows that civic knowledge is the main determinant for that variance. There are major differences in civic knowledge between the programmes, and besides, knowledge is strongly correlated to deliberative teaching methods, general verbal skills and parents’ SES.

On the contrary, political efficacy does not differ among programmes. Instead, gender turns out to be a powerful predictor; young men are more self-confident concerning their political skills, compared to

101. Approximately, 9% of the population is a member of a political party, and among youth the interest is even lower, 3% according to Statistics Sweden (SCB).
102. Some 70% of first-time voters participated in the 2002 national elections. There are, however, large differences among young voters, depending on their educational level and ethnicity. Among academically educated citizens below 30 years of age, 87% voted, compared with 60% among those with only compulsory school degree (SCB).
young women. That is also the main reason behind young women’s lower interest in party activities. Participation in school democracy has a positive effect on students’ political efficacy, but when controlled for political interest the effect almost disappears. A prerequisite for a participatory effect seems to be that the person has a general political interest. Deliberative teaching methods, on the other hand, make a positive contribution to students’ civic knowledge in all study programmes, except male-dominated vocational ones, even when controlled for powerful alternative explanations.

Civic knowledge is a strong indicator for future voting and legal demonstrations. Political efficacy is a strong indicator for party membership, legal demonstrations, voting and blocking traffic. Low political self-confidence hinders all forms of political participation, even the basic duty of voting in national elections. The conclusion is that schools should pay more attention to such differences in these two dimensions of democratic competence that are caused by gender, socioeconomic background and the choice of study programme. The results have shown that equal opportunities for all do not lead to equality in results, something that may be observed both when it comes to democratic competence and attitudes towards active citizenship. Students in vocational programmes are left behind, which leads to widening gaps.

Obviously, when the goal is to foster democratically minded citizens, there is no single approach for a school to follow. Depending on the composition of students in different programmes, the main emphasis should be given to different methods. Earlier research has revealed that working-class youths – mostly boys – tend to have a negative attitude towards theoretical school subjects in upper secondary school (Hill, 1998; Tallberg Broman, Rubinstein Reich and Hägerström, 2002). In addition to the unique contribution of this study, these results are once again confirmed. I have also shown that working-class girls, besides having partly the same learning attitude as boys, also deviate from mainstream youth by having low confidence in their own capacities, measured here by questions about political efficacy. What is more, the gap between rhetoric in the official guidance documents and the practice in everyday activities in school has become visible. Providing equal chances for education may lead to increasing differences among students, if equality in results is not also included as a goal. These results call for more attention to the differences among study programmes, and point to the need for continuing development and adjustment of teaching methods, and the need of strategic means in order to achieve more equality in attitudes towards active citizenship.
## Appendix

Scheffé’s multiple comparison t-test – Pairwise comparison between groups in Tables 2 and 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Differences between groups that are significant, 0.05 level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School council</td>
<td>No significant differences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own initiative(s)</td>
<td>Mixed&gt;&lt;male dominated programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking politics with teachers</td>
<td>Academic&gt;&lt;male and female dominated, Mixed&gt;&lt;male and female dominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative classroom climate</td>
<td>Academic&gt;&lt;male dominated, Mixed&gt;&lt;male dominated, Male&gt;&lt;female dominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional teaching</td>
<td>Academic&gt;&lt;male and female dominated, Mixed&gt;&lt;male and female dominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General verbal skills</td>
<td>All except Mixed&gt;&lt;male dominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association memberships</td>
<td>Academic&gt;&lt;male and female dominated, Mixed&gt;&lt;male and female dominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent with academic degree</td>
<td>All except Mixed&gt;&lt;male dominated, Male&gt;&lt;female dominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father employed</td>
<td>Academic&gt;&lt;male dominated, Mixed&gt;&lt;male dominated, Male&gt;&lt;female dominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>All except Mixed&gt;&lt;male dominated, Male&gt;&lt;female dominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media habits</td>
<td>Academic&gt;&lt;male dominated, Mixed&gt;&lt;male dominated, Male&gt;&lt;female dominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External efficacy</td>
<td>Academic&gt;&lt;mixed, male and female dominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic knowledge</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political efficacy</td>
<td>All except Mixed&gt;&lt;male dominated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Table 5: The effects of schooling on democratic competence – by programme. Two structural equation models calculated with Amos 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Academic, natural sciences</th>
<th>Academic, social sciences</th>
<th>Vocational, male dominated</th>
<th>Vocational, female dominated</th>
<th>Vocational, mixed</th>
<th>All programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic competence</td>
<td>Political efficacy</td>
<td>Civic knowledge</td>
<td>Political efficacy</td>
<td>Civic knowledge</td>
<td>Political efficacy</td>
<td>Civic knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School council</td>
<td>+.17</td>
<td>+.05</td>
<td>+.14</td>
<td>+.06</td>
<td>(+.01)</td>
<td>(-.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own initiatives</td>
<td>+.10</td>
<td>(+.01)</td>
<td>+.16</td>
<td>(+.04)</td>
<td>(-.01)</td>
<td>(+.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking politics with teachers</td>
<td>+.24</td>
<td>(+.04)</td>
<td>+.26</td>
<td>+.05</td>
<td>+.27</td>
<td>(+.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative classroom climate</td>
<td>(-.08)</td>
<td>+.12</td>
<td>(-.07)</td>
<td>+.11</td>
<td>(-.18)</td>
<td>(-.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional teaching</td>
<td>(-.01)</td>
<td>(+.01)</td>
<td>(-.03)</td>
<td>(-.02)</td>
<td>+.50</td>
<td>(+.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covariance political efficacy and civic knowledge</td>
<td>+.39</td>
<td>+.35</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>+.07</td>
<td>+.16</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RMSEA = 0.023, $\chi^2=1059$, df=435, p<.00
RMSEA = 0.054, $\chi^2=752$, df=87, p<.00
Significance level $t>1.98/t<-1.98$. Non-significant coefficients in brackets

