

The effects of citizenship status on political participation in the case of young immigrants living in Germany

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The streams of international migration after the Second World War led to the establishment of numerous new immigrant groups in Western European countries. Thus, intergroup boundaries between “newcomers” and “natives” historically developed. Institutionalization (citizenship, religion, language, etc.) is a key issue in terms of intergroup boundaries between immigrants and host country community, since it, particularly citizenship, governs access to fundamental and political rights in the immigrant-receiving society (e.g. Alba, 2005). Citizenship regime of the host country affects the sense of memberships and the willingness to make claims among immigrants, as well (e.g. Alba, 2005; Koopmans and Statham, 2001).

Citizenship regime of Germany

In Germany, until recently (1990), the *Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz* (Nationality Act of the German Empire and State) of 1913 was the only legal basis for naturalization. The legislation was found to work very slow compared to other European countries (e.g. Soysal, 1994; Kostaryona, 2000). After the change in the Nationality Act in 1990, a new item was adopted in German citizenship law in 2000 which symbolically stopped the naturalization on the basis of blood kinship (*jus sanguinis*). The precondition for a German citizenship is an eight year residency of one of the parents or the holding of an unlimited residence permit since at least three years. Under the new law, children who fulfil the precondition acquire citizenship at birth (*jus soli*), but at the age 23, the youngster is expected to decide for one of their two nationalities. Thus, the new citizenship law permits the descendants of immigrants to acquire dual citizenship for at least a certain period of time which Kaya and Kentel (2005) call it as a limited ‘hyphenated’ citizenship.

The citizenship policies as well as other social and political rights which have been gradually given to immigrants show that holding the status of a “foreigner” or “immigrant” does not enhance and facilitate their economic, social and political lives (for immigration and its aftermath see for e.g. Portes, 1994) or well-beings (e.g. Branscombe, Schmitt and Harvey, 1999). When the economic programs first began, immigrants were conceived to be temporary, and their stay was defined by the constraints of economic cycles (Schönwälder, 2006); and guest workers were denied many of the basic civil rights such as family unification and freedom of assembly. The German Foreigner Law of 1965, for example, declared that foreigners enjoy all basic rights, except for the basic rights of freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of movement and free choice of occupation, place of work and place of education, and protection from extradition abroad (Soysal, 1994; for the historical

development of the legislation for foreigners in Germany see Weizsäcker, 2005). But the same law guaranteed the same labour market rights for EC nationals (Martin, 1998).

The extension of rights and the removal of the statutory obstacles for foreign workers to obtain an equal status have developed gradually. The first rights granted, early on, were trade-union and collective bargaining rights, and some social benefits (Abadan-Unat, 2002; Schönwälder, 2006; Soysal, 1994). Other economic and social rights followed, soon after guest workers had established themselves in the host countries. Still, foreigners experience exclusion as non-Germans. For example, apart from the foreigners' councilsⁱ, which has an advising character on the local level, foreigners in Germany today have no institutionalized channels of access to the political process (Koopmans and Statham, 2001).

Political participation

Political participationⁱⁱ is one of the most studied concepts in social and political sciences. Mainly, two approaches have dominated the literature. The first approach is sociological and has concentrated traditionally on structural-objective variables in its attempts to explain the determinants of political participation (e.g. Milbrath and Goel, 1982; Verba and Nie, 1972). The second approach is the psychological one which has recently focused on the topic regarding personal attitudinal variables (e.g. political efficacy, locus of control). Ulbig and Funk (1999) argue that in past research, social psychological factors have been largely ignored and mainly individual differences in political interest and beliefs of political efficacy have been studied. However, recently, social psychological theories focusing on the intergroup attitudes, emotions and behaviours in relation with different forms of political participation have been proposed (e.g. Klandermans, 1997; Kelly and Breinlinger, 1996).

In sociological literature, political participation has been conceptualized primarily as intent or effect of influencing governmental actions since Verba and his colleagues' first proposal (e.g. Verba and Nie, 1972). According to Brady's (1999) review, political actions have been differentiated as indirect (e.g. discussing politics and recruitment), electoral (i.e. voting, campaign activity, party membership or member of a political club), and non-electoral activities. The last one involved both conventional (e.g. informal community, contacting, organizational memberships, attending meetings or serving on boards) and unconventional actions (e.g. petitioning, lawful demonstration, boycotts, joining in wildcat strikes, refusing to pay rent or taxes, occupying buildings, blocking traffic, destroying property).