Comment: male-dominated vocational programmes are: construction, vehicle, energy, electricity and industry programmes. Female-dominated vocational programmes are health care and children, and recreation programmes. Mixed vocational programmes are: arts, business and administration, handicrafts, hotel and restaurant, food, and natural resource programmes.
Table 6: Testing the effects of schooling on democratic competence using alternative explanations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Alternative explanations</th>
<th>Political efficacy</th>
<th>Civic knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1=male)</td>
<td></td>
<td>+.14</td>
<td>(+.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of birth (1=Sweden)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>+.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General verbal skills</td>
<td></td>
<td>+.07</td>
<td>+.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associative activity</td>
<td></td>
<td>(+.01)</td>
<td>(-.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociocultural background</td>
<td></td>
<td>+.07</td>
<td>+.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare level at home</td>
<td></td>
<td>(-.03)</td>
<td>+.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td></td>
<td>+.66</td>
<td>+.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media habits</td>
<td></td>
<td>+.04</td>
<td>+.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External efficacy</td>
<td></td>
<td>+.06</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School council</td>
<td></td>
<td>+.04</td>
<td>(+.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own initiatives</td>
<td></td>
<td>(+.01)</td>
<td>(-.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking politics with teachers</td>
<td></td>
<td>(+.01)</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative classroom climate</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>+.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional teaching</td>
<td></td>
<td>(-.00)</td>
<td>(+.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covariance political efficacy and civic knowledge</td>
<td></td>
<td>.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2 adj</td>
<td></td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=2 639</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RMSEA .038, chi2=2 118, df=448, p<.00

Significance level t>+1.98/t<-1.98. Non-significant coefficients in brackets
Table 7: Predicting active citizenship, total effects

Standardised path coefficients, analysed with Amos 4/Streams 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>Party membership</th>
<th>Legal demonstrations</th>
<th>Blocking traffic</th>
<th>Voluntary social work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1=male)</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>+.00</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>+.12</td>
<td>-.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of birth (1=Sweden)</td>
<td>+.02</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General verbal skills</td>
<td>+.10</td>
<td>+.03</td>
<td>+.04</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associative activity</td>
<td>+.00</td>
<td>+.08</td>
<td>+.11</td>
<td>+.11</td>
<td>+.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociocultural background</td>
<td>+.12</td>
<td>+.03</td>
<td>+.02</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>+.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare level at home</td>
<td>+.06</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>+.01</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>+.23</td>
<td>+.32</td>
<td>+.36</td>
<td>+.08</td>
<td>+.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media habits</td>
<td>+.11</td>
<td>+.02</td>
<td>+.01</td>
<td>+.00</td>
<td>+.00</td>
</tr>
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Strengthening opportunities for citizenship education at local level: the case of Berlin-Neukölln

Franziska Süllke

Introduction – How is it possible to make citizenship education effective under difficult conditions?

Poverty, unemployment, a high percentage of migrants, an ongoing crisis in the local economy and a lot of educationally marginalised groups characterise the Berlin borough of Neukölln. Peter Wensierski (1997), editorial journalist of the German magazine DER SPIEGEL, called Neukölln “The Bronx of Berlin – being full of violent youth gangs, pitbulls, antisocial non-workers and mosques.” A combination of several interacting characteristics – such as a large foreign population, high crime and unemployment rates, large number of welfare recipients, ethnic conflicts, neglect, a lack of education and language skills, social demise and degeneration into a slum – culminated in the headline “End of the line – Neukölln”.

How can citizenship education work effectively under such difficult conditions?

How can these challenging parameters be reversed into democratic and social cohesion?

The head of a youth organisation in Berlin-Neukölln puts it in the following way (Bezirksamt Neukölln, 2006):

“It is essential to bundle the resources of young people, their energy and creativity, and to encourage them in more participation, activity and a realistic self-esteem by developing strengths and overcoming weaknesses.”

And a school teacher sums it up like this (ibid.):

“Through individual assistance, which is meant as help for self-help, we can give our young people the chance to build up their trust in their own abilities and their solidarity with others to start a better future.”

This research will make a contribution to the discussion about the challenges and opportunities of education for active citizenship and participation at the local level under difficult conditions in relation to the concepts of European citizenship education from a very practical, municipality-orientated point of view. The concepts underlying citizenship education, as used by the Council of Europe and the European Commission, are considered in terms of their relevance and practicability in the rather difficult context of Berlin-Neukölln, which is characterised by segregation and exclusion.

The article outlines three main challenges according to the overall topic:

Opportunities for citizenship education are very much dependent on the educational background and the social context young people live in. The reality of deprived areas and the gap between concepts and practice have to be regarded while thinking about methods and instruments for citizenship education.