But, who takes these political actions? Social psychological analysis of social change implies that it is more likely for disadvantaged and low-status group members to take part in political actions in order to eradicate the disadvantages in favour of their own groups than advantaged or high-status group

members (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). According to *social identity theory* (SIT) by Tajfel and Turner, identification with disadvantaged or low-status groups is the crucial factor in responding to status differences and disadvantages. Tajfel (1978) states that people who define themselves and are also often defined by others as a group solve a problem (that they feel they have in common) collectively (see also Simon *et al.*, 1998).

SIT (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) postulates that individuals define themselves to a large extent in terms of their social group memberships and tend to seek a positive social identity. This social identity consists of those aspects of an individual's self-image that derive from the social categories to which the individual perceives him- or herself to belong and to the value and emotional significance ascribed to that membership. Thus, social identity is a self-definition in terms of group membership. Because people strive to maintain or enhance their positive self-concept, they are motivated to view their ingroup more favourably than outgroups. When the positive distinctiveness of one's own group is not salient or is not reflected in the existing basis of comparison, members who maintain identification with their group may seek alternative dimensions for comparison that favour the ingroup or may attempt to regain feelings of positive distinctiveness by more active means.

Since different social groups possess social values disproportionately in Germany, it is plausible to expect immigrant group members to take part in political actions in order to improve their situation. Put another way, deprivation of equality may lead to mobilize immigrants' own groups as well as general public (e.g. Simon and Klandermans, 2001) to provide better conditions to immigrant groups. However, because of the systemic obstacles such as political context, economic situation (e.g. unemployment rate), demographic issues (e.g. desired population level), immigration policy, and attitudes towards immigration (e.g. prejudice), immigrants may encounter many problems in acting to protect their own group interests. Diehl and Blohm (2001) indicate that institutional setting as well as limited socio-political resources in Germany act to demobilize political participation among immigrants rather than promote it.

Political opportunity structure (POS) researchers (e.g. Koopmans and Statham, 2001) argue that the opportunities and constraints set by national citizenship regimes and integration models influence the type of immigrants' claim-making regarding their situation in the country of settlement. One fundamental factor in terms of claims-making is whether immigrants have the right to vote (which largely depends on citizenship status). Other factors as the existence of equal opportunity and anti-discrimination legislation, state subvention and consultation of immigrant organizations, or the availability of cultural group rights in domains such as education and the media play crucial roles as well.

One of the mobilization opportunities for immigrants is the ethnic organizations and networks by immigrants which play an important role in the emergence and survival of new ethnic minorities in immigrant-receiving countries (Diehl and Blohm, 2001; Kemp *et al.*, 2000; Sanders, 2002). Through facilitating the maintenance of social boundaries and ethnic identities they can provoke interest either in homeland or in host country politics. According to Kemp *et al.* (2000), the literature underscores three main functions of ethnic associations: the adjustment of immigrants into the host society; the reaffirmation or the transformation of immigrants' ethnicity in the new environment; and the mediation between immigrants and the home community in the sending countries.

Besides, the heterogeneity of immigrants not only in terms of populationⁱⁱⁱ but rather in terms of living conditions and socio-political rights can undermine their united political participation. As non-EU citizens, Turks have experienced several limits about migration, stay and working conditions, whereas Italians and Greeks (since the Greece's entrance in EU in 1981) have not much faced with such difficulties as EU country citizens (Hinrichs, 2003). Differential inequalities between immigrants who migrated from Turkey and who migrated from EU countries reflect on other dimensions, as well. If one compares different nationalities in terms of unemployment rate, for example, it is the highest among Turkish labourers—about 21% in 2001 whereas it is about 15% for Italians and Greeks (Hinrichs, 2003). Moreover, the cultural distance or misfit of Turkish immigrants compared to others who come from EU territory has been attenuated (e.g. White, 1997). And, segregation and disintegration of Turks has been one of the major debates as well as the main focus of the scientific research (e.g. Abadan-Unat, 2002; Auernheimer, 1988; Schönwälder, 2006).

Evidence on political participation of immigrants in Germany and research questions

In Germany, a significant body of research has been conducted about immigration and immigrants in all social science fields since 1960s. Yet, the major focus of these multi disciplinary attempts has been either socio-psychological or political integration of immigrants. Socio-psychological integration has been mainly studied in respect to identities (e.g. Auernheimer, 1988; Akgün, 1993; Glatzer, 2004) and/or acculturation attitudes (e.g. Bierbrauer and Pedersen, 1994; Nauck, 2001; Phalet and Schönpflug, 2001; Piontkowski *et al.*, 2000). Political participation of young immigrants (Diehl and Blohm, 2001; Glatzer, 2004; Weidacher, 2000) have been conceptualized as political integration, however, relatively few studies have been conducted about the political participation of immigrants in general.

For example, Glatzer (2004) compared Turkish, Italian, and German youths (N = 1200) in terms of political participation. The researcher illustrated that signing a petition is the most frequent action (44%) that all respondents (Germans are included) participate in, and political demonstration takes the second place (32%). Forty percent of the respondents, however, indicated that they did not participate

in any actions listed to them. In addition, fifty-five percent of the immigrants identify with both countries and almost equally with country of origin and with Germany which researchers called ambivalent identification^{iv}. Another study investigated the political participation of Italian, Greek, and Turkish young adults (Weidacher, 2000) that of the survey data was re-analyzed in the present paper with a social psychological perspective.

Consequently, political participation of immigrants has been investigated in sociology and political science, but yet, to our knowledge, any social psychological research^v on this topic has been conducted in relation to ingroup identification and citizenship status. Thus, the aim of this paper is to examine the social psychological underlying factors of political participation by immigrants. Specifically, following questions guided this research: How does the citizenship status of immigrants in Germany affect their political participation? Do immigrants identify with their country of origin or with Germans? What is the role of this in-group identification on their participation in political actions?

Study 1

In the first study, three immigrant groups were included in order to investigate the group differences in terms of political participation. To do that the survey (*Ausländersurvey97*) by German Youth Institute (Weidacher, 2000) was re-analyzed. In the survey, on the one hand, respondents were asked to indicate their residence status including the German citizenship (either already have or applied to have) in the same item. On the other hand, the interest of the respondents in the naturalization to Germans was asked in another item. Therefore, the hypotheses regarding the data were reformulated. The specific hypotheses to be tested in the first study were formulated as the following:

Hypothesis 1: There is a variation among immigrant groups in terms of political participation: Turkish immigrants participate significantly more than Greeks and Italians.

Hypothesis 2: The participation level is affected by the citizenship status of the immigrants: Immigrants with German citizenship status participate more in political actions than limited residence holders.

Hypothesis 3: And among immigrants who want to have German citizenship (interest in naturalization to Germans), the participation rate is higher compared to others who do not want to have it.

Hypothesis 4: Identification with country of origin and interest in naturalization to Germans interact on political participation of Turkish immigrants, but this effect is not significant for Greek and Italian immigrants. Put another way, Turkish immigrants who strongly identify with their country of origin participate in political actions more when they have an interest in naturalization to Germans; however, such interaction effect is not significant for Greeks and Italians

Method

Participants

Altogether 2504 interviews with young adults (age from 18 to 25) were evaluated by German Youth Institute: 848 Italians (men = 425; women = 423), 826 Greeks (men = 429; women = 397), and 830 Turks (men = 422; women = 408). In terms of educational level, all three samples slightly differed. As regards to primary school education, Turkish sample had the highest percentage (48.7%) compared to Italians (40.7%) and Greeks (37%), but on the contrary, they showed the lowest percentage (18.7%) in terms of secondary school education compared to Italians (25.6%) and Greeks (26.2%). Almost same amount (60%) of Italians and Greeks were employed, whereas this figure was 49% for Turks.