Under very hard conditions, conventional forms of citizenship activation might not be applicable. For that reason, alternative forms should be taken into consideration. The overall goal has to be the integration of all groups in society, not only to reach those who are active anyway.
Given that education for citizenship and even more education for European citizenship is a difficult task, only the use of combined resources can reach the target. Different actors with access to young people have to be involved in citizenship education. A network of these actors, including the families, has to work together to foster the participation of young people in community life.

The perspective of this article is affected by citizenship education work in a deprived area of Berlin. Opportunities and constraints of citizenship education, and encouragement of active European citizenship under difficult social conditions are analysed.

**Concepts of European citizenship education – great expectations in Brussels and Strasbourg appearing at the local level**

Education for democratic citizenship became a common goal of education policies in Europe in the late 1990s. Both the Council of Europe and the European Commission have developed concepts for European citizenship education through their policies and programmes.

**The Council of Europe**

From the Council of Europe’s point of view (2007), education for democratic citizenship focuses on the following goals: participation, partnership, social cohesion, mutual understanding, access, equity, accountability and solidarity.

In the Council of Europe perspective, human rights are the precondition for active citizenship. The Council of Europe (2005) underlines that democratic citizenship is not limited to a citizen’s legal status and to the voting right this status implies, but includes all aspects of life in a democratic society.

This is a very important aspect of local policy in a large city like Berlin-Neukölln, because it also affects questions of migration, integration, intercultural dialogue and participation beyond different ethnic backgrounds.

The Council of Europe (2007a) defines “education for democratic citizenship” as “a set of practices and activities designed to help young people and adults to play an active part in democratic life and exercise their rights and responsibilities in society”. The Council declares that education for democratic citizenship “encompasses other related concepts, such as peace and intercultural education”. Human rights education is seen as the core and an indivisible part of education for democratic citizenship. This becomes apparent especially in terms of gender role models and political attitudes in different ethnic communities at the local level. There is an enormous need for conveying values of gender equality, democracy and the fulfilment of human rights.

Directed to the promotion of a culture of democracy and human rights, the Council of Europe considers education for democratic citizenship as a process of lifelong learning, aimed at all individuals, regardless of their age or role in society going far beyond the school environment. Lack of education is one of the largest problems in deprived areas such as Berlin-Neukölln. For that reason, priority has to be given to this issue at the local level.

**The European Commission**

Since the 1990s, the European Commission’s policy has aimed to bring Europe closer to its citizens. This is a great challenge in practice, because many citizens have hardly any idea what Europe means to them.
The European Commission (2007b) regards training and youth offers as useful vehicles for the promotion of active participation in Europe’s diversity of cultures, economies, polities and societies. The Commission places lifelong learning at the centre of an integrated approach to offer all European citizens opportunities for access to knowledge. Education and training are key elements of the citizen’s activation policy at the local level, too. However, offers are not always enough, because it is difficult to reach educationally marginalised groups. In several cases the target group cannot be convinced that education and training are useful for them without having any prospect of employment. Methods have to be found to support people to take part in education and training programmes to improve their chances of employment. The European Commission promotes several programmes in the fields of youth, culture, media, employment and civic participation to do just that. The European Commission (2007a) also runs the Europe for citizens programme to promote active citizens’ participation, understanding and solidarity among European countries and a European identity.

It is very often the case that the approach of these programmes does not fit with the concepts and capabilities of the people at the local level, because it is too complex and vague, not focusing on their existential problems, such as unemployment, poverty or ethnic conflicts. The task of local policy then is to bridge the gap between the overall European objectives and the premises of the local people.

As regards the concepts and definitions of European citizenship education elaborated by the Council of Europe and the European Commission, it can be argued that the Council of Europe represents a stronger orientation of citizenship education towards human rights and democratic participation, while the European Commission focuses more on training, lifelong learning and the development of a European identity. The impact and applicability of these policies at the local level will be analysed in the following sections by taking the Berlin borough of Neukölln as an example, where the social context constitutes a very special challenge to the elucidated concepts.

The difficult case of the Berlin borough of Neukölln

Socioeconomic realities of Neukölln’s neighbourhood and their impact on citizenship

Neukölln is one of the largest boroughs of Berlin and one of the poorest regions in Germany with very weak social infrastructure. Approximately 303 000 people live in Neukölln, from about 165 different nations. The quota of migrants is 22% (66 000 people). The largest proportion of people without German nationality is in the 6-18 age-group. Neukölln is the borough with the largest number of children and young people in Berlin – 54 000 live here. A huge number of young, often badly educated or non-skilled, migrant people are excluded from the regular labour market. Neukölln has the largest Turkish community in Berlin with about 27 000 people. There are several schools in which up to 98% of the students are of non-German origin. Some 30% of adults did not accomplish their education grade. Out of the migrants, nearly 50% finish school without a school-leaving certificate. The unemployment rate in Neukölln ranges from 23.4 % on average, and up to 38% in the northern part where there is a high proportion of migrants and educationally marginalised groups. Some 88 300 people depend on social welfare. Some 23.7% of Neukölln’s residents fall under the poverty threshold as measured by the population’s average (Bezirksamt Neukölln, 2007d).

Poverty and social segregation are also increasing by selective movement of people who are richer. Hence, it follows that the social gap between excluded and integrated citizens is multiplying.