Less than the half of each immigrant sample (41.9% of Italians, 40% of Greeks, and 38.1% of Turks) never lived in their country of origin. Only very little portion of each national group (7%) have lived until the age of 26 before their migration. Less than the half of the respondents had unlimited residence permission (41.4% of Italians, 40.1% of Greeks, and 45.7% of Turks), whereas some held the status of residence right (33.8% of Italians, 37% of Greeks, 26.7% of Turks). And, almost ten percent of the respondents applied for German citizenship (8.5% of Italians, 9.1% of Greeks, and 10.2% of Turks). Limited residence holders across the groups slightly differed as well (8.7% of Italians, 9.8% of Greeks, and 14.7% of Turks).

Measures

The identical questionnaires for three immigrant groups (Italians, Greeks, and Turks) were applied. The questionnaires^{vi} for each group were sex specific formulated and were submitted to the respondents both in German and in the respective national language. Since any validity and reliability tests for the scales were reported in *Ausländersurvey97* (Mittag and Weidacher, 2000) these were tested.

Political participation was assessed with 15 items via dichotomous scales (yes/no type). Items were listed as writing a letter to a politician, participation in a public discussion, working in a political office or in a committee, writing a letter to the media, entrance in a party, participation in a citizen initiative, working in a political group, donating money to a group, signing a petition, participation in a legal or in an illegal demonstration, participation in a trade union strike or other strike, and boycotting. Explanatory factor analysis (EFA) showed a multi-factorial structure (Eigenvalues: 3.24, 1.52, 1.27, 1.11, 1.01, .88, etc.), however, the first factor explains 21.60% of the total variance, but other factors do not contribute much to the explained total variance (10.17%, 8.50%, 7.43, 6.72, etc.). Therefore, one-factorial model was adopted. Cronbach's Alpha was .73 for fifteen items.

Two items of *Ausländersurvey97* were re-operationalized as identification with country of origin on the basis of findings which show that *feeling at home* is a component of identity construal (Hopkins, Reicher and Harrison, 2006; Reicher, Hopkins and Harrison, 2006), and that immigrants are rather perceived as Germans or even as *Germaners* or as *German-like* by the home country people (e.g. Kaya and Kentel, 2005; White, 1997). *Feeling at home* was assessed via the item: When people live in Germany for a long time and then visit to ... [country of origin], some can experience a difference. How is it like with you? Do you feel at home immediately, quiet fast, after some days, or after a long time? Or do you feel always foreign? The scale ranged from 1 (I feel immediately at home) to 6 (I don't travel to...). The second item was used to assess whether the respondents perceive that they are perceived as Germans by the home country people: When you stay in ... [country of origin] for some time, for example on vacation, the people there would very often, often, sometimes, rarely, or never consider you as German? The scale ranged from 1 (never) to 6 (I don't travel to...).

Results

The differences between immigrant groups were tested in terms of political participation (first hypothesis). The result evidenced significant difference among groups: Turkish immigrants' political participation illustrated the lowest mean value ($M = 2.09$, $sd = 1.72$, $n = 825$). The mean value for political participation of Italian immigrants was higher ($M = 2.15$, $sd = 1.67$, $n = 845$) than Turks, although the difference between these groups were not significant. The highest mean value was obtained for Greek immigrants ($M = 2.48$, $sd = 1.93$, $n = 822$); and the differences between Greeks and Turks, as well as between Greeks and Italians were significant. Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations.

Table 1. Mean comparisons in terms of political participation.

	N	Mean	Standard Deviation
<i>Nationality^a</i>			
Italians	845	2.1538	1.6722
Greeks	822	2.4805	1.9360
Turks	825	2.0921	1.7247
<i>Residence type^b</i>			
Limited residence holders	276	2.2283	1.8864
German citizens/applicants	232	3.0216	2.4485
<i>Interest in naturalization to Germans^c</i>			
Never want to have	235	2.2468	2.0061
Probably not	625	2.1056	1.6118
Probably	905	2.0751	1.5794
Always want to have	494	2.3522	1.7861
German citizens/applicants	233	3.0086	2.4477

Note: Table shows the results of one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA).

^a The difference is significant according to F value ($F(2, 2491) = 11.34$, $p = .000$).

^b F value is significant, $F(1, 507) = 16.98, p = .000$.

^c The difference is significant ($F(4, 2491) = 14.36, p = .000$).

The second hypothesis assumed a difference between limited residence holders and immigrants who already have or applied for German citizenship status. Because of unequal distribution in terms of residence type, which could distort the results, only the means of two of these groups were compared. The comparisons revealed that limited resident holders in Germany ($M = 2.23, sd = 1.88, n = 276$) participate significantly less than German citizens/applicants ($M = 3.02, sd = 2.45, n = 232$). The effect of interest in naturalization to Germans on political participation was tested as well. Immigrants who always want to have a German citizenship participate more ($M = 2.35, sd = 1.79, n = 494$) than others, but the highest rate of political participation was among German citizens/applicants ($M = 3.01, sd = 2.45, n = 233$). For means and standard deviations see Table 1.

Finally, the interaction between nationality, identification with country of origin and interest in naturalization was tested. Identification scale was differentiated as low versus high identification categories by using mean split. Interest in naturalization variable was recomputed as yes/no type that immigrants who want to naturalize was coded as 1 and who do not want to as 2, and German citizens were excluded. Thus, three-way interaction could be analyzed. According to the results, no three-way interaction between the variables was significant (see the note under Table 2); therefore, our fourth hypothesis was not verified.

However, two-way interaction between nationality and identification was found to be significant ($F(2, 2162) = 4.38, p = .013$). These interactions were qualified with the direct effects of nationality ($F(2, 2162) = 10.25, p = .000$) and identification ($F(2, 2162) = 5.65, p = .018$). According to the mean comparisons, Italian ($M = 2.07, sd = 1.67, n = 417$) and Turkish ($M = 1.80, sd = 1.45, n = 383$) immigrants who identify weakly with their country of origin participate less in political actions in Germany than who identifies strongly (for Italians, $M = 2.24, sd = 1.65, n = 332$; for Turks, $M = 2.23, sd = 1.73, n = 325$). However, for Greeks low identification with country of origin ($M = 2.42, sd = 1.78, n = 393$) lessens political participation compared to high identification ($M = 2.35, sd = 1.75, n = 312$). The results are presented below, in Table 2.

Table 2. Means of political participation regarding identification and nationality.

Identification with country of origin	Nationality	N	Mean	Standard Deviation
Low	Italians	417	2.0695	1.6720
	Greeks	393	2.4249	1.7829
	Turks	383	1.7990	1.4467
High	Italians	332	2.2380	1.6473
	Greeks	312	2.3558	1.7547
	Turks	325	2.2277	1.7277

Note: A 3 (nationality: Greeks, Italians, Turks) x 2 (identification: low vs. high) x 2 (interest: never vs. always) ANOVA was calculated. For three-way interaction F value was not significant ($F(2, 2162) = .30, p = .739$).

Discussion

The results of the first study verified our first hypothesis about the variation among immigrant groups in terms of political participation, but did not verify our assumption that Turks participate more than other groups; rather the least participation rate was among them. Put straightforward, it was found that Turks participate significantly less than Greeks. This is contrary to the general assumption that deprivation of equality may lead to mobilize immigrants' own groups as well as general public (e.g. Simon and Klandermans, 2001). Similarly, it does not confirm the assumption of SIT (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) which argues that disadvantaged and low-status group members are more likely to take part in political actions in order to eradicate the disadvantages in favour of their own group. This lack of confirmation, however, maybe due to the lack of research design, that is, the aim of the political actions is not controlled for. Therefore, it cannot be argued that even though these political actions target the eradication of the disadvantages in favour of immigrant groups, the participation level of Turks (the most disadvantaged group among others as having the non-EU country of origin) is low.

Nevertheless, one possible explanation for the lower level of participation among Turks can be the difference in social and political rights and opportunities (e.g. Koopmans and Statham, 2001). That is, being immigrants from non-EU countries might undermine their political participation compared to Greeks and Italians who are immigrants from EU countries. In addition, it was found that limited residence holders participate less in political actions than German citizens/applicants in line with the findings of POS researchers. And among immigrants who want to have German citizenship, the participation rate is higher.