These difficult general conditions characterise the hard situation of Neukölln and have a very strong impact not only on the opportunities for citizenship but also on citizenship education at a local level. They are a hard benchmark for promoting active European citizenship, which is constantly in conflict with social, educational, integrative and economic problems.
There is doubtlessly a need to strengthen opportunities for citizenship education, but all good ideas and attempts have to be seen in relation to the chances of implementation in the given corporate, social, cultural and ethnic reality.

**The key challenges for citizenship education**

“Humans can be separated into three groups:
The few who take care that something is happening,
The many who observe what is happening,
and the majority of people who haven’t any idea of what is happening at all” (Karl Weinhofer, born 1942, German politician).

The main challenge for citizenship education is not the active and interested groups, but the people who hardly know anything about the functioning of society or the opportunities to take part actively in the community. Social and educational backgrounds play a very significant role in active involvement in society. The majority of young people in Berlin-Neukölln do not have the intellectual, social and material requisites to be open to citizenship education. The Council of Europe’s perception that participation depends on the willingness and capacity of individuals to engage with each other can be strongly confirmed from the local viewpoint. For that reason it is even more important to integrate the socially weak or uneducated people. They have to be provided with special offers for citizenship education.

Their value for the community has to be underlined to raise active citizenship. Citizenship education has to contribute to the needs of the people who are supposed to participate. The sense of being active as part of the community has to be cultivated.

Citizenship education needs to start by strengthening self-perception, developing personality and self-confidence, clarifying role models in terms of gender equality, and improving language, communication and emotional skills and an awareness of the common values of society. Many young people in Berlin-Neukölln have serious deficits in their social competence and their school performance. Migrants are torn between two cultures – the one of their country of origin and the one of their new homeland, Germany. They have to find their own identity by bringing different cultural backgrounds and different expectations and prospects together.

There are some basic requirements, which have to be fulfilled as a precondition for active citizenship. Derek Heater (1990) illustrates that in his book *Citizenship; the Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education*, as the so-called “cube of citizenship”. The first dimension of this cube is the synthesis of basic elements of citizenship: legal and civil, political and social aspects, civics education and identity aspects. The second dimension of the cube is the geographical context within which citizenship can be integrated: the local, the regional, the national, the continental and the global contexts. The third dimension of the cube is the educational one. This dimension implies a need to educate the citizen at three levels: the cognitive level – knowledge of the public affairs of the political community – the attitudes (affective) related to civics and the technical competencies (pragmatic) linked to political participation.

Accordingly, the degree and the realisation of active citizenship depends on citizenship education in different ways. Without citizenship education, citizens will not be able to participate actively in political life. Another very important element of the educational dimension is the intercultural education. It can strengthen citizenship by showing the possibilities to live together beyond the different cultural, ethnic and religious differences.
Opportunities for citizenship education at the local level under difficult conditions can be derived from these dimensions. Active citizenship depends very much on the first dimension – the availability of basic elements, such as legal and civil status, political knowledge, social security and cultural identification.

The vast majority of especially young people in Berlin-Neukölln are far removed from active citizenship. This is very much related to the fact that the existential questions of life such as family life, vocational training and job opportunities or the acquirement of German nationality are not clarified. The capability and willingness to take an active part in democratic life and to exercise rights and responsibilities in society is strongly connected to the degree of social and legal recognition. To accept and to tackle the difficult social, economic and also ethnic problems of a “hard case” area is a major challenge for citizenship education and its sustainability at the local, regional, national and European levels.

Three key challenges to citizenship education at the local level emerge from this:

Challenge 1: Active European citizenship can only work if basic existential conditions of life are fulfilled or have the prospect of being fulfilled. Opportunities for citizenship education are very much dependent on educational background and the social context young people live in. The reality of deprived areas has to be taken into consideration when thinking about active citizenship and the conception of methods and instruments for citizenship education.

Challenge 2: Alternative forms of citizenship education, which start at a very basic, simple and concrete level and which focus on the day-to-day problems of young people, have to be employed to strengthen opportunities for active citizenship. The integration of all groups in society has to be the overall goal – not only reaching those that are active anyway. Nevertheless, it is also important to empower those already active and to train the trainers in order to spread the message of citizenship education.

Challenge 3: Different actors who have access to young people have to be involved in citizenship education. Only a network of municipality workers, school teachers, people in youth organisations or institutions for social welfare and family assistance and of course the parents (who have to be educated themselves) can forward the cause of citizenship education and the participation of young people in the life of their community.

The key partners in implementing citizenship education

Citizenship education has to proceed within the social neighbourhood focusing on very concrete action plans and projects that directly affect the different target groups who are involved in the decision-making and budget allocating process (Senatsverwaltung Berlin, 2004). There is a variety of committed partners in Berlin-Neukölln who play a crucial role in the effort to support and practice citizenship education at the local level. They can be separated into two groups: the partners of organised civil society and the partners of formal and non-formal youth education.