In terms of identification with country of origin, it was found that the stronger Italian and Turkish immigrants identify with their country of origin the more they participate in political actions. Namely, identification with country of origin increases political participation level of Italian and Turkish immigrants. On the contrary, when Greeks identify with their country of origin, they participate in political actions to a lesser extent. Put another way, identification with country of origin decrease political participation among Greeks. Then, the question of the meanings of identification, which are not controlled for in the study, comes to the fore. In other words, the meaning of identification with country of origin may vary across immigrant groups as well as within a certain immigrant group: it may have either negative or positive connotations and/or contents.

Moreover, the effect of interest in naturalization did not provide a significant moderation effect in the first study. For that reason, instead of measuring the respondents' interest in naturalization the real citizenship status of the respondents' held at point of time of the data collection was assessed.

Study 2

In the second study, only Turkish immigrants living in Germany were included to extend the first explorative findings. In this study, only respondents who have citizenship status either from Germany or from Turkey were included. Respondents' identification with country of origin was obtained with other items than used in the first study. In addition, identification with Germans was measured. Subsequently, the specific hypotheses of the present study were formulated as the following:

Hypothesis 1: Whereas respondents' identification with country of origin significantly predicts political participation, identification with Germans does not.

Hypothesis 2: The effect of identification with country of origin on the political participation is moderated by the effect of citizenship status. That is, immigrants who identify strongly with their country of origin participate more in political actions when they have German than Turkish citizenship status.

Method

Participants

This study used a sample of 193 male (n = 101) and female (n = 92) respondents from Turkey living in Germany with the age range from 18 to 28. Educational level of the respondents varied from secondary school degree (34.2%) to university degree (8.3%). Altogether, 48.3% of the participants held a high school degree which meant a relatively high education level compared to Turkish immigrant population living in Germany. Regarding income, our sample showed the heterogeneity that represented Turkish immigrant population in Germany. Respondents held either German citizenship (51.3%) or Turkish citizenship (46.1%), however, five respondents did not indicate their citizenship status. Furthermore, only 52.8% of the respondents reported an ethnic origin either as Turkish or Kurdish, but about a half did not report any ethnicity. Concerning religion, Sunni (47.7%) and Alevi (36.3%) people^{vii} as well as Atheists and people who have other religious backgrounds were included.

Measures

Political participation was assessed by asking the respondents whether they took part in listed actions last two years, on scales ranging from 1 (never) to 6 (very often). Items involved, for e.g. spending time working for a political campaign, attending meetings or workshops, signing a petition, participation in an illegal or a legal demonstration, contacting media or members of the parliament.

EFA showed a one-factor model (Eigenvalues: 4.62, 1.01, .74, etc.) with 62.49% explained total variance. The measure was reliable ($\alpha = .88$).

The identification was assessed by asking respondents whether they identify with their country of origin and with Germans via three identical items. For example, whereas item “Belonging to my country of origin is very important to me” was used for identification with country of origin, “Belonging to Germans is very important to me” was used to assess identification with Germans. Respondents replied on six-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Factor loadings of the items on the relevant factor were quite satisfactory according to the EFA results: .87, .81, and .76 for identification with country of origin; .87, .70, and .45 for identification with Germans. Both measures were reliable ($\alpha = .85$ for identification with country of origin, and $\alpha = .70$ for identification with Germans). The inter-correlation between two factors was not significant.

Results

Two identification measures were included in the regression analysis to test the first hypothesis. As a result, political participation was significantly predicted by identification with country of origin ($\beta = -.18$, $t(190) = -2.48$, $p = .014$), but not by identification with Germans ($\beta = -.08$, $t(190) = -1.18$, $p = .240$; $F(2, 192) = 3.62$, $p = .029$). Contrary to the findings of Study 1, the less Turkish immigrants identify with their country of origin the more they participate in political actions.

However, when citizenship status was included in the two-way ANOVA, it was found that Turkish immigrants who identify weakly with their country of origin participate in political actions more when they hold Turkish citizenship ($M = 2.41$, $sd = 1.28$, $n = 38$) than German citizenship ($M = 1.92$, $sd = .79$, $n = 42$) as can be seen from Table 3. Conversely, Turkish immigrants who strongly identify with their country of origin participate in political actions less when they hold Turkish citizenship ($M = 1.78$, $sd = .86$, $n = 51$) than German citizenship ($M = 2.00$, $sd = 1.11$, $n = 57$).

In sum, citizenship status of the respondents moderates the effect of identification with country of origin: Whereas strong identifiers with country of origin participate more in political actions when they have German citizenship, they participate less when they hold Turkish citizenship. It is vice versa for weak identifiers: Turkish citizens participate more in political actions than German citizens.

Table 3. Interaction between identification with country of origin and citizenship status.

Identification with country of origin	Citizenship status	N	Mean	Standard Deviation
Low	German	42	1.9206	.7945
	Turkish	38	2.4143	1.2837
High	German	57	2.0042	1.1156
	Turkish	51	1.7841	.8621

Note: Table illustrates the results of 2 (identification: low vs. high) x 2 (citizenship status: German vs. Turkish) ANOVA. F value is significant for the interaction ($F(1, 188) = 5.54, p = .020$).

Discussion

In the second study, identifications with country of origin and with Germans were assessed for immigrants from Turkey living in Germany. And as assumed, only identification with country of origin significantly predicted political participation, although the relation was negative. This finding is in line with the assumption of SIT (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) which argues that rather than identification with high-status group (Germans) identification with low-status group predicts social change attempts. But, contrary to SIT, identification with country of origin did not trigger political participation in our sample.

However, the result of the second hypothesis indicates more complex relations between identification with country of origin and citizenship status. That is, when citizenship status is controlled for, it is seen that weak identification with country of origin results with lower level of participation among German citizens whereas it leads to higher level of participation for Turkish citizens. And political participation is the highest among the latter group (weakly identified Turkish citizens, $M = 2.41, sd = 1.28$) compared to other three groups. Second higher participation level is obtained for highly identified German citizens ($M = 2.00, sd = 1.11$). This finding is interesting since among immigrants who are, to some extent, excluded from the mainstream political process of the settlement country (as Turkish citizens), weak identification rather than strong identification with country of origin leads to higher level of political participation. One possible reason might be the meaning of this membership (country of origin).

According to SIT, the value and emotional significance ascribed to the membership is important for the positive self-concept of the individuals. This implies that the meanings attributed to membership of country of origin may vary among Turkish citizens. It is reasonable, when the different ethnicities (Turks, Kurds, etc.) and religious backgrounds (Sunni or Alevi) among immigrants who participated in the study is considered. It is probable to argue that the attitudes toward the country of origin may be diverse, and even may be negative among some of the immigrants from Turkey living in Germany. Regarding this point, the reasons that caused our respondents' to migrate from Turkey may also play an important role on the identification with country of origin: voluntarily or involuntarily migration

(particularly for Kurds or Alevis or left-wing activists due to political pressure). That is, this might be an intervening factor which is not controlled for in the analysis.

Nevertheless, concurring with POS, it can be argued that the citizenship of the settlement country increases immigrants' political participation when they strongly identify with their country of origin. These results also concur, to some extent, with the studies which show that it is often the more advantaged members of disadvantaged groups (German citizens in the present work) who engage in collective political actions, but not the most disadvantaged (Gurin and Epps, 1975; Klandermans and Simon, 2001; Vanneman and Pettigrew, 1972), since the advantaged members of disadvantaged groups are the most likely to make subjective social comparisons with members of more advantaged groups (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994).

Conclusions

In this paper, the effects of citizenship status and identification with country of origin on political participation of immigrants were examined. Main motivation behind this conduct was to examine whether those variables trigger or undermine the political participation of immigrants. In general, our results confirm the importance of citizenship status as well as of identification not only with country of origin. In particular, our first study showed that immigrants' participation in political actions varies among diverse immigrant groups (in the present research Turks participated less than Greeks, and Italians); and it is more likely for immigrants to participate in political actions when they are German citizens or when they are interested in naturalization to Germans. These findings imply that legal opportunities such as citizenship status that is provided to the immigrants within the settlement country trigger the participation level of immigrants. Based on POS' postulates, it can be concluded that the lower participation level among Turkish immigrants might be due to disparity between the socio-political rights granted to immigrants from non-EU countries and immigrants from EU countries (Greek and Italian immigrants).