The partners of organised civil society are for instance the so-called “neighbourhood management offices”, which have been functioning since 1999 as community centres to foster social-urban development; the Neukölln Citizenship Foundation as a platform for people who engage in activities associated with their borough (Bürgerstiftung Neukölln, 2007); and a diverse cultural scene, with the association Cultural Network Neukölln supporting the employment of artists from different ethnic communities (Kulturnetzwerk Neukölln, 2007). Moreover the different religious communities, particularly the Islamic community, have a very strong influence on young people. They have to be
incorporated in citizenship education at the local level so as to achieve political and social integration (Bezirksamt Neukölln, 2007a). Apart from that, small and medium-sized companies are more and more aware of citizenship education and feel an obligation towards the principles of corporate social responsibility. They have contact with young people during the job-orientation phase and vocational training and can influence them in terms of citizenship education. Self-employed people of non-German origin, members of the so-called “ethnic economy”, likewise play a major role in the citizenship education of young people through training and employment (Kresta, 2006).

The partners of formal and non-formal youth education are of course the schools where the teachers have to work as multipliers on the issue and to test new forms of internal and external co-operation. Many schools are already open to external projects executed by organisations that offer additional non-formal education or vocational orientation to students. In addition, youth and sports organisations together with youth workers play an important role in promoting and cultivating citizenship education (Jugendamt Berlin-Neukölln, 2007). Families also have a significant influence on the formation of their children. That is why it is very important to involve them at a very early stage in the process of formal and non-formal citizenship education.

Citizenship education is very much connected to a diversified approach, including partnerships among a wide range of stakeholders, practitioners, formal and non-formal educational institutions and the local public administration.

The examples of good practice in the following section focus on strengthening education for European citizenship, intercultural citizenship and ecological and social citizenship.

**Citizenship education in practice**

Despite the social problems of Berlin-Neukölln, 40.2% of its citizens work on a voluntary basis in order to improve the living conditions of their neighbourhood. Their engagement means that citizenship education represents a significant influencing factor at a very local level.

Concrete projects have a particular relevance for the promotion of active European citizenship, especially in the youth sector. To support these projects financially, the City Council of Berlin-Neukölln receives financing from the European Social Fund.

Small institutions and non-governmental organisations are supported in their efforts to make a contribution to the overall European objectives and also to the development of European citizenship and a sense of European identity.

Different initiatives also work in the fields of social inclusion, gender mainstreaming, professional integration, social and economic development and, of course, European citizenship education.

This article wishes to highlight three of these initiatives identified as examples of good practice by a committee for project evaluation in the City Council of Berlin-Neukölln. Some of the parameters for measuring good practice are the following:

- continuous involvement of participants and positive feedback by the target group;
- gender-mainstreaming;
- compliance with the success indicators set in advance;
- achievement of examinations/certificates;
- contribution to democratic and tolerant citizenship education;
- significant publicity;
- sustainable development;
- networking activities.
An essential factor in the success of these projects is their focus on the local situation and the needs and abilities of the target group, which is characterised by a low level of awareness and a lack of accompanying psychological support.

Example 1: Educating young people to become dance trainers

“Street dance is my life. It gave me so much – friendship, fun, motivation – and a real job perspective,” says 16-year-old Fidan. “Yes, I already earn good pocket money and later I can turn my passion – dancing – into a professional career. There is no better way of working,” adds 17-year-old Isaac.

The basic idea of this project is to educate 20 young people from immigrant backgrounds to become dance trainers in different styles of street dance. Both theoretical and practical considerations, as well as pedagogical competence, are taught. The aim is to obtain an accredited dance trainer certificate, which enables young people to work. By means of this, young people with problematic future prospects get the chance to obtain a qualification in line with their interests and capabilities, and to open up new vocational opportunities. The project leader explains the project’s concept in the following way: “There is an enormous demand for street dance, but there are no qualified dance trainers. Education projects for this street culture have only been initiated in the USA, Great Britain and France so far. The motivation for this project was to activate young people by giving them a real future perspective.”

The young people can work in different youth clubs as dance trainers and some of them finance their final secondary school examinations in this way. Furthermore, they improve their social and communicative competences. In an atmosphere, which is affected by the philosophy of hip-hop, the project participants learn, on the one hand, democratic and tolerant behaviour as a precondition for citizenship and, on the other hand, they teach other young people how to understand each other.

Implications

This project addresses the basic elements of citizenship, such as social security and identification. The most important premise for active citizenship is a future perspective with education and employment. The answer is to show young people how to develop themselves and how to integrate in society according to their interests and capabilities. The approach of training the trainers works very well in this project and can be one way to reach young people and instil notions of active citizenship. Active European citizenship can only work, as it does here, if basic existential conditions of life are fulfilled or have the prospect of being fulfilled, as was mentioned above in Challenge 1. Opportunities for citizenship education are very much dependent on educational background and the social context young people live in.

Example 2: “Rütli – Wear” school project

The Rütli school is situated in the northern part of Neukölln. It is a secondary school made up of 83.2% immigrants. Students with different cultural backgrounds, poor language skills and school performances and very ingrained gender role models have to interact with each other very often provoking a disrespectful, violent and aggressive atmosphere. The situation escalated in March 2006; teachers at the school wrote an emergency letter to the Berlin Ministry of Education because they were not able to control the situation any more and to offer regular school lessons. They called for the closure of their school and another form of education. The media reacted with a large campaign with headlines like “Rütli – source of terror – a school out of control full of hate and violence”. A new
director was introduced and a lot of external organisations and initiatives offered help to normalise school life once again.

One of these initiatives – started by a group of young students – was the project “Rütli – Wear”, designed to improve the image of the school and the pupils. The idea is that young people design their own logos and labels and print them on T-shirts or other textiles. The pupils gain knowledge of design, textile techniques, working with different materials and marketing. Additionally, they learn computer skills and might qualify for vocational training. All the project’s products are sold in an online shop, which was created by the young people themselves for the benefit of the school. A school company was founded to provide practical work placements and apprenticeship training positions for students of the school.

**Implications**

This project applies alternative and creative forms of education for active citizenship. By means of a very concrete and personal medium, such as fashion, it becomes easy for the participants to identify with common values created by themselves. The project participants used the opportunity of playing an active role in a creative process for their surroundings and to really make a change for the future of their school. Also this initiative provides new perspectives for the personal and professional development of these young people.

The combination of technical, creative and social competences during the project’s implementation is a very useful tool. This example illustrates Challenge 2 for citizenship education, as described above. Alternative forms of citizenship education, which start at a very simple and concrete level, have to be employed to strengthen opportunities for active citizenship.

**Example 3: The Green map project**

The so-called “Green map system” is a globally networked, universally applicable system for the coverage of all ecological and cultural features of a certain urban environment. The objective is to create a printed ecological map of a district in town. The project idea came originally from New York – green maps have already been created with the same standardised symbol system in more than 50 countries worldwide. The German green map co-ordinator, a professional geographer, offered to implement a project with students from Berlin-Neukölln in a deprived area.

The challenge of the project was for young people to create a printed map of their surroundings by mapping the infrastructure and the social, cultural, economic and ecological factors of the marked-off area. Discovering and compiling the characteristics of the district had a very strong impact on the pupils’ awareness of the community and their perception of the living environment. They also used the opportunities offered by the project to improve their IT knowledge, job orientation and future prospects.

The resulting printed green map is aimed at people who want to find special places in the neighbourhood. To design the green map, students got help from different people in the district, the school teachers, the neighbourhood management office, non-governmental organisations, youth centres and small and medium-sized companies. The green map has real added value for other citizens in the neighbourhood and beyond that it is an important contribution for the young people to identify with their living environment. The integration of the map in an existing worldwide system opens up opportunities for the participants to get in contact with other young people in Europe and the wider world.
Implications

The third challenge for citizenship education as described above is illustrated by this example. Different actors in citizenship education have to combine their activities and to work together to succeed. Young people have to be encouraged to join the network. They have to be supported in network activities in order to use synergies for a multiplied effect.

For some of the project participants, it was the first time that they had actively taken note of their neighbourhood. They got in contact with the relevant actors in the area and their awareness of the community’s structures was increased. They learnt about the different types of interaction and cooperation among neighbourhood management offices, religious communities, schools, youth organisations, cultural organisations, minority organisations, etc. This gave them the opportunity to step inside the community and to become an active citizen.

Conclusions, perspectives and policy implications

Strengthening opportunities for citizenship education at the local level is not an easy task to fulfil – especially under difficult social, ethnic and economic circumstances. It can only be brought forward by the joint action of many different partners working for the overall goal of improving active citizenship and cohesion in the community.

As an outcome of the previous explanations and remarks the following three conclusions can be drawn.

First of all, it is important to accept the fact that there are a lot of (young) people who cannot, or who do not (yet) want to, be active citizens. It is necessary to provide good general, cultural and emotional formal and non-formal education as a precondition for citizenship education. All measures have to consider the needs and abilities of the target group. It is very important to find out what are the interests, desires, capacities and objectives of young people, so as to build a bridge to the overall concepts of European citizenship education promoted by the Council of Europe and the European Commission.

In its glossary of terms for education for democratic citizenship, the Council of Europe (2003) introduces the term “participation” as defining the quality of citizenship education. The Council admits that participation depends on the willingness and capacity of individuals to engage with each other, but also to engage across communities and among individuals and the institutions that exist. This supports the position of the Council of Europe, namely that citizenship education is closely connected with offering opportunities for participation, since it is about developing the skills of participation and a reduction in the number of obstacles to participation. The first example of good practice relates to that. Participation is the first step in strengthening opportunities for citizenship education at the local level.

Secondly, by means of concrete projects that have a direct impact on the diverse life concepts of young people or that are related to common problems, worries or values, awareness of active citizenship can be increased. Alternative forms of citizenship education have to be employed to integrate all groups in society. This means that, on the one hand, the potential of young people has to be supported and developed and, on the other hand, weaknesses have to be addressed. The second example of good practice shows that in a very concrete project, which appeals to the creativeness of the individual and the team spirit of a group, a real change can be realised, which has a good impact on the whole area.

Thirdly, it is very important that young people get the opportunity to be involved in the development and design of their surroundings. By giving their creative energy, they start to identify with their living
area and thus they are sensitised to becoming active citizens. This can be seen in the third example of good practice.

**Perspectives and policy implications**

Recapitulating the opportunities and constraints of citizenship education under difficult social conditions, it can be argued that there is a huge variety of opportunities to improve education for active citizenship, even in a “hard case” area.

However, there is a gap between the concepts of the Council of Europe and the European Commission, and what is possible in practice. Local actors sometimes fail to raise awareness sufficiently of citizenship education using different instruments.