Regarding identification with country of origin, the findings of Study 1 evidenced that for young Italian and Turkish immigrants strong identification leads to higher level of participation. In the same way, the findings of second study suggest that immigrants' (Turks) naturalization to German citizenship may not heighten the level of participation by itself, but when they also identify with their country of origin (interaction effect). This is contrary to the political discourses which argue against ethnic background identification as an undermining factor for political participation or integration of immigrants. But this also implies that the opportunities that are provided to immigrants are not sufficient to enhance the participation in political actions, it is also essential that immigrants identify with a social group/category. In the second study, it was showed that this group/category can be the country of origin. The reason might be that identification with country of origin makes the group

membership (for e.g. Turks) salient^{viii} to the immigrants in the society of settlement. Still, if the enhanced participation among non-German citizens (Turkish citizenship) who are weakly identified with their country of origin is considered, it seems crucial to assess also the meanings of this membership, which is missing in the present work. As a result, however, it can be concluded that both the assumptions of POS and SIT are verified in our research in a complementary way.

Nevertheless, it should be noted here that the results of the present research are neither comprehensive for all immigrant groups nor for all generations. The differences between immigrant groups and generations are needed to be explored in further research. Besides, it is not likely for us to make causal inferences because of our research design (cross-sectional). More appropriate research designs (longitudinal) are required for such causality explanations.

Finally, it is to be noticed that an individual immigrant's decision for migration can only operate within the constraints of the opportunities like employment and housing prospects, transport costs, international law, immigration policies and the need for documents like passports, visas and work certificates (Castles, 1985; Cohen, 1987; Sassen, 2000). And as it was noted earlier, holding the status of "foreigner" or "immigrant" does not enhance and facilitate immigrants' economic, social and political lives as well as well-beings. For example, yet immigrants have no institutionalized channels of access to the political process (Koopmans and Statham, 2001).

Nonetheless, even without formal citizenship status, immigrants incorporate in various organizations, although the organizational life is fragmented not only by nationality (Greeks, Italians, Turks, Kurds, Yugoslavians, etc.)^{ix} but also by political stances (e.g. left-wingers, nationalists, religious fundamentalists), which undermines the united political participation. Besides, the high level of organizational activity among immigrants has not a centralized and representative character: Most of the organizations are very locally grounded, they are even not nationwide, and are not internationally organized. But since the last decade immigrant groups have started to focus on their life conditions in Europe and the organizations established since then reflect this orientation (e.g. Abadan-Unat 2002). This recent development might lead immigrant groups to act together to improve the socio-political conditions for all immigrants living in the host European countries.

Endnotes

ⁱ Based on the new *Law of Immigration and Integration* former *Ausländerbeirats* have been transformed into *Integration Councils* since January 2005.

ⁱⁱ Political participation and participation in political actions are used synonymously in the present paper.

ⁱⁱⁱ By far, the largest first-generation immigrant groups are Turks, followed by Yugoslavians and immigrants from the other European countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain). For the second generation this ranking changes somewhat, but still Turks are the largest. Today, after Turks, Italians constitute the second largest immigrant group living in Germany (Hinrichs, 2003).

^{iv} Some other scholars refer to it as dual rather than ambivalent identification by arguing that a person can simultaneously identify with both social groups which can be a positive attribute (e.g. Simon, 2004).

^v The social psychology of migration has a focus on the intersection of objective (immigration policy of the governments, the laws, unemployment rate in the receiving country, etc.) and subjective (prejudice, racial or discriminatory attitudes of the individuals in the receiving country) processes (see Pettigrew, 1996). That is, perceptions, attitudes and behaviours of immigrant individuals are assumed to be products of the interaction between macro- and micro-level factors which are constructed particularly through the daily life interactions and experiences.

^{vi} The questionnaires, the codebook and the file structure are online available at <<http://213.133.108.158/surveys/index.php?m=msw,0&sID=7>>.

^{vii} These are two big confessions of Islam in Turkey.

^{viii} For the salience of group memberships or identities see Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell, 1987.

^{ix} Horizontal hostility and nationalist sentiments among immigrant groups have been apparent.