The European concepts of citizenship education can work in the context of a “hard case” if they are transformed into concrete and target group orientated measures. The policies and programmes of the Council of Europe and the European Commission have to bear in mind the reality of the people at the local level, assuring that the basic elements of citizenship (legal status, political knowledge, social security, education and cultural diversity) are considered as influencing factors for active citizenship.

There is a real need to devise a new communication policy to address civil society. Awareness-raising campaigns have to be started so as to create general interest and concern for the issue of citizenship education for young people in a community-based – and also European-orientated – perspective. This can only succeed through the combined action of all relevant stakeholders, officials and practitioners and, of course, the young people themselves. For that reason, the Council of Europe and the European Commission should share the task of citizenship education with as many actors and multipliers as possible, so as to enlarge the network of partners.

Goals such as participation, partnership, social cohesion, mutual understanding, access, equity, accountability and solidarity have to be communicated in an understandable and applicable way, so that concrete initiatives and projects can be created out of them.

Democratic culture has to start in day-to-day life by developing skills and by offering concrete and manageable opportunities for participation.

A sense of European identity – and for mutual understanding to exist between European citizens – has to start with identification and active participation at the local level, combined with a feeling of belonging to the community.

Taking into account that all the methods and instruments illustrated can work well under difficult conditions, it is likely that they will be even more effective in a context with better socioeconomic conditions. Applying them could really make a change and strengthen opportunities for citizenship education at the local level.
Observations: translating research into policy

Nathalie Stockwell and Hanjo Schild

The following observations and conclusions represent the perspective of youth policy making, inspired by youth research findings presented at the seminar that was at the source of this publication. They were debated within the so-called “magic triangle” of youth research, policy and practice, providing grounds for evidence-based youth policy making. This dialogue, happening in both formal and informal spaces and moments, underlined the importance of certain implications that the existing variety of meanings, understandings and realities of European citizenship have in informing and forming policy approaches and strategies. Those implications, applicable in such essential spheres of young people’s life as education, civic activities, the dialogue of decision makers with the younger generations, etc., are presented below. They have to be seen in relation to the institutional framework of the Directorate of Youth and Sport of the Council of Europe, the Youth Policy Unit in the Directorate General for Education and Culture of the European Commission and the Youth Partnership between them.

Active democratic citizenship of young people is a key priority for European youth policy, which equally concerns the Council of Europe and the European Union. There are nevertheless some specificities in the way this common priority is addressed and implemented within the framework of the European Union and the Council of Europe, owing to the differences in the scope of these organisations, the nature of their work and their underlying objectives. Further promotion of active European citizenship of young people is needed, taking into account these specificities.

A shared understanding of the concept of European citizenship

The notion of active European citizenship needs debating and clarifying. However, the main concern should not be to try to come up with a precise definition of European citizenship on which everyone can agree. What is important is developing a shared understanding of the concept of European citizenship in all its dimensions, including political, social, cultural, economic and legal aspects, as well as setting a frame, which would provide opportunities for young people to experience and develop their active European citizenship.

The concept of European citizenship goes beyond the European Union of 27 member states, it concerns the whole continent and even impacts on neighbouring regions of Europe. European citizenship differs from EU citizenship, to which a precise set of rights and obligations are attached. European citizenship is linked to a sense of community and belonging. It is built around common values of tolerance, solidarity and freedom.

“We versus the other” attitude

Europe is rich because of its diversity. European citizenship cannot be described by excluding – namely, a “we versus the other” attitude – but by respecting differences and facilitating inclusion through sharing common values. Cultural and ethnic diversity should not be seen as a source of potential problems and conflicts. Intercultural contacts and learning should be promoted to foster mutual understanding and tolerance.
More means for young people to develop their active European citizenship

It is important to further develop and reinforce existing tools and instruments that foster active European citizenship at European level. The Youth Open Method of Co-ordination developed within the EU as a follow-up to the White Paper on Youth should be further developed and implemented to create more opportunities for young people to participate. The structured dialogue launched by the Commission within this context should be used by young people and other relevant actors in the youth field as a privileged tool to enable young people to participate in policy shaping discussions. The EC Youth in Action programme should be further exploited as an instrument to promote active European citizenship. The co-management of the Council of Europe’s youth sector, though not transposable to all institutional contexts, can be a model of good practice for certain bodies and/or organisations working specifically with and for young people.

Developing opportunities for young people to participate is particularly important at regional and local levels, where participation strategies in different settings such as schools, work, community and leisure time places must be improved and encouraged. The Youth Open Method of Co-ordination and structured dialogue between young people, political actors and other stakeholders in the youth field should be put into practice above all at the local level.

Both “conventional” and “unconventional” avenues to European citizenship should be considered as relevant. Enhancing participatory, democratic approaches, which also include dissident positions and “alternative” ways to participate, is imperative. Culture plays an important role in fostering active European citizenship and social inclusion. It is a valuable means for young people to express themselves and make a contribution to society, especially for the ones who are not interested in – or excluded from – the so-called “classic” ways of participating, for example voting or participating in policy shaping debates.

The role of formal and non-formal learning

In the discussions on active citizenship and active European citizenship, special attention should be given to citizenship education. Not only through formal curricula, but also by promoting opportunities for young people to learn to participate by participating and to develop their creativity and entrepreneurship, both in and outside schools. Young people should be encouraged to develop entrepreneurial mind sets. Acquiring these competences requires more possibilities for young people to develop them from an early age.

Best practices should be exchanged on issues relating to active European citizenship, encompassing the experiential approach applied in formal, non-formal, informal and blended learning settings.

Providing sound, evidence-based foundations for such educational approaches and activities, as well as a better general understanding, are very much needed. To this end, more knowledge of these issues, particularly through research and studies, exchanges and dialogue must be produced and disseminated.

Further debates on the topic should be promoted

There are several relevant and controversial topics linked to European citizenship, which need to be further discussed. Those were – to name the most pertinent: Euro-patriotism versus Euro-scepticism, mystification versus demystification, utilitarian view of EU membership, the dimension of social control, domestication versus liberalisation, emotional dimensions, illusions, aspirations, diversity and

103. The structured dialogue was reinforced by the adoption on 20 July 2006 of the Commission Communication on “Active European Citizenship of Young People” (subsequently endorsed by the European Council in a resolution of 14 November 2006).
otherness, dignity, well-being, sense of community and of belonging, inclusion/exclusion, integration of all regardless of their social class, particularly of migrants, asylum seekers, ethnic and other minority groups, such as LGBT.

**Impact of the conclusions**

For the Youth Partnership between the Council of Europe and the European Commission these findings and recommendations have a great relevance for future action and must be integrated into an extended work programme. They are also of great value for various other stakeholders in youth policy, youth research and youth work. Once disseminated they will aim to impact on further policy shaping in the youth field, beyond the work of the Youth Partnership.

To foster European citizenship, to provide opportunities for young people to play an active role in the debates about Europe and its future developments, we need to further develop appropriate tools and instruments that encourage and enable citizens to participate and to engage, be it at European or at national and local levels. Networks and debates around the topic of active democratic citizenship and European citizenship must be reinforced. The Open Method of Co-ordination, the structured dialogue, the co-management system, or participation structures in families, schools, at the workplace or in the community and leisure life point in the right direction. And educational, training and youth work activities are essential cornerstones in this strategy.
Observations: translating research into practice

Miguel Ángel García López

The following observations are a collection of reflections from youth research in relation to educational practice. The research seminar that provided the basis for this publication represented the initiation of the dialogue – a translation of research into practice – as through its many moments and discussions, and the mixed roles and types of participants (researchers, youth workers, practitioners, etc.) new insights were created.

There are numerous lessons that could be taken from the different contributions on educational practice. In an attempt to highlight the most important ones, the following lessons could be underlined:

The conceptualisation of European citizenship in educational practice should not be limited to the European Union

The European Union is certainly the most relevant political and institutional reality when talking about Europe and the most influential one for young people. At the same time, Europe is more than the European Union, particularly when talking about European citizenship. Nationalities, identities, traditions, feelings and belongings play, for citizens, an important role not necessarily embraced by institutional realities. This “permanent tension”, Europe-European Union, is something to be critically and constructively addressed when implementing educational projects related to European citizenship.

Is there a final answer to the question “What is European citizenship?”

The research contributions showed us that the answer is probably “no”, or a least not a closed one. At the same time, the fact that European citizenship is, indeed, a notion “under construction” should not undermine the findings of research and what is already known from educational practice. What is already known about European citizenship should be the basis of a clear educational proposal. What is still to be discovered should be considered as a challenge for its further development.

A global vision needs to be integrated in discussions about Europe and European citizenship

This perspective is unavoidable when considering phenomena such as economic globalisation, migration processes, environmental degradation and intercultural relations; all of them very relevant when exploring European citizenship.

When considering the notion of European citizenship the “educational and political” dimensions are closely linked and should be tackled in training

Effective citizenship requires the development of individual competences as well as structural changes to strengthen opportunities for immigrants, minorities and disadvantaged groups. This educational and political dimension represents one of the major potentials of citizenship education.
Exploring European citizenship implies a certain “Utopia”

Exploring European citizenship brings up the discussion of the Europe of values, the values that should “guide” European integration. Without falling into an unrealistic or romantic approach, the message that “it is possible to build a new Europe” should be part of stimulating and future-oriented educational practices.

European citizenship as a rational notion with an emotional component

European citizenship is also related to identity, identification, sense of belonging and values. It is important to integrate and to balance both dimensions in educational practice when choosing and designing different activities.

Research offers a deeper understanding of young people’s realities and concerns

The values and mechanisms that are important for young people’s lives (for example, mobility, opportunities, solidarity and global equity) shape their identity, are the motors of their social involvement and represent the basis for citizenship. This deeper understanding of young people is clearly very important in the design and implementation of educational practices.

The need to articulate an educational policy based on active citizenship

Citizenship education is already, in one way or another, part of the educational policy of all the European states. Constitutions, and education and youth law proclaim the need to educate in democratic values and promote participation. At the same time, when it comes to its implementation, there are significant difficulties and controversies: the role of formal and non-formal education, the relationship with “ethical” and “political” education, its compulsory or optional nature, the misleading understanding of citizenship education as “patriotic” education, etc. Without being the magic solution for overcoming these difficulties, the findings of research and experiences from educational practice could significantly contribute to a better articulation of an integral and open educational policy, where active citizenship is not just an aim to be achieved but a daily exercise of all those involved.

The relevance, richness and importance of these lessons, coming from a cross-fertilisation of research and educational practice, encourage us to strengthen mutual recognition and communication between these – at times – isolated pillars of youth work.
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